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[Page i]Spring/Summer 1988

World Order

The Human Rights of the Iranian Bahá’ís: A Congressional Hearing Congressman Gus Yatron Congressman John Porter Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter Robert C. Henderson Firuz Kazemzadeh

The Senate Debate The House Debate

A Concurrent Resolution

Prejudice and Discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran Leland W. Robinson [Page ii]

World Order

VOLUME 22, NUMBERS 3 & 4 • PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

WORLD ORDER IS INTENDED TO STIMULATE, INSPIRE, AND SERVE THINKING PEOPLE IN THEIR SEARCH TO FIND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY LIFE AND CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND PHILOSOPHY

Editorial Board: FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH BETTY J. FISHER HOWARD GAREY ROBERT H. STOCKMAN JAMES D. STOKES

Consultant in Poetry: HERBERT WOODWARD MARTIN

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WORLD ORDER is published quarterly by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, 415 Linden Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD ORDER, 536 Sheridan Road, Wilmette, IL 60091. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the publisher, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, or of the Editorial Board. Manuscripts can be typewritten or computer generated. They should be double spaced throughout, with the footnotes at the end. The contributor should send three copies—an original and two legible copies—and should keep a copy. Return postage should be included. Send manuscripts and other editorial correspondence to WORLD ORDER, 415 Linden Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091.

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Copyright © 1991, National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States. All Rights Reserved. Printed in the U.S.A. ISSN 0043-8804

IN THIS ISSUE

1	Human Rights in a World Community Editorial
3	About This Issue
4	Opening Statement by Congressman Gus Yatron
6	Restoring Human Rights statement of Congressman John Porter
8	Human Rights in Iran testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter
11	Two Bahá’í Families testimony of Robert C. Henderson
14	The Continued Persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran testimony of Firuz Kazemzadeh
18	Senate Debate: Eliminating Religious Intolerance
21	House Debate: Speaking Out for People of All Faiths
26	Senate Concurrent Resolution 120
27	News Item poem by Carmen M. Pursifull
29	Prejudice and Discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran by Leland W. Robinson
51	Leap, My Soul, in Grateful Joy! poem by Phyllis K. Peterson
52	Authors & Artists

[Page 1]

EDITORIAL

HE NOTION of human rights is modern. Until the seventeenth century it was generally believed that rights belonged to groups, classes, ury tates. The aristocracy, the clergy, the burghers, even the serfs, had rights derived from their status in society, but no one imagined that an individual could claim rights by virtue of membership in humanity.

Over the last two centuries human rights ceased to be an abstraction. The American and French revolutions turned them into fighting issues in the streets. With the spread of democracy it became obligatory for political leaders to pay tribute to human rights even when such rights were persistently violated. The Constitution of the United States, until amended through the suffering of a civil war, itself provided an instructive example, proclaiming human rights and endorsing slavery at the same time.

Today one would search in vain for a regime, no matter how despotic and arbitrary, that would openly profess disregard of human rights. Yet virtually every state claims, to a greater or lesser extent, that human rights are an internal affair of little significance to the world community. The doctrine of national sovereignty, perhaps the most potent political principle of our time, is used as a shield to protect the national state from "the decent opinion of mankind."

National sovereignty is the line behind which a state feels free to conduct itself as it pleases. No interference in "the internal affairs" of a state is tolerated, and the human rights of its citizens are supposed to be of no moment to outsiders. But the doctrine of unlimited national sovereignty has not survived the two world wars intact. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations have produced a body of international law that limits the freedom of the state in its treatment of its own population. United Nations conventions and treaties that deal with the crime of genocide, with torture, with the rights of women and children, have further internationalized the issue of human rights.

The struggle has not ended. All over the world individuals and groups are daily denied their most basic rights. Yet it is no longer possible to claim that the defense of the rights of the people of a country concerns only that country. A world community has already come into existence, mankind are its citizens, and the defense of their rights is the right and the duty of the world. [Page 3]

About This Issue

THREE TIMES during the last six years—once in 1982 and twice in 1984—WORLD ORDER has published testimony concerning the persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran. Now we are once again publishing testimony and other documents relating to the deprivation of the human rights of the Iranian Bahá’ís: testimony on June 29, 1988, before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives; the introduction of a concurrent resolution on the floor of the U.S. Senate on May 23, 1988; the debate on the resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives on August 8, 1988; and the text of the concurrent resolution passed by both houses of Congress. The complete transcription of the June 29 hearings, together with the prepared statements, questions and answers, and exhibits accompanying the testimony of the Bahá’ís is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office in a booklet entitled Religious Persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran, 1988.

The nature of the persecution of the Iranian Bahá’ís has changed since WORLD ORDER chronicled the more than one hundred years of the Bahá’ís’ treatment in Iran in an editorial in its Winter 1978-79 issue shortly after the start of the Islamic Revolution. The number of executions has dropped, and the number of Bahá’ís in Iranian prisons has decreased. Yet the Bahá’ís as a community have not been given their human rights, they are not recognized as a religious community, their properties remain confiscated, and they are denied the opportunity to exercise Bahá’í acts of worship.

In 1987 the U.S. State Department, in considering the continued persecution of the Bahá’ís, noted that “It is the sense of the Congress that the Government of Iran has systematically discriminated against the Bahá’í community, including the arbitrary detention, torture, and killing of Bahá’ís, the seizure of Bahá’í property, and the outlawing of the Bahá’í faith” and that “Iran’s gross violations of the human rights of the Bahá’í community are in direct contravention of the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.” The State Department further noted that “It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall take all necessary steps to focus international attention on the plight of the Bahá’í community and to bring pressure to bear on the Government of Iran to cease its insidious policy of persecution.”

The 1988 testimony and debate included in this issue is yet another voice added to the worldwide protestations of the persecutions of the Bahá’ís in Iran. “It is time again,” Senator Christopher Dodd observed when introducing the concurrent resolution on the Senate floor, “to call the attention of the Government of Iran to the international norms of civilized behavior.” The passage of the resolution by the U.S. Congress would be, in the senator’s words, “a small step in trying to restrain and eliminate religious intolerance from this world”—a prejudice that not only brings untold suffering to countless numbers of individuals and jeopardizes an entire religious community but also remains a barrier to peace.

THE EDITORS [Page 4]

"Religious Persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran, 1988"

June 29, 1988

HE SUBCOMMITTEE on Human Rights and International Organizations has the Bahá’ís in Iran. Unfortunately, the grievous human rights situation in Iran warrants yet another public airing.

Our concern continues for our appeals on behalf of Iranian Bahá’ís have gone unheeded and our questions unanswered. Since past congressional inquiries regarding the Bahá’ís have been met by Iranian authorities with silence, I hope today we can work toward shattering the silent slaughter of innocent victims in Iran.

Once again, we appeal to the Government of Iran to stop torturing, imprisoning, and killing the Bahá’ís.

In 1979, we saw the Shah deposed and the emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Ayatollah, though a religious figure, did not bring to his office religious and political tolerance; he instead implemented vicious fanaticism as the law of the land. Iranians began to die by the thousands, either in the war with their neighbor, Iraq, or in political and religious persecutions and executions which became almost a daily occurrence.

According to the Special Representative of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, there were more than 7,000 executions in Iran between 1979 and 1985. This figure excludes those countless secret executions not announced by the authorities. Many Iranians whose lives and liberty were threatened, fled. Those who remained were tortured or incarcerated, or at the very least, robbed of their basic freedoms.

Losing their lives is not the only problem now facing Bahá’ís in Iran. Even though they represent the largest religious minority in that Middle Eastern country, their religion is not recognized and their places of worship are destroyed. Their marriages are not sanctioned, and their children are denied the opportunity to attend universities. There is nowhere for them to go for justice, for every vestige of due process has been eliminated.

The Bahá’ís are a gentle and peace-loving people who espouse equality and education. Those of us who know them wonder why the Bahá’ís, who teach [Page 5]about the eradication of prejudices, have been so prejudiced against, and why their prosecutions and persecutions continue in Iran.

We must take action once again to let the world know the Iranian Bahá’ís are not forgotten. They are alive in the minds and hearts of all of us. Their faith has become an inspiration to us, and has illuminated a very dark period in Iran's history. [Page 6]

STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN JOHN PORTER BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 29, 1988

TR. CHAIRMAN, thank you for allowing M me to testify today. I commend this Subcommittee for holding this hearing, and for scheduling such expert witnesses as Ambassador Schifter, Firuz Kazemzadeh and Robert Henderson. I look forward to hearing the testimony from these individuals who continually support religious freedom for Bahá’ís around the world.

There has been some progress made in the Iranian government's treatment of Bahá’ís since I last appeared before this Subcommittee on May 2, 1984. Five Iranian Bahá’ís were executed in 1987, compared to more than 100 in 1983. Persecution of the Bahá’í religious minority, however, continues, and Congress must focus attention on this issue until full human rights for Bahá’ís are granted.

The Bahá’í Faith, originating in the mid-nineteenth century, is Iran's largest religious minority. Although its followers are non-violent advocates of universal peace and unity of mankind, members of the Muslim Shi'ite clergy have focused hostility on the Bahá’í community since its inception over 140 years ago.

Not surprisingly, the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime institutionalized this hostility into governmental policy. Since 1979, nearly 200 Bahá’ís have been executed, thousands have been imprisoned and forced to endure ruthless torture, and many have been sentenced to death, solely for their religious affiliation.

Bahá’í persecution has unfortunately spread to other Muslim nations, including Egypt. In May 1987, 48 Egyptian Bahá’ís were sentenced to three-year prison terms for allegedly violating an Egyptian law banning Bahá’í religious activities. Although I am pleased that thirteen of the Bahá’ís were acquitted by the Egyptian Court of Appeals in Cairo on February 17, 1988, and the remaining 32 were acquitted on June 13th, I remain concerned about the message this incident sent to other countries in the Islamic world where hundreds of thousands of Bahá’ís reside.

On June 2, I introduced H. Con. Res. 310 along with my co-chair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, Tom Lantos. I am pleased to report that over 100 members of the House have cosponsored this resolution, including the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Broomfield; the ranking member of the Human Rights and International Organizations Subcommittee, Mr. Solomon; and Chairman Hamilton and ranking member, Mr. Gilman, of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee. In addition, a similar resolution was introduced in the Senate by Senators Chris Dodd and John Heinz, and currently has 38 cosponsors.

While H. Con. Res. 310 acknowledges positive developments, such as the decline in executions and the release of many Bahá’ís from prison, it also expresses concern for the pervasive economic and social pressures which continue to threaten the survival of the Bahá’í religious community in Iran.

The purpose of this resolution is two-fold: (1) It holds the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including the Bahá’ís, in a manner consistent with that Government's obliga- [Page 7]

RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS

tions under international agreements guaranteeing the civil and political rights of its citizens;

(2) It calls upon the President of the United States to cooperate with other governments and with the United Nations to promote the protection of the religious rights of the Bahá’ís.

It is important to recognize the extensive support this Administration has given to the Bahá’ís. In view of the Khomeini regime's human rights record, one of the worst in the world, the Administration has given special consideration in both our refugee and asylum programs to the vulnerabilities of Bahá’ís and other religious minorities.

The President has personally condemned the tragic persecution of Iranian Bahá’ís. Ambassador Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, helped to bring international attention to this issue during his term as head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and again in his position in the Executive Branch.

I believe that this support, combined with the efforts of Congress and other international bodies, helps bring the necessary pressure to bear on Iranian authorities. Members of Congress have often voiced expressions of concern for the Bahá’ís, including the passage of resolutions in 1982 and 1984 on behalf of the Iranian Bahá’í community.

Furthermore, in 1985 over 100 bipartisan Members sent an appeal to the U.N. Human Rights Commission supporting religious freedom for Bahá’ís persecuted by the Iranian government. Congress recently included language in the State Department Authorization Bill (H.R. 1777) urging the President to take all necessary steps to focus international attention on the plight of the Bahá’í community.

The recent developments in Iran and in Egypt demonstrate the importance of our statements. I hope the Subcommittee will mark-up my resolution soon, so that it can be considered during the 100th Congress by the full House of Representatives.

Congress must speak out, as we are doing today, until human rights are restored to the Bahá’í community worldwide. [Page 8]

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD SCHIFTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 29, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on human rights conditions in Iran with particular reference to the situation facing the Bahá’ís.

Iran is one of the countries which the United Nations Human Rights Commission has selected for special scrutiny by calling for the appointment of a special rapporteur, whose task it is to review human rights conditions there and file reports thereon with the Commission and with the United Nations General Assembly. Iran has fought against these efforts to examine its human rights performance and has threatened those member countries of the United Nations which voted for the investigations with economic reprisals.

At one time, this effort was almost successful. In early 1987, a motion to derail the United Nations investigation lost narrowly, by an evenly divided vote. But the review of Iranian human rights conditions has continued and has been increasingly valuable in shedding light on the deplorable situation in Iran.

In his January 1988 report, the United Nations Special Representative on Iran stated, for example, that information on maltreatment and torture in prisons continues to be received. Information on irregularities of various kinds in the course of trials, the report noted, was abundant, consistent, and convincing.

Between 1979 and the end of 1985 more than 7,000 executions took place in Iran. Tens of thousands were arbitrarily arrested. Torture appears to be a standard feature in the treatment of both political and non-political prisoners, as the government moves to suppress opposition brutally. There have been persistent reports from varying sources of severe beatings, whippings, solitary confinement, suspensions by arms and wrists, mock executions, mutilations, and even execution by stonings.

Freedom of speech, assembly and association is sharply curtailed. An Iranian under suspicion of holding views that differ from the regime can be arbitrarily arrested and detained without formal charges or on trumped-up charges. In some cases, relatives of suspects have been held and tortured until the suspect is found or turns himself in. The Revolutionary Guards and the "komiteh" (local quasi-official neighborhood groups or block-wardens) which make arrests appear to be free to question and torture as they see fit. Both the Revolutionary Guards and the Komitehs also appear to function with the approval of top officials.

Most of those arrested are permitted a trial of some sort by a revolutionary court. However, political cases are not given legal safeguards, and if a political trial is public it is usually because the prisoner has already been forced through torture or other means to confess his crime. The United Nations Special Representative stated in his 1987 report that:

Accused persons had not been informed of the charges against them, could not communicate with counsel of their own choos- [Page 9]

HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter

ing, had no legal assistance assigned to them, could not examine witnesses of the prosecution, had sometimes not been informed of the verdict and the sentence handed down to them, and had been denied the right to their conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal.

In Iran, a theocratic state, religion is supposed to be synonymous with government, and the Constitution declares that "the official religion of Iran is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari Shi'ism." Approximately ninety percent of Iranians are Shi'a Muslims, and nine percent are Sunni Muslims. The remaining one percent includes Bahá’ís, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews.

Although there are reports of discrimination against Sunni Muslims at the local level, the regime seems to have made some effort to reduce the antagonism toward Sunnis. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians are permitted to practice their religions, but suffer discrimination, particularly with regard to employment. Christians and Jews are suspected of loyalties to the West and Israel, respectively, and are, therefore, the victims of various types of persecution and discriminatory treatment.

Though native to Iran, the Bahá’í religion is not recognized in Iran. Bahá’ís have been subjected to periodic episodes of violence and intimidation since the religion was founded in 1844. But only under the Khomeini's regime has persecution become all-encompassing and systematic. The Prosecutor General issued an order in 1983 that banned all Bahá’í religious activity and established a legal basis for criminal charges against all Bahá’ís as such.

The Khomeini government considers the Bahá’í religion a dangerous form of heresy and an enemy of the state. Enormous pressures have been exerted to force Bahá’ís to renounce their faith. Since the beginning of the take-over, approximately 200 Bahá’ís have been executed. From 1980 onward, members of the National Spiritual Assembly, the [Page 10]elected body responsible for Bahá’í leadership, were arrested and executed. This practice continued with their replacements until there was no longer an official Bahá’í leadership. Attacks against Bahá’ís have taken place in all provinces of Iran, and Bahá’ís have often been killed by mobs. Thousands have been driven from their homes and forced to leave their jobs and places of education.

The United Nations Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance says in his 1988 report that:

Since 1983 the teaching of the Bahá’í faith has reportedly been declared a criminal offense. . . . According to a decree of August 1983, the Bahá’ís have reportedly been deprived of institutions necessary for the proper practice of their religion and the maintenance of the social, educational and humanitarian activities of their community, as well as permission to hold public meetings, to express their faith openly or to publish religious literature.

We believe that the effort of the United States Government and of others as well to keep the world's attention focused on the Iranian government's treatment of Bahá’ís has had some positive effects. In 1987, approximately 500 Bahá’ís were released from prisons, leaving about 150 still under incarceration. This year, so far, no Bahá’í executions have taken place. We have also learned that of the 12 Bahá’ís condemned to be executed, one has been released.

On the other hand, the United Nations Human Rights Commission Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance reports that in recent months the Iranian Government has increased its economic pressure on Bahá’ís. Thousands of Bahá’ís who were dismissed from their positions in education and government continue to be denied their jobs and pensions, and have been instructed to repay all salaries received during their period of government employment.

All in all, we find ourselves in agreement with the last report of the UN Human Rights Commission Special Representative on Iran, published in January of this year. It notes that Iran continues to act in ways inconsistent with international instruments on human rights, that the situation justifies continued international concern, study, and constant monitoring. Experience has demonstrated that even the most egregious violators of human rights ultimately prove sensitive to public exposure of their actions. The spotlight of world attention must, therefore, continue to be trained on the human rights conditions in Iran. [Page 11]

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. HENDERSON, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 29, 1988

R. CHAIRMAN, Members of the Committee

I am Robert Henderson, Secretary General of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States. I come before the Committee to read the testimonies of two individuals who, unfortunately, cannot appear in person because threats have been made against members of their families still living in Iran. The testimonies have been edited so that names of persons and places will not reveal the identities of the two individuals. However, if the Committee wishes, we will submit details that cannot be made public in an open session.

Testimony 1

BORN A Zoroastrian, Mr. A. became a Bahá’í in 1963 and married a Bahá’í in 1964. He attended military school and then worked as an assistant police officer in city X for four years. In 1983 he was dismissed with no compensation on the grounds that he was a Bahá’í and had married a Bahá’í woman.

In 1984 he was summoned by the Islamic Revolutionary Court and interrogated for four hours. ...The court consisted of three persons: the chief prosecutor who was a mullah, and two other religious dignitaries. One of these was... a specialist in Bahá’í cases who subjected (Mr. A.) throughout the trial to verbal abuse, using swear words directed at both him and his wife. This religious judge also pronounced the sentence of death for having become a Bahá’í and married a Bahá’í woman and condemned Mr. A. at the same time to pay back all the salaries he had received during his years of work.

Mr. A. was then taken to a cellar where three men were waiting for him. They asked him, "Are you a Bahá’í?" He answered "Yes." They repeated the question, and when he replied again in the affirmative they fell upon him and began to beat him. Mr. A. fainted after a few minutes of beating. He was also tortured by stretching and breaking the ligaments of his shoulder and legs. His kidneys were damaged and bled. During his time in prison the bleeding subsided, but he still bears the marks of torture on his right leg and finds walking difficult because of pain in his left knee. He has a medical certificate stating that the ligaments in his knee and shoulder have been broken, although the reason is not stated.

Afterwards Mr. A. was taken to a prison cell with a cement floor and bare of any furniture. The cell was so small that it was impossible to lie down at full length and he had to lie with his knees bent.

Eleven days later, three guards (Pasdarans) took him to his house while they searched it. He asked permission to go to the lavatory; this was granted. He climbed out of the lavatory window and escaped, taking refuge first with a neighbor and then with a friend until he could change out of his prison clothing. He fled to city Y where his wife and fourteen-year-old daughter, who had been hiding there, subsequently joined him. [Page 12]Robert C. Henderson, Bahá’í witness at Congressional hearing

The family left Iran. All they had with them were 3,000 tomans in cash and the clothes they had on. Mr. A.'s properties and assetts were all confiscated. After 44 months. they were accepted as refugees. They now live with his wife's father....

Testimony 2

BECAUSE OF HER Bahá’í activities (Mrs. B.) was frightened she would be arrested. Therefore, she and her husband. . . decided to flee the country. They were arrested at the . . . border. For ten days they were questioned and told that if they (would) recant their Faith they would be released, and that otherwise they would be imprisoned. The persons interrogating them told them that the main reason for their imprisonment was that they are Bahá’ís and not because they tried to escape from Iran. They told them that the Moslems were not arrested for such an offence. Since they refused to recant their religion, they were sent to prison X where they were treated badly and beaten. Mrs. B. was placed against a wall and had to remain standing there the whole night. Often, she felt dizzy and moved, and they would beat her so that she would remain against the wall without moving.

The following morning she was brought to prison Y... She remained there for 3 months in solitary confinement and was forbidden to speak. Whenever the guardians heard a noise in a cell they would force the prisoner to be silent. This imposed silence was very difficult to endure.

She was fed three times a day; however, since she was considered an "unclean Bahá’í" they did not want to touch her plate, so they threw her food through a slot and most of it would fall on the floor. Due to the bad conditions under which she was imprisoned and the unhealthy food, she began suffering from an ulcer, but was not allowed to see a doctor. Being that it was in the middle of winter, the water was ice cold and the cell she was confined in was freezing cold. She was given only two thin blankets and she was so cold that she could hardly move her hands or feet. During the three months she spent there, the only clothes she had were those she was [Page 13]wearing the day of her arrest. After each bath she would put on these same clothes without ever being able to have them washed or changed. Several times they told her that she was going to be executed and that they would come and fetch her. She would wait for 5 hours or more, and when they would come back they would inform her that the execution was rescheduled for the following day. Often she heard them through her cell door boasting that they had arrested her family and executed them. This was not true but of course at the time she believed what she had heard.

After these three months, she was transferred to prison Z and finally after four months she was permitted to see her family once a month for 10 minutes through a glass barrier, talking to them by means of a (tapped) telephone. In prison Z the cells measured 6 meters by 4 meters, and they packed 80 to 100 prisoners into each one. They had no place to lie down or be able to sleep. They were allowed to take a bath once a week and only after midnight, because the Bahá’ís, being considered "unclean", were the last to use the bathrooms. Sometimes, there was no hot water left by the time they could wash. She was in a cell with many elderly women who suffered tremendously from the lack of hot water and the cold. Once a day they were allowed to use the toilet for only one hour and this was not enough time for 100 prisoners....

For four months, while she was in prison Z, every 3 or 4 days she was blindfolded and brought to a room for interrogation. Each time she answered questions, they made her sign her statement with the blindfold on her eyes. Their aim was to force the Bahá’ís to sign statements saying that they are spies for Israel and the U.S.A., and that the Bahá’ís were conspiring politically against the Iranian government. Once they tried to force a woman to sign such a statement by holding a pen in her hand and since she resisted they broke her fingers. During each interrogation, Mrs. B. was beaten harshly on her head and body, which was bruised.

It was only after being imprisoned for seven months that she was brought to trial. There were three persons present and the only question they asked her was whether she was a Bahá’í and whether she wanted to continue being a member of this religion. Since she had no intention of recanting her Faith, they sent her back to prison where she remained for another seven months. It was after a total of 14 months imprisonment that she was finally released but only upon payment to the authorities of the only money she had left after all the property and possessions she and her husband owned had been confiscated.... [Page 14]

The Continued Persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran

TESTIMONY OF FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH, SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 29, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN, Members of the Committee:

I am Firuz Kazemzadeh, Professor of History at Yale University and Secretary for External Affairs of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, the elected governing body of the American Bahá’í community.

This is the third time Bahá’í witnesses appear before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations to testify about the situation of their coreligionists in Iran. The first was in May 1982, in the early years of the Iranian revolution, when the fanatical ardor of the new regime was at its highest, and the extreme fundamentalist elements in the new government felt that the eradication of the Bahá’í community from Iran was attainable.

The second appearance was in May 1984, after more than 150 Bahá’ís, including many of the leaders of the community, had been executed, hundreds had been tortured, thousands had been thrown in jail, and tens of thousands had been deprived of their livelihood, expelled from schools, subjected to physical and psychological attacks, and reduced to the status of outcasts in their own country.

In 1984 as in 1982, American Bahá’ís testified about the systematic destruction of Bahá’í religious institutions, the confiscation of properties, the desecration of holy places, and the daily outrages perpetrated upon individual Bahá’ís by the various agencies of the government as well as by private vigilante groups bent upon ridding Iran of those who dared to differ with them in matters of faith.

Bahá’ís in the United States and throughout the world appealed to the governments, the media, the leaders of thought, to raise their voices in protest against the persecution of a peaceful religious community that was threatened with genocide. The response has been rewarding. Heads of governments have made statements, parliaments have passed resolutions, the media have publicized the persecutions, and the United Nations has taken a stand on the violation of human rights in Iran, specifically mentioning the Bahá’ís in several resolutions.

I wish to express to the Subcommittee and to the entire Congress, on behalf of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States and some 110,000 American Bahá’ís their gratitude for the support given by this Committee and the Congress to the Bahá’ís in Iran. The Congressional Resolutions of 1982 and 1984, the frequent mention, on the floor of the House and of the Senate, of the plight of Iranian Bahá’ís, the statements made by President Reagan and officials of the Department of State, and the efforts of U.S. representatives at the United Nations have undoubtedly played an important part in the recent improvement in the status of Iranian Bahá’ís, an improvement that I wish to report.

In 1987 there began to appear signs of change in the Iranian government's treatment [Page 15]

CONTINUED PERSECUTION

of Bahá’ís. Whereas early that year there were several arrests and three executions of Bahá’ís, since last September no Bahá’í has been executed; and no Bahá’í has been arrested since February 1988. Moreover, there has been a significant reduction in the number of Bahá’ís held in the various Iranian prisons. Eighteen months ago more than 750 Bahá’ís were in prison. The latest data show 152. Some were released after completing their prison sentences, but many others had their sentences reduced in such a way as to make them eligible for early release. Until recently, for every Bahá’í released, another one would be jailed. Currently, releases occur without new arrests, thus genuinely reducing the Bahá’í prison population. There have been no reports of torture inflicted on any Bahá’í prisoners in the last several months, and there are indications that the general treatment of prisoners has somewhat improved.

There have been other favorable developments. For the first time, a few Bahá’ís have been issued visas and permitted legally to leave the country. While most of them had applied for visas for medical reasons, some were allowed to travel to visit families abroad. In several instances Bahá’ís whose homes, shops, or farms had been confiscated, were permitted to resume ownership. It must be noted, however, that as of now only a small fraction of confiscated properties has been returned.

One of the most encouraging developments of the last few months has occurred in the field of education. Some Bahá’í students who had been expelled from schools and colleges have been invited to resume their studies. We do not know how many, and it remains to be seen whether the right to education will be extended to all Bahá’ís or will be granted only in exceptional cases.

In the absence of firm data it is futile to speculate about the reasons for the change in the treatment of the Bahá’ís by the author-

Firuz Kazemzadeh, Bahá’í witness at Congressional hearing [Page 16]ities in Iran. Whatever the reasons, we welcome the change and hope that it will continue until the Iranian Bahá’ís are guaranteed all their human rights.

Yet I cannot conclude on this optimistic note. It is an unfortunate fact that the persecution of the Iranian Bahá’ís has not ended and may at any time flare up again in its most savage forms. International complications, economic crises, changes in leadership, domestic upheavals, could produce situations in which one or another group of extremists would want to use the Bahá’ís for a scapegoat, as has happened repeatedly in the last 150 years.

Moreover, up until now the Iranian authorities have not given any indication of relenting in their explicitly stated purpose of destroying the Bahá’í community, even if they have diminished pressure against individuals. Not a single word has been uttered to indicate that the Bahá’ís as a community would be given their human rights. Membership in the Bahá’í community is still officially considered an affront to public decency, if not a crime. The findings of the various Iranian courts that the Bahá’ís were subversive, that they were in the service of foreign interests, that they promoted immorality, that they were guilty of "corruption on earth" and fought against God, have not been withdrawn or repudiated.

Unlike Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians, the Bahá’ís, Iran's largest religious minority, are not recognized as a religious community and are referred to as "the subversive sect," or the "errant sect." All Bahá’í community property, including holy places, meeting halls, schools, hospitals, and even cemeteries, has been expropriated. Education of Bahá’í children in their parents' faith, possession of Bahá’í books, performance of Bahá’í marriage ceremonies, and Bahá’í acts of worship are all viewed as crimes by the government. Bahá’ís are not even allowed decently to bury their dead or properly to mark their graves.

In Iran, where the state sector of the national economy is much larger than in the United States, railways, airlines, schools, universities, and most of the health institutions are owned and operated by the government. Prohibition of employment of Bahá’ís in these areas has a serious economic effect on the community. In spite of every effort of the Iranian Bahá’ís to educate their children, to have them acquire a useful trade or profession, to bring them up to be productive members of society, the prospects for the future of the Iranian Bahá’í community are bleak.

Iranian authorities are continuing their psychological warfare against the Bahá’ís, who must make themselves invisible to survive. Even when the government announces an amnesty, it excludes from the amnesty armed robbers, rapists, kidnappers, major drug traffickers, spies, and members of the "errant sect," the current code words for the Bahá’ís. The Iranian Bahá’ís continue to suffer defamation, public insults, and accusations in spite of the fact that the Iranian authorities, nine years after the revolution, are in possession of all state archives and all of the archives of the Bahá’í community. The Iranian government knows for a fact that there is no evidence to show that the Iranian Bahá’ís as a community were ever disloyal to their country.

In view of all this, the American Bahá’ís feel strongly that the case of their persecuted Iranian coreligionists must not be allowed to slip into obscurity. International publicity has been an important cause of the improvement in the status of the Iranian Bahá’ís. Newspaper articles and editorials in such influential papers as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Le Monde, broadcasts by the Voice of America and the BBC, statements by government leaders in many countries, have trained a searchlight on Iran. Should the searchlight be turned off, the ensuing darkness would provide a cover for fresh crimes against the Iranian Bahá’ís.

American Bahá’ís hope that the United States will continue to show, through its elected representatives in Congress, its concern for the fate of the Iranian Bahá’í community. Human rights have ceased to be internal matters of this or that state. They have [Page 17]

CONTINUED PERSECUTION

become a component in the relationships between states and have been woven into the fabric of international relations.

The case of the Bahá’ís in Iran is such a pure instance of religious persecution that it may serve as an archetype. The American Bahá’ís hope that advocacy of the cause of the Iranian Bahá’ís would not only alleviate the sufferings of the Iranian Bahá’ís but help all who suffer persecution for their faith.

dpt-handed

Watch repairman ordered close shop, no business license for Bahá’í

Congressman Gus Yatron and Firuz Kazemzadeh at Congressional hearing [Page 18]

Senate Debate: Eliminating Religious Intolerance

THE CONCURRENT resolution expressing the support of the U.S. Congress for the rights of the Bahá’í religious minority in Iran was introduced on the floor of the U.S. Senate on May 23, 1988. The following is the text of the resolution and the comments by Senator Christopher Dodd as they appear in the Senate Congressional Record on May 23, 1988. -ED.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 120 SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS OF THE BAHÁ’Í RELIGIOUS MINORITY IN IRAN

Mr. DODD (for himself, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. SIMON, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERRY, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. WILSON, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. PELL, Mr. QUALE, Mr. ADAMS, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. GORE, Mr. GLENN, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. EXON, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. KARNES, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. DIXON, Mr. McCAIN, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. EVANS, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, and Mr. SIMPSON) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 120

Whereas the Congress has, by concurrent resolutions adopted in 1982 and 1984, and in numerous other appeals, declared that it holds the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including members of the Bahá’í faith, Iran’s largest religious minority;

Whereas the Congress has condemned the Government of Iran’s actions against Bahá’ís on account of their religious beliefs, and has urged the President to work with appropriate foreign governments and with the United Nations in efforts to appeal to the Government of Iran concerning the Bahá’ís;

Whereas nearly 200 Iranian Bahá’ís, including many elected leaders of the religious community, have been executed since 1979, on account of their religious beliefs, thousands more have been imprisoned, and many subjected to torture and demands for recantation of their religious faith; and

Whereas the Government of Iran has not only undertaken to deprive Bahá’ís of civil, economic, and social rights, but also has in many cases confiscated Bahá’ís’ community and personal property and denied access for Bahá’ís to education, employment, pensions, insurance, and other benefits available to other Iranians: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress-

(1) continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including Bahá’ís, in a manner consistent with that Government’s obligations under international agreements guaranteeing the civil and political rights of its citizens;

(2) welcomes reports of the recent release of Bahá’ís from prisons in Iran and takes note of the decline in the numbers of Bahá’ís and others executed in that country;

(3) expresses the hope that these [Page 19]developments may indicate a greater willingness on the part of the Government of Iran to act in a manner consistent with its obligations under the various international agreements to which it is a party;

(4) urges the Government of Iran to restore fully the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion, education, and equal protection of the law; and

(5) calls upon the President—

(A) to continue to observe and report on developments affecting the Bahá’í minority in Iran, and to monitor developments affecting Bahá’ís in countries in which their rights might be abridged on account of their religious beliefs;

(B) to cooperate with other governments in continuing to make appeals to the Government of Iran concerning the situation of the Bahá’ís;

(C) to initiate and support efforts in the United Nations and its agencies on behalf of measures to promote the protection of the religious rights of Bahá’ís; and

(D) to provide, and to urge others to provide, for refugee and humanitarian assistance for those Bahá’ís who flee their homelands for reasons of religious repression.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

● Mr. DODD. Mr. President, together with my colleague, Senator HEINZ, I submit today a Senate concurrent resolution to call continuing attention to the plight of the Bahá’í religious minority in Iran. In this effort we are joined by 31 other Senators as cosponsors.

Most of my colleagues are painfully aware of the tragedy that befell this peace-loving community as a result of the takeover of Iran by the fanatically intolerant regime that continues to rule it. At the time that our country is about to complete the process of its accession to the Genocide Convention, it is instructive to recall that the possibility for actual genocide to occur has not been eliminated even to this supposedly ‎enlighted enlightened‎ age. It can be legitimately argued that measures taken by the Government of Iran against the Bahá’í minority in recent years have, in fact, constituted the most recent example of this horrendous crime against humanity.

This is a particularly opportune day for the submission of this concurrent resolution. May 23, 1988, marks the 144th anniversary of the founding of the Bahá’í faith. On this day, in 1844, in a small house in the city of Shiraz, Iran, the advent of the Bahá’í faith was announced to its first disciple. It was the start of a decade of rapid spread but also intense persecution of the new religion. By 1850, that first disciple and 20,000 others met cruel and bloody deaths at the hands of the fanatical mobs incited by the Muslim clergy. The only crime of those early Bahá’ís, as of those in our time, was to profess belief in the divine authority of the peace-loving founder of the new faith.

Bahá’ís throughout the 160 countries and territories where they reside celebrate this day as one of the holiest of the year. Today they reflect on the past decade, when the successors of those clergymen continue to torment the small law-abiding Bahá’í community, many of whose members are descendants of those who were killed 140 years ago. During the past 8 years more than 200 Bahá’í leaders have been killed and the ‎communtiy community‎ has been outlawed. One of the first acts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was to demolish the small house in Shiraz, the site of the event that the Bahá’ís celebrate today.

Mr. President, it is time again to call the attention of the Government of Iran to the international norms of civilized behavior. The repression of the Bahá’ís has been eased somewhat recently, and our concurrent resolution takes note of that. Even one killing, however, in the name of religious intolerance is one killing too many. By supporting our concurrent resolution, our colleagues can take a small step in trying to restrain and eliminate religious intolerance from this world. I urge my colleagues to do just that.

[Page 21]

House Debate: Speaking Out for Peoples of All Faiths

The concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the U.S. Congress about the continued violation of the human rights of the Bahá’ís in Iran by the government in Iran went before the U.S. House of Representatives on August 8, 1988. The following is the text of the debate in the House of Representatives as it appears in the House Congressional Record on August 8, 1988, pages H 6572–73.—Template:Smallcaps

URGING IRAN TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF THE BAHA’I FAITH.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 120) urging the Government of Iran to respect the human rights of members of the Baha’i faith, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read as follows:

S. CON. RES. 120

Whereas the Congress has, by concurrent resolutions adopted in 1982 and 1984, and in numerous other appeals, declared that it holds the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including members of the Baha’i faith, Iran’s largest religious minority;

Whereas the Congress has condemned the Government of Iran’s actions against Baha’is on account of their religious beliefs, and has urged the President to work with appropriate foreign governments and with the United Nations in efforts to appeal to the Government of Iran concerning the Baha’is;

Whereas nearly 200 Iranian Baha’is, including many elected leaders of the religious community, have been executed since 1979, on account of their religious beliefs, thousands more have been imprisoned, and many subjected to torture and demands for recantation of their religious faith; and

Whereas the Government of Iran has not only undertaken to deprive Baha’is of civil, economic, and social rights, but also has in many cases confiscated Baha’i community and personal property and denied access for Baha’is to education, employment, pensions, insurance, and other benefits available to other Iranians: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress—

(1) continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including Baha’is, in a manner consistent with that Government’s obligations under international agreements guaranteeing the civil and political rights of its citizens;

(2) welcomes reports of the recent release of Baha’is from prisons in Iran and takes note of the decline in the numbers of Baha’is and others executed in that country;

(3) expresses the hope that these developments may indicate a greater willingness on the part of the Government of Iran to act in a manner consistent with its obligations under the various international agreements to which it is a party;

(4) urges the Government of Iran to restore fully the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and [Page 22]religion, education, and equal protection of the law; and (5) calls upon the President- (A) to continue to observe and report on developments affecting the Bahá’í minority in Iran, and to monitor developments affect- ing Bahá’ís in countries in which their rights might be abridged on account of their reli- gious beliefs; (B) to cooperate with other governments in continuing to make appeals to the Gov- ernment of Iran concerning the situation of the Bahá’ís; (C) to initiate and support efforts in the United Nations and its agencies on behalf of measures to promote the protection of the re- ligious rights of Bahá’ís; and (D) to provide, and to urge others to pro- vide, for refugee and humanitarian assistance for those Bahá’ís who flee their homelands for reasons of religious repression.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, a second is not required on this mo- tion.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON] will be recognized for 20 minutes and the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOL- OMON] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON].

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. YATRON asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support Senate Concurrent Resolution 120, legislation urging the Government of Iran to respect the human rights of members of the Bahá’í faith. The Congress has adopted two other resolutions, in 1982 and 1984, on the plight of this persecuted religious minority. The situation for these brave individuals war- rants our speaking out again on their behalf.

Our subcommittee recently held hearings on the human rights situation in Iran, fo- cusing primarily on the treatment of the Bahá’í community. The administration and private witnesses agreed that the actions tak- en by Congress, together with international efforts, have resulted in a decline in the num- ber of Bahá’ís killed in Iran. Even though the numbers of deaths have decreased, the night- mare the Ayatollah has created for these peo- ple continues.

This resolution calls upon the President to continue to observe, report on, and monitor developments affecting this religious com- munity, and to cooperate with other govern- ments in making appeals to the Government of Iran. It also asks the President to initiate and support efforts in the United Nations on behalf of Bahá’ís, and to provide for refugee and humanitarian assistance for those Bahá’ís fleeing from religious repression.

Senate Congressional Resolution 120 is a noncontroversial, bipartisan initiative which has the support of the administration. It passed in the other body on June 23. The companion bill in the House, House Congres- sional Resolution 310, was introduced by Congressmen PORTER, LANTOS, and a score of other Members. I commend Chairman FASCELL, Congressmen BROOMFIELD, HAM- ILTON, PORTER, LANTOS, and GILMAN. I also commend Mr. SOLOMON, the ranking mi- nority member of the Subcommittee on Hu- man Rights and International Organizations, for his valuable contribution to the hearings we have held on human rights in Iran.

I urge adoption of the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield my- self such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, which calls upon the Government of Iran to cease its persecution of the Bahá’í faith. The resolution further calls for that government to restore in Iran the freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion that are set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Mr. Speaker, the continuing persecution of [Page 23]members of the Bahá’í faith is one of the great tragedies of our time. The Bahá’í faith is the largest religious minority in Iran. Its teachings emphasize peace, equality, and the brotherhood of all people. The Bahá’ís are a nonviolent people who believe in submitting to civil authority.

Under the Shah's government, many Bahá’ís reached positions of great responsibility in Iranian society. However, the ayatollah's regime has, from the very outset, undertaken a campaign of active persecution against this religion. Hundreds of Bahá’ís have been summarily executed. Thousands have been imprisoned, and still thousands more have been deprived of their jobs and livelihood. Bahá’í services have been prohibited, and many shrines and meeting houses have been desecrated.

In 1984, we passed a resolution very similar to the one we are considering today. We have some reason to believe that this earlier resolution did not go unnoticed in Tehran, and that some measure of relief from this torment of persecution was granted.

Now that the Government of Iran appears to be giving up on trying to fight an unwinnable war—and also finds itself isolated and condemned in the court of world opinion—the time is right to pressure them again to end this brutal and inhumane persecution.

Mr. Speaker, the unanimous vote of the House of Representatives behind this resolution today will send a powerful signal to Iran that the American people—and free people everywhere—demand a stop to the persecution of the Bahá’í faith.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], a distinguished member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 120 and I commend the distinguished human rights subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON], and the subcommittee ranking minority member, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], for their leadership in this issue.

No one disputes the right of the Iranian people to organize their affairs as they see fit; but that right, like every other right, has its natural limits. In the aftermath of the Islamic revolution, Iran began two policies which set it outside the limits of respect by all civilized countries.

First, Iran began a campaign to spread its revolution abroad, through subversion and armed force. There have been tragic repercussions of that policy throughout the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon.

Second, Iran began a cruel campaign of religious intolerance. The first aim has been to supress a peace loving, objectively inoffensive group, the Bahá’ís of Iran. The Bahá’í religion grew out of Islam and adherence to it is therefore viewed as apostasy by Iran's clerics. The Iranian regime seems willing to overlook the many contributions to Iran's development attributable to the Bahá’ís; indeed one may wonder whether the regime's attitude toward Bahá’ís is attributable more to its attitude toward modernism than the religious differences they have with the Bahá’ís.

Whatever the reason, the Iranian treatment of Bahá’ís has been abysmal. There have been many deaths, many instances of confiscation of property and of the desecration of religious sites. While some recent improvements have been observed, this is no time to let down our guard about the very dangerous phenomenon of state-sponsored religious intolerance.

I am proud to be a cosponsor of an identical resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 310, which was introduced by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER] earlier this year. I also salute the efforts exerted by the American Bahá’í community on behalf of their fellow believers in Iran, efforts in which they have been joined by people of good will from every walk of life.

I hope that this resolution is adopted unanimously. [Page 24]Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. LEACH of Iowa asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I also rise in support of this Senate concurrent resolution.

I would like to thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member for their leadership in this instance, and I would only make the single point that by this resolution we are speaking not only to the plight of the Bahá’ís but the peoples of all faiths in all countries who may be persecuted by majorities against minorities.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, which puts Congress firmly on record in support of the plight of the Bahá’í and by implication in support of all peoples of all faiths persecuted solely on the grounds of convictions held.

This House and all similarly constituted parliamentary bodies have a responsibility to make clear that the Iranian regime is accountable for its persecution of these courageous people.

While there have been recent reports of the release of a number of Bahá’ís from prisons in Iran and while executions appear to have declined, the international community dares not be silent until all such grievous human rights abuses have ended.

Far too fresh in our memories are the executions of over 200 Bahá’ís in Iran since 1979, the pattern of brutal torture and imprisonment, the desecration of property sacred to members of the faith, and the economic hardships visited upon the Bahá’í. The terror which has befallen this vulnerable religious community is unconscionable.

It is important to point out that in its persecution of the Bahá’í the Government of Iran carries a legal as well as moral and humanitarian burden of accountability. As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Iran is bound by its provisions to protect religious freedom within its borders, including the rights of minorities, in community with like believers, to profess and practice their faith. In addition to breaching international norms of decency and civility, Iran's failure to adhere to international human rights standards constitutes outlaw conduct.

Until the campaign of religious persecution and genocide against the Bahá’ís comes to an end, this body and the executive branch have an obligation to monitor events in Iran, to work with other governments to bring pressure on Iranian authorities to cease their human rights violations, to press the case of the Bahá’í in international forums, and to provide appropriate assistance to those fleeing persecution. It is the least we can do for this suffering people who desire nothing more than to worship freely according to their conscience.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of Senate Concurrent Resolution 120 regarding the plight of the Iranian Bahá’ís.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 120 is identical to House Concurrent Resolution 310 which was introduced on June 2 by myself and TOM LANTOS, my cochair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. House Concurrent Resolution 310 has 117 bipartisan co-sponsors, including leaders of the full House, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. I want to thank Chairmen FASCELL, YATRON, and HAMILTON for acting so quickly upon this resolution in their respective committees, and Representatives FOLEY and MICHEL for scheduling this resolution in such a rapid manner.

The purpose of this resolution is twofold:

First. It holds the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including the Bahá’ís, in a manner consistent with that government's obligations [Page 25]under international agreements guaranteeing the civil and political rights of its citizens; and

Second. It calls upon the President of the United States to cooperate with other governments and with the United Nations to promote the protection of the religious rights of the Bahá’ís.

On June 29, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations held hearings on the plight of the Iranian Bahá’ís. Drs. Firuz Kazemzadeh and Robert Henderson, two distinguished representatives of the Bahá’ís in the United States, testified before the subcommittee and expressed their gratitude for the support given to the Bahá’í community by the committee and the Congress over the last several years. They described recent improvements in the status of the Iranian Bahá’ís, and stated that previous congressional resolutions and statements by Representatives, Senators, President Reagan, and State Department officials have all played an important part in the Bahá’ís’ improved situation.

Drs. Kazemzadeh and Henderson reminded us that the situation in Iran, although somewhat better, remains grave. Over 300,000 Bahá’ís continue to be denied employment in such sectors as the railways, airlines, schools, universities, and most health institutions. Bahá’í children are not admitted to schools and universities. Bahá’í properties remain expropriated. Fundamental community activities, such as marriage, spiritual education of children, and possession of religious books, continue to be regarded as illegal acts for Bahá’í followers.

Mr. Speaker, although the number of Bahá’ís executed and imprisoned during the past few years has decreased, the less graphic annihilation of the Bahá’í culture is an extremely serious matter. We must not be silent while Bahá’ís and other Iranian citizens are forbidden to worship, work, study, or travel as they choose. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of Senate Concurrent Resolution 120.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I have not further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRAY). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON] that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 120).

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate concurrent resolution was concurred in.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. [Page 26]S. Con. Res. 120 Agreed to August 8, 1988 One Hundredth Congress of the United States of America AT THE SECOND SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight

Concurrent Resolution

Whereas the Congress has, by concurrent resolutions adopted in 1982 and 1984, and in numerous other appeals, declared that it holds the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including members of the Bahá’í faith, Iran's largest religious minority;

Whereas the Congress has condemned the Government of Iran's actions against Bahá’ís on account of their religious beliefs, and has urged the President to work with appropriate foreign governments and with the United Nations in efforts to appeal to the Government of Iran concerning the Bahá’ís;

Whereas nearly 200 Iranian Bahá’ís, including many elected leaders of the religious community, have been executed since 1979, on account of their religious beliefs, thousands more have been imprisoned, and many subjected to torture and demands for recantation of their religious faith; and

Whereas the Government of Iran has not only undertaken to deprive Bahá’ís of civil, economic, and social rights, but also has in many cases confiscated Bahá’í community and personal property and denied access for Bahá’ís to education, employment, pensions, insurance, and other benefits available to other Iranians: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress—

(1) continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all its nationals, including Bahá’ís, in a manner consistent with that Government's obligations under international agreements guaranteeing the civil and political rights of its citizens;

(2) welcomes reports of the recent release of Bahá’ís from prisons in Iran and takes note of the decline in the numbers of Bahá’ís and others executed in that country;

(3) expresses the hope that these developments may indicate a greater willingness on the part of the Government of Iran to act in a manner consistent with its obligations under the various international agreements to which it is a party,

(4) urges the Government of Iran to restore fully the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion, education, and equal protection of the law; and

(5) calls upon the President—

(A) to continue to observe and report on developments affecting the Bahá’í minority in Iran, and to monitor developments affecting Bahá’ís in countries in which their rights might be abridged on account of their religious beliefs;

(B) to cooperate with other governments in continuing to make appeals to the Government of Iran concerning the situation of the Bahá’ís;

(C) to initiate and support efforts in the United Nations and its agencies on behalf of measures to promote the protection of the religious rights of Bahá’ís; and

(D) to provide, and to urge others to provide, for refugee and humanitarian assistance for those Bahá’ís who flee their homelands for reasons of religious repression.

SEC. 2.

The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

Attest:

Attest:

Secretary of the Senate.

Clerk of the House of Representatives. [Page 27]

News Item

Dark rising from crevass in damaged earth, taking form as it rises. Growing gross with matter, it solidifies into shapeless black. Traveling noiselessly, not touching ground, it absorbs all as it passes over.

It grows in mass, spreading leviathan clouds of sightless night over the earth.

It speaks through the acts of the masses. Its words are genocide, depravity, deprivation.

Do not despair. The second coming is here. The promise is kept. A radiance beams down on earth, solid, expanding, guiding the blind. Its brilliance illuminating the darkness.

How many will see? Who will follow the light?

-Carmen M. Pursifull Copyright 1991 by Carmen M. Pursifull

[Page 29]Prejudice and Discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran BY LELAND W. ROBINSON

SINCE THE FOUNDING of the Bahá’í Faith in the mid-1800s, Bahá’ís in Iran have been victims of prejudice and discrimination, with the discrimination at times taking phys- ically violent forms. During the nineteenth century thousands of Bahá’ís were branded as heretics and put to death in appallingly cruel ways. Since the creation of the Islamic Re- public of Iran in 1979, conditions have again become extremely oppressive for the Bahá’ís.

A number of books, essays, and studies have described and documented particular acts of discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran.' But few have attempted to examine in detail the reasons for many Muslims' animosity toward Bahá’ís. This study addresses two basic ques- tions concerning the relationship between Muslims and Bahá’ís. The first is the ques- tion of which group or agency in Iran is most responsible for spreading anti-Bahá’í views and inciting anti-Bahá’í acts. The second has to do with the reasons for the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís. The first question is examined rather briefly, while ex- ploration of the second question comprises the main body of this study.

Copyright 1990 by Leland W. Robinson. The essay is adapted from a paper presented at a meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Chicago, Illinois, October 1988.

1. See Amnesty International, Iran: Violation of Human Rights (London: Amnesty International Pub- lications, 1987); [Bahá’í International Community], The Bahá’ís in Iran: A Report on the Persecution of a Religious Minority (New York: Bahá’í Internation- al Community, 1982); Douglas Martin, The Perse- cution of the Bahá’ís of Iran, 1844-1984 (Ottawa: Association for Bahá’í Studies, 1984); Minority Rights Group, The Bahá’ís of Iran (New York: Mi- nority Rights Group, 1983); Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism (Oxford: George Ronald, 1985); William Sears, A Cry from the Heart: The Bahá’ís in Iran (Oxford: George Ronald, 1982); and U.S. Committee for Refugees, Iranian Refugees: The Many Faces of Persecution (Washington, D.C., U.S. Com- mittee for Refugees, 1984).

Research Design

THE RESEARCH consisted of study of the ex- isting literature in English about the preju- dice and discrimination directed toward Bahá’ís in Iran as in-depth interviews with a small sample of Iranian Muslims and Bahá’ís. All of the interviews were conducted in the United States where all but one of the inter- viewees currently reside.

There are significant limitations to such a study. A fair amount of literature is available in English presenting the Bahá’í perspective but less presenting the Muslim view. Even the Bahá’í literature focuses more on document- ing the extent of the persecution than on ex- plaining it. Interviewing Iranians living in the United States has serious limitations since such individuals are not, in many ways, rep- resentative of their countrymen still living in [Page 30]Iran. Because of the limitations, caution has been exercised in interpreting and presenting the findings of this study.

Moreover, the study is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. Conducting survey research using a probability sample was not a viable option since an adequate sampling frame was unavailable. Instead, lengthy interviews were conducted with a relatively small number of Iranians. The interviews with Bahá’ís averaged one hour and fifty minutes in length, those with Muslims, one hour and five minutes. The same number of questions was asked of the Muslims as of the Bahá’ís, but the Bahá’ís generally had more to say in response to the questions, thus accounting for the longer average length of the Bahá’í interviews.

All of the Bahá’ís in the sample live in the Chattanooga, Tennessee, metropolitan area, as do eight of the ten Muslims. The ninth Muslim lives in Charleston, West Virginia; the tenth lives in Tehran, Iran, and was in the United States visiting her daughter.

The Sample

FIGURE 1 contains some of the characteristics of the individuals in the sample. Only individuals who had grown up in Iran and had spent at least their childhood and adolescence in that country were included in the sample. The median age at which the Bahá’ís in the sample moved their domicile from Iran to the United States was thirty-six, the Muslims, twenty-seven. Most of the interviewees have visited Iran since moving to the United States, typically for a month or two at a time. The Muslims have visited more recently, with the average length of time since their last visit being only three years. The corresponding figure for the Bahá’ís was thirteen years, reflecting the fact that Bahá’ís have not felt safe in visiting since 1978. Although living in this country, almost all of the interviewees—all of the Bahá’ís and seven or eight of the Muslims—have kept closely in touch with events in their homeland by avidly reading news reports and by corresponding with friends and relatives in Iran. Two or three of the Muslims

Figure 1. Characteristics of the Sample for the Study of the Relationship between Muslims and Bahá’ís

	Bahá’ís	Muslims
Male	5	7
Female	5	3
Age
range	24-73	20-65
mean	51.3	47.6
median	52	49
Age when domicile no longer Iran
range	15-56	16-63¹
mean	35.9	33.7
median	36	27
Age when last visited Iran
range	22-56	16-63
mean	39.2	43.2
median	39	46
Education
advanced degree(s)	2	7
bachelors degree	3	0
some college	2	1
high school diploma	0	1
less than diploma	2	2
Current Occupation
professional	2	6
owner of business	2	1
employee	5	1
housewife	0	1
retired	1	1
Religious involvement as child or youth
very involved	10	3
somewhat involved	0	3
slightly or not involved	0	4
Religious involvement now
very involved	10	0
somewhat involved	0	2
slightly or not involved	0	8
Muslim/Bahá’í playmates as child
yes	8	2²
no	2	8
Muslim/Bahá’í friends as youth or adult in Iran
yes	10	1
no	0	9
Muslim/Bahá’í friends now
yes	7	9
no	3	1

¹The 63 year old still lives in Iran. ²One was a Muslim as a child who had no Bahá’í playmates. [Page 31]were not as closely in touch with current events in Iran but were able to provide recollections regarding the years when they lived in the country.

All of the Bahá’í interviewees have continued to be deeply or somewhat involved in their religion, but most of the Muslims have not. It is an Islamic tenet that if one is born to Muslim parents, one is a Muslim unless one takes the active step of renouncing Islam or converting to a different faith. In that sense, all of the Muslim interviewees are Muslims. However, there is no Shi'ah mosque in the Chattanooga metropolitan area, and most of the Muslim interviewees do not consider themselves actively involved in their faith. One commented: "I think of myself as a born Muslim, but that's as far as I go." Most of the Muslim interviewees were more actively involved in their faith when they were growing up in Iran, but the version of Shi'ah Islam promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini has caused some of them to distance themselves from their faith.

Primary Source of the Prejudice and Discrimination against Bahá’ís

ABOUT a third of the way through the interview, each interviewee was asked the following rather lengthy question:

In your opinion, which group or agency of Iranian society has been most responsible for spreading anti-Bahá’í views? Is it parents in the way they raise their children? Is it friends and relatives in their gossip with each other? Is it teachers in the schools? Is it the Muslim clergy? Is it the government? Or is it some other group or agency of Iranian society?

Nine of the ten Bahá’ís identified the clergy, while the tenth thought it was the government acting through the clergy. The Shi'ah clerics were described by the Bahá’í interviewees as ignorant, prejudiced, and eager to promote their own financial well-being by spreading lies against the Bahá’ís. One Bahá’í said, "The clergy is the heart of the evil in Iranian culture, in Islamic culture. They are the ones who are, as Bahá’u’lláh said, like the clouds in the sky that prevent the light of the sun from getting to the people."

The Muslim response to the question was not so uniform. Three identified the Shi'ah clergy as being most responsible for spreading anti-Bahá’í views, one identified the clergy in conjunction with fanatical Muslim laymen, and one identified the clergy and the government together. Thus half of the Muslims identified the clergy by itself, or the clergy in conjunction with some other group. Of the remaining five Muslims, four did not know, and one said that by making inflammatory statements the Bahá’ís themselves were responsible for generating anti-Bahá’í views. This last individual, however, at another point in the interview said that "among the Muslim clergy their favorite topic always was the Bahá’ís and how bad they were. The Bahá’ís were to Muslim clergy like Communists are to [Christian] evangelists."

The clergy's influence appears to be greatest on the less-educated Iranians. Since most Iranians have little formal education, the clergy's influence on the Iranian population is very substantial, a point that has become obvious to the entire world since the Iranian revolution. One Bahá’í, who had been converted from Islam to the Bahá’í Faith as a young adult, told the following story regarding the ways in which Shi'ah clerics generate hatred against Bahá’ís in the hearts of uneducated Muslims:

To create hatred in their hearts against Bahá’ís, you know what the clergy tell them? They say that if you become a Bahá’í, first you have to burn the Qur'an. And they told me, when I was a Muslim, that Bahá’ís put five or six Qur'ans under their feet, to use as a stepping stool, so that they can pick up their own Bahá’í books off of a high shelf. They play with people's emotions according to their level. They go to the level of each group-what makes them the most irritated.

Every Bahá’í interviewed told of far-fetched rumors about the Bahá’ís that were spread by the clergy. For example, one Bahá’í woman in the sample told about a housemaid whom [Page 32]she had employed for a number of years coming to her to ask about the assertion that Bahá’ís have tails:

A young girl who had been working for me in our house for eight or ten years one day came up to me and said, "Did you hear what that mullá said?"

And I said, "What?"

And she said that the mullá said that Bahá’ís have tails.

I said, "Really, are you crazy? How many times have you been with me and my children in the pool? How many times have you been with me and my children in the [public] bath? Have you seen a tail on any of us?"

They are so ignorant that when a mullá says this thing, though she was in my house for ten years, she believed that maybe we have tails. And then they [the clerics] say that among the Bahá’ís a woman can marry her uncle or her brother. They say so many things against Bahá’ís that, really, the people become brainwashed.

Although the Shí’ah clerics’ influence in Iran seems greatest on those with less education, the more highly educated are also significantly influenced by them. Such is the case even among upper-middle class professionals who might, in some cases, be favorably disposed toward the Bahá’í Faith. One of the Bahá’í interviewees, who had lived in Iran until he was in his fifties and who had extensive professional contact with well-educated Muslims, said that

There was a group of higher level people, or intellectual people, who were Muslims but who had a very good feeling about the Bahá’í Faith, about its principles, and about all the Bahá’ís. Always they were saying: "We know that you [Bahá’ís] have the best principles in the world. We know that you are much better than all these Muslims. But if we do not become a Bahá’í, this is because there are so many limitations for the Bahá’ís in this country."

One of my friends, who had a very high rank in the government, one day said to me, "I know what you are telling and what you are doing is right, but in this country we have to be careful of those crazy mullás. We have to be aware of what they can do and what kind of harm they can make."

Although the diffusion of anti-Bahá’í views in Iranian society generally starts with the Shí’ah clergy, many other Muslims play an important role. For example, Muslim parents may hear anti-Bahá’í views from the clergy and then pass those views on to their children. The children, in turn, may pass the views on to their playmates. One of the Bahá’í respondents commented:

The stories that the Muslim children have heard from their parents, all the wrong and awful things that children learn about the Bahá’ís it is horrible. They say that [Bahá’í] brothers and sisters can be together [have sex] and that at the end of their parties they [the Bahá’ís] turn out the lights and the men and women are together.

In addition to being asked which group or agency in Iranian society has been most responsible for spreading anti-Bahá’í views, interviewees were asked which group or agency in Iranian society they viewed as being most responsible for inciting anti-Bahá’í acts. Nine of the Bahá’ís identified the clergy, and the tenth identified the clergy and the government together. One Bahá’í commented:

Always the mullás. The mullás have pushed the government to persecute the Bahá’ís. Of course, the soldiers of the government have committed many of the crimes against the Bahá’ís, but it is because the mullás have pushed them to do it. . . . The root of all anti-Bahá’í acts has been with the clergy.

When the Muslims were asked to identify the group or agency most responsible for inciting anti-Bahá’í acts, six identified the clergy alone, or the clergy in conjunction with some other group, and the remaining four did not know which group or agency was most responsible.

Thus virtually all of the Bahá’ís in the sample and about half of the Muslims [Page 33]identified the clergy as being the main group responsible for spreading anti-Bahá’í views and inciting anti-Bahá’í acts—a point of view supported by published historical accounts.²

One cannot, however, ignore the major role of the Iranian governments of the last 145 years in persecuting Bahá’ís. Both the Qájár and Pahlavi shahs passed laws discriminating against Bahá’ís in a wide variety of ways. Furthermore, Iranian governments at various times have taken an active role in inciting and participating in direct physical attacks on Bahá’ís and their property. For example, a major wave of attacks against Bahá’ís took place in 1955. The process began with a series of incendiary sermons at a mosque in Tehran by a leading mullá named Muḥammad Taqi Falsafí. The government then put the national and army radio stations at the mulla’s service, thus spreading his views all over the country. The government announced that it had ordered the suppression of all Bahá’í activities, and government officials took part in a major act of vandalism against the Bahá’í national headquarters by destroying its impressive dome. Douglas Martin, a Bahá’í historian, has noted that

In response to the government’s initiatives, the Ayatollah Behbeháni, second-ranking figure in the hierarchy, heaped praise on the Shah, calling the Iranian army “the Army of Islam” and assuring the authorities that the anniversary of the attacks on the Bahá’í National Centre would henceforth be observed as a religious holiday.

Martin’s account suggests one of the main motives of the government in attacking Bahá’ís—namely, the winning of public support, especially the support of the clergy. The attacks are most likely to occur when the government is politically weak and when it wants to divert attention from some unpopular government act. In 1955 the Shah was weak, having just returned from exile in 1953. He needed public support, and he wanted to divert public attention from his decisions to join the Baghdad Pact and to compensate the shareholders of Anglo-Iranian Oil, which had been nationalized by the Mosaddeq government while the Shah was in exile.³

However, neither the Pahlavi shahs, nor the earlier Qajars, would have had much of a motive in attacking Bahá’ís had it not been for the fact that the clergy was a powerful anti-Bahá’í force the favor of which needed to be curried and for the fact that the clergy, in spreading anti-Bahá’í views, had made anti-Bahá’í acts politically popular.

Not all of the Qájár shahs seemed to have had personal animosity toward the tenets of the Bahá’í Faith, and only the first Pahlavi shah, Reza Shah, seemed to have felt personal hostility against Bahá’ís. Referring to Reza Shah, Martin writes of the

... hostility which the Shah himself appears to have gradually developed towards the Bahá’í community. For him, the monarchy had become the focal point of Iranian life, the fulcrum on which he could lift the nation into the twentieth century. Rezá Shah demanded that those who served him place the monarchy first in their loyalties. He became aware, however, that the loyalty of his Bahá’í subjects was a derived one. Since loyalty to civil authority was one of the tenets of their faith, it was conditioned by that faith. Bahá’í concepts and laws affected the members’ relationship to the monarch in both large questions and small. Highly competent believers would serve readily in the civil service, but refused absolutely to accept political posts. Since the Bahá’í writings forbid the kissing of hands, Bahá’í army officers and civil officials would bend low over the Shah’s hand, but would refrain from

Notes

2. See Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany, New York: State U of New York Press, 1980) 76-80; [Bahá’í International Community], Bahá’ís in Iran 36, 38; Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran, 11-24, 31-66, 77-81; and Momen, Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 141, 237, 253, 285-86, 294, 296-97.

3. See Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran 76-90; and Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran 22. [Page 34]touching it with their lips, as protocol expected them to do.4

The hostility of Reza Shah toward the Bahá’ís seems to have played a significant role in promoting a rather severe period of governmental discrimination against Bahá’ís in the mid-1930s.5 However, in the vast majority of cases, governmental discrimination against Bahá’ís can best be viewed as efforts by the government to win the favor of the clergy or to win political advantage by exploiting the hostility that the clergy had generated in Iranian society against the Bahá’ís. Therefore, it is the Shi’ah clergy, not the government, that must be seen as the primary source of the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran.

4. Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran 18. 5. Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran 18-20. 6. See, for example, Amnesty International, Iran

Reasons for the Prejudice and Discrimination against Bahá’ís

Religious Reasons: The clergy's extreme hostility toward the Bahá’ís is indicative of the important role that religious factors play in explaining the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís. The religious basis of the prejudice and discrimination is also demonstrated by the fact that during the Khomeini regime tremendous efforts were made to force Bahá’ís to recant their faith. These efforts have been well documented in reports of human rights agencies and were mentioned by both the Muslim and Bahá’í interviewees in this study. One young Bahá’í, who had been secretly smuggled out of Iran in 1986, told the following story:

A mullá was very very angry that I was Bahá’í. He came to our house, along with four or five guards. They shot the door to open it. We had pictures of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá [the Son of Bahá’u’lláh, the Prophet-Founder of the Bahá’í Faith, and the authorized interpreter of His Father’s writings]. One was very big. They broke all of them. They took everything about the Bahá’í Faith—pictures, books, things like that. They were ready to take us all to jail, but they didn't. They said that we are just small Bahá’ís and that we don't know anything about the Bahá’í Faith.

They said, "We will give you time—ten days, one month—to change your religion."

And every month or two they would come back to our house and do the same thing.

My parents said, "We are too old. It is too late for us to change our religion."

But they said, "You have children who are still young. It is not too late for them to see the light." They said to me—I was nineteen or twenty—that there is still time for me to become a Muslim.

I said, "No! It is impossible! You can take me anywhere you want, but I will not change."

They spoke very, very bad language.

A Muslim interviewee told of the case of a sister of a close Bahá’í friend of hers who was arrested.

The sister of my [Bahá’í] friend, after the revolution, started working in a company that was owned by a Bahá’í. She was a secretary or something. So, one day they come to her house, and they get her and accused her of having some sort of a relationship with the company owner, who was married. So they get her, and they took with them a lot of her things. For example, she had a guitar. Music is very restricted in Islam, and having a guitar is not the best thing to have. So they got her, and they took her to jail for about twenty-one days or so. And they really hurt her so bad, both physically and psychologically. When she got out, you know, she was really out of her mind for a while. She was hurt! Real crazy. And what I really appreciated about her was that they had tried to force her to deny her faith. They said that if she would deny her faith they would make things much easier for her—release [Page 35]her or something. But she never denied her faith.

One of the most important religious factors responsible for generating hostility toward Bahá’ís is the Qur’anic statement that Muḥammad is the “Seal of the Prophets.” Muslims interpret this title to mean that, although there have been many prophets in the history of the human race, the “door of prophethood” was closed forever by Muḥammad. Bahá’ís, on the contrary, claim that there have been two prophets (or “Messengers of God” as they are called by Bahá’ís) since Muhammad—the Báb, the Prophet-Forerunner of the Bahá’í Faith, and Bahá’u’lláh, the Prophet-Founder of the Bahá’í Faith—and that there will be others in the future.

Bahá’ís believe that Muslims misunderstand the phrase “Seal of the Prophets” and that Muhammad did not claim there would be no future Messengers of God. Bahá’u’lláh explained that, since there is an essential unity among all of the Messengers of God, all of them could rightly claim to be the first and the last. All could rightly claim to be the “Seal of the Prophets.” Regarding Muhammad, Bahá’u’lláh wrote:

Hath not Muḥammad, Himself, declared: “I am all the Prophets?” Hath He not said as We have already mentioned: “I am Adam, Noah, Moses, and Jesus?” Why should Muḥammad, that immortal Beauty, Who hath said: “I am the first Adam” be incapable of saying also: “I am the last Adam”? For even as He regarded Himself to be the “First of the Prophets”—that is Adam—in like manner, the “Seal of the Prophets” is also applicable unto that Divine Beauty. It is admittedly obvious that being the “First of the Prophets,” He likewise is their “Seal.”7

Muḥammad can also be seen as the “Seal of the Prophets” in the sense that He was the last Messenger of God in the six-thousand-year-old Adamic Cycle (also called the Prophetic Cycle). The declaration of the Báb marked the beginning of the Bahá’í Cycle (also called the Cycle of Fulfillment).8

The Bahá’í explanations are rejected by both the Shi’ah and Sunni branches of Islam. The Báb and Bahá’u’lláh are considered by Muslims to be imposters, their followers to be infidels, and the Bahá’í Faith to be a misguided social or political movement. As a result, the Bahá’í Faith has no protection under Iranian law. In the current Iranian constitution, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians are protected as member of recognized religions but not the Bahá’ís, the largest religious minority in Iran.

All of the Bahá’ís in the sample and eight of the ten Muslims considered the issue of Muḥammad’s being considered by Muslims as the “Seal of the Prophets” to be extremely important in explaining the hostility of Muslims toward the Bahá’í Faith. Three of the Bahá’ís and three of the Muslims considered it to be the most important reason, and an additional two Bahá’ís and two Muslims viewed this factor as tied with another for being the most important.

Two of the Muslims, however, thought that Muhammad’s being considered the “Seal of the Prophets” was not at all important. These individuals were both raised in the same town in Iran and are convinced that Bahá’u’lláh claimed to be the Twelfth Imám and not a prophet. Since, in their view, Bahá’u’lláh did not claim to be a prophet, there is no conflict with Muḥammad’s claim to be the “Seal of the Prophets.” One of the two put it this way:

When Bahá’u’lláh made his claim in Iran, he did not claim that he was a prophet. He claimed that he was the Twelfth Imám. He did not question the validity of Muhammad saying that He [Muhammad] was

7. Bahá’u’lláh, The Kitáb-i-lgán: The Book of Certitude, trans. Shoghi Effendi, 2d ed. (Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1950) 162. 8. The Báb, Selections from the Writings of the Báb, comp. Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, trans. Habib Taherzadeh et al. (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1976) 161, and Bahá’u’lláh, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh: Selected Letters, 2d ed. (Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1974) 102-04, 166-67. [Page 36]the final prophet. He claimed to be the Twelfth Imám of the Shí’ah Faith.

These two individuals are incorrect in their belief that Bahá’u’lláh claimed to be the Twelfth Imám and did not claim to be a prophet. Nevertheless, the issue of the Twelfth Imám is extremely important in explaining the hostility of the Iranian Muslims toward the Bahá’í Faith.

Shi’ah Muslims believe that the divine line of descent from Muḥammad includes Muḥammad’s son-in-law ‘Alí, ‘Alí’s two sons Ḥasan and Husayn, and their nine successors. These twelve individuals are referred to by Shi’ahs as Imáms, a usage of the term that is more specific than the way the term is used by Sunnís.

Imáms are not prophets since they do not have the power to reveal God’s law. They do, however, have the power to guide mankind by upholding and interpreting the divine law.

The last of the Imáms, the Twelfth Imám, vanished from sight in the ninth century (the third century of the Islamic calendar) and is believed by Shi’ahs to have been put in hiding by God to protect him from his enemies.

Shi’ahs believe that the Twelfth Imám still lives and that he continues, from his hiding place, to control the affairs of the human race. One day he will return in the role of the Mihdi, the divinely guided restorer of the Faith who will establish a reign of righteousness and justice throughout the world. This belief is so central that the Faith is often referred to as Twelver Shí’ísm.

Bahá’u’lláh did not claim to be the returned Twelfth Imám, but the Báb did make that claim, as well as claiming to be a prophet. Bahá’u’lláh, Who had been a follower of the Báb, supported the Báb in both of these claims.

Contemporary Muslims in Iran regularly confuse Bahá’u’lláh with the Báb. One of the Muslim interviewees commented: “There is no question that people don’t particularly know Who was the Báb and Who was Bahá’u’lláh, but they just think that whoever came up with this new idea [that the Twelfth Imám has already returned] is wrong.”

Although Muslims in Iran may be unclear about whom the Bahá’ís identify as the Twelfth Imám, many of the Muslims, nevertheless, correctly perceive that Bahá’ís claim that the Twelfth Imám has already returned. This Muslims reject as a preposterous lie. One of the two Muslim respondents who thought Bahá’u’lláh was not claiming to be a prophet said:

Respondent: “I never had the view that either the Báb or Bahá’u’lláh was claiming to be a new prophet.”

Interviewer: “But it was your understanding that the Báb or Bahá’u’lláh was claiming to be the Twelfth Imám?”

Respondent: “Yes, that’s right.”

Interviewer: “Do you remember which one was claiming to be the Twelfth Imám?”

Respondent: “I never really did know the difference, no. I still have confusion. I don’t know which one is which.”

Interviewer: “So, you saw Bahá’ís as the ones who were claiming that the Twelfth Imám had returned?”

Respondent: “That’s right.”

Interviewer: “And you felt that was a fraudulent claim?”

Respondent: “Right.”

According to the Shi’ah belief system, the Twelfth Imám will return shortly before the final Day of Judgment. At that time the Twelfth Imám, as the Mihdi, will have a final victorious confrontation with evil. Because the Shi’ahs believe there has not been a final apocalyptic battle with evil nor a final Day of Judgment and since looking forward to the return of the Twelfth Imám is such a central part of their belief, the Shi’ah Muslims’ disagreement with Bahá’ís is fundamental in explaining their hostility toward the Bahá’í Faith. Seven of the ten Bahá’í respondents and seven of the ten Muslims identified the different understandings about the return of the Twelfth Imám as a very important factor in explaining the hostility. One of the Bahá’ís and three of the Muslims identified it as the most important factor, and an additional two Bahá’ís and one Muslim ranked it as tied for [Page 37]first place with the issue of Muhammad's being the Seal of the Prophets.

Regarding the two issues of the Seal of the Prophets and the Twelfth Imám, most of the Bahá’í and Muslim respondents tended to agree about their importance. However, there was not agreement between the Bahá’ís and Muslims regarding the importance of two other religious factors.

Devout Muslims believe that Islam con- tains all the spiritual guidance that the hu- man race will ever need. Therefore, to convert from Islam to any other faith is considered apostasy and a crime against God that is wor- thy of death. Such individuals are considered mahdúr al-damm (those whose blood may be shed with impunity). Although a significant minority of Bahá’ís in Iran have been con- verted to the Bahá’í Faith from Christianity, Judaism, or Zoroastrianism, the great major- ity of Bahá’ís in Iran are of Muslim back- grounds. They, or their ancestors, were con- verted from Islam. The fact that Bahá’ís are seen by Muslims in Iran as apostates who have turned their backs on God and on Islam cer- tainly contributes to the hostility of Muslims toward Bahá’ís.

All ten Muslims in the sample considered the Bahá’ís’ conversion from Islam to be im- portant in explaining hostility toward Bahá’ís. One considered it the most important reason, and another considered it tied with another factor for first place in importance. Only three of the Bahá’ís, however, considered the factor important, and none considered it the most important of the factors. One of the three Bahá’ís who did consider it important was himself converted from Islam to the Bahá’í Faith as a young man and still has a number of Bahá’í family members in Iran who had been converted to the Bahá’í Faith during their adult life. This individual made the fol- lowing comment:

During the revolution, people who were born Muslim and became Bahá’ís suffered more than those who were born into a Bahá’í family. And that had to do with their conversion. Those who were born in Bahá’í homes were considered lost people born to lost families. But, "You Mus- lims-why did you do that?!"

The Bahá’ís and Muslims in the sample also disagreed on the significance, for Bahá’í/ Muslim relationships, of the fact that Bahá’u’lláh asserted that the clergy is no longer needed. The Bahá’ís in the sample felt that the factor is important in explaining the hos- tility of the Muslim clergy toward the Bahá’í Faith, while the Muslims considered the fac- tor relatively unimportant.

Bahá’u’lláh proclaimed that the seeking of spiritual truth should now be an individual pursuit. In the past, when few people had education or could read, the clergy was nec- essary to interpret the prophet’s message. But in the modern world, Bahá’u’lláh explained, the human race has moved beyond the need for such assistance. Thus the Bahá’í Faith has no clergy, although it does have democrati- cally elected office holders who perform ad- ministrative functions at the local, national, and international levels.

Bahá’u’lláh’s teaching about not needing clergy directly challenges the Shi'ah doctrine of taqlid and, if followed, would leave the Shi'ah clergy without employment. Martin explains that

The mainspring of Shi'ism is the doctrine of taqlid or imitation. The average man, dependent for salvation on right action but lacking the time or capacity for the nec- essary study of quranic law, stands in dire need of spiritual guidance. He fills this need by finding a spiritual guide to imi- tate, one whose life and learning demon- strate the necessary level of attainment. It is the clergy who perform this role for the masses and who are themselves followers of still more perfect mentors in the hier- archy of mujtahids and ayatollahs above them. If, however, imitation of others is no longer the path to spiritual progress, the entire ecclesiastical structure and the vast system of endowments, benefices, and fees which sustains it no longer have a rea- son for existence. These practical impli- cations, together with Bahá’í theological and social principles, were seen by the [Page 38]‘ulamá as leading to the dismantling of the familiar world they dominated and in which they were totally invested."

Seven of the ten Bahá’ís in the sample considered the Bahá’í belief about the abolition of the clergy very important in explaining the hostility in Iran toward the Bahá’í Faith. Four considered it the most important factor, especially in explaining the hostility of the Muslim clergy. One commented that "the financial thing, and the prestige of being a clergyman, is more important than the idea of Muḥammad being the Seal of the Prophets." Another Bahá’í said, "For the [Shi‘ah] clergy the most important thing is their own welfare. They don't care if the Twelfth Imám has come or will come—they don't care. They just want their job." However, only two of the Muslims thought this factor was important, and neither of these rated it first or second in importance.

The Bahá’is in the sample argued that the Muslim clerics in Iran have a strong financial interest in making sure that the Bahá’í Faith never becomes too large, since their jobs would then be in jeopardy. Their financial interest, they argue, motivates them to find other religious and non-religious bases for criticizing the Bahá’í Faith.

Three of the Bahá’ís in the sample also volunteered the view that Muslim clerics in Iran often try to promote attendance at the mosques where they preach by denouncing the Bahá’ís. This, it was pointed out, also promotes their own financial well-being. One of the Bahá’ís put it thus:

The clergy have a very direct interest in keeping people ignorant because they make a chunk of money in the ceremonies they have. They want people to come to the mosques, so the best thing they can do is find a common enemy. So they find some Bahá’ís, and they say "Let's go shoot them. Let's go ridicule them. Let's go burn their houses." They get a lot of adherents that way. So they have very much an interest in that.

9. Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran 13-14.

Islam's emphasis on the role of the clergy has both religious and economic ramifications, which leads naturally to a discussion of economic reasons for the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís.

Economic Reasons

Many of the more wealthy Bahá’ís who could get their money out of the country did so when the Revolution seemed immiment. After the Revolution, many of the more affluent and well-known Bahá’ís who were not killed or imprisoned fled for their lives, leaving their wealth behind to be confiscated by the government. A great many of the Bahá’ís who have stayed in the country have been fired from their jobs or had their businesses taken from them. Property and retirement funds owned by the Bahá’í community of Iran have been confiscated, and Bahá’í children are prevented from obtaining higher education. As a result of the economic restrictions, the socioeconomic standing of the Bahá’ís in Iran has declined precipitously since the Revolution.

However, it appears that before the Revolution most Iranian Bahá’ís were doing fairly well economically. The Bahá’í and Muslim respondents in this study claimed that, despite the prevalence of poverty in Iran, few Bahá’ís were extremely poor. At the other end of the scale, only a tiny minority were extremely rich. All respondents asserted that the majority of Bahá’ís were middle class or upper-middle class, and that this is how Iranian Bahá’ís were viewed by most Iranian Muslims.

Perhaps one reason why the Bahá’ís apparently did so well economically is that the Bahá’í Faith puts a very strong emphasis on education. Before Reza Shah closed all Bahá’í schools in the country in the mid-1930s, they were widely respected for their excellence. Cabinet ministers, and even Reza Shah himself, sent their children to the Bahá’í school in Tehran. Although the Bahá’í community has been denied the right to run its own schools since the 1930s, Bahá’í youngsters have continued to distinguish themselves [Page 39]academically at public schools and at Christian and Zoroastrian schools.

Another tenet of the Bahá’í Faith that probably has promoted the economic prosperity of the Bahá’í community is the concept of work as worship. William Sears, a noted Bahá’í teacher, explains that Bahá’ís believe that "daily work, whatever it may be, when carried out to the very best of their ability, and in service to their fellow men, when performed with skill, trust and integrity, is the very finest kind of prayer."10 This belief tends to promote hard work and integrity that has benefited Bahá’ís economically.

The unity of the Bahá’ís in Iran was also important in supporting the Bahá’í community's economic standing. Bahá’ís in Iran generally try to help each other as best they can. For example, if a Bahá’í family is suffering from unemployment, other Bahá’ís will try to help them find a job.

With unity, a strong emphasis on academic excellence, and hard work, the Bahá’í community of Iran generally prospered economically. Many Bahá’ís went into the helping professions, especially medicine. Some served in the military or the civil service, but probably the largest number went into private business.

One of the economic issues explored in this study was whether Muslims might be jealous or resentful of the financial prosperity of the Bahá’í community before the Revolution. Only two of the Bahá’ís and none of the Muslims thought there was a general feeling of jealousy or resentment toward the majority of Bahá’ís. Although it is possible that the respondents are underestimating the extent of jealousy or resentment, at least it can be said that the findings do not seem to indicate that such jealousy has been a major factor in promoting hostility toward Bahá’ís.

However, many Muslims in Iran are hostile, resentful, or jealous of the relatively few Bahá’ís who were extremely wealthy before the Revolution. When Bahá’ís discuss the small minority of Iranian Bahá’ís who were extremely wealthy, they prefer to talk about someone like ‘Abdu’l-Mitháq Mitháqiyyih, a humble man who lived modestly and gave a great deal of money to the Bahá’í Faith. Mitháqiyyih also financed the building of an excellent hospital in Tehran, a rest home that was attached to it, and a nursing home in the countryside near Tehran. These were built primarily for the Bahá’í community and were managed by the Bahá’ís, but they were open to people of all religions.

Mitháqiyyih certainly did not engage in conspicuous consumption, but there were some wealthy Bahá’ís who did. One of these was an extremely wealthy Bahá’í financier who rode in chauffeured limousines, had private body guards, and wore large diamond rings. The report of the Minority Rights Group describes him as one "with a reputation for questionable business dealings," who "became extremely unpopular," and whose banks "were special targets in the 1978 riots."11 Another wealthy Bahá’í owned a number of large business ventures. He built a house that one of the Bahá’í interviewees in this study described as "exactly like Versailles, though smaller."

Conspicuous consumption is not consistent with the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith. Bahá’u’lláh counsels against focusing one's life on the material pleasures of this world, although He forbids asceticism. Therefore, the conspicuous consumption of some Bahá’ís made many others uncomfortable.

Both the Bahá’í and Muslim respondents were asked whether Muslims in Iran, before the Revolution, had a tendency to stereotype Bahá’ís as being guilty of conspicuous consumption. Among the Bahá’ís, three said yes, six said no, and one did not know. Among the Muslims, one said yes, and nine said no. Thus the majority of both Muslims and Bahá’ís thought conspicuous consumption was not a problem. Most thought that the number of wealthy Bahá’ís who were engaging in

10. Sears, Cry from the Heart 34-35. 11. Minority Rights Group, Bahá’ís of Iran 10. [Page 40]conspicuous consumption was so small compared to the number of wealthy Muslims who were exhibiting such behavior that the Bahá’ís in general were not stereotyped by Muslims as being guilty of this.

However, the responses of those who did think that Muslims stereotyped Bahá’ís as guilty of conspicuous consumption were interesting. One Bahá’í commented:

When society is rotten, whoever lives in that society is influenced by it in one way or another. In Iran there was a lot of oil money, and oil money contaminated the atmosphere of Iran. Lots and lots of people became very rich very quickly. Among them were some Bahá’ís, although the majority were Muslims. So, when all of a sudden you have this excessive wealth, it is easy to forget one's other duties. So, you have too much money, you travel to the West, you buy expensive jewelry, you show off to other people. That is what deteriorated the Bahá’í community in Iran, because some Bahá’ís definitely got too much involved in wealth, and that caused resentment by many other Bahá’ís. I think that what happened in Iran with Khomeini was one of the best things that could have happened to the Bahá’í community, because it started purifying the Bahá’í community—getting it back to the basics.

This Bahá’í, of course, recognized that the Khomeini regime had, in other ways, been a disaster for the Bahá’í community, but he did see a silver lining on the dark cloud.

Another Bahá’í commented as follows regarding the conspicuous consumption of some of the wealthy Bahá’ís:

When I went back to Iran [in 1978] it was really bothering me that at some of these Bahá’í gatherings [at Bahá’í homes] there might be a room with two hundred people sitting. It was so huge that two hundred people could sit down at the same time in a single room. And the jewelry and the cars! And one day I talked to somebody and I said: "I am sorry, but when I was reading the Old Testament, and reading about a time when the Jewish people were engaged so much with material things that he [God] warned them and something happened." I said: "I see the exact same thing now. This is not what the Bahá’í Faith wants from us. This is not the correct way to live." And everyone among the Iranians was laughing and saying that I had become Americanized.

This same Bahá’í had the following comment regarding Muslim perceptions of the mansion that one of the wealthy Bahá’ís had built:

This is one of the reasons why people were bad to Bahá’ís, because they said that these Bahá’ís steal from us and they make these palaces. That was the only thing that Muslims in Tehran were talking about. It was something that was catching the eye of everyone.

It seems quite possible that this interviewee is correct and that the majority of the other interviewees were underestimating the degree to which hostility toward a few flashy Bahá’í millionaires colored the perspective of Muslims toward the Bahá’í community as a whole.

There is evidence that many Muslims believe the Bahá’í community, in the time of the Shah, used some of its money to bribe poorer people into becoming Bahá’ís. This was mentioned by both a Bahá’í and a Muslim interviewee. The Bahá’í commented: "Some Muslims thought that when a poor person becomes a Bahá’í, the Bahá’ís give them money." The Muslim said,

Among the non-Bahá’í students at Tehran University it was believed that Bahá’ís go to India and Africa, and they have money, and that's one way to attract people to the Bahá’í Faith, by giving them money. It was also believed by the people in our neighborhood that the neighbor who lived across the street from us was bribed into becoming a Bahá’í. Before he became a Bahá’í his economic situation was not good, but after he became a Bahá’í his situation improved. People in the neighborhood believed that the Bahá’ís had bought his house for him, and everything else.

The interviewees were asked whether Bahá’ís, before the Revolution, were [Page 41]stereotyped as being members of a particular occupation. The Bahá’í and Muslim responses were almost identical. Eight members of each group said that there was no such stereotype. Of the two remaining Bahá’ís, one thought that Bahá’ís were stereotyped as businessmen, and one thought they were stereotyped as high government officials. Of the two remaining Muslims, one thought that Bahá’ís were stereotyped as high government officials, and one did not know. Thus, according to the respondents in this study, Bahá’ís were not generally seen as rich businessmen, although Jews were stereotyped in this way.

In 1958, William O. Douglas, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice, wrote the following regarding the reputation of Bahá’í businessmen in Iran:

The Bahá’ís have many businessmen among their numbers. They enjoy a fine reputation as merchants. The reason is that they maintain a high ethical standard in all their dealings. Merchants in the bazaar are quick to take advantage; they will cheat and palm off false or inferior goods. Never the Bahá’ís. They are scrupulous in their dealings; and as a result they grow in prestige.¹²

In order to determine whether Douglas’ characterization of the public image of Bahá’í businessmen is accurate and whether the image has continued in more recent times, each interviewee was asked whether there has been a stereotype in Iran regarding whether Bahá’í businessmen are honest and trustworthy or dishonest and untrustworthy. Among the Bahá’ís, nine thought that Bahá’í businessmen were generally seen as honest and trustworthy, while one thought that there was no general public image of Bahá’í businessmen. Among the Muslims, five thought that they were seen as honest and trustworthy, three thought that there was no general public image, and two did not know. Thus none of the respondents thought that Bahá’í businessmen were generally seen as being dishonest, untrustworthy, exploitative, or sneaky. One Muslim commented, “I was a businessman when I lived in Tehran. I always trusted Bahá’ís very much. They were very honest people. If you were going to make a deal, you did not have to watch it, be careful, or read the contract carefully.”

Khomeini’s government charged that Bahá’í businessmen during the time of the Shah generally made excessive profits in an underhanded way, often with the help of the Shah—a type of business referred to as “profiteering.” Eight of the Bahá’í interviewees thought that there was no truth to this charge whatsoever, but two of the Bahá’ís thought that it might apply to a very small minority of wealthy Bahá’í businessmen. Five of the Muslim interviewees thought that there was no truth to the charge, four did not know, and one thought that some Bahá’í businessmen might have been guilty of profiteering, but to no greater degree than were the Muslim businessmen.

A few rich Bahá’ís are seen by many Muslims in Iran as having been guilty of profiteering, but apparently the majority of Muslims do not see Bahá’í businessmen in general as having been guilty of such activity. Indeed, there seems to be a substantial amount of respect in Iran for Bahá’í businessmen. The hostility toward one Bahá’í businessman was based more on the fact that he had close ties with the Shah than on the fact that he was wealthy, engaged in conspicuous consumption, or was excessively aggressive in his dealings. Thus it appears that economic reasons have not played a particularly important role in explaining the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran. They are far less important than religious reasons and less important also than political reasons.

Political Reasons: Khomeini’s government claimed that the Bahá’í Faith was not really a religion at all but rather a political movement that was originally created by the British for the purpose of promoting their colonial ambitions by bringing disunity to the Ira-

12. William O. Douglas, West of the Indus (New York: Doubleday, 1958), quoted in Sears, Cry from the Heart 35. [Page 42]nian people. This charge, which long predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is given great credence by a high percentage of Iranians, especially the more highly educated.

The interviewees were asked whether they thought there was any truth to the charge that the Bahá’í Faith is a political movement. All of the Bahá’ís said there was absolutely no truth in it. Half of the Muslims, however, indicated that they thought there was at least some truth in the charge. Four said they did not think there was any truth to it; the remaining Muslim did not know. One of the Muslims who thought there was some truth to the charge merely said the following: "I think that might be true, not because they were created by the British, but rather because the nature of the Bahá’í Faith, with its call for the unity of humankind, has some political connotations." However, some of the other Muslims went much further. For example, one Muslim responded by saying:

I think so. Any organization in a disorganized society can be used and will be used. It will not go to waste. Also, you would hear of Bahá’í conventions in London, and ties with the British system, that would indicate that this organization has relations with a foreign country and a foreign power. And, again, the principle that a foreign power is not going to let an organization go to waste. They are going to use it, and it will be used for the interests of the foreign power.

This interviewee was asked the follow-up question: "Does this anger you, or make you think poorly of the Bahá’í Faith?" He responded: "No, not at all. I think it is only fair game." This individual has a quite tolerant view of the Bahá’í Faith, yet still believes the charge.

One Muslim interviewee, who at an earlier point in the interview had commented that in his youth he had seen the Bahá’í Faith as primarily a political movement, was asked whether he still saw it in that light. He responded:

Yes. As a matter of fact I see it more now. I think that the English had something to do with it. I think it was the English who started the whole thing, wanting to bring fracture between the religions. That's what I believe. I think the same thing is true today with Khomeini coming to power. When asked which foreign power he thinks has been responsible for bringing Khomeini to power, he responded: "I think it is the English."

Regarding the claim that the Bahá’í Faith was a creation of the British, Peter Smith, a Bahá’í historian, has written that it is unsupported by documentary evidence, is (at the least) historically and logistically unlikely, and is vehemently denied by the Bahá’ís. Nevertheless, the style of thinking which it exemplifies is readily understandable given the actual extent of foreign meddling in Iranian affairs. 13

13. Peter Smith, The Babi and Bahá’í Religions, 1844-1944: From Messianic Shi’ism to a World Religion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge U Press, 1987) 179.

Smith's comment that this "style of thinking" is "readily understandable" is an important point. Because of past foreign meddling, Iranians tend to see foreign political conspiracies everywhere. However, their tendency to see themselves as the victims of conspiracies is also something that is promoted by the Shi’ah Faith. It is part of what might be called a Shi’ah world view and reflects the experiences of Shi’ahs in previous centuries of being persecuted by Sunnís. Moojan Momen, another Bahá’í historian, quotes Gustav Thaiss as follows:

The environment (in the broadest sense) to an Iranian Shi’a is seen as threatening, a perception in which the directionality involved is from the environment toward the person, so that he is viewed as an effect, and various external factors as cause. A person in such a cultural situation would not likely hold himself accountable when things go wrong and would generally react by turning anger and hostility outward to- [Page 43]

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BAHÁ’ÍS

ward others perceived Sunní oppressors, an arbitrary and unjust government, imperialists, agents of change and modernization, minority groups such as Jews, Bahá’í etc. 14

Because of such thinking, Iranian Muslims were inclined to believe the Khomeini government's claims that the Bahá’ís were political allies of the Shah. When the respondents in this study were asked whether they thought there was any truth in the charge that Bahá’ís were political allies of the Shah, all ten Bahá’ís said that there was no truth whatsoever in that charge. The Muslims, however, were not so sure. Three thought that there was truth in the charge, three did not know, and only four were confident that there was no truth to the charge. One of the Muslims said, "I think that was true, because it makes sense. If you have an organization that is getting along pretty well with the ruling party, they must be friends. If you are not friends, you are enemies in countries like Iran."

After talking about "the close tie of the Bahá’ís in general with the Shah's regime," one of the Muslim respondents stressed that being a Bahá’í was a definite advantage in terms of getting a job in the Shah's civil service:

Interviewer: "So, becoming a Bahá’í opened certain doors in the Shah's regime?"

Respondent: "Sure."

Interviewer: "What kind of opportunities would be opened?"

Respondent: "Well, if you wanted to get a job in a certain office, in a certain place, and if the head of that particular organization was Bahá’í, or was a Bahá’í sympathizer, if you were Bahá’í you had a better chance of getting it."

Interviewer: "And was this fairly common in the civil service under the Shah's regime?"

Respondent: "Yes. And consequently, when Bahá’ís had a sort of special relationship with the Shah and his family, it was advantageous to be Bahá’í. I'm not really using that as something to make Bahá’ís look bad or ugly or anything. It was just a fact."

Throughout the last Shah's years in power, Bahá’ís were discriminated against in employment. This was true not only in getting jobs at private companies owned by Muslims but also in getting positions in the civil service. The discrimination occurred with the full knowledge and approval of the Shah, and the Shah's secret police, SAVAK, enforced the discriminatory rules against Bahá’ís. And yet the Shah did have a special relationship with a few Bahá’ís, and Bahá’ís were placed in a number of important civil service positions. The Shah's personal physician and his pilot were Bahá’ís. The head of the national airlines was a Bahá’í, as were high officials in other important agencies such as the Seven Year Plan Organization, the Ministry of Education, and the army's purchasing department.

The Shah did not put Bahá’ís in key positions because he was a Bahá’í (as was sometimes rumored) or because he loved the Bahá’í Faith and wanted to reward its members. Rather, according to the Bahá’í respondents in the study, he did so because he believed he could trust them not to plot his overthrow and not to participate in graft and corruption. Thus he placed them in positions close to him where his personal safety was at stake and in positions where the pressure and temptation to accept bribes were very great. For example, the Bahá’í who was head of the army's purchasing department controlled a multibillion dollar budget and could easily have become a millionaire in a short time by accepting bribes from companies that wanted to supply the army, but the Shah knew he could count on the Bahá’í not to accept bribes.

The accepting of bribes was extremely common throughout Iran, but Bahá’ís had a well-earned reputation for not participating in the custom. One of the Bahá’í interview-

14. Gustav Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism..." 230, quoted in Momen, Introduction to Shi'i Islam 237. [Page 44]ees' brother was vice-president of Iran Air and in charge of awarding all of the contracts for building airport terminals, hotels, and other facilities at airports. This interviewee commented:

My brother could have quickly become a millionaire in the job he had at Iran Air, because he was in charge of awarding all of these contracts. And each of these companies were willing to give bribes of hundreds of thousands of dollars to him in order that he accept their offers. But the reason the Shah appointed a Bahá’í as president of Iran Air, and the reason he appointed my brother as vice-president, is because the Shah was sure that they would not accept one penny as a bribe.

The Bahá’ís were, in fact, trustworthy not only because of the extremely strong emphasis within the Bahá’í Faith on honesty, trustworthiness, and performing work in the spirit of worship but also because a central tenet of the Bahá’í Faith is loyalty to government. Engaging in subversive activity is strictly forbidden.

Muslims in Iran were far more aware of Bahá’ís in key positions than they were of employment discrimination against the majority of Bahá’ís. Thus they readily believed the claims of the clergy that Bahá’ís were political allies of the Shah and that Bahá’ís in general were favored by the Shah and given special privileges. They also widely believed completely erroneous claims, including claims that Prime Minister Hoveida was a Bahá’í and that high officials in SAVAK were Bahá’ís. Although they were not directly asked about Hoveida, two of the Muslim interviewees volunteered the misinformation that Hoveida was a Bahá’í.

Although much that is believed by Iranian Muslims regarding the role of Bahá’ís in the late Shah's administration is false, clearly a few Bahá’ís did hold important positions. And yet Bahá’ís sincerely believe that they were not politically involved in the Shah's regime. The Muslims view the Bahá’ís’ claim of innocence as ridiculous. To serve in key positions in the Shah's administration is a political act, they claim, even if those positions are not overtly political in nature. The Muslims who take this view and who denounce Bahá’ís and the Bahá’í Faith on the basis of this argument, conveniently forget that the Shah was himself a Muslim and that the vast majority of the people in his administration were Muslim. Nevertheless, such Muslims have a point.

Bahá’ís disagree—partly because Muslims use the term "political" more broadly than do Bahá’ís. Bahá’ís are forbidden to engage in partisan political activity, although the Bahá’í writings are not specific in delineating forbidden political activities. In Iran Bahá’ís interpret the injunction to mean that they cannot join a political party, engage in political campaigning, participate in any political movement, or hold an office that is clearly political in nature. As long as such guidelines are not violated, Bahá’ís can claim with a clear conscience that they were not politically involved in the Shah's regime. Indeed, they follow the guidelines rigidly. One of the Bahá’ís who was interviewed had held the position of Deputy Director of the Iran National Tourist Organization. At one point he was required to join the Shah's "Resurgence Party." Rather than do so, he resigned his post. A few Bahá’ís, including this particular individual, were offered ministerial positions but turned them down because the positions were political in nature.

Muslims, however, did not know about these guidelines. They merely saw that Bahá’ís, real or imagined, were in key positions in the Shah's administration, and they concluded, with the encouragement of the clergy, that the Bahá’ís were political allies and supporters of the Shah.

The tenet of the Bahá’í Faith that forbids its members to engage in partisan political activity, either in support of or in opposition to the existing government, also led Muslims to deduce that Bahá’ís were supporters of the Shah. Just before and during the revolution, the country was so politicized that any group not actively opposing the Shah was viewed as supporting the Shah. [Page 45]One final political issue that must be mentioned is the clergy’s claim that Bahá’ís are either spies for or agents of Zionism. The falsity of this claim has been addressed adequately elsewhere.¹⁵

Although the charge is fallacious, Iranian Muslims give it a good deal of credence. The Bahá’ís and Muslims in this study all agreed that many Iranians believe it, although only two of the Muslims personally gave the charge much credence.

Taken as a whole, the political factors contributing to the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran seem important. The political charges against the Bahá’ís have been powerful weapons in the campaign against them, especially in the context of contemporary revolutionary Iran. They have been more important in generating and maintaining hostility against the Bahá’ís than have the economic factors, but they have not been as important as the religious factors. The political charges against the Bahá’ís should be seen more as powerful weapons against the Bahá’ís than as fundamental reasons for the long-term prejudice and discrimination against them.

Sociocultural Reasons: How is the average Bahá’í, as an individual human being, viewed by Muslims in Iran? The answer to this question varies significantly with educational level and with extent of contact with Bahá’ís.

The Bahá’ís and Muslims in this study agreed that, as a general rule, the less-educated Muslims are more influenced by the clergy and are, therefore, more likely to harbor a variety of negative and false stereotypes about Bahá’ís—for example, that Bahá’ís are sexually promiscuous, that they marry close relatives, that they are contemptuous of Islam, or that they somehow trick Muslims into becoming Bahá’ís. This last belief is one of the reasons that less-educated parents teach their children to stay away from Bahá’ís and refrain from talking to them or associating with them in any way. As a result, less-educated Muslims have less contact with Bahá’ís and thus less of an opportunity to learn that their stereotypes are false.

The mobs that sometimes physically attack Bahá’ís or their property are most likely to be made up of less-educated Muslims, although better-educated Muslims, along with the clergy, may play a role in inciting the mob to action. Mob action, as well as the verbal taunting of Bahá’ís, is, therefore, more likely in the lower-class or working-class neighborhoods of the larger cities and in the villages and smaller towns where the overall education level is low. One Bahá’í commented: “I grew up in a good part of Tehran, but I always used to hear that in the south of Tehran, whenever Bahá’í men and women and children would come out of their houses, the neighbors would run after them and insult them.”

More highly educated Muslims are far less likely to believe the more far-fetched rumors, such as that Bahá’ís have tails. Since they tend to be more secular, they have not been as influenced by the anti-Bahá’í views of the clergy and are less concerned about the possibility of Bahá’ís “tricking” them into joining the Bahá’í Faith. They also tend to have a great deal more personal contact with Bahá’ís, which further breaks down the negative stereotypes. Most Iranian Muslims with at least some college education, as well as less-educated Muslims who may have had, for whatever reasons, more personal contact with Bahá’ís, generally see Bahá’ís as honest, trustworthy, polite, friendly, and decent people.

Such positive attitudes toward individual Bahá’ís seem odd, particularly considering all that has been said about religious, economic, and political conceptions about them. It is a strange paradox of Muslim/Bahá’í relationships in Iran that even those Muslims who view the Bahá’í Faith in a highly negative light may, nevertheless, like Bahá’ís personally. The two Muslims in this study who were the most critical of the Bahá’í Faith nevertheless commented on how much they enjoy

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15. Martin, Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran 40; Minority Rights Group, Bahá’ís of Iran 10–11. [Page 46]socializing with the Iranian Bahá’ís in the Chattanooga metropolitan area. One said:

The group of Bahá’ís here are the finest, and I enjoy visiting them and being with them, but I never would want to discuss religion with them because I am afraid that would ruin the relationship. But I wonder why they should be Bahá’í. I don’t really know.

One of the Bahá’ís commented that Muslim friends in Iran used to “tell us ‘You are a very good people, but it is such a pity that you are Bahá’í.’ And then I would laugh and say ‘That is why we are good. If we were not Bahá’í, we would be just like all the others.’”

A few of the Bahá’ís made the point that even Muslim neighbors who usually seem quite friendly can be induced to commit anti-Bahá’í acts if the social pressures on them are great enough. One of the Bahá’ís, whose parents’ home had been burned to the ground, told the following story:

People came to our house and destroyed everything. When my father came home, he found nothing but ashes. They had even taken our dishes to their own homes. But a few months later, a few of them came to apologize for their wrongdoing, and to ask what they could do to support our family. They said that they had been misguided and lied to by the mullás.

Some Muslims who view Bahá’ís as being nice, friendly people, nevertheless distrust that friendliness because they suspect that it is a tactic used to persuade Muslims to become Bahá’ís. Three of the Muslims in this study and one of the Bahá’ís volunteered the view that many Muslims distrust the friendliness of Bahá’ís, even though they may at the same time appreciate it. One Muslim commented that “They [Muslims] think they [Bahá’ís] are doing this [being friendly] to convert you to the Bahá’í Faith. But, nevertheless, they like them for the kind things that they do. But they are sort of cautious about it.” These Muslims are partly right, since Bahá’ís do generally believe that being kind and considerate is an important way of attracting people to their religion. One Bahá’í, who had commented that Bahá’ís in Iran are generally very kind and considerate to Muslims, said, “We thought that we should be like that because of what ‘Abdu’l-Bahá told us that deeds are important for teaching and everything—much more important than speaking. That’s why we always try to be good with them, nice with them.”

But the desire to teach people about the Bahá’í Faith through example and the desire to win converts to the Bahá’í Faith is neither the only nor the most important reason a Bahá’í might be friendly. Being kind and friendly to all people is highly stressed in the Bahá’í writings not merely as a tool for converting others to the Bahá’í Faith but as something that is extremely important and valuable in its own right.

One of the reasons some Muslims may be suspicious about the motives behind Bahá’í friendliness is that many Muslims see Bahá’ís as too oriented toward converting others. One of the Muslims in this study said that “a major project of every Bahá’í in life is to have more people join their ranks”; another said:

People thought that Bahá’ís always wanted to convert Muslims to become Bahá’ís. They used to think that Bahá’ís gave people money to convert to the Bahá’í Faith. People did not want their teenagers to go out with Bahá’ís because they felt that their teenage children might be influenced to become Bahá’ís.

Another issue that was examined is the degree to which Bahá’ís are seen by Muslims as supercilious or condescending toward Muslims. The Bahá’ís were asked whether Iranian Bahá’ís generally felt themselves to be superior to Iranian Muslims. Six of the Bahá’ís said that they thought that Iranian Bahá’ís generally did feel superior, while four said that they generally felt equal to Iranian Muslims.

The six Bahá’ís who said that Bahá’ís feel superior stressed, however, that they did not let that feeling of superiority show in their interactions with Muslims. One of the six commented:

I think the Bahá’ís feel superior to Muslims, but they don’t act superior toward [Page 47]the Muslims. They feel that they know something that the Muslims don't know, and this thing is very important. It is very high. And they feel sorry for the Muslims that they don't know, and don't even want to know. But Bahá’ís never act as if they are superior.

Another Bahá’í put it thus:

I don't think that the superiority feeling of the Bahá’ís is so big that it shows to the Muslims. The feeling is just an interior thing. It is not a feeling that I am superior in other things such as knowledge or sports or whatever. It is a peaceful internal feeling, and I don't think that is a thing that would show to a Muslim.

From the comments of the Muslims it appears that the Bahá’ís were generally successful in keeping their feelings of superiority from showing. When the Muslims were asked whether the Bahá’ís in Iran generally seemed to feel superior, equal to, or inferior to Muslims, only one said that Bahá’ís probably feel superior, but this interviewee immediately added "but not snobbish." Five of the Muslims said that Bahá’ís seemed to feel equal to Muslims, and four did not know. None of the Muslims felt that there was a problem in Iran of Bahá’ís being condescending toward Muslims.

The Muslims and Bahá’ís in this study all agreed that Bahá’ís in Iran are not "clannish" in the sense of just sticking to themselves. Three of the Muslims mentioned that Bahá’ís were clannish in the sense of being supportive of each other, but they did not see this as bad. One of the Muslims said:

Respondent: "They were seen as supportive of each other."

Interviewer: "And was this seen in a bad light or a good light?"

Respondent: "In a good light for them. They were respected for that."

There also does not seem to be a problem with Bahá’ís showing disrespect for Islam as a religion. All ten Bahá’ís were adamant that Bahá’ís everywhere in the world respect Islam as a religion. They pointed out that the Bahá’í Faith is the only organized religion in the world, besides Islam, that recognizes Muhammad as a prophet, and four of them volunteered the information that, since the Revolution, Bahá’ís have defended Islam to Muslims who have been turned against their own religion because of Khomeini.

The Muslims in this study also generally agreed that Bahá’ís are respectful of Islam as a religion. Six said that they are, one said that some Bahá’ís are and some are not, and three did not know. However, it should be remembered that most of the Muslims in the sample were highly educated. It is the less-educated Muslims who are more inclined to believe the false stories, such as that Muslims who become Bahá’ís must burn a copy of the Qur'an.

Khomeini and his followers argued that Iran has been corrupted by Western influence and that Bahá’ís have played a major part in the corruption. Because the clergy has stressed this point, it is probable that many less-educated, more-fundamentalist Muslims in Iran today do see Bahá’ís as too Western-oriented. However, it is not clear whether this was a very widely held perception during the time of the last Shah. The respondents in this study were not in agreement on this question, but most did not think it was a problem. When asked whether Bahá’ís, during the time of the Shah, were generally seen by Muslims as being a westernizing influence in Iranian society, six of the Bahá’ís said yes, and four said no.

Five Muslims said yes, and five said no.

When those who said yes were asked whether Muslims resented Bahá’ís because of this, two Bahá’ís said yes, and four said no, while three Muslims said yes, and two said no.

Thus only two Bahá’ís and three Muslims thought there was any tendency during the time of the Shah for Muslims to think poorly of Bahá’ís because they saw Bahá’ís as too westernized, and the two Bahá’ís did not think it was a very serious problem. The Bahá’ís claimed that being westernized was popular during the time of the Shah. So many Muslims were westernized that the Bahá’ís did not stand out unduly in this regard, and even if they had, they would have been [Page 48]admired for it rather than resented. One of the Bahá’ís commented:

It was not resented, but they [Bahá’ís] were seen as being more westernized than non-Bahá’ís. One of the customs of Bahá’ís, for example, is taking a shower or bath every day. But this was not a custom for the Muslims, and when they would learn that Bahá’ís take a shower or bath every day, they would say, “You are westernized.”

This Bahá’í claimed that if one was different in almost any way from traditional Iranian Shi’ah culture, some people would say one was “westernized.”

Two of the five Muslims who thought that Bahá’ís were generally seen as westernized claimed that this was, if anything, an advantage for the Bahá’ís. One of these Muslims explained that he admired Bahá’ís for being westernized because he saw them as being very modern in their thinking. He even encouraged his sons to associate with Bahá’ís because he believed that the Bahá’ís’ modern way of thinking would have a beneficial influence on them.

Of the three Muslims who thought that many people, even during the time of the Shah, looked down on Bahá’ís for being too westernized, two were quite adamant. One commented as follows:

Respondent: “Bahá’ís were noted for wanting to westernize the whole society. Forget about Friday being a holiday; make it Sunday so it is convenient; change your calendar; you know, do all that sort of thing just because they are doing it in France and America, and they are rich, and they know what they are doing.”

Interviewer: “Were the Bahá’ís that you became acquainted with in high school and college also excessively oriented toward the West?”

Respondent: “Yes. They seemed to be almost worshipping the West, and it was almost unbearable at times. Bahá’ís were not the only ones who advocated that. There were also many others. But those who didn’t want to make a wholesale change in our society and in our way of life really didn’t like Bahá’ís. And I must admit that, right or wrong, I was in that category.”

The perceived western orientation of Bahá’ís came up again at a later point in the interview with this same Muslim, and at that point he was asked to identify some of the particular ways that Bahá’ís seemed westernized. He responded that Bahá’í women did not want to wear the veil, Bahá’ís did not participate in Muslim ceremonies, and Bahá’ís were “in favor of western education, western way of life, western government, freedom, [and] the study of various things.”

This hostility toward the perceived Western orientation of Bahá’ís was almost certainly a minority opinion during the time of the Shah, but it has grown in influence since the Revolution. The clergy has used it as a fairly powerful weapon in criticizing Bahá’ís and in promoting hostility toward them.

Among the sociocultural reasons for the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís, the only other one that seems very important is the fact that many Muslims perceive Bahá’ís as too oriented toward converting others to the Bahá’í Faith. The sociocultural factors, however, do not seem to be of major importance in explaining the prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís. They are certainly not as fundamental as are the religious factors. They also are probably not as important as the political or economic factors.

Conclusion

THE STUDY of the reasons for anti-Bahá’í prejudice in Iran supports the conclusion that the Shí’ah clergy has been the group most responsible for promoting prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís in Iran. Whenever the Shí’ah clergy has been more powerful within Iranian society, the Bahá’ís have experienced more vigorous persecution.

The clergy dominates the current government of Iran and has used the machinery of government against the Bahá’ís and against several other groups that the clerics dislike (Kurds, Communists, secular liberals, and intellectuals). But the governments of the Qájár [Page 49]and Pahlavi shahs also enacted and enforced discriminatory legislation against Bahá’ís and sometimes played an active role in physically attacking Bahá’ís and their property. These discriminatory policies and activities of the previous governments should be seen primarily, though not entirely, as attempts to win the political support of the clergy and of the less-educated masses of Iranians and to distract attention from politically unpopular acts. The policies and activities would not have made political sense were it not for the fact that the clergy had been so hostile toward the Bahá’í Faith and had influenced a great many Iranians to feel the same hostility.

Religious reasons have been the most important in explaining the hostility of the clerics and others in Iran toward the Bahá’ís. The Bahá’í Faith is seen by Muslims as neither a legitimate independent religion nor a legitimate sect of Shí‘ah Islam. Rather, it is seen as a heretical sect that is totally outside the bounds of acceptable Shí‘ah belief and practice. The Bahá’í Faith violates cherished and fundamental beliefs of devout Twelver Shí‘ahs. The clerics believe that, if the Bahá’í Faith were allowed to grow and prosper, it would threaten the basic institutions of Shí‘ah Islam as well as the position and livelihood of the clergy.

The persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran is one of the most important contemporary examples of religious persecution. However, no major and long-term case of religiously based persecution is ever purely and simply religious in nature. There are always other factors, real and imagined, that promote the prejudice and discrimination against the persecuted group. In the case of the Iranian Bahá’ís, political factors are currently the most important, followed by economic and sociocultural factors, in that order. Although these factors provide weapons for use in denouncing Bahá’ís and in building up hostility toward them, it is not likely that they would have led to nearly as much prejudice and discrimination against Bahá’ís if the Bahá’í Faith were not already hated for religious reasons.

[Page 51]

Leap, My Soul, in Grateful Joy!

Inner vision once veiled By ignorance and self, Now my resuscitated spirit leaps As the Word of God unites with my embryonic sight! Light springs forth And I am blinded to desire, Inward beauty Far surpassing outward dreams. Sweet music permeates the soul And I delight in the ancient dance of submission, A grateful response To an unconditional embrace. Reunion consummated, Unexpected joy Emanates from a newly regenerated soul, Panting for yet another embrace. Leap, my soul, in grateful joy! Dance in endless exaltation!

-Phyllis K. Peterson Copyright 1989 by Phyllis K. Peterson [Page 52]

Authors & Artists

PHYLLIS K. PETERSON is a free-lance writer and performer who conducts workshops on anger. Her Skylark Video is used by Family Violence Shelters, Parents Anonymous, and the National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse.

CARMEN M. PURSIFULL has published three volumes of poetry-Carmen by Moonlight in 1982, The Twenty-Four Hour Wake in 1989, and Manhattan Memories also in 1989.

LELAND W. ROBINSON, who holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Northwestern University, is the head of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. His publications include articles on contemporary Black nationalist groups and involving parents in the treatment of behaviorally disordered children, as well as SOCTERMS: Sociological Definitions, a software package for computer-aided instruction.

ART CREDITS: Cover design by John Solarz; photograph by Mark Sadan; p. 2, photograph by Steve Garrigues; p. 5, photograph of Congressman Gus Yatron, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 7, photograph of Congressman John Porter, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 9, photograph of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 12, photograph of Robert C. Henderson, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 15, photograph of Firuz Kazemzadeh, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 17, photograph of Congressman Gus Yatron and Firuz Kazemzadeh, courtesy of the Bahá’í Office of External Affairs; p. 20, photograph by Steve Garrigues; p. 28, photograph by Steve Garrigues; p. 50, photograph by Steve Garrigues.