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| Bahá’í News | December 1982 | Bahá’í Year 139 |
‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’:
A special report
To all National Spiritual Assemblies
Dear Bahá’í Friends,
On January 12, 1979, all National Spiritual Assemblies were informed that the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran had instituted a special fund for the relief of the needy and suffering from among the believers in that country. The Universal House of Justice contributed $135,000 to that fund, which is now being administered on behalf of that body from the World Centre. At that time the House of Justice called upon the friends throughout the world “to offer their substance ... to help their tormented brethren in the Cradle of the Faith.” The response to this appeal was overwhelming, and from the generous outpouring of funds from the friends all over the world hundreds of our Persian co-workers have been assisted.
Since oppressive measures against the Faith have intensified over the years, the number of Persian Bahá’ís who are in need of temporary assistance has correspondingly increased, and the Persian Relief Fund balance is now perilously low. The Universal House of Justice deems it necessary to again inform the believers throughout the world of the urgent need to replenish this Fund. This letter is sent with the assurance that the spirit of self-sacrifice will once again be manifested in resolving this grave problem.
The House of Justice implores the dear friends the world over to continue their prayers on behalf of our oppressed brethren in Iran that their suffering will come to an end and they will once again be free to practice their Faith.
With loving Bahá’í greetings,
Department of the Secretariat
September 26, 1982
Bahá’í News[edit]
The third of five International Conferences is held in Lagos, Nigeria | 1 |
Dr. Daniel Jordan, vice-chairman of the U.S. National Assembly, is slain | 3 |
The U.S. House of Representatives condemns the persecutions in Iran | 4 |
‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report by the Minority Rights Group Ltd | 6 |
Commentary on ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’ prepared for the House of Justice | 15 |
Around the world: News from Bahá’í communities all over the globe | 16 |
Bahá’í News is published monthly by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States as a news organ reporting current activities of the Bahá’í world community. Manuscripts submitted should be typewritten and double spaced throughout; any footnotes should appear at the end. The contributor should keep a carbon copy. Send materials to the Periodicals Office, Bahá’í National Center, Wilmette, IL 60091, U.S.A. Changes of address should be reported to the Office of Membership and Records, Bahá’í National Center. Please attach mailing label. Subscription rates: one year, U.S. $8; two years, U.S. $15. Second class postage paid at Wilmette, IL 60091. Copyright © 1982, National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States. World rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
International Conferences[edit]
Lagos: ‘Vast outpouring confirmations’[edit]
The Hand of the Cause of God John Robarts represented the Universal House of Justice at the Bahá’í International Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, held August 19-22 at the National Theatre of Nigeria.
The African gathering, the third in a series of five International Conferences held near the midpoint of the Seven Year Plan, was attended by an estimated 1,500 Bahá’ís from 46 countries.
Among those present were 11 members of the Continental Board of Counsellors and 54 Auxiliary Board members from 23 countries.
At the opening session of the Conference, which was filmed by Nigerian Television and presented on news broadcasts that same evening, a government representative read a letter
‘How wonderful that it has been possible to convene this Conference on African soil with such a large number of African friends in attendance, in loving memory of the most distinguished heroine of the Bahá’í Dispensation ...’
from the governor of Lagos State praising the Bahá’ís and the principles of the Faith.
A public relations team, Mrs. Dorothy Hansen and Tunde Agbabiaka, fielded questions from a dozen reporters at a successful press conference that was attended by Counsellors Zekrollah Kazemi and Mihdí Samandarí.
As a result, excellent newspaper and magazine articles and television interviews continued to appear throughout the Conference.
A Nigerian-Iranian couple gave three floors of a building for sleeping accommodations and bought 300 mattresses for the friends.
Prayers in many languages were recited at the Conference, one of them by a 16-year-old girl who chanted softly in Sango, the mother tongue of the Central African Republic.
The Conference, like the two that preceded it and the two that were to follow, was dedicated to the memory of the Greatest Holy Leaf.
Mrs. Joanie Lincoln sang a lovely song she composed especially for the occasion and taught to the audience, “La Plus Sainte Feuille” (the Greatest Holy Leaf).
The Conference deliberated on the phenomenal growth of the Faith in Africa and on the goals yet to be won. Between one speaker and the next there was music and dance, and songs in many African languages.
The five-member Conference Committee included Ibo and Yoruba, American and Iranian members. They reported to the Universal House of Justice by cable on August 24: “A wonderful spirit, inspiring presentations and stirring music. Many offers pioneering, travel teaching. Humbled vast outpouring confirmations.”
More than a thousand Bahá’ís are shown outside the National Theatre in Lagos, Nigeria, August 20. They were among an estimated 1,500 believers from 46 countries who attended the third of five Bahá’í International Conferences held in 1982.
[Page 2]
The Hand of the Cause of God John Robarts
represented the Universal House of Justice at
the Conference in Lagos, Nigeria.
Message to the Conference in Lagos from the Universal House of Justice[edit]
To the Friends gathered at the Bahá’í
International Conference at Lagos
Dearly-loved Friends,
With hearts overflowing with love for the people of Africa, so richly endowed with the gifts of the spirit, so abundantly and repeatedly blessed since the dawn of this Revelation, and so gloriously promising in the unfoldment of their hidden potentialities, we welcome the friends gathered at this Conference held in one of the most important capitals of their emergent continent.
As we review the annals of our Faith we see that since the days of the Blessed Beauty and up to the early 1950s, the activities of the friends in Africa had produced the formation of one National Spiritual Assembly with its seat in Cairo, Egypt, the opening of 12 countries to the light of the Faith, and some 50 localities established throughout its vast lands. It was at such a time that the beloved Guardian ushered in the first African Teaching Plan, to be followed during the remaining years of his ministry and in subsequent years after his passing, by a series of challenging and bravely executed plans designed to implant the banner of the Faith throughout the length and breadth of that continent and its neighboring islands.
Today, after the lapse of a little over three decades, we stand in awe as we view with admiration one of the most valiant contingents of the Army of Light, guided by its own Board of Counsellors, led and administered by 37 National Spiritual Assemblies and 4,990 Local Spiritual Assemblies, privileged to serve an eager and radiant community of believers drawn from 1,152 African tribes residing in 29,000 localities.
How wonderful that it has been possible to convene this Conference on African soil with such a large number of African friends in attendance, in loving memory of the most distinguished heroine of the Bahá’í Dispensation, the eldest daughter of the King of Glory, who lived a long life of sacrificial service to the Cause of her Beloved Father. Her meekness, her unassuming nature, the purity of her soul, the sensitivity of her heart, the calmness of her demeanor, her patience and long-suffering in trials, and above all, her unshakable faith, her tenderness and love, and the spirit of self-renunciation which she evinced throughout her blessed life, are outstanding characteristics that we can well emulate, particularly in Africa, where these heavenly qualities play such an important part in attracting the souls, and winning the hearts to the Cause of Bahá’u’lláh.
We rejoice in the knowledge that some communities have already initiated in her name teaching and consolidation campaigns of far-reaching magnitude, that many Bahá’í women, inspired by her example, are accepting an ever-greater share of responsibility in running the affairs of the community, and that numerous newsletters are reflecting eulogies of the station she occupied, the sufferings she endured, and the heroism she demonstrated in her love for the glorious Cause of her Lord.
The fortunes of the Seven Year Plan in Africa are in the balance. As we draw near to the midway point in the unfoldment of the processes it has set in motion, we call upon its valiant promoters on the African mainland and its surrounding islands to take stock of their position, to reappraise their progress, and to concentrate their resources on whatever portions of the goals are as yet unachieved.
Chief among its objectives are a widespread recruitment of many more supporters of the Most Great Name, then the deepening of the individual believers, for the fulfillment of all goals ultimately depends on them, and a notable increase in the number of newly formed as well as firmly rooted Spiritual Assemblies, to serve as bases for the manifold activities of the community, including the Bahá’í education of children, a greater participation of women and youth in Bahá’í activities, and the formulation of ways and means to enrich the spiritual lives of the “noble” and “pure-hearted” believers of a “fast-awakening continent.”
May the participants in this Conference carry to the mass of their devoted fellow believers, whose personal circumstances have made it impossible for them to attend, the spirit of joy and optimism which we hope will be generated at this gathering and the flames of enthusiasm which we pray will be enkindled in their hearts.
May the memory of the Greatest Holy Leaf, who through her life of heroic self-sacrifice has left to us “a legacy that time can never dim,” inspire the friends in every country of the continent to rededicate themselves to the Cause of God, not to allow any opportunity for mentioning the Faith to slip by unutilized, and not to permit one day of their lives to pass without a noble effort to draw nearer to the good-pleasure of the Blessed Beauty.
Our fervent prayers surround you as you proceed with your deliberations.
August 19, 1982
United States[edit]
Dr. Daniel Jordan slain in Connecticut[edit]
Dr. Daniel C. Jordan, vice-chairman of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, was found stabbed to death October 16 in a parking lot in Stamford, Connecticut.
Dr. Jordan disappeared October 15 while en route to New York City from California on business connected with his position as dean of the School of Education at National University in San Diego, California.
Stabbed once[edit]
When he failed to keep a speaking engagement the following day, his wife, Nancy, was notified.
She flew immediately to New York from their home in Escondido, California, with Dr. Donald Streets, a Bahá’í who is a professor at National University and a close friend of the Jordans.
On Wednesday, October 20, police in Stamford wired a photo of an unidentified body to the New York City police department’s missing persons bureau.
After making a tentative identification from that photo, Mrs. Jordan was accompanied by police to Stamford where a positive identification was made at 5:30 that evening.
Dr. Jordan had been stabbed once in the neck and his spinal column severed.
A spokesman for the Stamford police said Dr. Jordan probably was slain late Friday, October 15, or early the following morning.
It is known that he placed a phone call Friday evening to a member of the Association for World Universities, the organization to which he was scheduled to speak Saturday, and said he would be staying with friends that night.
Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly, said, “As far as we know, Dr. Jordan was in New York on professional business unrelated to his duties with the Faith.”
Dr. Daniel C. Jordan, a Rhodes scholar and educator who was vice-chairman of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States.
“We are not aware that he contacted any Bahá’ís on this trip,” said Dr. Kazemzadeh, “and we have no evidence to suggest that this tragedy was in any way related to Dr. Jordan’s Bahá’í activities.”
Funeral services for Dr. Jordan, a member of the National Spiritual Assembly since 1963, were held October 23 in Stamford.
Dr. Jordan, the first American to win a Rhodes scholarship in music, was born June 2, 1932, in Alliance, Nebraska. He earned degrees in music from the University of Wyoming and Oxford University in England, and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in human development from the University of Chicago.
Before assuming his post at National University, he served as director of the Center for the Study of Human Potential and professor of education at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst.
Dr. Jordan was the founder and director of the American National Institute for Social Advancement (ANISA), a comprehensive model of education organized around a philosophical base that is designed to help develop the human capacity to learn, act and communicate.
An author and editor of numerous articles, books and pamphlets on education and human development, he had lectured widely and appeared on more than 200 radio and television programs.
Dr. Jordan served as an educational consultant to a number of institutions of higher education including the U.S. Department of Education and U.S. State Department, and directed and administered many governmental grant programs in education.
He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Educational Research Association, the National Association for the Education of Young Children, and the American Psychological Association.
As remarkable as were his professional accomplishments, Dr. Jordan is most fondly remembered by Bahá’ís for his warm and unassuming manner, his keen sense of humor, and his superb musical talents.
Besides his wife, Dr. Jordan is survived by three daughters: Melissa, age 18; Sara, 15; and Charlotte, 5.
United States[edit]
House resolution condemns persecutions[edit]
Following the lead of its colleagues in the Senate, the United States House of Representatives approved September 30 a concurrent resolution that strongly condemns the persecution of Bahá’ís by the government of Iran.
The resolution, sponsored by more than 20 congressmen representing a wide spectrum of political opinion, was introduced by Rep. Don Bonker (R-Wash.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations.
An identical resolution was approved by the Senate on June 30 at the urging of Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.) and others.
Following the completion of some technical details, the resolution was to be sent to the White House. President Reagan would then have 10 days (not counting weekends) in which to sign or reject the resolution, or allow it to take effect without his signature or comment.
‘Savage persecution’[edit]
In expressing the gratitude of the U.S. Bahá’í community for the congressional action, Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly, said the resolution “once again condemns the unjustified and savage persecution of a peaceful and law-abiding minority.
“International protest may not resolve the problem,” said Dr. Kazemzadeh, “but it certainly creates an atmosphere in which it is more difficult for the Khomeini regime to justify its systematic persecution of the Bahá’ís.”
The concurrent resolution had its genesis May 25 when four Bahá’ís—Dr. Kazemzadeh; Judge James F. Nelson, chairman of the National Spiritual Assembly; Glenford E. Mitchell, then secretary of the National
‘International protest may not resolve the problem,’ said Dr. Kazemzadeh, ‘but it certainly creates an atmosphere in which it is more difficult for the Khomeini regime to justify its systematic persecution of the Bahá’ís.’
Assembly and now a member of the Universal House of Justice; and Mrs. Ramna Nourani—testified before the House subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations chaired by Rep. Bonker.
During that hearing Mrs. Nourani testified about the death of her mother, Mrs. Ginous Mahmoudi, a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran who was secretly executed in December 1981 with seven other members of that body, and the disappearance of her father, Houshang Mahmoudi, a member of the previous National Spiritual Assembly of Iran who was abducted in August 1980 with the rest of its members and is presumed dead.
The subcommittee also was given an historical overview of the persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran since the Faith’s inception in 1844, and a review of specific incidences of repression and violence following the Islamic Revolution in 1978.
Besides Rep. Bonker, those who spoke in favor of the House resolution included Reps. Jim Leach of Iowa, Edward Derwinski of Illinois, Fortney “Pete” Stark Jr. of California, and Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin.
“... the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations has conducted a series of hearings on religious practice throughout the world,” Rep. Bonker said in supporting the resolution. “We have been particularly concerned about the persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran.
“Testimony has revealed that the grossest violations of human rights of the community have been committed by the Iranian Government.
“... the resolution before us holds the Government of Iran responsible for this behavior, and expresses the hope (that) the Government should immediately cease its discrimination (against) the Bahá’í community.”
“... it is shocking,” said Rep. Zablocki, “that religious persecution of the most barbarous kind still exists in the world.
“Despite the standards observed by our Government and many other governments throughout the world, the principle of the freedom of conscience and religion is more honored in the breach than the observance in certain States—Iran’s persecution of the Bahá’ís is a case in point.”
Rep. Derwinski said, “... Bahá’ís are a special target of the religious fanatics who now run the Government of Iran, and this savage persecution continues without world attention to it.
“Outside Iran this resolution, therefore, could have special significance. Certainly it is not going to change the policies of the Iranian Government, but perhaps it will alert the sleeping conscience of the world to the terrible condition of the Bahá’ís in Iran and the immense suffering borne by the faithful in the name of their religion.”
“While this resolution falls short of incorporating some of the suggestions which emerged from our subcommittee hearing,” said Rep. Leach, “it is identical to Senate Concurrent Resolution 73 as passed by the Senate and thus is
[Page 5]
Rep. Don Bonker, chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organizations, is shown during Bahá’í testimony before that subcommittee last
May.
Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, then vice-chairman of the U.S. National Spiritual Assembly, points to one of the exhibits during Bahá’í testimony last May before the House Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International
Organizations.
certain of final passage without referral to conference.
“I would like to note for the record, however, several facts which this resolution does not make clear.
“First, the Iranian Government is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states, in article 16, that everyone shall have the right to freedom of religion and, in article 27, that persons belonging to religious minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to profess and practice their own religion.
“The Constitution of Iran recognizes only the Zoroastrians, the Jews, and the Christians as religious minorities which are free to practice their religion and does not so recognize the Bahá’í faith.
“Second, it should be made clear to the Government of Iran that history will record the acts for which they have responsibility and that they may, at some time in the future, be held accountable under international law for their persecution and extermination of these religious people.
“Third, I would draw the attention of the Members of this body to a resolution adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Commission in March 1982, expressing the deep concern over human rights violations in Iran and requesting the United Nations Secretary General to establish direct contact with the Government of Iran and to continue his efforts to insure that the Bahá’ís are guaranteed their basic human rights.
Formal appeal[edit]
“Also, the United Nations General Assembly, of which Iran is a member, adopted by consensus in November 1981 the ‘Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance or Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.’
“Finally, while the resolution before us does not specifically call on the President of the United States to take any specific action in response to this human rights tragedy, I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to the administration to do all in its power, in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran, to back up the efforts of the UN Secretary General and the UN Human Rights Commission in addressing the persecution of the Bahá’ís, to use opportunities in international forums to express the moral outrage of the American people over what is happening, to urge foreign governments to make urgent appeals to the Iranian authorities to cease the execution and persecution of the Bahá’ís, and to render all appropriate, feasible humanitarian aid to Bahá’ís victimized by this tragedy.
“Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to give this resolution their strong support as an unmistakable signal to the Government of Iran that the Congress of the United States, and the people it represents, will not countenance the continued persecution and repression of this peaceful religious group.”
Special report[edit]
‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’[edit]
This article is excerpted from “The Bahá’ís of Iran,” a report written for the Minority Rights Group Ltd. by Roger Cooper, a London-based journalist specializing in the politics, economics and religions of the Middle East, where he has lived and traveled extensively. The Minority Rights Group is an international research and information unit registered in Britain as an educational trust under the Charities Act of 1960. Its principal aims are:
- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicizing the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world;
- to help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarized, are difficult to resolve; and
- to foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.
Attitudes toward Bahá’ís[edit]
The current repression against the Bahá’ís of Iran, both official and unofficial, is the direct outcome of popular attitudes, fostered by clerical hostility and mirroring those held four or five generations ago.
Action against the Bábís, militant extremists intent on overthrowing the existing order, was to some extent justified for security reasons, even if the physical barbarity meted out to them was not, even by the standards of the day.
New accusations against Bahá’ís have in some cases replaced the old ones against Bábís, but in most cases
... Bahá’ís consider that all the major religions teach universal spiritual principles and that only the social teachings change in accordance with the needs of the age. They see their faith merely as the latest in an unbroken chain of divine revelation ...
they are ultimately based on disapproval by religious orthodoxy and fear of political dissent by the civil authorities. (Today this amounts to much the same thing.)
In 1848 the burning questions concerned the Báb’s knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and Arabic grammar, today they concern alleged Bahá’í collaboration with Zionism and imperialism, but beneath the contemporary veneer lingers the same theological odium. What has happened is that attitudes to the Bábís have simply been transferred to the Bahá’ís, with few Iranians appreciating how different Bahá’ísm is from Bábísm.
To a large extent this is the fault of the Bahá’ís themselves, who after a short period of stressing the very real differences between their faith and Bábísm have for many years now conflated the two, so that Bahá’ísm is seen by most Iranians, not unreasonably, as a direct successor to Bábísm rather than as a new and independent religion.
The common perception of Bahá’ísm among Iranians can be summed up in two words: Din nist—“It (the Bahá’í faith) is not a religion.” This is the most frequent reply if one ask any Iranian today why the Bahá’ís are being persecuted. It is the reply given by young militants serving as Revolutionary Guards, by conservative bazaar merchants and by many who are disillusioned with or even opposed to the present regime, yet feel obliged to defend practices which they know reflect badly on their country internationally. The latter category of people will often condemn the persecution of ethnic minorities, leftist guerrillas and supporters of the former regime before they express concern for the Bahá’ís.
It is significant that no emigré Iranian politician has so far dared to condemn publicly anti-Bahá’í repression, at least in specific terms. Most of them take the view that what is happening to the Bahá’ís is only one aspect of the arbitrary savagery which occurs so frequently in Iran today. This reticence is clearly based on the fact that the Bahá’ís are not a popular cause in Iran.
Nearly every new religion, almost by definition, feels that it is different from and superior to its predecessors. This is as true of Islam, which triumphed over Arab paganism and Zoroastrianism, and bestowed inferior status on Jews and Christians, as it is of Christianity in relation to Judaism, or of the Aryan sun-father faiths that displaced the older moon-mother religions of the ancient Near East.
The Bahá’í faith is no different. As already noted, Bahá’ís consider that all the major religions teach universal spiritual principles and that only the social teachings change in accordance with the needs of the age. They see their faith merely as the latest in an unbroken chain of divine revelation, not the first and not the last, but the best-suited to the world today and for the next 1,000 years.
Intolerance of religious minorities has existed, with few exceptions, throughout history, and has only quite recently, and still not universally, been considered abnormal. The successful heresy may sweep all before it, as did
[Page 7]
Islam, which must have been seen as a
heresy by the orthodox Meccans who
controlled the profitable pre-Islamic
shrines, but unsuccessful heretics—politically, that is—must practice dissimulation or expect persecution, just like individuals who refuse to adopt the
new orthodoxy when a whole society is
transformed by conquest, religion or
revolution.
This has been a recurring theme in Iranian history, with the forced conversion or persecution of the defeated common events. Manichees, Mazdakites, Zoroastrians and Bábís provide good examples of such intolerance.
To understand why Bahá’ísm is not perceived by most Iranians as a religion requires some knowledge of Islamic history and dogma. Since the Muslim community was bitterly divided over the question of the succession from the moment of the Prophet Muḥammad’s death in 632, schism in Islam is almost as old as the religion itself.
The resulting Sunni-Shi‘i split did not, however, create two religions. All but the most extreme Shi‘is have almost always been considered Muslims by mainstream Sunnis, especially if they kept their innermost views to themselves.
The minimum requirement of Muslimhood is the profession of faith, belief in a sole God whose messenger was Muḥammad, a definition wide enough to embrace a huge diversity of other beliefs. But once a presumed Muslim denies a basic Islamic belief or introduces one that is clearly heretical—such as the Druzes’ assertion of the divinity of the Caliph al-Hakim—he is deemed to have left the ranks of Islam and becomes an apostate whose blood may be shed with impunity.
The Bahá’í belief in evolutionary revelation, for example, does not differ basically from the Islamic belief in nubuwa (prophethood). Muslims believe that God has sent a number of prophets for the guidance of mankind, the first of whom was Adam and the last Muḥammad. Bahá’ís would agree with this, though perhaps not to the specific number of 124,000 prophets accepted by most Muslims, and, as noted, they also recognize a number of prophets denied by Islam. But they do not accept that with Muḥammad the “door of prophethood” was closed forever. They believe that the Báb succeeded Muḥammad as a prophet, or divine manifestation, with the specific mission of preparing the way for Bahá’u’lláh, and that other prophets will follow, though not for a thousand years.
Armed Revolutionary Guards patrol the roof of the Bahá’í National Center in Iran at the time of its seizure in February 1979.
The Bábis and early Bahá’ís did, it seems, consider themselves Muslims in a sense. They could make the profession of faith with a clear conscience. Some early Bahá’í converts from the Shi‘i clergy kept on their clerical appointments, and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, as already noted, prayed every Friday in an ‘Akká mosque, although Bahá’ís now claim that He did so not as a Muslim but to maintain a friendly relationship.
Since there is no universally accepted source of orthodoxy in Islam it is difficult to define heresy, but the nearest equivalent is bid’a, literally innovation, and there is no doubt among Muslims, both Shi‘is and Sunnis, that the claims to prophethood by the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh put them and their followers beyond the pale of Islam. Since they are seen as being heretical Muslims (they alone of the world religions recognize Muḥammad as a prophet, but this, far from helping their cause, actually makes matters worse in Muslim eyes) they cannot claim, in any Muslim community, the protection they might otherwise expect as dhimmis, non-Muslims living under Muslim domination.
Such status, second-rate but at least safe, is guaranteed under the present Iranian constitution to Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians, all of whom are recognized as religious minorities, even though limitations have been placed on their religious and social practices. The followers of the Bahá’í faith, however, are denied such recognition. “Din nist,” their “religion” is not a religion.
The question of whether Bahá’ísm is a separate religion or not therefore lies at the heart of the present crisis. If they were to be considered such they would be in little danger, but at present this seems quite unlikely to happen.
There are precedents in Iran for giving recognition to religious minorities theoretically beyond the pale. Zoroastrians are so recognized, although the name by which they are known in Arabic, zandik, derived from the Zend language of their scriptures, has come to mean atheist, and they were not initially recognized by Islam as possessors of a divine scripture, like the Jews and
[Page 8]
The House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur,
Iran, which was destroyed in 1981 during anti-Bahá’í fervor that followed the
Islamic Revolution.
Christians. Sikhs, whose religion can be seen as an Islamic heresy, are still active as bazaar traders. Significantly, though, Sikhs are not usually Iranian citizens, even after long residence in Iran, and their religion is not seen as a threat to Islam. Nor, since it is one of the few religions not to welcome proselytes, is Zoroastrianism.
Earlier critics of the Bábís and Bahá’ís took the trouble to list what they regarded as their heresies. E.G. Browne, the British orientalist who wrote so prolifically on the Bábís, summarizes1 an elaborate critique of their faith, written about 1907. The author, Aqa Muhammad Taqi, lists and refutes 30 Bábí heresies, some rather obscure. These include Bábí attempts to explain away the Koranic statement that Muḥammad is the “Seal of the Prophets,” the denial by Bábís of the resurrection of the body and of a literal heaven and hell, and their claim that willingness to die for religious beliefs is a proof of truth.
An interesting attack on the Bahá’í faith was written in the early 1930s by J.R. Richards, a Welsh missionary in Shíráz, who accused Bahá’ís of distorting their own history. His aim was to provide fellow-missionaries with information about the faith needed for their work. As Richards saw it, Iran “is slowly coming to the cross-roads where she must face the inevitable choice, Christ or Materialism.” He regarded the Bahá’ís as a “movement” spreading “insidious propaganda,” rather than a faith, with no prospects in Iran or elsewhere, while of Shi‘a Islam he wrote: “With the coming of religious freedom its day will draw to a close.”2
Despite their particular prejudices, both Aqa Muhammad Taqi and Richards at least took the trouble to read the Bahá’í texts they were refuting. Today, not one Iranian in a hundred who denies that the Bahá’ís have a religion is likely to have studied their beliefs in any depth or from primary sources. This is partly because even under the Pahlavis, a period of relative tolerance for the Iranian Bahá’ís, the printing, publication and import of Bahá’í literature were banned. Bahá’í texts did circulate in samizdat form, but on nothing like the scale of the equally illegal communist literature.
In examining the theological objections to the Bahá’í faith, the Western observer faces what seems an insoluble problem. Brought up in a climate of religious tolerance he wishes to transpose his own liberal views to a society where they are alien. He wants the persecution of Bahá’ís to end, not just because he is opposed to all religious persecution, but by using the argument that the Bahá’ís have a religion just as valid, from his point of view, as that of the persecutors. But the argument goes unheeded, since to the religious establishment in Iran, including the faqih, or supreme religious leader referred to in the Constitution, as well as to all other leading Iranian divines, Bahá’ís are Muslim heretics and as such mahdur al-damm (those whose blood may be shed with impunity) unless they recant. They represent a cancer that must be cut out before it can infect the rest of the body.
Shi‘a Islam regards itself as a minority faith born of repression and injustice, yet sees nothing wrong in applying such standards, on the rare occasions when it has been in a position to do so, to minority faiths it views as dangerous. The more fanatical might even argue that the current persecution of Bahá’ís reflects a “liberal” approach, since the number killed to date is still only a tiny fraction of the community’s total numbers, all of whom are theoretically mahdur al-damm.
Prejudice against the Bahá’í faith is not, however, confined to theological disapproval. Serious accusations are also made against the Bahá’ís, individually and collectively, on political and moral grounds. These accusations are far easier to refute since they are based at best on misunderstandings and over-simplifications and at worst on malicious misinterpretations.
The most serious political charges against the Bahá’ís are that they cooperated actively with the Shah’s regime, and are opposed to the present regime. (It is conveniently forgotten that the first accusation could with equal justice be leveled against the vast majority of Iranians, including many members of the clergy, at least until 1978, and the second against larger numbers than the present regime cares to admit.) This raises the question of whether the Bahá’ís can be considered a political group. Participation in partisan politics is certainly not permitted among Bahá’ís, and anyone breaking this rule is liable to expulsion. Put differently, anyone participating in poli-
[Page 9]
tics would have ceased to be a practicing Bahá’í by so doing.
Nevertheless, Bahá’ís cannot claim to be completely uninvolved in politics. They believe, after all, that the present world order is doomed and will one day be replaced by their faith. Islam generally, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of it in particular, make no clear distinction between religion and politics, and the same can be said for the Bahá’í faith.
The Bahá’ís also have specific views on what most people call political questions. Dr. Denis MacEoin has pointed out that Bahá’ís are opposed to communism and socialism, and have adopted clear positions on such issues as racism, nationalism and world government.3 In several cases, such as their attitude toward communism, their views coincide with those of the orthodox clergy in Iran, but there is one major difference. Bahá’í texts refer to divinely sanctioned monarchy, and it is clear that this is the form of government they prefer.
Despite the ill-treatment Bábís received from Qajar autocrats, Bahá’í leaders from Bahá’u’lláh onwards were rarely critical of the institution of monarchy, or even autocracy. They took no part in the Constitutional Revolution, for example, and described Mohammad Ali Shah, who tried to overthrow the Constitution, as a “just king.” Bahá’ís apparently said prayers for Mohammad Reza Shah during the 1978-79 Revolution. The Shi‘i clergy, by contrast, were in the main opposed to both the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes, and believe that monarchy is by definition unjust. The Bahá’ís have, however, always honored their pledge of loyalty to the government in power, whatever form it has, not only in Iran but wherever they live. There is no evidence whatsoever of Bahá’ís working for the overthrow of the Khomeini regime, directly or indirectly. Likewise they have scrupulously avoided participating in partisan politics of any kind.
As to the question of whether Bahá’ís actually cooperated with the Pahlavis there is evidence that some prominent beneficiaries of the regime were Bahá’ís or had strong Bahá’í connections. The Shah’s personal physician and close confidant, for example, was a Bahá’í, General Ayadi, who was commonly believed to have used his position to advance his co-religionists. Hojjab Yazdani, a rich Bahá’í financier with a reputation for questionable business dealings, became extremely unpopular, and the banks he controlled were special targets in the 1978 riots. The long-serving prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda had a Bahá’í father (who was expelled from the community) and was therefore considered by many Iranians to be a Bahá’í or at
Shi‘a Islam regards itself as a minority faith born of repression and injustice, yet sees nothing wrong in applying such standards, on the rare occasions when it has been in a position to do so, to minority faiths it views as dangerous.
least to favor Bahá’ís, even though he considered himself a Muslim.
In many cases where Bahá’ís succeeded through their natural ability and hard work it was thought that their success was at least partly due to their membership in an elitist and semisecret society, which is how Bahá’ísm (and freemasonry) have always been seen in Iran. Political power in Iran has almost never been exercised through Western style party organizations, so the fact that Bahá’ís have never been involved in partisan or parliamentary politics does not prevent them from being seen as a clandestine political group by most Iranians. If anything, Bahá’í disclaimers of political involvement serve to confirm this view.
A difficulty here is that according to Islamic theory, or at least practice, the child of a Muslim is deemed to be automatically a Muslim, whereas the Bahá’ís believe that each individual is responsible from the age of 15 for his own faith. It is also not always clear whether those said to be Bahá’ís really were. Since Qajar times the accusation of being a Bahá’í has been a way of discrediting an enemy. Even if the charge is false some mud is likely to stick. What matters in Iran today is not so much whether Bahá’ís as a group actually cooperated with the former regime, but that most Iranians believe they did, while they have no chance to prove the charge false.
Bahá’ís in fact claim that far from benefiting from the policies of the Pahlavi regime they were discriminated against, being denied the right of seeking employment as Bahá’ís, from having their marriages recognized, from organizing their own schools, and from publishing or distributing their own religious literature, all serious disabilities that did not apply to most Iranians. They add that in 1975, when Iran officially became a one-party state, Bahá’ís came under pressure to join the Rastakhiz Party, but almost without exception refused, and were penalized for this lack of cooperation with the regime.
An extension of the accusation that Bahá’ís were politically involved with the former regime is that they collaborated with SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police organization. Here again, the fact that Bahá’ís, in conformity with their policy of never attacking government bodies in the countries they live in, failed to condemn the activities of SAVAK has been used to support this charge, for which no evidence has been published. One basis for the charge might be that Parviz Sabeti, a senior SAVAK official, came from a Bahá’í family, though he neither considered himself nor was considered a member of the faith. Far from collaborating with SAVAK, Bahá’ís claim, they actually suffered at their hands, particularly in terms of employment rights, a field in which SAVAK showed special interest.
Bahá’ís are also commonly accused of being agents of Zionism and imperialism. Evidence to support the former accusation is that the Bahá’í World Centre is in Haifa, Israel, that large numbers of Iranian Bahá’ís travel (or used to travel) to Israel, and that funds were sent from Iran to Israel. All three facts are true, but the conclusion is false.
It has already been seen that Bahá’u’lláh was exiled to what is now Israeli territory (but was then part of the Ottoman Empire), but this was on the orders of two Islamic governments and long before the State of Israel was created. The fact that their main shrines are in the vicinity of Haifa is due to the same historical events, over which Bahá’ís had no control. They
[Page 10]
say they are not prepared to relocate
their spiritual and administrative centres for short-term expediency, and of
course the centre requires contributions from Bahá’ís all over the world,
including Iran, home of one of the
largest communities. All these funds,
however, are used for Bahá’í purposes
and have nothing to do with Israeli
politics. (Since 1979 the remittance of
funds from Iran to Israel has been banned and no Iranians have been permitted to travel to Israel.)
As to the charge that Bahá’ís are agents of imperialism, or even spies, it has to be remembered that Iran was a victim of semi-colonialism and neo-colonialism for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Iranians are understandably deeply suspicious of foreign influence, which they see in the most unlikely places. Long after Britain ceased to play an active role in Iran’s internal affairs, for example, most Iranians continued to see British influence at work. (Some even do today.) The British mandate of Palestine coincided with the formative years of Bahá’ísm as a world religion, so many Iranians assume a connection. This is reinforced by the fact that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá received a British knighthood.
Similarly, the fact that there is a large Bahá’í community in the United States fuels suspicions that the faith is a creation or at least a tool of imperialism. During the Pahlavi period, when nationalism was in vogue, the faith’s internationalism provided further grounds for official and unofficial dislike. Similar accusations have also been made against the Episcopal Church in Iran, apparently because of its British connections. Prominent members of that church have suffered severe persecution and even death, yet this cannot strictly be called anti-Christian repression.
The accusation that Bahá’ís are morally corrupt is widely believed by the Iranian masses. This charge has for years been made by Iranian clerics, and is based on two factors. The first, beyond the control of Bahá’ís, is that their marriage ceremony has never been recognized in Iran, and since there is no civil marriage either, Bahá’ís must either deny their religion and be married according to one of the recognized religions, or be married according to their own invalid rite. Most choose the latter, which makes it easy for fanatics to accuse Bahá’ís of immorality. Bahá’í couples who have been married for years are still considered to be living in sin, and their children illegitimate. Bahá’ís officiating at marriages can be and have been accused of “encouraging prostitution,” an offense that in itself carries the death penalty.
Other aspects of Bahá’í practice that have been deliberately misconstrued
Other aspects of Bahá’í practice that have been deliberately misconstrued ... are that men and women are not segregated in Bahá’í gatherings ... that both sexes serve together on committees, and that Bahá’í women do not wear the veil.
among uneducated Muslims are that men and women are not segregated in Bahá’í gatherings, as they are in Muslim ceremonies, that both sexes serve together on committees, and that Bahá’í women do not wear the veil. By the time these facts have been retold a few times many Iranians are ready to believe tales of wild orgies, whereas in fact Bahá’í standards of sexual morality are just as high as those of any other religion in Iran.
A final reason for anti-Bahá’í attitudes, although rarely stated, must be Bahá’í opposition to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clergy. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi were often scathing on these subjects, calling the Shi‘is “the most wretched of sects”4 and its leaders “false, cruel and cowardly,”5 hardly attitudes likely to endear the Bahá’ís to the religious establishment. Even if such harsh assessments may have been modified in the more tolerant paths the Bahá’ís have more recently trod they will not have been forgotten by the clergy, even if not publicly expressed.
Persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran[edit]
Persecution of the Bahá’ís and their Bábí predecessors is as old as the faith itself. In 1845, shortly after proclaiming His mission in Mecca, the Báb returned to Iran, and was almost immediately arrested, remaining in captivity until His execution in 1850. Even before the Báb’s death, some 300 of His followers were killed after being besieged by government troops for over six months at Sheikh Tabarsi, a village near the Caspian Sea. They had surrendered under an amnesty that was immediately broken.
For the next few years mass killings of Bábís continued. Their heroism in the face of death was a major factor, in the opinion of contemporary Western observers, in the spread of the new religion. At least 3,000 Bábís are believed to have been killed during the 1848-52 period, often in the most brutal circumstances. The authorities sometimes gave condemned Bábís and, later, Bahá’ís to individual guilds and groups, who vied with each other in devising cruel methods of torture and execution as proof of their loyalty and orthodoxy. Physical violence, including torture and wanton slaughter of Bahá’ís, has continued with varying intensity ever since. Often the result of instigation by religious leaders or fanatical political groups, the attacks are the most shocking aspect of the current persecution of the Bahá’í community, but still only one part of what many see as a coordinated campaign of total eradication.
The last two decades of the Qajar period and the intense modernization that characterized the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-41) were relatively peaceful periods for Iranian Bahá’ís. But even with the introduction of Western-type institutions, such as the secular jurisdiction that replaced the religious courts, they remained second-class citizens. Their schools were closed, their marriages were not recognized and they were forbidden to publish their literature or to worship publicly. During this period, and in the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-79), the Bahá’ís nevertheless flourished, largely because of hard work, self-help, community spirit and emphasis on education.
Their most serious setback occurred in 1955, shortly after the coup d’état that overthrew the Mosaddeq regime. Stirred up by the fanatical Shaikh Falsafi, whose incitements to take action against these “enemies of Islam” were broadcast by the state radio, mobs attacked Bahá’í property, desecrating cemeteries, looting shops and houses, and destroying crops and livestock.
[Page 11]
Gravestones in one of a number of Bahá’í cemeteries in Iran that have been desecrated since the Islamic Revolution.
The motivation for this policy appears to have been a concession by a rather uncertain new regime toward the conservative religious groups whose support was felt vital to the monarchy’s survival.
Intensive lobbying by Bahá’í groups in Europe and the United States, particularly through the United Nations and in intellectual circles, proved effective, however, and before long the Iranian government called a halt to the repression, in which police, army and government personnel had participated. Much damage had in the meantime been done, not just in material terms, serious though that was, but by reviving suspicions and prejudices that had long lain dormant. As a result, anti-Bahá’í feeling, which had been slowly receding, was resuscitated in the younger generation.
During the latter years of the Shah’s reign, even during the so-called liberalization period, Bahá’ís continued to be denied many of those rights which the government, having adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was committed to uphold. They were deprived of the right of equality in employment, since Bahá’ís were barred from a wide range of government jobs, to publish and distribute their religious literature and to worship openly.
Documentary evidence exists that the Society for the Propagation of Islam, an extreme fundamentalist group, sought the cooperation of SAVAK in attacking the Bahá’í community systematically. SAVAK tacitly agreed, but ordered that “provocation and disturbance” should be avoided. Ironically, the Society, which was led for some time by Mohammad Ali Raja’i, later prime minister and president of the Islamic Republic, has itself accused the Bahá’ís of collaboration with SAVAK.
But the harassment and social stigma that were fomented by religious extremists in the period up to 1978 were minor irritations compared with what has happened to the community in the past four years. There is clear evidence that the authorities are condoning and in some cases initiating the terror and repression against Bahá’ís, involving physical violence, imprisonment, economic sanctions and other pressures that have already caused widespread suffering. Although it is difficult in today’s circumstances to obtain independent confirmation of the hundreds of cases of persecution, their authenticity is not seriously at issue. The government, far from denying the allegations, instead defends its actions, and inactions, in a variety of other ways.
It is not the purpose of this report to provide a detailed account of this persecution, which has been amply recorded by the Bahá’ís themselves.6 Nevertheless, it is clearly essential to examine here the various forms it has taken and the scale on which it has been practiced. Despite some measure of isolated and opportunist violence, as well as personal greed, the similar circumstances of different cases and particularly the annihilation of the commu-
[Page 12]
nity’s leadership, make what is happening look increasingly like a coordinated plan. Even if it is not, and the evidence is inconclusive, the result is
the same: a green light for fanatics to
practice pogroms and harassment,
which are placing immense pressure on
Bahá’ís to recant their faith and convert (or “return,” as most Iranians
would see it) to Islam.
International reaction[edit]
The evidence to support a claim that the Iranian government is in gross violation of the human rights of its Bahá’í citizens is extremely strong. Among the national and international bodies that have passed resolutions or recommendations calling on the Iranian government, often in strong terms, to end such violations, are the European Parliament, the United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission, the Canadian and Federal German Parliaments, and the Australian Senate. In January 1982 the Council of Europe adopted a resolution calling on member states to “use every available opportunity ... to convince the Iranian authorities of the need to respect internationally accepted human rights standards.”
Meeting in Geneva in September 1981, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution, by 19 votes to none, with five abstentions, in which it expressed its conviction that what it called the “systematic persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran” was “motivated by religious intolerance and a desire to eliminate the Bahá’í Faith from the land of its birth.” The resolution further expressed concern that the Iranian Government appeared to have ignored all previous approaches regarding the Bahá’ís, as well as concern for the “perilous situation facing this community.”7 Resolutions by the other bodies are along similar lines.
What response does the Iranian Government make when challenged by international public opinion? The commonest is to deny that any oppression has taken or is taking place, and to insist that “the only Bahá’ís to be prosecuted and sentenced are those who have been involved in acts of espionage and other activities contrary to the higher interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”8 Counter-charges are frequently added such as claims that Bahá’ís cooperated with the Shah’s government “to oppress the people and plunder our country’s wealth.”9 The Bahá’í Faith is stated to be “not a religion but an ideology created by colonial powers to help the past illegitimate government of Iran in their oppressions of the brave people of Iran.”10
Evidence is rarely given to substantiate these accusations, and when it is it
Expressed through the UN Commission on Human Rights, or the General Assembly ... widespread moral disapproval of what is happening ... could make the authorities in Tehran curb the more fanatically anti-Bahá’í elements.
tends to be distorted, such as the claim that Hoveyda was a Bahá’í.11 Another argument used is that acts of violence, such as the destruction in 1979 of the House of the Báb in Shiraz, have been the work of “unruly mobs”12 (although their lack of discipline is justified). It has also been stated, less frequently, that the (Bahá’í) community is too small to deserve separate legal status. The blanket denial is sometimes accompanied by what seems to Western ears as an irrelevancy, as when the Iranian representative at the UN, replying to a statement on the plight of the Bahá’ís made on behalf of the 10 member-states of the European Community, said, “No single Bahá’í has been sued, put to trial or persecuted in Iran,” and then added that the Shah’s purchase of unsold British automobiles in the mid-1970s had saved the United Kingdom from economic crisis.13
Conclusion[edit]
As must by now have been established, the question of the persecution of the Bahá’ís is a complex one. Apart from the matter of motivation, there is not even general agreement among observers as to whether what is happening amounts to official policy, except perhaps the dismissal of Bahá’ís employed in government agencies, which was also against the laws of the previous regime. Some feel that it is rather the work of individual fanatics, and not a coordinated and systematic campaign, such as, say, the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War, or Hitler’s slaughter of European Jews.
The disappearance of the Bahá’í national leaders, for example, could have been the work of an anti-Bahá’í group taking the law into their own hands, as was the case with the murders of Episcopalians in 1980. Those who speak of genocide should remember that even at its highest estimate the number of Bahá’ís killed is only a tiny fraction of the whole community, though none the more excusable for that. It is also worth noting that despite his reputation for outspokenness Ayatollah Khomeini has not personally made any inflammatory anti-Bahá’í remarks since his return to Iran, as he has done in the case of the Kurds, Americans and the Mojahedin. Nor has any theologian openly stated that Bahá’í blood may freely be shed.
It has certainly suited the regime to have a convenient domestic scapegoat like the Bahá’ís, and once a free rein has been given to persecution it is difficult to stop it. There are perhaps parallels here with the seizure of the U.S. hostages, which began as an unofficial endeavor, then won such popular support that the government found it difficult to end the crisis, even though many leading officials were totally opposed to it. Constitutional provisions such as the right to a fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention are not always observed, and there is a great deal of unofficial decision-making, including administrative and judicial acts affecting life and property, over which the nominal authorities cannot or do not care to exercise control.
So is international action on the Bahá’í question likely to be ineffective or even counter-productive? Certainly circumstances were quite different in 1955 when world opinion forced the Shah’s government, then heavily dependent on the West, to end anti-Bahá’í repression. Today no foreign government, even Iran’s few radical allies, has any real influence in Tehran, as was seen recently over efforts to mediate in the war with Iraq. Countries with a large Muslim population, even where the
[Page 13]
government is secular, are unlikely to
seek involvement on behalf of what
many of their citizens regard as a
heretical and threatening offshoot of
Islam. Nor are the socialist countries
likely to bother unduly about the plight
of a religious group ideologically far
removed from and even hostile to
theirs. Even those most concerned
about the Bahá’ís, the West and many
Third World countries, some with active and useful Bahá’í communities of
their own, must doubt whether there is
much they can do. In the case of the
U.S. hostages they found they could do
little.
Perhaps the most hopeful avenue is indicated by the evidence, scanty though it is, that Iran has been embarrassed by international reaction to the plight of the Bahá’ís during the past year, as also seems to have been the case over the wholesale slaughter of supporters of the Mojahedin, which has subsided, though not ceased, in recent months. One sign of this is that the publicity which used to accompany the execution of Bahá’ís has died down, a possible indication that the authorities have begun to realize the harm this is doing to their image. The Bahá’ís in Tehran have received semi-official hints to try to discourage the attention the persecution has been receiving abroad, and Iranian diplomatic representatives have been put on the defensive at a time when they wish to win sympathy over the Iraqi invasion. Even denials that anything untoward is happening must be seen as a tentative step in the right direction, particularly
Right: A Bahá’í child sits pensively beside the body of her martyred mother.
A part of the crowd of some 4,000
mourners who attended the funeral in Tehran in January 1980 of Dr. Manuchihr Hakim, a Bahá’í who was murdered by armed gunmen in his clinic in
the capital city.
[Page 14]
as Iran seems anxious to end its near-isolation from the international community.
Groups concerned with discrimination against minorities, and the Bahá’ís themselves, do feel that the right kind of collective protest can help. Expressed through the UN Commission on Human Rights, or the General Assembly, they feel, widespread moral disapproval of what is happening, whether this is officially sanctioned or not, could make the authorities in Tehran curb the more fanatically anti-Bahá’í elements. This seems a more hopeful approach than that of direct diplomacy, which the potentially influential EEC countries do not believe would be effective.
A firm statement by the UN Secretary-General, or the appointment of a commission of enquiry or a special rapporteur, might well be denounced publicly in Iran as interference in an internal matter, but it could nevertheless have useful behind-the-scenes effects. The inaccurate near-hysterical denunciations that have appeared in some Western publications almost certainly do more harm than good. Iran is unlikely to change any policy in apparent reaction to outside pressures, even from the UN, so great tact and understanding are necessary. The lesson to be learned from the hostage crisis is that patient negotiating, however frustrating at times, is more effective than direct political or military action, and this still applies to any dispute with Iran. An essential ingredient for success is the effort to understand the Iranian point of view, however alien it may appear.
If the present leaders in Iran are to be convinced that what is happening to the Bahá’ís is wrong, it is more likely to be by arguments such as that they should not feel threatened by a community that represents less than one per cent of the total population, or that the repression is counter-productive because of the sympathy for the Bahá’ís it creates abroad and possibly in Iran. After all, it was largely the persecution of the Bábís by the Qajars that made Bahá’ísm the largest religious minority in a country where martyrdom has always been held in the highest esteem. But on even the most optimistic view there is unlikely to be an end to discrimination against the Bahá’ís of Iran in the foreseeable future. Prejudice seems still to be so deep-rooted that it may take more than a generation before the Bahá’ís can be assimilated into their native land, for it is just as much theirs, with the rights guaranteed them by the Universal Declaration. Although the best that can realistically be hoped for is the removal of the grosser elements of the present persecution, pessimism about the prospects should not deter efforts to end it completely.
Bahá’ís of the Buyir-Ahmad tribe from Kata, a small village near Isfahan, Iran, are shown prior to setting up a tent city. They were driven from their village and housed temporarily in the Bahá’í Center in Isfahan.
- E.G. Browne, Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (Cambridge, 1918) pp. 323-339.
- J.R. Richards, The Religion of the Baha’is (London, 1932) pp. 225-227.
- In a private conversation with the author.
- Ma’ida-yi Asmani (Tehran, 1971-3) vol. 7, p. 182.
- Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day Is Come (Wilmette, 1939) pp. 93-98.
- The most complete account is The Bahá’ís in Iran, A Report on the Persecution of a Religious Minority, published by the Bahá’í International Community (New York, June 1981) with a supplement in September 1981. The Bahá’ís also publish press releases dealing with individual cases of persecution. In most cases the allegations are supported by documentary evidence such as facsimiles of official letters and newspaper reports.
- ECOSOC E/CN4/Sub 2/L778, 2 September 1981.
- Statement by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, quoted in Note Verbale of the Iranian Mission to the UN, Geneva, 22 September 1981.
- Letter from the Iranian chargé d’affaires to an unnamed British MP dated 24 June 1981, quoted in The Bahá’í Faith.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Undated statement issued by the Iranian Embassy in London, summer 1981.
- United Nations, 36th General Assembly GA/SHC/2453 dated 29 October 1981.
World Centre[edit]
Commentary on ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’[edit]
1. On page 10, column 1, it is stated:
“Bahá’ís cannot claim to be completely uninvolved in politics. They believe, after all, that the present world order is doomed and will one day be replaced by their Faith. Islam generally, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of it in particular, make no clear distinction between religion and politics, and the same can be said for the Bahá’í Faith.”
Comment: There is no doubt in the mind of any Bahá’í, as the clear instructions of his Faith testify, that in a world beset by strife and conflict, he should make a clear distinction between religion and politics, and avoid, both individually and collectively, all political entanglements and all forms of subversive activity. However, the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh also enshrine the concept of World Order as the culmination of a long and painful process of social and spiritual evolution. This is the age-old promise found in all religious scriptures for the establishment of universal peace and God’s Kingdom on earth.
All the prophets of the past have spoken of that day, but it was not possible of realization in past Dispensations, because the conditions of the world did not lend themselves to such fulfillment. When visualizing that day, the prophet Isaiah sees the “Prince of Peace” and “the government shall be upon His shoulder,” and Christ taught His followers to pray, “... Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven.” It is clear, therefore, that in anticipation of the coming age of humanity, and of an era when, the nations of the world would have emerged
| This commentary on “The Bahá’ís of Iran” by Roger Cooper was prepared by an ad hoc committee appointed for the purpose by the Universal House of Justice. |
from their present chaotic conditions, God’s Revelation should provide a blueprint to enable church and state to merge and matters of state and of religion to be dealt with by the agencies of God’s future new World Order.
2. In the same paragraph it is also
stated:
“... Bahá’ís are opposed to communism and socialism, and have adopted clear positions on such issues as racism, nationalism and world government.”
Comment:
It is true that Bahá’ís have taken positions regarding the theory of some of the political systems in the world, but when doing so they are careful not to give the impression that they are for or against any existing government. Shoghi Effendi, in a letter written on his behalf to one of the believers who had written an article commenting on current political affairs, advised him against such a step, as his comments would be liable to be misrepresented and misunderstood by politicians. The Guardian’s secretary goes on to say on his behalf: “There is, however, one case in which one can criticize the present social and political order without being necessarily forced to side with or oppose any existing regime. And this is the method adopted by the Guardian in his Goal of a New World Order. His criticisms of the world conditions, besides being very general in character, are abstract; that is, instead of condemning existing institutional organizations it goes deeper and analyzes the basic ideas and conceptions which have been responsible for their establishment. This being a mere intellectual and philosophical approach to the problem of world political crisis, there is no objection if you wish to try such a method, which immediately carries you from the field of practical politics to that of political theory. But in view of the fact that no clear cut line can be drawn between theory and practice you should be extremely careful not to make too free a use of such a method.”
3. The following is also stated in the same paragraph:
“Bahá'í texts refer to divinely sanctioned monarchy, and it is clear that this is the form of government they prefer. Despite the ill-treatment Bábís received from Qajar autocrats, Bahá’í leaders from Bahá’u’lláh onwards were rarely critical of the institution of monarchy, or even autocracy. They took no part in the Constitutional Revolution, for example, and described Mohammad Ali Shah, who tried to overthrow the Constitution, as a ‘just king.’ Bahá’ís apparently said prayers for Mohammad Reza Shah during the 1978-79 Revolution.”
Comment: Bahá’u’lláh has praised a “republican form of government” for it “profiteth all the peoples of the world” but He recommends for the future of society, after it has emerged in the fullness of time from its present stage of universal convulsions, a form of government in which the ideals of republicanism are combined with the institution of kingship. What He advocates, therefore, is not absolute monarchy but constitutional monarchy.
Bahá’ís consider it contrary to their teachings to express views on what current form of government is best for a given country. They show their loyalty to the government under whose jurisdiction they live, and they not only obey, but indeed regard it as meritorious to pray for it.
The world[edit]
23rd Green Lake Conference is held[edit]
“Points of Light” was the theme of the 27th annual Green Lake Bahá’í Conference held September 17-19 at the American Baptist Assembly center in Green Lake, Wisconsin.
Among the 980 Bahá’ís and their guests who attended the conference were Auxiliary Board members Khalil Khavari and Ronna Santoscoy, and Glenford E. Mitchell, former secretary of the U.S. National Spiritual Assembly, who was making his last public appearance in the U.S. before leaving for Haifa to assume his duties as the newest member of the Universal House of Justice.
“The Dawning Place of the Mention of God” was the title of a two-part audio-visual presentation Saturday evening by Bruce Whitmore, secretary of the House of Worship Activities Committee and manager of the Bahá’í House of Worship in Wilmette.
Another of the guest speakers was Gayle Morrison of Kauai, Hawaii, author of To Move the World, the biography of the Hand of the Cause of God Louis G. Gregory.
Thirteen optional workshop sessions, each of which was presented twice Saturday afternoon, were included in this year’s program. They covered such topics as the Creative Word, the “most challenging issue,” working with the media, Bahá’í perspectives on health and healing, Holy Days and family life, energy and communications, public speaking, teaching the Cause, and pilgrimage.
Music was plentiful with a conference theme, “Points of Light,” by Jerry Johnson of Shorewood, Wisconsin, and performances by a variety of other artists.
The children’s program was well attended and well supervised with children of various age groups attending classes and engaging in a variety of interesting and educational activities.
Glenford E. Mitchell, the newest member of the Universal House of Justice, was among the speakers at the 23rd Green Lake Bahá’í Conference.
Costa Rica[edit]
Sixty-eight Bahá’ís from Talamanca, Limón, San José and La Bomba, Costa Rica, attended a regional conference last July 3-4 that inaugurated the new district Ḥaẓíratu’l-Quds in La Bomba.
The facility was donated by a well-known Bahá’í family in Costa Rica. Its dedication fulfills a goal of the second phase of the Seven Year Plan.
A bronze plaque on the building tells of its dedication in memory of Mrs. Lazzrich de Molina for her many years of outstanding service to the Cause in the Atlantic Zone.
The conference, which included a presentation on the life of the Greatest Holy Leaf and a showing of the film “The Pilgrimage,” centered on the study of Bahá’í family life and the compilation on “Divine Assistance” prepared at the World Centre.
India[edit]
More than 90 residents of four tribal areas in Bihar State, India, accepted the Faith this year following the first phase of a teaching campaign directed by the State Teaching Committee aided by Counsellor Shirin Boman.
Mrs. Boman visited members of the Aroan tribe whose headman had been contacted earlier. She found that the people were eager to meet the Bahá’ís and had many questions. The headman and members of his family declared their belief in Bahá’u’lláh, as did other members of the tribe.
The following day, the director of the Ministry of Industry took the Counsellor in his jeep to a distant area.
“It was a wonderful sight,” Mrs. Boman reported, “to see so many tribal women, children and men gathered together to hear about our beloved Faith.”
The State Teaching Committee decided to rent a center in the market place of the tribal villages and to have a coordinator there to conduct deepening classes.
The National Spiritual Assembly of India has decided to develop more literature in the main tribal languages and to encourage the State Teaching Committee of Bihar to concentrate its efforts in that area.
Hong Kong[edit]
A three-member Bahá’í delegation from Hong Kong and Macau, a Portuguese province located near Hong Kong, presents Bahá’í literature to the governor of Macau on March 8, the occasion of the official recognition of the Faith in Macau. This recognition marks the incorporation of all the Local Spiritual Assemblies in Macau and Hong Kong. Presenting the literature to Gov. Vasco de Almeida e Costa are Chester Lee (right), chairman of the National Spiritual Assembly of Hong Kong; Claude Toui-Kan (left), chairman of the National Teaching Committee of Macau; and Farideh Paymani, a pioneer from Iran. The incorporation of the Faith in Macau was accompanied by a series of Bahá’í proclamations in newspapers and on radio and television.
Puerto Rico[edit]
Counsellor Donald Witzel addressed a dozen students from North, Central and South America last September 6 at the official opening of the new CIRBAL training center in Arecibo, Puerto Rico.
The students were beginning a four-week course in broadcast management and engineering conducted by K. Dean Stephens of CIRBAL, which is an acronym for the Spanish name “Centro para Intercambio Radiofónico Bahá’í de América Latina.” CIRBAL is a medium for the exchange of information and materials among Bahá’í institutions engaged in radio broadcasting in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Mr. Stephens is a technical expert who has guided Bahá’í efforts in radio broadcasting for several years.
CIRBAL’s first building, a permanent training center dedicated to the memory of the late Amoz Gibson, a member of the Universal House of Justice, was opened last August 28.
The new CIRBAL building, said Mr. Stephens, marks the start of an educational complex destined to grow into a vocational school designed to meet Bahá’í needs for expertise in radio broadcasting.
Japan[edit]
Shown here are members of the Bahá’í community of Ube City, Japan, and their guests with Bahá’í Trudi Scott (fourth from left) who spoke at a public meeting last April 18 during her visit to several Japanese cities. Mrs. Scott, a Bahá’í from England, served as secretary to Bernard Leach, a Bahá’í who was a well-known potter whose work influenced folk art movements in Japan and the West.
Thirty people, more than half of
whom were not Bahá’ís, attended a
public meeting last April 18 in Ube
City, Japan.
The guest speaker was Trudi Scott, a Bahá’í from England who served for 15 years as secretary to the late Bernard Leach, a Bahá’í who was well-known for his pottery and who wrote an autobiography entitled Beyond East and West.
Mr. Leach spent much of his life as a courier between East and West, influencing the folk arts movement in Japan and in the West.
During Mrs. Scott’s visit to Japan, she traveled to several Bahá’í communities, visiting local officials, artists and educators. She was interviewed by newspaper reporters and had an audience with Princess Chichibu.
- The charming and delightful story of a Bahá’í student
- whose energy and devotion contributed to the growth
- of the Bahá’í Faith in Berkeley and at
- Stanford University
- of the Bahá’í Faith in Berkeley and at
- whose energy and devotion contributed to the growth
- The charming and delightful story of a Bahá’í student
IN THE
VANGUARD
by
Marion Carpenter Yazdi
Youth in the Vanguard tells the fascinating story of the first Bahá’í student at the University of California at Berkeley and at Stanford University. In the familiar chores of finding meeting places, placing speakers, sending out invitations, putting up posters, and writing notices for newspapers, you will find a kinship with a predecessor that transcends time and place.
A special treat also awaits you in the story of one who set her course so deliberately in the footsteps of the Master, who grew up with the loving guidance and encouragement of such stalwart pioneer workers as Helen Goodall, Ella Cooper, Kathryn Frankland, and Ella Bailey, and who had her academic career shaped by letters from ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi.
Youth in the Vanguard tells the story of two loves—Marion Carpenter Yazdi’s love for a dashing young Persian graduate student whom she met at Berkeley when a quota system foiled her dreams of entering Stanford University as a freshman, and her love for the Bahá’í Faith.
| Marion Carpenter Yazdi first heard about the Bahá’í Faith in 1912 when her mother read aloud a newspaper article about ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in the Los Angeles Times. In 1914 she learned more about the Faith from a Bahá’í salesman and became a Bahá’í. From that time to this the Bahá’í Faith has provided the ballast and direction for her life. Except for two short periods she has spent most of her life in Berkeley, serving the community at large as a teacher and businesswoman, and the Bahá’í Faith in a number of capacities. |
Cloth edition only. 211 pages, Forewords by Ali M. Yazdi
and publisher, preface by author, notes, index, many photographs.
Catalog No. 332-089 $14,00*
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