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World Order, Series 2 Volume 27 - Issue 4

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Summer 1996

World Order

CHURCH BURNINGS: THE UGLY AGONY
OF A DYING ORDER
EDITORIAL

INTERDEPENDENCE COOPERATION
AND THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL
INSTITUTIONS
AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS

REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MICHAEL L. PENN

UNDERSTANDING POST-COLD WAR
COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS
JALEH DASHTI-GIBSON

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World Order

VOLUME 27, NUMBER 4

WORLD ORDER IS INTENDED TO STIMULATE, INSPIRE, AND SERVE THINKING PEOPLE IN
THEIR SEARCH TO FIND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY LIFE AND CONTEMPORARY
RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND PHILOSOPHY

Editorial Board:
FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH
BETTY J. FISHER
HOWARD GAREY
ROBERT H. STOCKMAN
JAMES D. STOKES

Consultant in Poetry:
HERBERT WOODWARD MARTIN

Subscriber Service:
LISA CORTES

WORLD ORDER is published quarterly by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, 415 Linden Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD ORDER Subscriber Service, Bahá’í National Center, Wilmette, IL 60091. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the publisher, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, or of the Editorial Board. Manuscripts can be typewritten or computer generated. They should be double spaced throughout, with the footnotes at the end. The contributor should send four copies—an original and three legible copies—and should keep a copy. Return postage should be included. Send manuscripts and other editorial correspondence to WORLD ORDER, 415 Linden Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091.

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WORLD ORDER is protected through trademark registration in the U.S. Patent Office.

Copyright © 1996, National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States. All Rights Reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
ISSN 0043-8804

IN THIS ISSUE

1   Church Burnings: The Ugly Agony of a Dying Order

Editorial

2   Interchange: Letters from and to the Editor

5   Interdependence, Cooperation, and the Emergence

of Global Institutions

by Augusto Lopez-Claros

17   Hiawatha, Hiawatha

poem by V. d’Araújo

19   Reflections on the Future of International Relations

by Michael L. Penn

33   Breaking the Fast in ‘Alá, the Month of Loftiness

poem by Peter E. Murphy

35   Understanding Post-Cold War Collective Sanctions

by Jaleh Dashti-Gibson

Inside back cover: Authors & Artists in This Issue

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Church Burnings: The Ugly
Agony of a Dying Order

EVER since the days of slavery black churches have been more than houses of worship. An oppressed people made them centers of its community life; a refuge from the indignities, the horrors, and the humiliations faced daily in a hostile world dominated by brute force; a school of endurance and survival. More recently black churches served as centers of the civil rights movement, providing some of its most outstanding leaders and endowing it with the spirit of nonviolence.

The current epidemic of church burning in the South is not about religion. It is an ugly manifestation of ingrained racism, an attack on black communities by hate-filled individuals or groups. It is a desperate reaction against the progress American society, black and white, has made in the last half century and an effort to rekindle the worst forms of racial bigotry and prejudice.

Arson, a particularly heinous form of crime fully comparable to murder, is made even more revolting when committed as an act of warfare against a racial, ethnic, or religious minority in whom it evokes memories of past injustices and a sense of continuing oppression.

Bahá’ís are well acquainted with prejudice and persecution. They have frequently been subjected to attacks by mobs and governments alike. Fully committed by their Faith to the ideals of equality of races and the oneness of humanity, Bahá’ís feel the pain of all those who suffer injustice. They unequivocally reaffirm their determination to work for the elimination of racism wherever it poisons people’s minds and hearts. Confident in the ultimate triumph of justice and love, Bahá’ís of all races and nations pray: “O Lord God! Make us as waves of the sea, as flowers of the garden, united, agreed through the bounties of Thy love. O Lord! Dilate the breasts through the signs of Thy oneness, and make all mankind as stars shining from the same height of glory, as perfect fruits growing upon Thy Tree of Life.”

Although for the moment the forces of separatism, bigotry, and fanaticism seem to be on the ascendent, their successes are an illusion. The world is inexorably moving toward its destiny of unity and peace. The burning of black churches in the American South, like the executions of innocent Bahá’ís in Iran and other acts of terrorism, is the ugly agony of a dying order.

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Interchange LETTERS FROM AND TO THE EDITOR

OUR Letters to the Editor section has been enriched by a very penetrating comment on gender equality, prompted by Jane J. Russell’s “Spiritual Vertigo at the Edge of Gender Equality” published in our Fall 1995 issue. The letter ends with a provocative invitation to our readers to explore other areas in which Bahá’ís may unconsciously harbor divisive prejudices. Race, of course, but also social class, ethnicity, occupation, educational level, and even physical appearance are a few that come to mind. You writers out there, Arise and express yourselves! We—the editors and all our readers—are heartened by this airing of views that justifies the name “Interchange.”

Our Summer issue includes a number of articles that should inspire more real conversation with our readers and authors. Readers will be struck by Bahá’u’lláh’s anticipation of the problems that beset us today in the realm of international relations and by the solutions His writings propose, solutions toward which the specialists in this area struggle, however uncertainly. The latter part of the title of Dr. Augusto Lopez-Claros’ article—“The Emergence of Global Institutions”—suggests the inexorable working-out of Bahá’u’lláh’s plan, by agents for the most part unaware of that plan. But read the article: This sober, step-by-step analysis of the developing institutions of governance of worldwide scope is a real eye-opener.

Ms. Jaleh Dashti-Gibson explains a particular tool among the modalities for keeping the peace among nations: collective sanctions. This, too, has been clearly anticipated in the works of Bahá’u’lláh. Once again, we are acquainted with a specific mechanism that goes beyond “an expression of vague and pious hope.” The problem is thoroughly discussed, with impressive reference to a number of studies from a variety of points of view.

Mere mechanisms, however, can solve nothing, as Dr. Michael L. Penn’s scrutiny of the traditional dichotomy between realism and idealism shows. As we learn from Dr. Penn, no choice between them is necessary, for they must work together; each is impotent without the other. Once more the argument in its application to international relations is thoughtfully presented with abundant reference to contemporary students of the subject, with “idealists and “realists” represented, especially the latter.

To the Editor

GENDER EQUALITY

The first thought that popped into my mind upon reading the article “Spiritual Vertigo at the Edge of Gender Equality” [by Jane J. Russell, Fall 1995] was: this article should be sent to every delegate to the election of the National Spiritual Assembly in their preelection packet and be made required reading, indeed to every Local Spiritual Assembly for distribution.

[Page 3] The statistics provided by Ms. Russell show just how insidious our—everyone’s—cultural conditioning is regarding the place and abilities of women in leadership roles.

It can and must be clearly inferred that in the secret voting process, where anonymity is assured, the deeply ingrained true feelings spontaneously come to the fore and influence the voters’ judgment. Thus they don’t vote their conscience and who they think is most qualified, but rather for the person with whom they feel most comfortable. And Ms. Russell proves to us scientifically the sad fact that most of us still feel most comfortable with men in leadership positions, be we Bahá’ís or not.

This phenomenon of voters voting their feelings and not their conscience has become known to political strategists and pollsters, and they target accordingly the tone and substance of their publicity.

As Bahá’ís we are prohibited from electioneering, and perhaps the pendulum has, therefore, swung too far in the opposite direction, and we’re afraid to openly discuss barely even the most general information relating to elections, such as the facts presented in this article, or qualifications for various positions. But we should discuss and share them among all Bahá’ís. We should talk about the knowledge presented in essays such as Ms. Russell’s so we may become fully aware of how those hidden feelings cause us to act. These are vital issues as are all other facts regarding all kinds of prejudices. We must learn how to practice voting in order to help the Bahá’í community become free of this scourge. And Shoghi Effendi, Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith, presents us with the uncomfortable fact that none of us is free of prejudice, since we live in the world at large. Even the fact that racial prejudice is the “Most Challenging Issue” within and outside the Bahá’í community is made clear to us by him.

Ms. Russell shows that when it comes to appointed positions of women we know what we must do: we use our rational mind, let our conscience guide us, and apply what the Bahá’í Sacred Writings tell us; out of the field of qualified individuals we choose those who have traditionally been left out by reason of gender, race, color, or class; in fact we prefer them. This presents us the encouraging news that in the affairs of Bahá’í community life we have begun to internalize this revolutionnry principle. We stand a good chance of penetrating the inner fortress of cultural conditioning and change our spontaneous actions when voting anonymously. Our Sacred Writings tell us that we are capable of changing such conditioning, that the future well-being of humankind depends on it. Ms. Russell’s article gave us an accurate gauge of how far we have yet to go regarding the equality of women and men.

What about similar information about the other prejudices we still harbor? How far has our community come? Such statistics should be gathered and published. Or are we afraid to face the facts? Ms. Russell faced this fear head-on on one issue. Can we do less about the others? We must include them in our learning process.

RUTH PERRIN

Atlanta, Georgia

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Interdependence, Cooperation, and
the Emergence of Global Institutions

BY AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS

Copyright © 1996 by Augusto Lopez-Claros. This essay is based on a talk presented at the Conference on the New World Order in Bahá’í Perspective hosted by the Institute for Bahá’í Studies, January 26-28, 1996, in Evanston, Illinois. The views expressed here are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund.

IT IS probably not possible to survey briefly world events over the last decade without feeling intense excitement, without being aware that one is witnessing events of great historic significance. A writer for The New Yorker not long ago pointed out that “as the decade draws to a close, the globe seems to be spinning faster than at any time in the last forty years, blurring long-familiar landscapes.” Indeed, the “acceleration in the velocity of our history and the uncertainty of its trajectory” —to use the words of a noted political observer—have become the background against which new ideas and concepts are shaping the world we live in during the last years of the twentieth century.

One of the inevitable consequences of this faster spinning is that the associated centrifugal forces are throwing into sharper contrast some of the challenges that humanity faces collectively. Charles Dickens’ reference to the French revolution in the opening sentence of A Tale of Two Cities seems to capture the sense and the spirit of the age in which we live: “It was the best of times, and it was the worst of times.” The current age is, indeed, one of expectations and hope as well as deepening contradictions and uncertainties.

A brief discussion of the contrasts that characterize the present world situation and an admittedly personal list of some of the reasons why these are both, at one and the same time, “the best of times and the worst of times” helps to illuminate humanity’s predicament.

The Best Of Times

THERE ARE a number of processes that are fundamentally constructive and that permit many to envision the future with a sense of optimism and promise.

For example, the softening of political tensions between the major powers in the last few years has had a number of beneficial implications and has perhaps provided a renewed sense of hope for the future. In particular, it has dramatically reduced the likelihood of a nuclear war that could have engulfed the entire planet and undermined humanity’s future security and well-being. [Page 6] Many will remember the darkened international horizon of the early 1980s that prompted perceptive thinkers like Jonathan Schell to write:

In the face of this unprecedented global emergency, we have so far had no better idea than to heap up more and more warheads, apparently in the hope of so thoroughly paralyzing ourselves with terror that we will hold back from taking the final, absurd step. Considering the wealth of our achievement as a species, this response is unworthy of us. Only by a process of gradual debasement of our self-esteem can we have lowered our expectations to this point. For, of all the “modest hopes of human beings,” the hope that mankind will survive is the most modest, since it only brings us to the threshold of all the other hopes. In entertaining it, we do not yet ask for justice, or for freedom, or for happiness, or for any of the other things that we may want in life.”

However keenly one may have felt the threat of nuclear war at that time, there is little doubt that, at least on this account, the world is a safer place today than it used to be. The end of the Cold War has also made it possible (at least in principle) for governments to set in motion processes aimed at allocating fewer resources to building up machineries of war and destruction and to maintaining military establishments, thus permitting their allocation to more productive ends that are more conducive to the welfare and, to use the words Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith, to “that which would conduce to the happiness to mankind.”

Moreover, there is increasing evidence throughout the world of a move toward the establishment of democratic regimes and representative governments and the rule of law. This has been a positive development because it is only in the context of representative governments that have derived their legitimacy through some form of popular vote that their policies can he expected to be sensitive to the needs of their populations. Increasingly, economic and social development are being seen less in terms of the evolution of aggregate economic indicators and more in terms of whether such development is compatible with equity and social justice, protection of the environment, and respect for civil and other basic human rights. One aspect of this broadening of the definition of economic and social development is the increasing on-going efforts at international economic cooperation, perhaps most dramatically seen in the context of the European Union.

Furthermore, there has been continued and remarkable progress in the fields of transport and communications, which has contributed to bringing human beings closer to each other and has forced them to reexamine many of their long-held prejudices.

Finally, although this list is not by any means exhaustive, there continues to be progress in the field of medicine, agriculture, and science in general, which suggests that in a gradual, evolutionary way science and technology are being used to alleviate many long-established economic and social problems. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the present age is the belief that the application of the scientific method and the onward march of technological progress will eventually allow us to satisfy the vast majority of the material needs of humankind.

The Worst Of Times

HOWEVER, at the same time, and notwithstanding the favorable trends and processes, [Page 7] there are other forces at work that give cause for concern and lead many to think of these as being especially dangerous times.

For example, the rapid deterioration of our environment, including deforestation, soil erosion, the thinning of the ozone layer, global warming, and so on give a sense of the precariousness of the world’s ecological system and the extent to which unrestrained industrialization and narrowly defined economic growth can undermine the basis for sustainable development.

Moreover, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, has, in many parts of the world, become an increasing threat to domestic peace and stability. The perniciousness of this trend has acquired manifestations even in traditionally egalitarian societies. In Russia, for example, during the last four years income distribution has become less equal than it is in most large industrial countries; Russia has managed to do in a few years what it took the United States nearly a quarter of a century to accomplish.

Yet another unfavorable trend is the corruption of religion, which has ceased to be, for the most part, the traditional source of spiritual guidance and inspiration and has become, instead, a force for disunity and the source of much confusion and conflict among the peoples of the world. The weakening of religion, in turn, has resulted in a general sense of disaffection and moral disorientation that transcends geographic and cultural barriers. How far humanity has moved from the role of religion was described by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the son of Bahá’u’lláh and the interpreter of His writing, at a large gathering of students and faculty at Leland Stanford Junior University in October 1912:

If religious belief proves to be the cause of discord and dissension, its absence would be preferable; for religion was intended to be the divine remedy and panacea for the ailments of humanity, the healing balm for the wounds of mankind. If its misapprehension and defilement have brought about warfare and bloodshed instead of remedy and cure, the world would be better under irreligious conditions.

The forces released by the clash of these opposing tendencies, some constructive and some destructive, have given many a sense that not only is the current age a very special (albeit dangerous) period but also one filled with a number of historical challenges and opportunities. Hence it is not surprising to find heated and interesting debates on such concepts as the new world order and, more substantively, the kinds of institutional structures that should be built to support an increasingly interdependent community of nations.

Interdependence, Cooperation,
and the Nation State

IN these best and worst of times an examination of one specific aspect of the broader question of interdependence is useful. The world has been transformed during the last several decades by technological progress, which, in turn, has had a dramatic impact on the nature of economic and political phenomena and in the way nations relate to each other. Greater economic integration made possible by rapid developments in transport and communications in particular have made evident the need For greater international cooperation. Jean Monnet, the father of the European Union, observed perceptively that economic integration was forcing nations to accept voluntarily the same rules and the same institutions and that, as a result, their [Page 8] behavior toward each other was also changing. This, he said, was permanently modifying relations between nations and could be seen as part of the “process of civilization itself.”

But greater interdependence has also created tensions arising out of the potential conflict between national sovereignty and collective welfare. Indeed, it is not inaccurate to say that at present most countries’ commitment to integration and increased international cooperation coexists with a reluctance, stemming from a desire to safeguard national interests, to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions. Therefore, one key question in the years immediately ahead is whether greater economic integration (fueled by further technological change, no longer under the control of any single sovereign state) will inevitably lead countries to seek common ground and perhaps even to build common institutions in other areas, such as foreign affairs and defense. Will the abdication of some national sovereignty in the economic sphere also lead to a similar process in other spheres of international relations?

Most people the world over have come to recognize the need for the existence of a certain number of institutions at the national level to guarantee the effective working of society. Everybody understands the need for a legislature to pass laws, for an executive branch to implement the laws, and for a judicial branch to interpret the law and to pass judgment whenever differences of interpretation arise. Most would agree with the notion that a central bank and other financial institutions are needed to regulate different aspects of the economic life of a nation. Indeed, it is not inaccurate to say that a sign of development and civilization is the extent to which such institutions in a particular nation have been allowed to develop and, in the process, managed to bring stability and a measure of prosperity to the life of a nation. Conversely, the absence of such institutional progress undermines the creative energies and the vitality of a nation and holds back its development.

At the same time it is also clear that national institutions and governments, in an increasingly interdependent world, are less and less able to address key problems, many of which have acquired an important international dimension.

First, governments are increasingly unable to do the kinds of things that they used to be able to do in the past and that, in people’s minds, came to be identified with the very essence of government. Richard Cooper, one of our most insightful international economists, provides some interesting examples of this. He observes that a number of econometric studies have shown that in the last forty years there has been a marked decline in the size of what economists call the “fiscal multiplier.” This is a relatively simple concept that tries to capture the impact on a nation’s gross national product of a given fiscal policy stimulus, such as a tax cut. If [Page 9] the magnitude of this multiplier is compared for a number of countries over a relatively long period of time—for example, since the early 1950s—it can be observed that it has been falling steadily. This means, that, whereas in the past governments could look to a fiscal stimulus as a way of addressing some specific macroeconomic problem (such as a stubbornly high unemployment rate), now that ability has been greatly diminished. A given fiscal stimulus by the British or French government simply “spills” into the rest of the world faster than it used to. Or as Cooper puts it “the increasing internationalization of the economy has led to an erosion of our government’s capacity to do things the way it used to.” This, in turn, can, and sometimes has, led to a kind of paralysis on the part of governments, a sense that since the world has changed and it is no longer under their control—or at least they have less control over it than used to be case—the optimal policy response is to do nothing. Yet, publics have vastly higher expectations about economic policy and are unlikely to be placated by their leaders telling them that there is very little that can be done because the effectiveness of traditional policies has been greatly reduced by processes outside their control. The result is a profound sense of public dissatisfaction and/or apathy that one can perceive in many countries.

Second, because of economic integration, government action can, occasionally, have unintended consequences, as opposed to an ineffective impact, which is the situation in the first case. Cooper again provides some examples. In one instance the United States decided to restrict European steel sales in the U.S. market. Europeans responded by restricting their own steel purchases from Brazil, Korea, and others. These countries, in turn, expanded their sales to the American market to compensate for the shortfall in Europe. At the end of the day there was no fundamental change. In another instance, in the early 1980s, the United States decided to tighten significantly its monetary policy while at the same time pursuing an expansive/loose fiscal policy (associated with a massive defense buildup). This led to a very sharp increase in international interest rates, which then became a key contributing factor in the onset of the international debt crisis, imposing a heavy burden on many nations and, in the end, also hurting the balance sheets of American banks.

The failings of the present international institutional arrangements in the political sphere are even more obvious. From Rwanda to Yugoslavia to Chechnya, one can see increasing evidences of the failure of the international community to address urgent and sometimes tragic problems because of the absence of international institutions charged with the power and jurisdiction to act in instances or situations that lie beyond the jurisdiction of national bodies. When half a million people in Rwanda are butchered within a brief span of time, and the images of the carnage are relayed to every corner of the world, there seems very little that the international community can do, other than wring its hands, express regret, and helplessly stand by lamenting its impotence. This is an eloquent indictment of the tragic shortcomings of the present international political system. It was this kind of insight that led two Harvard professors, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, in the 1950s to write about the need for the [Page 10] “establishment of world institutions which correspond to those which maintain law and order within local and national communities.”

The above Considerations lead to the following question: What is the most adequate response to the erosion of policy effectiveness? One obvious starting point is realizing that much of the ineffectiveness of government actions (and the corresponding paralysis that accompanies them) stems from the fact that the actions are being carried out by individual sovereign states, acting alone, in full use of their (rapidly diminishing) powers, whereas joint, coordinated actions can restore (sometimes to a great extent) the utility of the previously ineffective policy. The realization that, in an increasingly interdependent world, national institutions are less and less able to address problems that are fundamentally international in character and the implications that the realizatinn carries for the exercise of political authority are the motivating forces behind many of the present experiments in many parts of the world with integrative processes and the building of supranational institutions to support and direct such processes. Chief among these experiments one must note the economic, political, and institutional developments in the context of the European Union.

Global Institutions

ALBERT EINSTEIN, who together with Bertrand Russell and others gave a great deal of thought to the political requirements in the new climate created by the arrival of nuclear weapons, believed that one way one could address the evident failings of the international institutional framework was to create truly supranational organizations. In 1946, soon after the creation of the United Nations and very much aware of this organization’s limitations, he wrote:

The development of technology and of the implements of war has brought about something akin to a shrinking of our planet. Economic interlinking has made the destinies of nations interdependent to a degree far greater than in previous years. . . . The only hope for protection lies in the securing of peace in a supranational way. A world government must be created which is able to solve conflicts between nations by judicial decision. This government must be based on a clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments and the nations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons. A person or a nation can be considered peace loving only if it is ready to cede its military force to the international authorities and to renounce every attempt or even the means, of achieving its interests abroad by the use of force.

Russell held similar views:

A much more desirable way of securing world peace would be by a voluntary agreement among nations to pool their armed forces and submit to an agreed International Authority. This may seem, at present, a distant and Utopian prospect. but there [Page 11] are practical politicians who think otherwise. A World Authority, if it is to fulfill its function, must have a legislature and an executive and irresistible military power. All nations would have to agree to reduce national armed forces to the level necessary for internal police action. No nation should be allowed to retain nuclear weapons or any other means of wholesale destruction. . . . In a world where separate nations were disarmed, the military forces of the World Authority would not need to be very large and would not constitute an onerous burden upon the various constituent nations.

In the aftermath of the chaos and destruction unleashed by World War II Einstein, Russell, and others laid out an important argument in favor of the creation of an international authority, explaining that the time had passed when military conflicts and their associated damage could be reasonably contained. In earlier times, because of the limited destructive power of weapons, a war between, say, France and Germany, did not, on the whole, disturb the peace and tranquility of the Incas in South America or of certain tribes in Africa. In the nuclear age, however, war had become unthinkable and its consequences universal. National sovereignty, which had always been understood to mean the right of a country to defend its interests by the use of force if necessary, but the exercise of which had assumed that conflicts would remain largely confined to given geographic areas, no longer served the interests of anyone. On the contrary, thus understood, national sovereignty cast a dark shadow over the future of everyone. Hence the notion eventually emerged that lasting international peace will be feasible only in the context of the creation of a global institution based on the principle of collective security.

An additional argument supporting the creation of global institutions stems from the flowering of science and technology. Since this is irreversible and no longer under the control of any one government or power, the process of global integration and interdependence will continue to bring nations and peoples together and will increasingly expose the weaknesses of prevailing international political arrangements. As problems became more global in nature—from the environment to the functioning of the international economy—situations could emerge where important areas of human endeavor no longer receive adequate attention, creating the risks of ever more intense crises. Thus the creation of supranational institutions can be seen as fundamentally a preventive measure, designed to bring into being bodies with the appropriate jurisdiction over problems no longer under the control of today’s sovereign states.

Yet another argument for the creation of global institutions is the enormous cost of maintaining military establishments associated with the present system of sovereign states. According to the United Nations Human Development Report 1990, by the mid-1980s military spending in developing countries —some U.S. $200 billion per year— exceeded spending on health and education combined. This telling statistic brings to mind the intense policy debates at the beginning of the decade on the scope that would be created by savings in defense spending, the so-called “peace dividend,” and the uses to which it could be put. Staff at the International Monetary Fund have recently estimated that every 1 percent increase in the efficiency of government spending worldwide (much defense spending falls under the category of “unproductive” expenditure) releases about U.S. $100 billion in resources that can [Page 12] be allocated to such things as human capital investment, social protection, and deficit reduction. One cannot help reflecting on the words of Bahá’u’lláh, Who, in the early 1890s, when visited by the Cambridge orientalist Professor Edward G. Browne, said, “we see your kings and rulers lavishing their treasures more freely on means for the destruction of the human race than on that which would conduce to the happiness to humanity,” an observation that has remained tragically relevant during the next one hundred years.

Although many recognize the intellectual value of the arguments for global institutions, others think it would be politically very difficult to achieve international consensus for establishing a broad and deep institutional structure, such as that which would have to underlie the creation of a world government. Still others think that such a goal, while not politically impossible, might be undesirable because it would lead to some kind of monstrous state that would eventually control every aspect of people’s lives, ultimately even depriving them of essential liberties.

Part of the mistrust of global institutions comes from a somewhat strained understanding of human nature. For many, human beings are essentially selfish and aggressive, and war reflects their inner nature. From this perspective, humankind’s extinction as a species is more or less inevitable. As the weapons of destruction become technologically more refined and as their efficacy is enhanced, the time will come when humanity will simply obliterate itself. This particular view of humanity is in sharp contrast with the Bahá’í view, which says that “man is a mine rich in gems of inestimable value” and that through education these gems can be brought out into the open for the benefit of humankind. It is not a question of naively denying that human beings are incapable of behaving detestably toward one another. Unfortunately, during the twentieth century humankind has developed this ability to an extreme degree, and perhaps this century will be remembered as the time in the evolution of humanity when this ability was most horribly manifested. It is more a question of recognizing that “Prejudice, war, and exploitation have been the expression of immature stages in a vast historical process and that the human race is today experiencing the unavoidable tumult which marks its collective coming of age.”

Yet others see a different obstacle to global institutions. They view the diversity of the human family as an insurmountable obstacle to greater international cooperation and initiatives that might lead to global governance. To have a form of centralized government machinery that would manage global affairs on a world scale, such individuals believe, one would need to have a set of universally accepted human values, something that apparently does not exist today. But this line of thinking ignores the communications revolution that has taken place during the twentieth century, providing overwhelming evidence that the world has, indeed, become a global community. The revolution has clearly altered the dimensions of the planet and brought its inhabitants much closer to each other. Moreover, it has forced them to challenge long-held views about human nature and humankind’s presumed inability to transcend [Page 13] the parochialism of tribe and nation and has contributed to a growing consciousness of world citizenship.

Beyond the impact of the communications revolution there are some universally accepted human values that transcend cultural barriers. Indeed, many see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a broad consensus on the part of the international community on some fundamental, broadly held values. Various articles of the Declaration address such concepts as the will of the people as the basis of government authority and hence the need for the periodic establishment of the legitimacy of governments through elections (Article 21); the safety of citizens and the right to equal protection under the law (Article 7); the availability of information and freedoms of association and expression (Article 19); the ownership of property (Article 17); and the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of the individual and his/her family (Article 25). In any event, the existence of international institutions or a world government does not presuppose the uniformity of values. All that is necessary is that there be certain universally accepted human values that have some relevance in the field of international relations (for example, ecological stability). Beyond this, it is possible to have a great deal of diversity within a particular international institutional framework. The variety of religions, for example, may persist, as may many other indigenous habits or customs.

Yet the creation of supranational institutions does, of necessity, imply the loss of sovereignty in certain areas. Indeed, the will to abdicate specific powers to supranational institutions—as is being done, in the context of the European Union—is itself an exercise of national sovereignty. When, in 1994, the citizens of Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated in national referenda and approved their respective governments’ decisions to join the European Union, they collectively undertook to transfer sovereignty in key areas, hitherto under the jurisdiction of their national governments. They did so because it was felt that the benefits to be derived from closer international cooperation and recognition of common interests exceeded the perceived costs associated with the loss of some sovereignty.

The present system of sovereign states has sometimes created delusions of freedom. Countries may, for example, use force to defend “vital” interests, as Iran and Iraq did throughout much of the 1980s, sustaining in the process large losses of human life, putting otherwise enormous strains on the social, economic, and political fabric of their respective societies. Political leaders may freely decide what percentage of the national budgets will be allocated to defend national borders. But one does not need to be very perceptive to realize that such liberties are, in fact, important constraints that limit a country’s freedom to allocate resources to improve the quality of life. Maybe it would be better not to have the freedom to accumulate machines of war because international political arrangements have evolved and finally eliminated the need for massive spending on security, thereby liberating economic resources to fight against hunger or poverty or to invest in the future of our children. Russell has observed that

War has so long been a part of human life that it is difficult for our feelings and our imaginations to grasp that the present [Page 14] anarchic national freedoms are likely to result in freedom only for corpses. If institutions could be created which would prevent war, there would be much more freedom in the world than there is at present, just as there is more freedom owing to the prevention of individual murder.

Beyond giving up certain national “liberties,” one must not fall prey to associating world government with the creation of an Orwellian superstate that will control and direct every aspect of life and that will eventually suffocate the diversity of the human race, a source of vitality and creativity through the ages. Rather, one must study carefully the principle of unity in diversity, eloquently articulated by Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith. This principle, he said,

does not ignore, nor does it attempt to suppress, the diversity of ethnical origins, of climate, of history, of language and tradition, of thought and habit, that differentiate the peoples and nations of the world. It calls for a wider loyalty, for a larger aspiration than any that has animated the human race. It insists upon the subordination of national impulses and interests to the imperative claims of a unified world. It repudiates excessive centralization on the one hand, and disclaims all attempts at uniformity on the other. Its watchword is unity in diversity. . . .

Others argue that the creation of a world government might result in the emergence of an enormous and inefficient bureaucracy. However, the creation of international institutions would presumably allow national governments to get rid of or significantly reduce the scope of many functions (for example, defense) that are integral to the current system of sovereign states and would, by the gradual elimination of overlapping areas of activity, create at least the potential for improved efficiency. Thus, rather than resulting in the emergence of a large and inefficient bureaucracy, global institutions could at least potentially streamline government and gradually eliminate the many barriers that inhibit human interaction and that have often existed when countries’ actions have been motivated by fear, suspicion, or competition. In any event, inefficiencies associated with the existence of bureaucracies (at any level, local, national, or international) are to be dealt with through improvements in management and administration, including a clear identification of objectives and responsibilities, and not through the elimination of the bureaucracies themselves. Citizens in a particular country may at times feel that their governments are neither especially sensitive to their nor particularly efficient in the administration of the resources and functions under their jurisdiction, but few would argue that the logical solution to this problem would be to do away with governments themselves, as if the functions they perform and the needs they fulfill could simply be assumed away or ignored. Arguing against the creation of an international authority on the environment, say, on the grounds that it might initially lead to an inefficient bureaucracy is not a serious argument as it implicitly suggcsts that the alternative is better, namely—some global environmental crisis resulting from the absence of a forum for discussion and action on problems with a strong international component.

For those who argue that a world government would inevitably lead to overcentralization, an undue curtailment of local and [Page 15] national freedoms, and even result in the emergence of a world dictatorship, one can point to history. It did not happen in the United States, when the colonies gave up their sovereignty to a federal government, and it certainly is not happening in Europe. It will always be possible, in the context of democratic societies living under the rule of law, to limit legally the various spheres of influence of each level of government, as is happening in the context of the European Union through the repeated application of the “principle of subsidiarity”—namely, the idea that a particular area of responsibility, such as the provision of elementary education, should best be carried out by the lowest possible level of government (in this case, local) and that higher forms of government should not become directly involved in those aspects inherent to this particular activity. Application of the principle of subsidiarity would, likewise, suggest that issues of environmental protection, economic management, defense, and security, because of their systemic nature and the high level of integration between states, should be dealt with by supranational institutions.

The Future

AS PERSUASIVE as some of the arguments for global institutions are, the prevailing view on the initiatives called for by Einstein and Russell in the post-war period—and which lie at the heart of the vision of world order offered by Bahá’u’lláh more than a century ago—seems to be that they are unlikely to crystallize into concerted international actions in the near future. Skeptics might point to the objective fact that the major initiatives taken during the twentieth century in the area of international relations were all in response to, and not to anticipate or prevent, the suffering and destruction of the two world wars. Indeed, the most far reaching and ambitious of these, the creation of the European Union, brought together precisely those states most affected by those global conflicts. This suggests that truly global institutions will not emerge unless some sufficiently profound crisis, unparalleled in its intensity, universal in its character, eloquently and permanently sears into human consciousness the notion of humanity’s interdependence and oneness and the dangers of preserving an international institutional framework no longer responsive to the needs of the majority of the human family. The force of adverse circumstances rather than an act of mature and collective will is what would precipitate a new stage in the political life of humanity.

But, regardless of the way in which global order comes into being, through collective pain and suffering, or as a result of the gradual evolution of new forms of international cooperation in the context of an emerging global community, the ultimate outcome will largely be a function of humanity’s exertions and initiatives and the strength of its will. Einstein was right when he wrote that “the destiny of civilized humanity depends more than ever on the moral forces it is capable of generating.” The long-awaited “kingdom of God on earth,” that symbol at the center of the vision of the future offered by many of the world’s religions, will not be established by an instantaneous act of our Creator, finally tired of humanity’s weaknesses, failures, and spiritual shortcomings. If that kingdom is to be the basis for the future development of the manifest and (as yet unimaginable) latent capacities of the human race, if that future is to be sustainable and achievable, its foundations will have to reflect an appropriate degree of understanding and acceptance by the majority of the human family of the spiritual and moral requirements [Page 16] for peaceful and purposeful life in the new century.

This means the conviction that all human beings have been created “to carry forward an ever-advancing civilization”; that “to act like the beasts of the field is unworthy of man”; that the virtues that befit human dignity are trustworthiness, forbearance, mercy, compassion and loving kindness towards all peoples. . . . that the “potentialities inherent in the station of man, the full measure of his destiny an earth, the innate excellence of his reality, must all be manifested in this promised Day of God.”

[Page 17]

Hiawatha, Hiawatha

Hiawatha, Hiawatha,

Beautiful horse,

Run, run, run

To glory

And escape

Injustice of men,

Hiawatha, Hiawatha,

Run, run, run,

Precious you are

In your speed,

Hiawatha, Hiawatha,

Red horse

That I love,

Run, run, run

To freedom,

My prayers

With you,

Hiawatha, Hiawatha,

I see you

In my dreams,

Cavalcade

In the hill, canyon,

And mountain,

Hiawatha, Hiawatha,

Run, run, run

To freedom,

Escape injustice

Of men!

Your shelter and refuge

Are waiting for you

In the valley of love

And you hear,

Beautiful horse,

Your name be called:

Hiawatha, Hiawatha. . . . .

—V. d’Araújo

Copyright © 1996 by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States

[Page 18]

[Page 19]

Reflections on the Future
of International Relations

BY MICHAEL L. PENN

Copyright © 1996 by Michael L. Penn. This essay is based on a talk presented at the Conference on the New World Order in Bahá’í Perspective hosted by the Institute for Bahá’í Studies, January 26-28, 1996, in Evanston, Illinois. The author wishes to thank Drs. Betty J. Fisher and Rick Johnson for their assistance in the preparation of this article.

Introduction

DESPITE the end of the Cold War, realism continues to compete with idealism for the minds and hearts of world leaders. In recent years idealists have begun to suggest that realism, which tends to emphasize immutable barriers to international peace, is becoming increasingly incongruent with global realities. In contrast to the pessimism embodied in the realist perspective, idealists note that four global trends support the possibility of establishing an enduring peace based on principles of cooperation and justice: the spread of democracy, a growing recognition of economic interdependence, the decreasing appeal of war, and the rise of supranational institutions to regulate world affairs.

As an ideology, realism stands as a potential barrier to peace because it embodies hopeless attitudes about the possibility of erecting an international framework suitable for maintaining collective security among nations. Hence any foreign policy based on realism encourages nations to maintain the status quo and continue to invest in military infrastructures required for war because the nature of world politics is said to be constrained by human nature, which, realists say, is fundamentally selfish and aggressive. Such a view is reflected in the work of Walter Lippmann, one of the chief architects of realism, who noted that world politics must be understood as a self-interested struggle for power among nations. Similarly, Alfred Mahan, another early and influential realist, suggested that “The law of states, as of man, is self-preservation” and that “it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other ground than national interest.” Hans Morganthau, the most successful proponent of [Page 20] realism, maintained that the human desire for domination is part of human nature and that this desire fuels the relentless struggle for power at each level of human organization—from the family to the arena of international politics.

Realism thus discourages investment in transnational institutions and policies that may be capable of resolving international disputes peacefully because such mechanisms are said to be founded on naive assumptions concerning the flexibility of human nature, the power of law to constrain human aggression, and the ability of nations to render pursuit of self-interests subservient to the goal of peaceful coexistence.

Idealists, in contrast, argue that the well-being of nations is not necessarily secured by increasing amounts of military spending; that post-Cold War geopolitical and economic conditions render the present time particularly propitious for establishing new modes of international relations; and that international institutions that help preserve international peace by limiting national borders, facilitating the resolution of international disputes, and safeguarding the interests of the planet as a whole are not only possible but necessary if humanity is to survive in this period of nuclear proliferation, diminishing resources, and global interdependence. Thus, in spite of the historical record, idealists suggest that long-term global security may best be achieved if national policies are animated by a vision of collective security and international cooperation.

Although the ideological struggle between realism and idealism has occupied the minds of political thinkers for much of the past century, the new world order adumbrated in the writings of the Bahá’í Faith may have the potential to satisfy many of the legitimate concerns raised by realists while also giving practical expression to the vision for the future of humankind articulated by idealists.

Idealism, Realism, and American Foreign Policy

IN HIS recent book on idealism, realism, and American foreign policy, writer and analyst David Callahan provides insight into the ideological struggle between idealism and realism during the past century. He points out that, beginning with Alexander Hamilton, who dismissed “Enlightenment ideals of how a community of nations should behave,” and extending throughout much of the twentieth century, realism has inspired the foreign policy of most of America’s presidents and foreign-policy makers. As early as 1910 Alfred Mahan [Page 21] warned that, unless America adopted a realist foreign policy, it might well find itself “vulnerable to an ‘aggressive restlessness’ that underlay the continuous struggle for survival among great powers.” Theodore Roosevelt is said to have adopted Mahan’s foreign policy perspective and become one of the first realist presidents of the United States.

Mahan’s contemporary, Walter Lippmann, further advanced the aims of realism when he attacked the “naive,” idealistic assumptions that were said to characterize President Wilson’s handling of the peace negotiations that followed World War I. Insisting that the world was considerably different from the one envisioned by Wilson, Lippmann wrote that

The Wilsonian vision is of a world in which there are no lasting rivalries, where there are no deep conflicts of interest, where no compromises of principle have to be made, where there are no separate spheres of influence, and no alliances. In this world there will be no wars except universal war against criminal governments who rebel against universal order.”

Despite Lippmann’s obvious sarcasm, his depiction of Wilson’s idealistic vision is remarkably close to the degree of cooperation that is called for in the new world order described in the Bahá’í writings.

Although idealism may have had strong, vocal supporters following World War I, the calculated, self-interested brutality of World War II led to the consolidation of a realist foreign policy among U.S. leaders and foreign-policy makers: “In a world of Hitlers and Tojos,” Callahan writes, “it was hard to have faith in good intentions and high minded schemes for collective security.” In his depiction of American vulnerability following the second World War, Nicholas Spykman, a powerful U.S. foreign-policy analyst, complained that the international community was without a central authority to preserve law and order, to guarantee territorial integrity and political independence, or to secure basic rights under international law. “States exist, therefore, primarily in terms of their own strength or that of their protector states,” Spykman wrote, “and if they wish to maintain their independence, they must make the preservation or improvement of their power position the principal objective of foreign policy.” Although the United States was a significant contributor to the development of the United Nations following World War II, the Wilsonian vision of collective security was supplanted by an aggressive [Page 22] arms race that was to claim an increasing share of the world’s economic, political, and intellectual resources.

The United States, influenced by Hans Morgenthau, the most successful proponent of realism during the postwar period, and by U.S. diplomat George Kennan, who was deeply suspicious of both the legal and moral ideals that had influenced U.S. foreign policy, pursued the Cold War strategy of containment for more than four decades.

The Reemergence of Idealism

IN THE recent past, however, realist doctrine has come under renewed attack. Over the last two decades a respected cohort of scholars and analysts have begun to suggest that global trends toward greater economic interdependence cast serious doubts over the legitimacy of a realist foreign policy. In support of their critiques of realist policies, they cite the rising power of multinational corporations and the emergence of international nonstate actors such as the various nongovernmental organizations, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the European Community. They also describe a rapidly changing world in which advances in communication, transportation, and international trade have released irreversible forces of transnational integration.

The rapidly changing geopolitical and economic context has led both idealists and realists to affirm that world politics is in a period of transition. In 1975 Henry Kissinger, perhaps the most powerful realist in recent years, affirmed that “we are entering a new era” and that “old international patterns are crumbling.” The world, Kissinger noted, “has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.” In his description of this shifting paradigm, Michael Allen, a professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, asserts that while in the past

the foreign encounters which had the greatest consequences for the welfare, security and consciousness of people . . . were those enacted by agents of [Page 23] states. . . . Today . . . (m)erchants and bankers are both more numerous and have been joined by overseas managers, engineers and technical advisers. Together their trans-border encounters have greater consequences for the welfare, security and consciousness of people around the world than most of the inter-governmental or domestic actions of states.

Despite these noteworthy changes, “essential realism,” which is fundamentally Hobbesian in nature, continues to manifest itself as captains of industry, bankers, film makers, and other private actors have entered, en masse, the international arena.

Essential realism, according to Allen, sees states as the primary units of action, assumes an environment of mutual hostility or suspicion among states, seeks power as a means of security in a presumably anarchical environment, and assumes that state actors are rational—inasmuch as they are motivated by self-interest. Since private citizens tend to be guided by many of these same assumptions, in spite of dramatic changes in the form realism may now take, the spirit of realism continues to inform the nature of relations among and between the peoples and nations of the world. Furthermore, neither the emergence of nonstate actors nor the end of the Cold War has put to rest realists’ concerns for international order and security. Indeed, as Callahan notes, from a realist’s point of view, while the end of the Cold War may have changed the structure of world politics, it did not change its essential nature:

That nature is seen as governed by an inescapable reality: no central authority exists to manage the international system. . . . [thus] each country must take responsibility for its own security, preparing for the use of military force or living at the mercy of stronger neighbors. The Cold War’s end, far from increasing stability, is seen as creating new dangers by replacing stable bipolar rivalry with a less predictable multipolar system in which many strong states compete for position and all states feel less secure.

The Bahá’í Faith and the Future of International Relations

DESPITE the century-long struggle between realism and idealism, from a Bahá’í perspective the realist’s need for national and international security and the idealist’s hope of achieving harmony and cooperation among peoples and nations are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, and commensurate with [Page 24] a realist perspective, the Bahá’í writings suggest that a sustainable peace can only be achieved when the practical means necessary for safeguarding national borders and resolving international disputes peacefully have been well established. At the same time, Bahá’ís view peace as more than the absence of war and maintain that true peace requires a conscious, moral commitment to the reality of humanity’s interdependence.

In a series of letters written between 1929 and 1936, Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith and the great-grandson of Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Faith, invited humanity to investigate the model for world order outlined in the Bahá’í teachings:

Leaders of religion, exponents of political theories, governors of human institutions, who at present are witnessing with perplexity and dismay the bankruptcy of their ideas, and the disintegration of their handiwork, would do well to turn their gaze to the Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh, and to meditate upon the World Order which, lying enshrined in His teachings, is slowly and imperceptibly rising amid the welter and chaos of present-day civilization.”

The uniqueness of Bahá’u’lláh’s vision for a new world order lies not only in the peace-keeping institutions it prescribes but in the philosophical and spiritual foundations upon which these institutions are based. Unlike the most powerful political systems of the present or past, which assume the inevitability of conflict between nations and peoples, the new world order adumbrated in the writings of Bahá’u’lláh rests upon an emerging consciousness of the oneness and interdependence of all humankind. “Let there be no mistake,” was Shoghi Effendi’s firm assertion.

The principle of the Oneness of Mankind—the pivot round which all the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh revolve—is no mere outburst of ignorant emotionalism or an expression of vague and pious hope. Its appeal is not to he merely identified with a reawakening of the spirit of brotherhood and goodwill among men, nor does it aim solely at the fostering of harmonious cooperation among individual peoples and nations. Its implications are deeper. . . . Its message is applicable not only to the individual, but concerns itself primarily with the nature of those essential relationships that must bind all the states and nations as members of one human family. It does not constitute merely the enunciation of an ideal, but stands inseparably associated with an institution adequate to embody its truth, demonstrate its validity, and perpetuate its influence.

It is in this Bahá’í vision of oneness and interdependence, as well as in the [Page 25] establishment of an international governing body—with sufficient military backing to ensure collective security—that both realists and idealists may find their highest hopes realized.

Indeed, more than a century before the height of the arms race, Bahá’u’lláh, in a letter to Queen Victoria but addressing the entire “concourse of the rulers of the earth,” wrote:

We see you adding every year unto your expenditures and laying the burden thereof on the people whom ye rule; this verily is naught but grievous injustice. . . . Be reconciled among yourselves, that ye may need armaments no more save in a measure to safeguard your territories and dominions. Be united, O concourse of the sovereigns of the world, for thereby will the tempest of discord be stilled amongst you and your peoples find rest. Should any one among you take up arms against another, rise ye all against him, for this is naught but manifest justice.

In an elaboration of Bahá’u’lláh’s prescription for a new world order embodying those institutions necessary to ensure collective security, Shoghi Effendi affirmed:

What else could these weighty words signify if they did not point to the inevitable curtailment of unfettered national sovereignty as an indispensable preliminary to the formation of the future Commonwealth of all the nations of the world? Some form of a world super-state must needs be evolved, in whose favor all the nations of the world will have willingly ceded every claim to make war, certain rights to impose taxation and all rights to maintain armaments, except for purposes of maintaining internal order within their respective dominions. Such a state will have to include within its orbit an international executive adequate to enforce supreme and unchallengeable authority on every recalcitrant member of the commonwealth; a world parliament whose members shall be elected by the people in their respective countries and whose election shall be confirmed by their respective governments; and a supreme tribunal whose judgment will have a binding effect even in such cases where the parties concerned did not voluntarily agree to submit their case to its consideration.

To those who suggest that such a framework is impractical, the Bahá’í writings call for reflection on the federal system that binds the semisovereign states that make up the United States. Because there is interstate cooperation and greater loyalty to a national constitution and body of laws, it is possible for the northern, southern, eastern, western, and central states, as well as Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, to conduct commerce, protect civil rights, educate the population, share resources, and protect the interests of both individual states and the union in a more efficient, cost-effective manner. On a global scale, [Page 26] what is impractical is having to carry out those processes necessary for the maintenance of nations without a legal, constitutional, and legislative framework that would facilitate and inform the nature of international relations.

In a recent statement on the prosperity of humankind, the Bahá’í International Community’s Office of Public Information notes that “Laying the groundwork for global civilization calls for the creation of laws and institutions that are universal in both character and authority.” For example, internationally accepted and enforceable laws on human rights; a common global currency; a common universal auxiliary language; a common system of weights and measures; a common commitment to cultivating, safeguarding, and sharing the earth’s natural resources; and a universally supported international peace force, accountable to the dictates of a world parliament would be among the earliest and most important fruits of such a global framework. Would not the business of sustaining and supporting life on earth be facilitated by such collective arrangements?

Although mindful of the grievous slaughter and exploitation of America’s original inhabitants, Shoghi Effendi also suggested looking at the early history of the United States to develop greater confidence in the feasibility of a global federal system. In 1931 he wrote:

How confident were the assertions made in the days preceding the unification of the states of the North American continent regarding the insuperable barriers that stood in the way of their ultimate federation! Was it not widely and emphatically declared that the conflicting interests, the mutual distrust, the difference of government and habit that divided the states were such as no force, whether spiritual or temporal, could ever hope to harmonize or control? And yet how different were the conditions prevailing a hundred and fifty years ago from those that characterize present-day society! It would be no exaggeration to say that the absence of those facilities which modern scientific progress has placed at the service of humanity in our time made of the problem of welding the American states into a single federation, similar though they were in traditions, a task infinitely more complex than that which confronts a divided humanity in its efforts to achieve the unification of all mankind.

On Human Nature

DESPITE the feasibility of establishing a global system of governance, the central concern expressed by realists that may cast doubts on the vision of [Page 27] world order is human nature. As has been noted, realists regard human nature as incorrigibly selfish and aggressive; thus they argue that peace initiatives that depend upon human beings for their success are bound to fail.

In spite hf its wide acceptance, the realist perspective on human nature is one that fails to comport either with history or with the most recent developments in human psychology. Such a perspective has also been called into question in the writings of the Bahá’í Faith. In its 1985 statement to the peoples of the world, the Universal House of Justice, the supreme governing and legislative body of the Bahá’í Faith, notes that, while uncritical assent has been given to the proposition that human beings are incorrigibly selfish and aggressive, far from expressing their true self, the aggression and conflict that characterize our social, economic, and religious systems represent a distortion of the human spirit. “Satisfaction on this point,” the Universal House of Justice writes, “will enable all people to set in motion constructive forces which, because they are consistent with human nature, will encourage harmony and cooperation instead of war and conflict.”

From the psychological literature there is much evidence to suggest that human behavior (including either aggression or altruism) is a function of the relationship between malleable attitudes and prevailing social and/or political conditions. Thus, if one wants to explain why a person, a group, or a society has acted aggressively, one must know something about the interaction between the actors’ beliefs and values and the social conditions prevailing at the time. Since all human qualities can be strengthened or weakened by training and are subject to immediate and historical social, political, and moral influences, aggression and selfishness are not unalterable features of humanity’s behavioral repertoire. Rather, in most cases they are characteristics that are as remediable as is the inability to read and write.

Furthermore, if humanity is one, indivisible, organic whole, its growth, like [Page 28] that of all organic systems, is characterized by different stages of development. The Bahá’í writings point out that just as the individual must pass through infancy, childhood, and adolescence so also humanity has had to pass through analogous stages. During the development process, if a human being is subject to the proper education, he or she grows from a state of relative helplessness into a being capable of the most subtle and exquisite thoughts and actions. If one had not witnessed a newborn baby grow into a mature adult, one would not easily believe that a creature who can neither hold up its head nor control its own sputum could someday be able to play the harpsichord, fly an aircraft past the speed of sound, or transplant a kidney from one living person to another. This is the miracle of life and development.

Centuries ago Aristotle noted that if one wishes to know the true nature of a thing, one must know its final cause, its end or purpose. To understand fully the nature of an acorn, for example, one must know that it has the potential to become an oak tree. Final cause thus embodies a sense of telos or destiny. When one understands a developing organism’s final cause, one is able to nurture its development with faith and confidence. One does not, for example, discard one’s children because they are helpless, or bothersome, or sometimes even rude, arrogant, and violent; nor does one say that such characteristics are part of the child’s immutable nature. The children are educated because there is a vision for their potential. The development of the body politic must be understood in much the same way.

The Importance of Women in the Peace Process

AMONG the most important prerequisites for peace is the full and equal participation of women in all aspects of society—including the international political arena. Echoing assertions made more than a century ago by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Bahá’u’lláh’s appointed successor and interpreter of His writings, the Universal House of Justice recently noted that

The emancipation of women, the achievement of full equality between the sexes, is one of the most important, though less acknowledged prerequisites of peace. The denial of such equality perpetrates an injustice against one-half of the world’s population and promotes in men harmful attitudes and habits that are carried from the family to the workplace, to political life, and ultimately to international relations. There are no grounds, moral, [Page 29] practical, or biological, upon which such denial can be justified. Only as women are welcomed into full partnership in all fields of human endeavor will the moral and psychological climate be created in which international peace can emerge.

Indeed, examination of the historical record reveals that much of the bellicose behavior attributed to “human nature” by realists is largely the reflection of only one half of the world’s population. Rarely have women of the world been the progenitors of war and systematic violence. On the contrary, while men have been waging war, women have been resolving disputes peacefully, nurturing the development and well-being of others, and teaching children the qualities of mind and heart necessary to get along with their siblings, classmates, and friends. As a result, the women of the world have developed many of the skills now needed to erect a global society based on principles of cooperation and justice. In 1912 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá affirmed that,

imbued with the same virtues as man, rising through all the degrees of human attainment, women will become the peers of men, and until this equality is established, true progress and attainment for the human race will not be facilitated.

The evident reasons underlying this are as follows: Woman by nature is opposed to war; she is an advocate of peace. Children are reared and brought up by the mothers who give them the first principles of education and labour assiduously in their behalf. Consider, for instance, a mother who has tenderly reared a son for twenty years to the age of maturity. Surely she will not consent to having that son torn asunder and killed in the field of battle. Therefore, as woman advances toward the degree of man in power and privilege, with the right of vote and control in human government, most assuredly war will cease; for woman is naturally the most devoted and staunch advocate of international peace.

Those who have turned their hearts longingly toward peace would thus do well to promote the education, participation, and full equality of women in all aspects of life.

The Role of Religion in the Peace Process

IN THE recent past some of the most vocal opposition to the concept of world government has come neither from policy analysts nor from heads of state; it has come from religious leaders. One interpretation for such opposition is that religious leaders may recognize that it is impossible to establish a peaceful [Page 30] society without the animating spirit and harmonizing influence of religion. The writings of the Bahá’í Faith support such a view. Although both idealism and realism have tended to ignore the role of religion in the peace process, the writings of the Bahá’í Faith support the view that the proper expression of religion is indispensable to the establishment of peace. For example. in The Promise of World Peace the Universal House of Justice notes that no serious attempt to set human affairs aright or to achieve world peace can ignore religion. Humanity’s perception and practice of it are largely the stuff of history:

That the perversion of this faculty has contributed to much of the confusion in society and the conflicts in and between individuals can hardly be denied. But neither can any fair-minded observer discount the preponderating influence exerted by religion on the vital expressions of civilization. Furthermore, its indispensability to social order has repeatedly been demonstrated by its direct effect on laws and morality.

Referring to the corruption or eclipse of religion, the Bahá’í writings affirm that

Should the lamp of religion be obscured, chaos and confusion will ensue, and the lights of fairness, of justice, of tranquillity and peace cease to shine. . . . [the] perversion of human nature, the degradation of human conduct, the corruption and dissolution of human institutions, reveal themselves, under such circumstances, in their worst and most revolting aspects. Human character is debased, confidence is shaken, the nerves of discipline are relaxed, the voice of human conscience is stilled, the sense of decency and shame is obscured, conceptions of duty, of solidarity, of reciprocity and loyalty are distorted, and the feeling of peacefulness, of joy and of hope is gradually extinguished.

The indispensability of religion to the establishment of world peace is also evident in a conversation reported to have taken place between Bahá’u’lláh and one of His followers—Varqá:

Once Varqá asked Bahá’u’lláh, “How will the Cause of God he universally adopted by mankind?” Bahá’u’lláh said that first, the nations of the world would arm themselves with infernal engines of war, and when fully armed would attack each other like bloodthirsty beasts. As a result, there would be enormous bloodshed throughout the world. Then the wise from all nations would gather together to investigate the cause of such bloodshed. They would come to the conclusion that prejudices were the cause, a major form being religious prejudice. They would therefore try to eliminate religion [Page 31] so as to eliminate prejudice. Later they would realize that man cannot live without religion. Then they would study the teachings of all the religions to see which of the religions conformed to the prevailing conditions of the time. It is then that the Cause of God would become universal.

The spread of the “Cause of God” has been directly linked with the establishment of peace on earth because these twin processes are intertwined. From a Bahá’í perspective, it should be noted that the “Cause of God” is one Cause, that all the religions of the world derive their inspiration from the same Source, and that all the Founders of the world’s religions have been animated by a single purpose, which is to usher in those spiritual and social conditions necessary for the realization of peace and harmony among peoples.

All religions—Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and so on—have prophesies about the establishment of international peace. The prophet Isaiah has said that the Lord “shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” Christ has foretold that the meek “shall inherit the earth.” In the Revelation of St. John there are allusions to a “new heaven and a new earth.” In Islam the appearance of the Qá’im, the Mihdi, and the Twelfth Imam is said to correspond to the emergence of the Kingdom of God on earth. Likewise, the Buddha, Zoroaster, and Krishna have all prophesied the establishment of brotherhood among the nations and peoples of the earth. The Bahá’í perspective is that the stage has been set and the practical means have been established whereby peace among nations may be realized.

Toward a Blending of the Practical and the Visionary

WORLD peace is now a practical reality because modern technology has made available material means necessary for organizing the planet. Moreover, as is evidenced by the frequency and variety of global summits that have taken place over the past five years, a consciousness of interdependence has begun to shape the thinking of those concerned with all aspects of life on earth. Despite the possibilities for world peace that result from these developments, the Bahá’í community is also aware of the turmoil now convulsing human affairs. In The Prosperity of Humankind, the Bahá’í International Community’s Office of Public Information suggests that, while “Dangers unimagined in all history gather around a distracted humanity,” the greatest error that could be made [Page 32] at this juncture would be to allow the crisis to cast doubt on the ultimate outcome of the process that is occurring. While an old world order is passing away, a new one is struggling to be born:

The habits, attitudes, and institutions that have accumulated over the centuries are being subjected to tests that are as necessary to human development as they are inescapable. What is required of the peoples of the world is a measure of faith and resolve to match the enormous energies with which the Creator of all things has endowed this spiritual springtime of the race.

The task of awakening such faith, while remaining mindful of the practical requirements necessary for cooperation among peoples and nations, is the most important work in which leaders of thought, government, and community can engage as the new millennium draws closer. Thus, contrary to the dualism that has characterized the conflict between realism and idealism, it is a blending of the practical and the visionary that offers the best prospects for creating the peaceful future that humanity both longs for and deserves.

[Page 33]

Breaking the Fast in ‘Alá,
the Month of Loftiness
for the Bahá’ís in Iran

His stomach is scorched by matches

that have sizzled into his flesh.

His feet are leather bludgeoned clubs that run

him to the wall where he is tied.

Hear the dogs barking on the other side!

Hear the citizens who have crowded to watch!

His family cannot claim the corpse

without gold for the bullets that were lost.

The hungry dogs want to be fed.

—Peter E. Murphy

Copyright © 1996 by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States

[Page 34]

[Page 35]

Understanding Post-Cold War
Collective Sanctions

BY JALEH DASHTI-GIBSON

Copyright © 1996 by Jaleh Dashti-Gibson. This essay is based on a talk presented at the Conference on the New World Order in Bahá’í Perspective hosted by the Institute for Bahá’í Studies, January 26-28, 1996, in Evanston, Illinois.

The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. . . . Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.

—BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

The world is, in truth, moving on towards its destiny. The interdependence of the peoples and nations of the earth, whatever the leaders of the divisive forces of the world may say or do, is already an accomplished fact.

—SHOGHI EFFENDI

BENEFITTING from the demise of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars have sought alternatives to the use of military force to “meet successfully threats to common security” and to enforce international norms. As recent events in such varied locales as Iraq, Libya, Haiti, North Korea, and the former Yugoslavia suggest, collective sanctions have become a frequently used instrument for multilateral diplomacy by the international community in varied crises. In fact, sanctions have been imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations nine times since 1990 compared with only two instances during the first forty-five years of the organization’s existence.

The recent resort to the use of collective sanctions by the United Nations raises several issues of importance to students of world order. While most sanctions have been imposed by one country against another, sanctions have also figured prominently in most attempts to achieve world order and collective security. They have been attractive to the architects of international organizations because they are an instrument short of armed force. The end of the Cold War less than a decade ago created a window of opportunity for the United Nations to experiment with this policy tool for the first time without the ideological constraints that overshadowed the organization’s first four decades. Thus the time is ripe for reevaluating the role of collective sanctions in efforts to achieve world order and collective security.

Such a reevaluation must also take into account the role that values play in decisions to use collective sanctions. For example, international institutions imposing sanctions imply a preference for collective rather than unilateral responses to global crises as well as a desire to use the least amount of force required to achieve the preferred effect. [Page 36] However present such values may be, putting them into practice remains difficult in a world of competing national interests, complex international relations, and divided opinion over the purpose of international cooperation. Is it possible to move forward in the application of collective measures without some clear and commonly held understanding of such teleological questions?

The Bahá’í Faith emphasizes the central importance of the principle of unity in the path toward peace and world order. Given this focus, what insights can the writings of the Bahá’í Faith offer students of world order as they grapple with the moral issues that inevitably arise when addressing questions about the effectiveness and appropriateness of collective sanctions? How might collective sanctions be more closely aligned with the principles enunciated by Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith, and elaborated by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Bahá’u’lláh’s appointed successor and interpreter of His writings, and Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith? These questions are explored as a first attempt to cast the current scholarly debate about the effectiveness and desirability of collective sanctions in terms of the framework for collective security based on principles offered in the Bahá’í writings.

Collective Sanctions

THE term sanctions, defined in various ways in the scholarly literature, is used here in the sense offered by renowned sanctions expert, Margaret Doxey: “penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations.” This definition includes economic as well as noneconomic sanctions. Economic sanctions include trade measures, such as embargoes or boycotts, and financial measures, such as freezing assets and aid suspension. Noneconomic measures include diplomatic protest, expulsion from an international organization, refusal to issue travel visas, and the like.

The term collective sanctions rather than international sanctions indicates only those sanctions imposed through an international organization, primarily the United Nations. The terms sender nation and sending nation refer to countries (or the United Nations) that have applied sanctions against another country. The recipient of sanctions is referred to as the target nation. A sanctions episode is a case of sanctions applied by a sender against a target.

Pre-1990 Sanctions Experiences

WHILE sanctions have been policy tools long before the twentieth century, they gained a new prominence with the advent of the League of Nations, which made the imposition of economic sanctions mandatory against members who waged war. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided that

All the Members of the League . . . undertake immediately to subject it [the member resorting to war in disregard of the Covenant] to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.

As one scholar notes, the League placed “Great hopes” on “sanctions as the means of enforcement.” Although beset by problets, not the least of which was the refusal of the United States to join, the League fulfilled its obligation under the Covenant by boldly threatening sanctions against Italy after Italy [Page 37] invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. When the threat of sanctions was not enough to deter Mussolini, the League imposed economic sanctions against Italy later that month. Interestingly enough, some scholars have blamed this imposition of sanctions against Italy, a powerful member of the League, for the demise of this first-of-its-kind experiment with an international organization. These League sanctions, in fact, are often used as evidence that sanctions do not work.

With the United Nations, the League’s successor, sanctions have also played a role, albeit in less direct ways. Article 41 of the United Nations Charter states that

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Because of the development of the Cold War only a few years after the establishment of the United Nations, however, truly multilateral sanctions imposed by the Security Council were extremely rare. Sanctions were only applied twice—against Rhodesia and South Africa—by the United Nations during the period between 1945 and 1990.

Instead, during the Cold War, sanctions were primarily imposed unilaterally, the United States initiating sanctions by far the most frequently. The United States, either alone or as the leading sender, imposed sanctions in 77 out of the 116 cases from the beginning of the twentieth century through 1989. Indeed, much of the scholarly literature on sanctions emphasizes such unilateral sanctions rather than the scarcer, multilateral variety. Most of the unilateral instances of sanctions during this period were characterized by a large and powerful country assuming the role of sender and imposing sanctions on a smaller and weaker target country, usually in cases where the smaller country dared to defy the political or economic interests of the sending nation. The conclusions of studies based on such cases are basically pessimistic, leading to such generalizations as “sanctions rarely work.”

What must be remembered in the largely American debate over the effectiveness of sanctions from the time of the League of Nations throughout the period of the Cold War is that more was at stake than an objective evaluation of whether sanctions were effective. The issue of sanctions was part of a larger ideological debate in the United States, pitting “realists,” who successfully blocked involvement in international organizations, against Wilsonian “idealists,” who supported such involvement. The Wilsonian idealists actively supported the use of sanctions; their point of view was widely discredited when the experiment with the League of Nations failed, a failure tied to the imposition of sanctions. David Baldwin, a leading scholar [Page 38] of economic statecraft, observes that, “Whereas military force symbolized hardheaded ‘realism’, economic sanctions symbolized fuzzy-minded ‘idealism’ and unwillingness to face up to the hard facts of international life.” The disdain for multilateral sanctions that persists today is tied to the beliefs of the ideological victors, the realists. One suspects that this bias against sanctions, based on a connection of which few are aware, has tainted at least some of the studies of sanctions conducted in the post-World War II period.

With the caveat of the bias against sanctions in mind, what major conclusions about economic sanctions may be drawn from Cold War experiences? Although the literature about the success of sanctions reflects disagreement, the most comprehensive study in the field, written by economists Clyde Hufhauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, concludes that sanctions can be at least somewhat effective under certain conditions. According to this study, the key to a successful sanctions episode is careful consideration by the sender or senders of the goals of the sanctions as well as the choice of sanctions that are appropriate to the situation in terms of cost. In addition, the study offers many observations that serve as guidelines for potential senders contemplating the imposition of sanctions:

• The ideal target country should be much smaller than the sender country, economically and politically weak, and a trading partner of the sender.

• Sanctions should be aimed at achieving relatively modest goals and should be imposed comprehensively.

• Sanctions should bite economically but should not attract the assistance of a black knight (a major state that is willing to help the target and thereby offset the effect of the sanctions).

• To have a better chance of success the sanctions episode should be relatively short.

• If many countries are required to cooperate with the sender country for sanctions to be implemented, sanctions will be less successful, unless the sanctions are imposed through an international organization.

• The higher the cost of sanctions to the sender, the less effective they will be because domestic support for sanctions within the sending nation will erode.

While these conclusions may not be identical with all of the studies of sanctions during the Cold War period, they represent the accumulated wisdom concerning the primarily unilateral imposition of sanctions. It is worth noting that a few scholars have suggested that sanctions imposed through international organizations would he more likely to be effective, although the possibility of this happening was not promising when these studies were conducted.

Recent Experience

SINCE the unexpected end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the United Nations has entered a period in which it can finally experiment with more of the provisions of its Charter. The use of economic sanctions has been one such experiment. During the past five years the Security Council of the United Nations has called for the imposition of sanctions, at last count, against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Somalia, Liberia, the Khmer-Rouge held areas of Cambodia, the UNITA political movement in Angola, [Page 39] Rwanda, and Haiti. Post-Cold War sanctions experts George A. Lopez and David Cortright credit three factors as the primary explanations for this increase in multilateral sanctions and a concomitant decrease in unilateral sanctions: the increase in new possibilities for collective security provisions following the end of the Cold War; the trend of increasing international trade and interdependence; and the hint of “a preference among citizens and policy makers for alternatives to the use of military Force.”

The Security Council’s increase in the use of sanctions early in the 1990s was perhaps naturally accompanied by great hope that sanctions could be a viable alternative to military force. By finally achieving near-universal sanctions, many hoped that some of the problems that had undermined the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, such as the problem of black knights, would be solved. The record from these recent experiences, however, has been mixed.

Recent United Nations sanctions have been characterized by impressive achievements that many scholars would have believed impossible only a few years previously. First, and perhaps most significant, action has been taken by a Security Council that had been hampered by Cold War rivalries during the first forty-five years of its existence. Second, the recent sanctions have been nearly universal. Since Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions or other measures are binding on all member states of the United Nations, the problem of only one or a few states imposing sanctions in a globally interconnected economy is bypassed. Third, recent United Nations sanctions have been increasingly imposed in order to uphold certain international norms such as nonaggression, respect for human rights, and democracy, indicating the first hints of a move away from the more selfish motives of sending nations in previous years. Finally, one could argue that a norm has begun to develop for states to legitimize actions against a “rogue” state by seeking to impose sanctions through the United Nations rather than acting alone.

The impressive achievements of the United Nations’ sanctions, which should not be underestimated, are nonetheless tempered by several important limitations. First, although sanctions have been increasingly imposed by the United Nations, the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) still wield inordinate power. That is, if any of these members do not wish for sanctions to be imposed, they will not be. The most obvious implication of this reality is that United Nations sanctions will probably never be imposed against any of the permanent members, or their allies, for that matter. Thus an inequality—some would say hypocrisy—is built into any consideration of issues, a bias against holding the five permanent members of the Security Council accountable for their actions in the decision-making locus of the United Nations.

Second, and related to the first problem, is a lack of consistency in the application of sanctions. The United Nations lacks a mechanism for automatically considering the imposition of sanctions—or any other measure— regardless of when, where, or by whom a violation of international norms has occurred. Consequently, some states are punished or squeezed into compliance for a violation that [Page 40] other States may have committed without being sanctioned. Obviously, this is the case with the permanent members of the Security Council, but it is possible with other states as well. Despite any apparent desirability of creating strict guidelines for the types of offenses that would result in sanctions, such an automatic mechanism could lead to an institutional crisis in the United Nations similar to the crisis created by the mandatory sanctions called for by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Were a powerful member of the United Nations to commit a violation that would call for mandatory action by the other members of the organization, the very destruction of the organization could result. Nonetheless, scope for an increased measure of consistency in the upholding of norms by the United Nations certainly exists.

Third, recent multilateral sanctions have been unable to address all of the problems with unilateral sanctions noted earlier. Moreover, recent sanctions have highlighted certain problems that were underemphasized previously, most notably that sanctions hurt the wrong people in the target country. The claim is made that sanctions, especially trade sanctions, tend to affect the poor and vulnerable sectors of a target society disproportionately because leaders in the target country are able to shift the burden away from the influential sectors of society that are vital for their political survival. This problem is especially acute in nondemocratic target countries, such as Iraq or Haiti under the military junta, where the leadership has a small elite constituency. In these cases, some scholars contend, the burden of sanctions is endured by those who cannot change policy.

Finally, the most serious limitation of multilateral sanctions is that they do not seem to work as well as had been hoped. Critics point to the resort to military force in Iraq and the threat of a United States air strike against Haiti to prove that even multilateral sanctions are still ineffective. There are other important elements of this problem. For example, while multilateral sanctions greatly increase the number of states participating in the sanctions effort, a large economically motivated temptation to defect from the sanctioning coalition still exists. Businesses in a sanctioning state that trade illegally with a sanctioned state stand to make an enormous profit, given the desperate situation of the targeted state. In some cases, such as that of the Dominican Republic during the sanctions against Haiti, a real economic hardship may be borne by the often poor, close trading partners of the targeted nations. The international community has been inconsistent in helping nations that are truly hurt by sanctions against their trading partners, although it is called on to hear such concerns by Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. In short, multilateral sanctions, while certainly more desirable than unilateral sanctions for the reasons discussed above, may still be circumvented.

Considering the limitations of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, what does the mixed record on its recent sanctions mean? The still very new experience with several cases of multilateral sanctions has left many analysts less enthusiastic about the usefulness of this tool than during the initial euphoria over the renaissance of the United Nations. Despite this guardedness, however, some continue to look for ways of improving sanctions rather than rejecting them outright. A plethora of recommendations have been generated by several recent conferences on the subject and by commissions asked to consider this issue. In addition, some discussion of ethical issues involved in imposing [Page 41] sanctions, such as fairness, equity, and justness, has taken place. In brief, the recent recommendations fall into two broad categories: strengthening the economic bite of sanctions, thus increasing the likelihood that they would provide the coercive impact desired; and improving their political impact—that is, their ability to persuade leaders in the target country to change their behavior. Table 1 summarizes the recommendations under each of these categories. As the table suggests, much work to improve collective sanctions needs to be done, but several promising avenues offer potential solutions to many of the problems identified with them.

Collective Sanctions and
the Bahá’í Faith

GIVEN the new context in which collective sanctions are imposed, what is the Bahá’í perspective on their worth and desirability? To understand the place collective sanctions might occupy in world affairs from a Bahá’í perspective, it is first helpful to clarify the main features of the Bahá’í vision of peace and world order.

The Establishment of World Peace. Bahá’u’lláh has written that “the well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established.” Indeed, the principle of unity occupies a station of central importance in the Bahá’í Faith. “Unification of the whole of mankind is the hall-mark of the stage which human society is now approaching," Shoghi Effendi explains:

Unity of family, of tribe, of city-state, and nation have been successively attempted and fully established. World unity is the goal towards which a harassed humanity is striving. . . . A world, growing to maturity, must. . . recognize the oneness and wholeness of human relationships, and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this fundamental principle of its life.

Hence the establishment of international peace is inextricably linked with the widespread recognition and acceptance of the principle of unity and its implications. Bahá’ís believe that the “Great Peace towards which people of goodwill throughout the centuries have inclined their hearts” will unfold in two major stages, both of which include the principle of unity but at different levels. The first stage, referred to as the “Lesser Peace,” will come about “through a binding treaty among the nations for the political unification of the world.” This will involve fixing every nation’s boundaries, strictly limiting the size of their armaments, laying down the principles underlying the relations of governments toward one another, and ascertaining all international agreements and obligations. The second stage, referred to as the “Most Great Peace,” will be “the practical consequence of the spiritualization of the world and the fusion of all its races, creeds, classes, and nations.” Bahá’ís believe that it “will rest on the foundation [Page 42] of, and be preserved by, the ordinances of God.”

Table 1
Some Recommendations for Improving Economic Sanctions

Strengthening the Economic Impact of Sanctions

1. Fine-tuning sanctions through such measures as freezing the assets of elites so that the sanctions have the maximum impact on those who can change policy, while minimizing harm to innocents.^a
2. Improving the monitoring of compliance with a sanctions regime through improved intelligence, nongovernmental organizations, increased cooperation between the United Nations and its member states, and improved Security Council sanctions committees.^b
3. Bolstering the will of states to maintain sanctions over time by providing compensation to third-party countries hurt by complying with economic sanctions, as well as by imposing secondary sanctions against those countries that violate a sanctions regime.^c

Strengthening the Political Impact of Sanctions

1. Building linkages between opposition groups within the targeted country and the outside world to maintain internal support for sanctions.^d
2. Situating sanctions in a coherent strategy of coercive diplomacy with clear goals, clear consequences for noncompliance, and clear conditions for the removal of sanctions.^e

^aSources: See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995 (New York: The United Nations, 1995); Claudette Antoine Werleigh, “The Use of Sanctions in Haiti: Assessing the Economic Realities,” in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); and Patrick Clawson, “Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further Action,” Ethics and International Affairs 7 (1993): 17-38.

^bSources: See, for example, Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace 1995; Lloyd J. Dumas, “A Proposal for a New United Nations Council on Economic Sanctions,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions; and Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987).

^cSources: See, for example, Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace 1995; Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective; and James C. Ngobi, “The United Nations Experience with Sanctions,” in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions.

^dSources: See, for example, Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective; Peter Wallensteen, “Economic Sanctions: Ten Modern Cases and Three Important Lessons,” in Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics, eds. M. Nincic and P. Wallensteen (New York: Praeger, 1983); and Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19 (Apr. 1967): 378-416.

^eSources: See, for example, Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace 1995; Susan L. Woodward, “The Use of Sanctions in Former Yugoslavia: Misunderstanding Political Realities,” and Alexander Konovalov et al., “A Review of Economic Sanctions: A Russian Perspective,” both in Cortright and Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions.

Sanctions and Bahá’u’lláh’s Vision of Collective Security. In His writings Bahá’u’lláh offers a striking vision of collective security with implications for the first major stage of world peace as well as for collective sanctions. Essential elements of that future system include the convocation of an “all-embracing assemblage” to establish a binding treaty or covenant among the nations of the world with the provision that, if “any king take up arms against another, all should unitedly arise and prevent him.” This system would at once allow and require massive worldwide disarmament, leaving only those arms necessary for the purpose of preserving the security of their realms and of maintaining internal order [Page 43] within their territories.” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clarifies this system in even stronger language:

The fundamental principle underlying this solemn Pact should be so fixed that if any government later violate any one of its provisions, all the governments on earth should arise to reduce it to utter submission, nay the human race as a whole should resolve, with every power at its disposal, to destroy that government. (emphasis added)

The phrasing of this passage is critical. While measures should be taken to destroy such a government, it may be inferred that punishing the citizens under the authority of that government can be avoided. Warfare—the most extreme power at the disposal of the human race—might be necessary in some cases, but it would inevitably carry with it the loss of innocent lives. This prospect, in combination with the emphasis on disarmament in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings, suggests the desirability of developing and improving less drastic measures.

Obviously one such measure is sanctions. If collective sanctions can be improved, as has been recommended, so that they target the leaders and thereby the government of the country that decided to violate such a pact in the first place, while minimizing harm to innocent citizens, sanctions might fit in quite easily with Bahá’u’lláh’s vision of collective security and world peace. One could also imagine less drastic circumstances in which, as a warning to discourage more significant violations, less potent collective sanctions, such as diplomatic censure, could be imposed on nations committing minor violations.

Bringing Sanctions in Line with Bahá’í Principles. What could be done to bring the sanctions imposed recently more in line with Bahá’í principles? Of several spiritual principles that come readily to mind, justice and the twin pillars of reward and punishment are particularly applicable.

Bahá’u’lláh’s extensive writings on the principle of justice are illustrated by a few examples:

O Son of Spirit! The best beloved of all things in My sight is justice. . . . Verily justice is My gift to thee and the sign of My loving kindness. Set it then before thine eyes.

Justice and equity are two guardians for the protection of man. They have appeared arrayed in their mighty and sacred names to maintain the world in uprightness and protect the nations.

No radiance can compare with that of justice. The organization of the world and the tranquillity of mankind depend upon it.

One way to align sanctions with the principle of justice is for the international community to move increasingly toward a consistent application of sanctions for violations of widely held international norms. This implies that a violation by a large and powerful country would invoke as serious a response as a violation committed by a small and relatively weak country. Although the constitution of the Security Council provided for in the Charter of the United Nations obviously hinders this development, the problem [Page 44] with the power of the veto, widely noted in the literature on world order, will probably have to be addressed.

Another extension of the application of justice to the question of collective sanctions was also discussed above. Sanctions must be refined so that the punishment is applied to those who actually commit the violation and not to their innocent populations. Sanctions will never be seen as legitimate by the civilians of a targeted nation if they feel that they are being unjustly punished for actions by their government that were out of their control. The scholarly community is trying to find workable ways to make these refinements; many focus on ways to freeze the assets of target government elites, thereby affecting the leaders directly.

Bahá’u’lláh’s principle of the twin pillars of reward and punishment also has implications for sanctions: “The structure of world stability and order hath been reared upon, and will continue to he sustained by, the twin pillars of reward and punishment.” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá spoke of this principle in similar terms: “The tent of the order of the world is raised and established on the two pillars of ‘Reward and Retribution.’ . . . There is no greater prevention of oppression than these two sentiments, hope and fear. They have both political and spiritual consequences.”

Although it overlaps to some extent with the idea of justice, the principle of reward and punishment has its own implications for collective sanctions. First, for the punishment of collective sanctions to be fair and effective, those imposing sanctions must make clear the conditions under which sanctions will be imposed as well as the conditions that will result in their removal. Once again scholars working on ways to improve sanctions have focused attention on this area. Second, the role of “positive” sanctions, or inducements in order to gain compliance, needs to be studied further. This could represent the other pillar of reward insofar as sanctions are concerned.

Even a brief consideration of only a few of the many principles enunciated by Bahá’u’lláh and interpreted by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá suggests that collective sanctions have a significant role to play in the unfoldment of the new world order envisioned in the Bahá’í writings.

League of Nations Sanctions Revisited. Shoghi Effendi sheds further light on the unfolding process of world order by explaining the significance of the case of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. The literature on economic sanctions generally treats the League of Nations’ imposition of sanctions against Italy in response to its aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 as the epitome of failure. Ultimately, according to this point of view, the sanctions against Italy led to the [Page 45] complete discrediting of the League of Nations and to its subsequent demise as World War II erupted.

Shoghi Effendi, however, interpreted the action by the League of Nations in a different light. Writing in 1936, he refers to the sanctions against Italy (although he does not name the country) as, “an event without parallel in human history,” thereby offering another way to look at efforts toward international cooperation and integration:

That no less than fifty nations of the world, all members of the League of Nations, should have, after mature deliberation, recognized and been led to pronounce their verdict against an act of aggression which in their judgment has been deliberately committed by one of their fellow-members, one of the foremost Powers of Europe; that they should have, for the most part, agreed to impose collectively sanctions on the condemned aggressor, and should have succeeded in carrying out, to a very great measure, their decision, is no doubt an event without parallel in human history.

Was Shoghi Effendi unaware of the limitations of collective action in general and of collective sanctions specifically, especially in this case? No, in fact, after praising this effort as the world’s first experiment with the system of collective security “foreshadowed by Bahá’u’lláh and explained by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,” he writes:

There can be no doubt whatever that what has already been accomplished, significant and unexampled though it is in the history of mankind, still immeasurably falls short of the essential requirements of the system which . . . [the words of Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá] foreshadow. . . . Be that as it may, the significance of the steps already taken cannot be ignored. Whatever the present status of the League or the outcome of its historic verdict, whatever the trials and reverses which, in the immediate future, it may have to face and sustain, the fact must be recognized that so important a decision marks one of the most distinctive milestones on the long and arduous road that must lead it to its goal, the stage at which the oneness of the whole body of nations will be made the ruling principle of international life.

Thus Shoghi Effendi clarifies that the efforts of the League, including the imposition of sanctions, were a historic step on the path to true collective security, even though the goal of that path—the “oneness of the whole body of nations”—was far from having been achieved. This assessment of the actions of those in power in the world is reminiscent of Bahá’u’lláh’s assertion that “Soon will the present-day order be rolled up, and a new one spread out in its stead.” Scholars studying economic sanctions, and many of the other issues connected with world order studies, often focus on inadequacies, shortcomings, and failures—the collapse of the present order. The writings of Bahá’u’lláh and their interpretation, as seen by this example from Shoghi Effendi, point to the slow yet steady construction of a new world order amidst the crumbling Of the old. His reference to sanctions, illustrating the way in which this process plays out, stands in marked contrast with the pessimistic view of sanctions that dominates the scholarly literature by providing a broader lens through which to evaluate attempts at establishing world order.

Bahá’í Experience with Sanctions. The writings of the Bahá’í Faith offer principles and perspectives with implications for the use of collective sanctions. More directly, the Bahá’í International Community, a nongovernmental [Page 46] organization that represents the worldwide membership of the Bahá’í Faith at the United Nations, has lent its support to the concept of sanctions in two especially noteworthy ways: through its recommendations for reforming the United Nations and through its response to the recent wave of persecution against the Bahá’ís of Iran.

In 1955 the Bahá’í International Community sent to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld a document entitled “Bahá’í Proposals to the United Nations for Charter Revision.” The proposed revisions included one that suggested a preference for sanctions in at least one instance:

1. Membership in the United Nations being an indispensable condition for the preservation of international peace, no nation should be allowed to leave the organization. It is therefore proposed that Article 6 of the Charter be amended to read:

A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be subjected by the General Assembly, upon recommendation of the Security Council, to economic and other sanctions, and, in extreme cases, may be compelled by force to abide by the principles of the Charter.

The Bahá’í International Community suggested, in its proposed revision, that the principle of unity implied by the inclusiveness of the United Nations should not be compromised by expelling persistent violators from the organization. Instead, sanctions —and even force—should be imposed if needed to preserve that unity.

More recently, in Turning Point for All Nations, the Bahá’í International Community also refers to sanctions:

If the current system, which places state

sovereignty above all other concerns, is to give way to a system which can address the interests of a single and interdependent humanity, the resolutions of the General Assembly—within a limited domain of issues—must gradually come to possess the force of law with provisions for both enforcement and sanctions.

Although this proposal does not specify the type of sanctions endorsed, it supports the use of sanctions by the United Nations. Once more, it is clear that sanctions have a role to play from a Bahá’í perspective, at least in the near future.

The second area of activity by the Bahá’í International Community relevant to the issue of collective sanctions developed out of the most recent wave of persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran during the 1980s. The Bahá’í International Community engaged in an effort to bring the plight of the Bahá’ís in Iran to the attention of the world, first by informing the international news media, by appeals to the Secretary-General and senior human-rights officials of the United Nations, and by direct appeals to the government of Iran. When initial efforts failed to have any impact on the government of Iran, the Bahá’í International Community escalated its efforts by broadening its appeals to involve nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International, international bodies such as the European Parliament and the United Nations Commision on Human Rights, and eventually all of the ambassadors of the member governments of the United Nations. In a very short time, as noted in The Bahá’í World, a record of worldwide Bahá’í activities, “the persecution of the Bahá’ís in Írán was generally recognized as being the foremost example of religious [Page 47] intolerance in the contemporary world. . . .”

Although the efforts of the Bahá’í International Community are not an example of the use of economic sanctions, they are clearly an example of a milder form of collective sanctions falling under the heading of diplomatic protest and publicity. The Bahá’í World emphasized in this regard that,

Although it appeared unlikely that the government of Írán would respond favourably to international appeals on behalf of the Bahá’ís, it was clearly important to ensure that the campaign of persecution was not allowed to proceed in a semi-clandestine manner and that the Iranian authorities were made fully aware of the fact that any acts of persecution against the Bahá’í community would inevitably attract widespread international publicity and condemnation.

Even though this form of sanction is less dramatic than the complete severing of international trade and finance with a target country, its effects should not be underestimated. The efforts of the Bahá’í International Community brought the issue of the persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran to the consciousness of many, including those in powerful governments throughout the world and in international organizations, thereby affecting the Iranian government’s ability to participate in international life as long as it continued its policies.

Thus another example of the endorsement of collective sanctions by the Bahá’í International Community exists, this time not only in the texts of its documents but in deed as well. This gives further credence to the notion that sanctions are an important tool— albeit an imperfect one at this stage—for use by the community of nations and that they are consistent with the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith.

Toward the Future

IN THE “different world that emerged when the cold war ceased”—a world still not Fully understood—the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith provide an evolutionary perspective. This perspective situates current developments in the study and the use of sanctions and other forms of collective action in a world marked by construction and unfoldment amidst disintegration and collapse. Spiritual principles such as unity and justice elaborated in the Bahá’í writings offer powerful standards by which students of world order may evaluate any effort at reforming collective action. Such evaluations are critical as the world moves forward with this great experiment in global cooperation. For those who would strive to ensure that the experiment continues to progress, the following words of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá extend hope and encouragement concerning the ultimate outcome of these efforts:

A few, unaware of the power latent in human endeavor, consider this matter [the cause of universal peace] as highly impracticable, nay even beyond the scope of man’s utmost efforts. Such is not the case, however. On the contrary, thanks to the unfailing grace of God, the ioving-kindness of His favored ones, the unrivaled endeavors of wise and capable souls, and the thoughts and ideas of the peerless leaders of this age, nothing whatsoever can be regarded as unattainable. Endeavor, ceaseless endeavor, is required. Nothing short of an indomitable determination can [Page 48] possibly achieve it. Many a cause which past ages have regarded as purely visionary, yet in this day has become most easy and practicable. Why should this most great and lofty Cause—the daystar of the firmament of true civilization and the cause of the glory, the advancement, the wellbeing and the success of all humanity—be regarded as impossible of achievement?

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Authors & Artists

JALEH DASHTI-GIBSON, who holds a Master’s degree in International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame, is completing her dissertation on the monitoring of multilateral economic sanctions for a doctorate in international relations and comparative politics, also from Notre Dame. She has coauthored a research note on economic sanctions, which has been accepted for publication in The American Journal of Political Science. Her academic interests include international relations (including international organization, law, and political economy), conflict resolution, and peace studies.

V. D’ARAÚJO, Portuguese by birth and a long-time resident of Holland, makes a first appearance in World Order.

AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS is an economist with the International Monetary Fund. During 1992-95 he was the IMF’s resident representative in the Russian Federation; he is presently taking a period of study leave in Moscow to do some research and writing on economic reform in transition economies. Dr. Lopez-Claros was educated in England and the United States, receiving a diploma in mathematical statistics from Cambridge University in 1977 and a Ph.D. in economics from Duke University in 1981. Before joining the staff of the International Monetary Fund in 1984, Dr. Lopez-Claros was professor of economics at the University of Chile in Santiago. He has written and lectured in South America, the United States, and Europe on subjects such as economic integration, macroeconomic stabilization, public health, cooperation and interdependence, governance, peace and the meaning of spiritual development, and issues concerning the family and education.

PETER E. MURPHY, whose review of three books by and about Robert Hayden appeared in World Order’s Fall 1987/Winter 1987-88 issue, teaches English and creative writing in Atlantic City, New Jersey. His poems have been published in numerous literary journals and have been anthologized in several collections. He has been a poetry advisor and educational consultant to the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation, Education Testing Service, the New Jersey State Council on the Arts, and the PBS television series on poetry entitled “Moyers: Power of the Word.”

MICHAEL L. PENN, whose “Violence Against Women and Girls” appeared in our Spring 1995 issue, is a clinical psychologist and professor of psychology at Franklin & Marshall College in Pennsylvania. He is currently working on two books—Desecration of the Temple, an examination of the global problem of violence against women and girls, and Hope, Hopelessness, and American Race Relations, a study of the psychohistorical attitudes about the viability of healthy relationship between blacks and whites during the last three decades.

ART CREDITS: Cover design by John Solarz; cover photograph, Steve Garrigues; pp. 4, 16, 18, photographs, Steve Garrigues; p. 32, photograph, Mary Ann Gorski; p. 34, photograph, Steve Garrigues; p, 48, photograph, Darius Himes.

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