Bahá’í World/Volume 28/Beyond Integration and Separation

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[Page 223]

Roslzan Danes/I exmnines t/ze relationship

bem'een law and religion in the Bahá’í'

F (titli and (11100265 related issues in I‘Lf/érence t0 conlemporaljv debates.

BEYOND INTEGRATION AND SEPARATION

The Dynamic N ature oi Bahá’í Law

Acontemporary legal scholar has observed that law and religion “cannot maintain their Vitality independently of each other.”1 History supports this statement. An integration of law and religion has predominated in most human societies throughout the ages. “The differentiation between the religious and the secular,” one commentator writes, “is itself a comparatively modern development in the evolution of human society.”2

The historical reality of integration makes all the more significant the conscious experiments with the separation of law and religion that had their genesis in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and have come to dominate political and social discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While there have been examples of separation throughout human history, the contemporary world bears witness to the ascendancy of separation, and the

' Harold J . Berman, preface to Faith and Order: The Reconciliation ofLaw and Religion, ed. John Witte Jr. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), p. x. 3 Leo Pfeffer, Church. Stale, and Freedom (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953),

p. 3.

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related but distinct idea of secularism, as legitimate controlling norms.3 As one observer comments:

Either implicitly or explicitly, there appears to be a modem consensus among legal scholars and philosophers that the world has been disenchanted. The world can no longer be viewed as an integrated, meaningful whole under a comprehensive religious or metaphysical worldview, and law can no longer be legitimized by its religious or metaphysical foundations.4

Central to this movement from integration to separation as a framework for political and social order is the experience of the United States. In the colonial period religion was in the foreground of the legal enterprise—it was a central animus for the American experiment. The neo-Calvinist congregational form of the Massachusetts Bay Colony was explicitly theocratic. The Puritan mind recognized no distinction between religion and politics, and called for rule by the holy.5 In the postrevolutionary period, with the ideas of the free exercise and nonestablishment of religion entrenched in the Constitution, religion remained a framework in which American democracy operated.“ But a shift began as the religious

" Literature on the relationship between law and religion is mired in confusing terminology. In this paper the terms “separationism” and “integrationism” are employed as general categories. The central implication of separationism is that religious norms, institutions, and practices should have no controlling influence over political and legal order. In contrast, integrationism implies that religious norms, institutions, and practices may have influence over political and legal order. Both categories could have a number of institutional variations. While these categorizations are overly broad, they reflect the general connotations and meanings the author wishes to convey. A more comprehensive critique oi’terminological usages in law and religious scholarship is not possible in this brief study.

4 Mark Modak-Truran, “Habermas‘s Discourse The01y of Law and the Relationship Between Law and Religion,” Capital Unive1‘sil,timr Revieii' 26 (1997), p. 461.

5 For an excellent discussion OFtheocracy in colonial Massachusetts, see Perry Miller, “Puritan State and Society” in Peny Miller, Errand into {lie VWlderness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

“ Alexis de Tocqueville is the most famous chronicler of the American vision of religion as providing the tools ofa moral character and mentality without (cont’d)

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assumptions that were to guide legal and political institutions gradually moved to the background—assumed but often unstated. In the post—Civil War period, and in particular since the 19405, this has changed. A preoccupation of some sectors of the legal community has been to articulate clearly the principles of separation of law and religion and to adopt a stance that law must be secular in its orientation.

“If we had nothing else to boast of,” one American jurist has written, it is sufficient that America first implemented “the greatest achievement ever made in the cause of human progress. . .the total and final separation of church and state.”7 However, the issue of religious influence in law remains unsettled despite the influence of this American myth of an achieved separation. There exist, within the United States and globally, competing models of integration and separation, and a concommittant increasing tension between the advocates of these models. In an age when the elements of a global society are being clarified, the unsettled nature of this relationship also remains, as it has always been, potentially dangerous.

On the one hand, separationism frequently inspires movement towards a destructive form of integrationism. The resurgence of Hindu nationalism in India, the growth of the so-called religious right in the United States, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran are only a few examples of the recent emergence of political movements with integrationist intentions.8 On the other hand, integrationism in the contemporary world has often taken on a fundamentalist form that distorts the motivating religious doctrine. The doctrine of vildyat—ifaqz’h (rule by the clerics) in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the rise of the Taliban Islamic Movement of

which American democracy would fail. See his Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: G. Dearbom and Co., 1838).

7 David Dudley Field, “American Progress” in Jurisprudence (New York: Martin B. Brown. 1893), p. 6.

“ Perhaps the best example has been political movements attempting to reestablish the authority of the shari’a in many Muslim societies in the twentieth century. For an excellent discussion of Islam and politics, see Bernard Lewis, The Political Language Qf'lslum (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1988).

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Afghanistan both contain substantive innovations in the light ofhistorical, political, and legal practice in Muslim societies. In addition, in countries with a recent history of ideological hostility towards religion—such as Russia and China—religion is increasingly a destabilizing force, as witnessed in recent legislation limiting the definition of “legal” religious groups in Russia and the rise and suppression of the Falun Gong movement in China.

On this terrain, where there is both an enduring relationship between law and religion and an enduring skepticism concerning that relationship, the claims of Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith, must be examined. At first glance, His central claims concerning law and religion position us on familiar territory and raise all of the conventional concerns of integrationism. “[T]he precepts laid down by God,”9 Bahá’u’lláh writes, are “to build anew the whole world.”'0 These precepts “constitute the highest means for the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples.”ll Further, He cautions us, “Weigh not the Book of God With such standards and sciences as are current amongst you,” as the “Book itself is the unerring Balance.”12

Within these statements one recognizes the divine aim to order all of human life and a claim of universal relevance. In its broad outlines this presents nothing unique—the J ewish halakhah and Islamic Shari ‘ah make similar claims. There is also a claim of epistemological distinction, of a higher ordering of reasoning rooted in the transcendent, against which all law is to be measured. The concerns this raises, if applied as a basis for social order, are obvious: exclusivity, the creation of a notion of “otherness,” the use of the coercive force of law to implement a particular moral Vision, and the possibilities of interreligious unrest.

9 Baha’u’llah, the Kitáb—i—Aqdas, K 2. The main text of the presently published version of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas has sequentially numbered paragraphs, indicated here by the letter “K” followed by the relevant number.

10Cited in introduction to the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1992), p. 1.

1‘ Kitab-i-Aqdas, K 24

‘3 Kitab-i-Aqdas, K 99.

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[Page 227]But one should be cautious about making any substantive assumptions from this formal claim that the source of legal norms and rules is the divine alone. If there has been one lesson from twentieth-century developments in American legal philosophy, it is to recognize the characteristic embeddedness of law. ‘3 One must look at the law in action, the ends it pursues, and its links to power, change, and tradition in order to reveal its true character.

The Kitab-i—Aqdas, the central text of the canon of Bahá’í scripture and its book of laws, explicitly recognizes the embedded quality of law. The Kitab—i—Aqdas is also titled the Ummu ’l-Kitdb, or “Mother Book,” implying that within it one finds the entirety of the Bahá’í revelation—including not only its legal but also its social, theological, and philosophical dimensions. This inseparability of law from other methods of inquiry and experience is similarly found in the history, structure, institutions, and reasoning of Bahá’í law. It is these patterns of interaction and integration that must be examined if the content of claims to a divine law in the Bahá’í context are to be uncovered.

There are three steps to such a task. First, we must review the current tradition of separationism and ask whether there is any merit to examining anew the possibilities of integrationism. Second, we must identify a framework for a Bahá’í approach to issues related to the relationship between law and religion so as to clarify elements of separationist and integrationist thinking. Such a framework requires an explicit historical consciousness—it must take into account the age of the Bahá’í Faith and its stage of development, as well as the possibility that elements of the framework and the operation of Bahá’í law are subject to change over time. Third, we must position a Bahá’í approach to the tensions between integration and separation in relation to contemporary approaches and debates, so as to gain a critical perspective on the Bahá’í approach and its potential implications.

‘3 This approach refers primarily to legal realism and its descendents such as CLS (critical legal studies). For a comprehensive introduction to legal realism and some ofits central works, see William W. Fisher lll, Morton J. Horowitz, and Thomas A. Reed, American Legal Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

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The Tradition of Separation and Contemporary Legal Crises

In 1975, a report submitted to the Harvard Law School and Harvard Divinity School raised the concern that the “implicit interaction of law and religion is no longer adequately or systematically treated on the level of academic study or interprofessional discourse.”l4 This conclusion mirrors the more pointed observation that within American legal culture, and particularly in law schools, “it is not difficult to discover a palpable distrust of, and sometimes deepseated animosity toward, religious belief and practice.”‘5 This bias ranges from “the complete metaphysical denial of spiritual reality, usually accompanied by atheistic and materialist philosophies, t0 interpretations of rationalism expressed in logical positivism and psychological determinism.”16

In the twenty-five years since that report, debates concerning law and religion have intensified within American legal culture. The dominant position, both in terms of philosophical sophistication and practical reality, argues against both the desirability and possibility of religious influence. The dissenting voices argue that law and religion should not, and in some cases cannot, be divorced. By examining these arguments in the American context, we gain an understanding of the tradition of separationisrn and its current dilemmas. To date, legal literature has largely ignored the potential contributions of new religious movements and voices for resacralization.I7 If Bahá’í experience and scholarship have any contribution to make, they will have to engage successfully with these contemporary arguments and concerns.

'4 Frank S. Alexander, Religion and Law: Opportunitiesfor Creative Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1975), p. 1.

‘5 Randall Rainey, “Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?” Loyola at LosAngeles Law Review 27 (1998), p. 153.

“’ Rainey, p. 153.

'7 For a discussion of this point, see Rebecca R. French, “Lamas, Oracles, Channels and the Law: Reconsidering Religion and Social Theory,” Yale Journal afLaw and the Humanities (Summer 1998), p. 533.

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The law must be separate: arguments against religious influence

Until the twentieth century the main voices arguing for some sort of separation between religion and law were religious ones, and the central rationale was the protection of religion from state influence. In the debates surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment religion clauses, a central justification for disestablishment of religion was that it was favorable to religion. It “is adverse to the diiTusion Of the light of Chn'stianity,” James Madison wrote, and “not requisite for the support of the Christian religion” to have laws that require public support of religious teachers. ‘8

Today the most potent arguments against religious influence come not from religious voices, but from nonreligious ones. Where once religion was Viewed as a necessary backdrop to the political enterprise, the policy minded now perceive it as a threat. At the same time, religious voices, and in particular, elements reflecting a fundamentalist Christianity,‘9 have introduced the possibility of restoring some form of religious state, ignoring the benefits, especially in the Christian tradition, of separation. Contemporary arguments commonly made against religious influence in law are based on political realities and the expediencies of social order.

These arguments are reflections of the liberal state. Pluralism, it is argued, requires that government, and in some respects individuals, wear blinders concerning notions of the good when engaged in public decision making and the ordering of the public sphere. This neutrality is to prevent both imposition and coercion, and the fracturing of society along sectarian lines. Epistemologically, this minimizing of religious influence is supported by a rigid distinction between faith and reason, and the characterization of religious ways ofknowing as both distinct and unsuitable for public

'“ These quotations are excerpted from Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonst/‘(mce Against Religimm Assessments written in 1785, one Of the central texts in the history of the relationship between law and religion in the United States.

"’ The popular term for these movements in the United States has been “the religious right.”

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debate and decision making. These arguments for the exclusion of religious influence are expressed in a larger debate within legal academia that has been ongoing since the Supreme Court of the United States began defining the religion clauses in earnest in the 1940s. Central to this debate is the desirability of the movement from the hegemony of a republican Vision in Which the preservation of liberty requires participation and sharing, and thus the cultivation of certain Virtues, to a liberalism in Which the “central idea is that government should be neutral toward the moral and religious Views its citizens espouse.”20

Religion and law are inseparable:

voices in favor of religious influence

Against the backdrop of these dominant positions there are a growing number of arguments within American legal culture that separationism is a failed experiment and that contemporary legal en'ses, particularly in an age of increasing globalization, are deepened by the marginalization of religious influence. The best way to map the arguments in favor of religious influence is to view them against the backdrop oftwo interrelated contemporary legal crises: the weakening or loss of the internal and external fidelity of the law.

Crises ofintemalfidelily Internal fidelity refers to the faithfillness of any particular legal rule or standard to a pre-existent generative frame. “Law” is thus understood not only as positive rules but also as a relationship between rules and standards and the architecture of beliefs, traditions, and texts that support and give meaning to those rules.

A crisis of internal fidelity exists when legal rules and the institutions that create and interpret them have become unmoored from any generative aspirative frame. The result of such a crisis, it is feared, is legal hedonism. Separationism, it has been argued, raises dilemmas of internal fidelity. Many contemporary legal systems, whether currently separationist or integrationist, existed

3” For the best example of this analysis, see Michael J. Sande], Democracys Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). See particularly pp. 3—54.

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at the time of their founding within a frame that was explicitly religious. The evolution towards separationism has thus often required the displacement of the frame of reference for law. It is often argued that to restore the law’s Vitality, a rejuvenation of its religious roots is needed.“

Humanity has had little experience with legal systems that are explicitly separationist, let alone secular, from the outset. As we currently struggle to refine legal systems to meet the challenges of globalization, this is an important cautionary note. Constructs for internal fidelity of the law are needed to ensure that law remains properly constrained. Historically, religion has been the prime provider of this constraint, and separationism has not provided a suitable alternative.

As the displacement of religion has weakened bonds of internal fidelity, legal culture has increasingly lost its ability to talk about the transcendent, as well as about values. As a result, there has been a weakening of legal and political discourse. To achieve consensus and harmony within society, the orientation religious faith provides towards the ultimately unknowable Divine reality is fundamental. “It has the Vital role of keeping the argument open” by carving out “a narrow ridge between the two abysses of nihilism and idolatry.”22 An orientation towards the transcendent prevents the appearance of either nihilism or idolatry, both of which “refuse the authority of political argument”—nihilism by reducing all of life to a selfish contest, and idolatry by fixing one set of truths and expecting conformity to it.23

3' A paradigmatic example of an interpretive theory that would rejuvenate the religious roots of American law is originalism, which has, since the 19803, become common in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Originalism argues that constitutional interpretation must be bound by strict fidelity to the meanings understood by the drafters at the time the Constitution was written. Originalism calls for the law to show internal fidelity to a particular historical period and a particular document, thus reestablishing an internal fidelity of legal rules to the original vision of the American constitution. This was and is seen as a way to constrain a tendency towards legal hedonism.

33 Charles Davis, “Religion and the Making of Society,” Northwestern University Law Review 81 (1987), p. 729.

33 Davis, p. 729.

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Crises ofexternalfidelz'ty

Any notion of a crisis of internal fidelity is incomplete without an account of external fidelity of the law. Commonly discussed in relation to the idea of “legitimacy,” external fidelity refers to the relationship of faithfulness shown to the law by those subject to it. Ultimately, legitimacy is the authority a law is perceived to have and exert when it adheres to and resonates with a belief or recognized norm that is able to justify action.

External fidelity can be eroded in many ways. The perception that the internal fidelity of law no longer exists can lead to a questioning of the authoritative nature of legal rules. More destructive, however, is the erosion that occurs when the aspirative frame of the internal fidelity of the law has either been lost or is deemed obsolete by those subject to the law. If either of these conditions prevails, the law loses the functional ability to order society because individuals no longer recognize within the law the prerequisites that would determine adherence.

An increasing number of powerful arguments are being made that law in the contemporary West is beset by a legitimation cn'sis. This crisis, some have argued, has occurred because of misunderstandings concerning the historical, normative, and anthropological relationship between law and religion.24

Writing in the 1970s and 1980s, the noted legal historian and philosopher Harold J . Berman identified a crisis of external fidelity. Calling it an “integrity crisis,” Berman wrote that “our Whole culture [the United States of America] seems to be facing the possibility of a kind of nervous breakdown,” the symptoms of which include “the massive loss of confidence in law.”25 The “primary cause of the crisis,” he argued, is “the disintegration of its [the law’s] religious

34 Another response has been to deny the validity of talking in tenns of legitimacy altogether. “The concept of legitimation,” one critic has written, “has no clear operational meaning, nor agreed upon empirical referent. . .we would be better off abandoning the concept.” Alan Hyde, “The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law,” I/Visconsin Law Review (1983), p. 426.

5 Harold J. Berman, The Interaction ofLaw and Religion (London: Abingdon Press, 1974), p. 21.

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foundations.”3" His conclusion is premised on the historical fact of the “dialectical interdependence” of law and religion, in which religion provides a consciousness of the ultimate meaning and purpose of life to the law, and law lends religion a medium to facilitate the expression of its ultimate values.

Law, Berman contends, is “an active, living human process” that involves “man’s whole being, including his dreams, his passions, his ultimate concerns.”27 Reason, will, and memory, as capacities of human beings, exist in a state of constant interaction and interpenetration with one another. Within God—and as reflected within human beings—they are not in oppositional relationships with each other, but rather are difi‘erent aspects of one reality. When concretized into law, they similarly comprise aspects of one law, not three ideas in conflict.

This integrative dimension of law is both realized and understood through religion. According to Berman, law and religion have in common four elements: ritual, tradition, authority, and universality. Both law and religion require these four elements to maintain their mutual integrity, but the crucial point is that law and religion share their symbology in these four categories. Law employs these symbols to connect the legal order to beliefs about the purpose and meaning of life, to indicate legitimacy. “In every society,” Berman writes, “these four elements. . .symbolize man’s effort to reach out to a truth beyond himself. They thus connect the legal order of any given society to that society’s beliefs in an ultimate, transcendent reality.”28 The integrity crisis of which Berman writes can be recast as the product of a “secular—rational” model of law that veils “those elements law shares with religion,” especially those elements that “transcend rationality.”29 Berman’s solution to this legal crisis is to reestablish the authentic relationship between law and religion.

3“ Harold J. Berman, “The Religious Foundations of Westem Law,” in Faith and Order: The Reconciliation ofLaw and Religion, ed. John Witte Jr. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), p. 45.

37 Berman, The Interaction ofLau' and Religion, p. 31.

3“ Berman. The Interaction ofLaw and Religion. p. 25.

3" Berman, The Interaction ofLuw and Religion, p. 31.

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How can this reestablishment occur in conditions of increasing social, religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity? Berman acknowledges that “our intended destination is global integration—not global homogenization, not diminution of cultural differences and territorial allegiances, but a bringing together of the diverse constituencies of the world into a transcendent human family.”30 He believes that we are entering into an “age of synthesis” in which “‘either—or’ gives way to ‘both—and’” and we recognize that “the just is sacred or it is not just [and] the sacred just or it is not sacred.”31 By necessity, this requires a new logos or interface of spiritual faith rooted in our consciousness of the divine with the larger experience of the life of society as a whole. This demands that legal discourse be reoriented towards patterns of religious determinism in its own history, that religious thinking be allowed to influence the movement towards an integrative jurisprudence, and that the project of articulating generalizable norms based on this history and the relationship between law and religion occur. At the same time the revitalization of religion must occur, as the emergence of a “new law” and that of a “new religion” are inseparable.32

Is Religion Relevant? A Framework for a Bahá’í Response

The Bahá’í Faith is a young religion, and history suggests that there is typically a lengthy penod between the formation of a religion and the appearance of any legal system heavily influenced by that religion. In the evolution of Sunni Islam, for example, it was not until more than two centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad that the great ninth-century legal systematizer Muhammad ibn Idris al—Shafi‘i subsumed numerous localized schools of law into a method and set of sources rooted in Islamic norms and the experiences of Muslim societies. In the case of Christianity, it was not until the renaissance of the twelfth century—which witnessed the appearance of Gratian’s Decretum, continued struggles between the

3“ Harold J i Berman, “Law and Logos,” DePaul Law Review 44, p. 161. 3' Berman, The Interaction ofLaw and Religion, p. 114. 32 Berman, 7726 Interaction ofLaw and Religion, p. 125.

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regnum and sacerdoz‘um, and a focus on the autonomy of the churchthat a legal system with deep roots in Christianity began to develop.

In regard to this interregnum between the birth of a religion and the appearance of a legal system bearing its name, the Bahá’í Faith is no exception. Today, 150 years after the founding of the Bahá’í Faith, there is no identifiable Bahá’í legal system. There exist only fragments of a Bahá’í procedural and substantive law, and no country whose legal system is heavily influenced by a Bahá’í legal philosophy or method. However, important patterns have developed, providing a framework for understanding and analyzing the foundations of Bahá’í law, the operations of a Bahá’í legal system, and possible future patterns of development. By identifying this framework, possible Bahá’í responses to contemporary questions of law and religion and the crises of fidelity can be identified.

Origins: agitation in nineteenth-centmy Iran

The immediate prehistory of the Bahá’í Faith is of an Iran in a state of increasing agitation. Political, religious, and social fracturing and dissent—particularly around whether to modernize—contributed to periodic upheavals. In the political sphere, the formation of an increasingly separate and independent hierocratic order created an informal check on the exercise of government power. Manifestations of this political dualism included episodes of protest instigated 0r inspired by the ‘ulamd’. On the external front the Qajar Dynasty was besieged by another form of dualism: the increasing awareness and impact of Europe. Russia and England both harbored hegemonic aspirations over Iran, whose political and economic life was forced into a consistently reactive stance. One manifestation of these pressures within the structures of Iranian government itself was irrational fluctuations between the dominant patrimonial forms of government and attempts at constructing a modern bureaucratic state.33

37‘ The history of political reform in nineteenth—century Iran could be interpreted as a standoff between the conservative elements among the ‘ulamci '. reformist ministers, and the Shah. Yet, while attempted reforms were often undermined 0r stalled, it is clear that reformist tendencies did take root, one culmination ofthis process being the Constitutional Revolution of (cont’d)

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These forces of political disquietude were intensified by an intellectual and social climate characterized by new and more potent voices of dissent. Shiah Islam—the state religion of Iran since the early sixteenth century34—is a dissentist sect, formed in the nascent days of Islam as a reaction against the failure of ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib to be confirmed as the successor of Muhammad. These dissentist roots did not, however, translate into a history of active political resistance. Rather, due to complex forces including the occultation Of the Imarnate,35 the expectation of the Mahdi and the practice of taqz'yyih (voluntary dissumulation), Shiah dissent, while religious and intellectual, was less often political and social.

In the nineteenth century this changed.36 There was an emergence ofpolitical and social dissent divorced from religious moorings.

1906—1 1. For a discussion of political reform in Qajar Iran, see Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785—1906: The Role Ql'the Ulama in the quar Period (Los Angeles: University OfCalifornia Press, 1969).

3‘ It was during the Safavid Dynasty (1501—1722) that Twelver Shiism became the state religion of Iran.

35 Twelver Shiism professes that upon the passing of the Prophet Muhammad political and religious authority legitimately rested in an imam, the first such imam being ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib. Twelver Shiism is so-called because it acknowledges that a line oftwelve imams were specifically designated as such, with the Twelfth Imam—Muhammad al—Mahdiidisappearing into a state of occultation circa 873. The reality of the early history of Islam, which saw three caliphs assert political authority prior to ‘Ali, and the fact that no imam after ‘Ali held effective political authority, resulted in a substantial conceptualization and evolution in the concept Ofthe imamate. Generally, the unique station of the Imam came to rest on two factors: that he was specifically designated by his predecessor and that he alone was invested with personal qualities that set him apalt from the community of believers, in particular the qualities of ‘Ilm (knowledge) and ‘Ismah (infallibility). The imam’s authority did not come to rest on his possession of political authority. However, the effect Ofthis, both when there was a Visible imam and in the period of occultation, was to challenge the legitimacy of all political authorities. In some respects, this resulted in the maintenance and appeal to pre-lslamic forms of legitimacy, political quietism, and tensions among the various actors positioned to assert authority during the occultation.

3“ For a discussion ot‘dissent in the Qajar period see Mango] Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socia—religious Thought in quar Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982).

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At the core of this intellectual program was a conviction that free inquiry and religion were incompatible. Traditional religious modes of learning were not rejected outright but were seen as unable to respond adequately to changing cultural and social conditions. An Islamic worldview was gradually subordinated to Perso—nationalist ideals of identification.

At the same time, religious dissent became politicized and explicitly focused on transforming not only religious thinking but also social, economic, and political structures. This development was linked generally to Shiah messianism and the expectation of the appearance of the Mahdi,37 and specifically to ideas of renewal and regeneration that intensified in some circles in the early nineteenth century. Shaykhism38 began to speak of revelation in terms of cycles—with the idea that religious law must be transformed to meet particular stages of human growth and development. Within this emphasis on progression, a religious doctrine often characterized by political passivity was gradually forming an orientation towards the possibilities of political and social change in the near future.

These various strands of dissent form the backdrop for the appearance of the Bahá’í Faith. In 1844 Siyyid ‘Ali-Muhammad, the Bab,39 a merchant from Shiraz, claimed to be the recipient of divine guidance. While this claim at first appeared as an extreme and revitalized form of Shaykhism, it became readily apparent that it was in many respects sui generis as a form of dissent. This was made apparent by three claims of the Bab. First, while completing the Islamic hajj (pilgrimage) in late 1844, He made a claim of

37 The Mahdi, who is also referred to as the Qd ’[m, is a central figure of fulfillment in Twelver Shiism, and is expected to be the appearance of the Twelfth Imam from occultation.

38 Shaykhism refers to the movement founded by Shay@ Ahmad—i—Ahsa’i (175671825), which served as a philosophical and religious precursor to the emergence of the Babi religion. For a study of the relationship between Shaykhism and the Babi religion, see Abbas Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal: The Making Q/"tlze BdbiMovement in Iran 1844—1850(lthaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

3" For a discussion of the roots and evolution of the Babi religion, see Abbas Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal.

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messianic fulfillment when He publicly pronounced, “I am that Qd ’im whose advent you have been awaiting.”40 Second, while on trial in 1848 the Bab was unequivocal concerning His station as the Mahdi and the authority of his writings as the Word of God for the times. Third, by the time of His execution in 1850 the Bab had clearly established in the Bayan and elsewhere that He was in effect a precursor to Man—yuzhiruhu ’lláh (He Whom God shall make manifest), for Whom all past divine revelations had prepared the way.

The Bábi movement was thus both religious and political. It challenged religious ways of thinking but also aimed at political, social, and economic reform. It was fiJture oriented but did not forsake religion. Not surprisingly, therefore, it led to often Violent convulsions in the 1840s as this religiopolitical program sought to transform Iranian society.

Within this context of nineteenth—century agitation, and in particular the Bábi movement, the Bahá’í Faith was born. Baha’u’llah had become a Babi in the early days of the movement and upon the death of the Bab rapidly became one of the movement’s leaders. While imprisoned in 1852, Baha’u’llah received His first intimation that He was the expected Man—yuzhiruhu 716%, the bearer of a new revelation from God. As He describes this event, “I was but a man like others, asleep upon My couch, when 10, the breezes of the All-Glorious were wafted over Me, and taught Me the knowledge of all that hath been.”‘“ In 1863, while in exile in Baghdad, He made this claim public for the first time, and the notion of the “people of Bahá,” as distinct from both Babis and Muslims, was born.

Whereas the Babi movement had convulsed the internal dynamics of Iranian society, the religion of Baha’u’llah employed a different method and orientation. Enunciating the concept of unity as the pivotal construct of His religious, social, and political program,

4" Cited in H. M. Balyuzi, The Bdb, the Herald of the Day ofDays (Oxford: George Ronald, 1975), p. 71.

4' Baha’u’llah, The Proclamation Qf'Bahá’u’lláh (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1972), p. 57.

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Baha’u’llah’s revelation revolved around the integration and fundamental harmony of material and spiritual reality, reason and faith, and science and religion. His teachings were global, universal, and progressive in their outlook and spoke of the unification and collective maturation of the human race. Baha’u’llah taught that there is one God, one religion, and one human family, and that “[t]he earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens.”42 The expectation was of the emergence of a peaceful world through effective means of education and social and economic development, the establishment of racial and gender equality, the end of religious and spiritual hierarchy and elitism, the deepening of democratic tendencies, the end of hardened nationalism, and the spiritualization of public and political life. In this scheme, individual loyalty and orientation were not to the faithful but to all humanity, and the aim was not to regenerate Iran but to “build anew the whole world.”43 In fact, the regeneration of Iran and the regeneration of the world were not conceived by Baha’u’llah as exclusive projects. The pronouncement “Pride is not for him who loves his country but for him who loves the world” was not intended by Baha’u’llah to be, as E.G. Browne thought, “a fine sentiment.”44 It was actually the locus of Baha’u’llah’s political and legal program.

The early legal history of the Bahá’í Faith

The inclusive nature of Baha’u’llah’s overall message poses a legal dilemma from the outset. Many contemporary approaches to law have argued that law is innately exclusive. Such approaches claim that legal reasoning cannot avoid being consequentialistfocused on ends and outcomes—and, as such, is determined by the realities of power, class, and ideology within society. By articulating a global Vision of social change, with implications for a global law, it appears that Baha’u’llah’s Vision is caught between

“‘3 Baha’u’llah, Gleaningsfivm the Writings QfBa/zd 'u ’[ld/z, 2d ed. (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1994), 117, p. 250.

• 3 Baha’u’llah, cited in introduction to the Kitab-i-Aqdas, p. 1.

44 Edward G. Browne, cited in H. M. Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne and the Bahá’í Faith (Oxford: George Ronald, 1970), p. 88.

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two competing approaches to social change. On the one hand, Baha’u’llah speaks of His law as the “highest means for the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples.”45 Yet, if law is indeed innately exclusive of some members of society, then attempting to achieve Baha’u’llah’s Vision of global unity through legal-rational modes would be self—defeating. On the other hand, Baha’u’llah refers to His laws as a “choice wine” and writes that the rationale for obedience to them is the “love of [His] beauty.”46 Thus, Baha’u’llah’s Vision of social change could perhaps be seen as antilegalistic, relying on a more diffuse moral—ethical mode of transformation. Yet when accompanied by the banning of religious hierarchy and authority, the demand that individuals search out truth for themselves, and the assertion that science and religion are in harmony, reliance on such informal dynamics makes Baha’u’llah’s universal Vision unlikely ever to be achieved. History has shown that while the dissemination of a dynamic moral-ethical vision can have a transformative impact, it inevitably remains limited in scope and application.

Underlying these variant approaches to social change are the fundamental issues of religious influence in law. Contemporary arguments that religion is obsolete as a force for change challenge Baha’u’llah’s global Vision as unattainable and dangerous both in relation to method (legalistic or antilegalistic) and content (what role will His religious Vision play in His legal program?).

A pattern of response to these dilemmas is found in Baha’u’llah’s response to Haji Siyyid Javad—i~Karbila’i, a Bahá’í anxious for the dissemination and implementation of the laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Baha’u’llah writes:

Indeed, the laws of God are like unto the ocean and the children of men as fish, did they but know it. However, in observing them one must exercise tact and wisdom... Since most people are feeble and far-removed from the pumose of God, therefore one must observe tact and prudence under all

45 Baha’u’llah, Kitab-i-Aqdas, K 2. 4“ Baha’u’llah, Kitab-i-Aqdas, K 4.

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conditions, so that nothing might happen that could cause disturbance and dissension or raise clamor among the heedless. Verily, His bounty hath surpassed the whole universe and His bestowals encompassed all that dwell on earth. One must guide mankind to the ocean of true understanding in a spirit of love and tolerance. The Kitab-i—Aqdas itself beareth eloquent testimony to the loving providence of God.47

In this statement, Bahá’u’lláh claims to bear a new and independent revelation from God and to fulfil past religions. Implicit within this claim is the role of divine Lawgiver. Indeed, the Kitabi-Aqdas opens with a clear statement of divine law being made known through a prophetic intermediary and the necessity of humanity’s obedience to such law. “The first duty prescribed by God for His servants,” Bahá’u’lláh writes, “is the recognition of Him Who is the Dayspring of His Revelation and the F ountain of His laws [i.e., Bahát’u’llélh].”48 Further, “It behoveth every one who reacheth this most sublime station...to observe every ordinance of Him Who is the Desire Of the world.”49 Yet, in His response to Haj i Siyyid J avad, Bahá’u’lláh refuses to disseminate and implement His own laws despite the fact that they have already been revealed in the form of the Kitáb-i—Aqdas.

Within Bahá’u’lláh’s response we find a clear distinction between the act of lawmaking and the implementation of law—a common legal practice in many parts of the world today. Laws are often accompanied by legislated delays in implementation to allow preparation time for those who administer and those who are affected by the law. This delay is qualitatively different with a claimed divine law, however, inviting inquiiy into the absolute and normative character of that law. How can it be the “highest means” for the ordering of the world’s affairs, but not immediately applicable? Why is Hájí Siyyid Javéd warned to be so cautious in relation to the law? Given that the laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas reach the realm of ‘ibddat (ritual Observances) in addition to the realm

• 7 Bahá’u’lláh, cited in introduction to the Kitab-i-Aqdas. p. 6.

4“ Baha’u’llah, Kitab-i-Aqdas, K 1. 4" Bahá’u’lláh, Kitab—i—Aqdas, K 1.

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of mu ‘dmalét (societal relations), isn’t Haji Siyyid Javéd’s own spiritual health and status as a believer potentially threatened by a failure to follow the laws in as complete a manner as is practicable at the time? It seems that the imposition of divine law on humanity is not justified simply because God possesses the power to impose it.

Thus, the first foundation of our framework for understanding Bahá’í law is that divine legal will is not positivist. God’s sovereignty alone does not legitimize His law. Divine precepts are to be mediated in their application to human beings, not applied absolutely and immediately solely due to the sovereign nature of their source.

Underlying this distinction between legislation and implementation in Bahá’í law is a more general pattern of delay. Indigenous Bahá’í laws were rarely, if ever, publicly promulgated by Bahá’u’lláh until the completion of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas in 1873. In the period after Bahá’u’lláh’s first intimation (1852) and before His public declaration (1863) this is not surprising. There was an absence of both a legal authority (Bahá’u’lláh had not yet declared Himself to be the bearer of a new revelation) and a subject community (the “people of Bahá” did not yet exist). Bahá’u’lláh’s legal silence is thus expected in this period.

After 1863, however, there was no question of Bahá’u’lláh’s legal authority in light of both Bábi legal theory and the claims of Manifestationhood of Bahá’u’lláh. Two basic legal propositionssupremacy and evolution—may be derived from the Bétbi religion. The Báb positioned divine law, like religion, as historically relative. He stated, “The process of the rise and setting of the Sun of Truth [of a Manifestation of God bearing a new revelation] will. . .indefinitely continue...”50 A new Manifestation, with a new revelation and full legal supremacy over past Manifestations, is required at periodic intervals. This progressive orientation generated the Báb’s abrogation of the Qur’án and His promulgation of new

5“ The Báb, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, The World Order 0/301”; '11 'llci/z: Selected Letters, lst pocket sized ed. (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1991). p. 117.

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laws in the Persian Bayén. Divine law thus evolves as each Manifestation possesses the authority to abrogate past divine legislation.

After 1863 Baha’u’llah was such a legal authority. However, for ten years He remained fundamentally silent on legal issues, even in the face of repeated requests for legislation or clarification. Historical evidence suggests that while Bahá’u’lláh was in exile in Adrianople, from 1863 to 1868, petitions were sent to Him requesting the enunciation of laws. Bahá’u’lláh reportedly revealed a Tablet in Persian that included laws, but He decided not to release it. He wrote, “For a number ofyears petitions reached the Most Holy Presence [Baha’u’llah] from various lands begging for the laws of God, but We held back the Pen ere the appointed time had come,”5‘ and within the Kitáb-i-Aqdas itself Bahá’u’lláh alluded to these earlier petitions, saying:

Various petitions have come before Our throne from the believers, conceming laws from God, the Lord of the seen and the unseen, the Lord of all worlds. We have, in consequence, revealed this Holy Tablet [the Kitáb-i-Aqdas] and arrayed it with the mantle of His Law that haply the people may keep the commandments of their Lord. Similar requests had been made of Us over several previous years but We had, in Our wisdom, withheld Our Pen until, in recent days, letters arrived from a number of the friends, and We have therefore responded, through the power of truth, with that which shall quicken the hearts of men.52

The dynamics of revelation, social and historical realities, and legal reasons factor in this delay, but two important features may be noted. First, Bahá’u’lláh made a conscious choice to delay lawmaking. According to the Bahá’í concept of Manifestationhood, the bearers of divine revelation are not mere channels or mouthpieces of God.53 Manifestations have volition over the social

5' Baha’u’llah, “Notes" in the Kitab-i-Aqdus, p. 219.

53 Bahá’u’lláh, Kitab-i-Aqdas. K 98.

5" For a discussion Ofthe concept Ofthe Manifestation in the Bahá’í writings, see Juan R. I. Cole, “The Concept of the Manifestation in the Bahá’í Writings,” Bahá’í' Studies 9 (1982).

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expression of revelation. Thus, when Baha’u’llah chooses to withhold His “Pen,” one contributing factor is social contingency. Second, Bahá’u’lláh’s motivation to create laws is a response to the requests He has received from His followers, suggesting that law is in a relationship with a larger reality to which the decision to create laws must be responsive.

In delay, therefore, we see a second element of a pattern for understanding Bahá’í law—a stress on the relational aspects of law. The process of divine lawmaking, as described by Bahá’u’lláh, has an element of timeliness which depends upon the relationship between the lawmaking authority and the subjects of that law.

Our exploration of the early legal history of the Bahá’í Faith has focused so far on two somewhat formal legal observationsthe distinction between legislation and implementation, on the one hand, and the timing of lawmaking, on the other. The third observation, seen explicitly in Bahá’u’lláh’s response to Haji Siyyid Javad, takes us into a discussion of legal policy. Bahá’u’lláh emphasizes “love and tolerance” and the avoidance of anything that would “cause disturbance and dissension.” These are potential substantive rationales for the distinction between legislation and implementation and for the pattern of delay identified earlier. The first draws a link between law and social harmony or unity. Baha’u’llah, a realist, recognizes that, as He states, most people are “far-removed from the purpose of God.” Given this reality, Baha’u’llah appears to argue that the application of divine law could potentially have destructive consequences. The possibility that such application might lead to social agitation and disturbance would undermine the cardinal Bahá’í principle of unity.

Divine law, in the Bahá’í conception, has thus been intimately linked to social realities. More explicitly, the interface between social meanings and revelation becomes the determining force of when, or whether, a particular divine law should be applied. Divine law gains the potential to operate within human society only when social meaning allows for some clarity concerning the “purpose of God.” Baha’u’llah rejects, however, the possibility of effecting such changes in social meaning through either social engineering or coercion, either of which would cause the disturbance and dissension

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He is seeking to avoid. Rather, He views these changes in social meaning in aspirational terms: humanity innately desires the “ocean of true understanding” and has the capacity to attain it. He writes, “The supreme cause for creating the world and all that is therein is for man to know God,”54 and, as such, “All blessings are divine in origin but none can be compared with this power of intellectual investigation and research which is an eternal gift producing fi'uits ofunending delight.”55 This suggests that changes in social meaning should be accomplished through education and dialogue, and inclusiveness is to be facilitated through “love and tolerance.”

This positioning of law in relation to social meaning has some startling implications and creates many potential problems. On the one hand, the conscious linking of law with changes in social meaning is often conceived of as liberating. Arguing in general terms that law must respond to changes in how a particular society understands reality is an effort to allow the law to be creative amid changing attitudes concerning issues of race, religion, gender, and ethnicity.

On the other hand, this positioning suggests the possibility of law without any absolute principles; law which is ever changing at both the normative and practical levels, just as “the times never remain the same, for change is a necessary quality and an essential attribute of this world, and of time and place.”56 But Baha’u’llah clearly does not intend such a malleable concept of law, ordering that the laws He has legislated Himself remain unalterable until the coming of the next Manifestation of God. Although there are only approximately one hundred such laws, they touch on a wide range of legal topics including religious obligations, family, criminal law, property, sexual behavior, inheritance, torts and contracts, and government administration. Baha’u’llah describes His laws in absolute and universal terms.

54 Baha’u’llah, Tab/el‘s ()thI/IC} '11 'lláh Revealed After [/16 Kildb—i—Aqdus (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust. 1994), pp. 267768.

5‘ ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Foundations QI'World Unity (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1979), p. 60.

5“ ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, cited in introduction to the Kitáb—i~Aqdas, pp. 45.

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“Whenever My laws appear like the sun in the heaven of Mine utterance,” He writes, “they must be faithfully obeyed by all, though My decree be such as to cause the heaven of every religion to be cleft asunder.”57 The metaphors Baha’u’llah employs in reference to law reinforce the controlling normative dimension of His laws. Responding to Hájí Siyyid J avad, He states, “the laws of God are like unto the ocean and the children of men as fish, did they but know it.” The implication is that positive law is potentially the social expression of greater and absolute laws of creation.

In the context of the late nineteenth century, Bahá’u’lláh’s universalist message, while certainly progressive, was by no means unique. There were many theories and movements at the time that echoed Bahá’u’lláh’s call for a universal auxiliary language and world government accompanied by greater social and economic justice. But Baha’u’llah articulates His Vision within a framework that, as described by the Universal House of Justice, views “[t]he human race, as a distinct, organic unit, [which] has passed through evolutionary stages analogous to the stages of infancy and childhood in the lives of its individual members, and is now in the culminating period of its turbulent adolescence approaching its long-awaited coming of age.”58 This View of the collective maturation of humanity rests on three basic postulates.

First, collective social maturation is seen as a reflection of the patterns of unity that underlie creation itself. “[R]eality,” one Bahá’í scholar has argued, “is an integrated whole but. . .this wholeness is a unity in diversity, not a uniformity.”5" Within this integrated whole there exist four distinct levels of being—God, the Manifestations of God, the human soul, and material reality. Human beings represent yet another pattern of unity in diversity, integrating spiritual reality (the human soul) and material reality (the human body) within

57 Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, K 7.

5“ The Universal House of Justice, The Promise of World Peace (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, [985), p. 16.

5" William S. Hatcher, “The Kitab-i—Aqdas: The Causality Principle in the World Of Being” in The Law ()fLOVL’ Enshrinecl, John S. Hateher and William S. Hatcher (Oxford: George Ronald, 1996), p. 114.

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a single organic unit. In this vision, every created thing is seen as constructed according to patterns of unity in diversity and dependent on such integration. Unity in diversity is thus the organizing principle of life and existence.

This View of reality argues that society needs to evolve to reflect more fully the reality of unity in diversity so as to maximize its potential for social order and organization. Human social life is ever advancing. The social life of humanity has become more complex and integated, and thus humanity must develop its ability to organize in patterns of unity in diversity.

Second, human society is not naturally in such a state of unity in diversity. Society is a human construct and, as such, can be reformed and changed. The Bahá’í writings argue for a specific analysis of how free will has acted to construct human social organization: “Unification of the whole of mankind is the hallmark of the stage which human society is now approaching. Unity of family, Oft1ibe, of city-state, and nation have been successively attempted and fully established. World unity is the goal towards which a harassed humanity is striving.”“0

There exists a third dimension to this idea of collective maturation. If unity in diversity is the necessary pattern for social evolution but human free will determines the ultimate course of social organization, there exists no guarantee that humanity will rise to the challenges of social order. Religion becomes relevant here. The dynamic interplay between the Divine and humanity is the motivating force of maturation. Progressive revelation posits that through religion God speaks to humanity in terms relative to the degree of its maturation. Thus, religion provides the mindset and historical consciousness needed to meet the challenges of further maturation. Bahá’u’lláh draws a crucial nexus between the capacity for positive social change and the processes of divine revelation when He writes:

And now concerning thy question regarding the nature of religion. Know thou that they who are truly wise have likened

“0 Shoghi Effendi, The World Order qf‘Ba/id ’u ’l/(i/z, p. 202.

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the world unto the human temple. As the body of man needeth a garment t0 clothe it, so the body of mankind must needs be adorned with the mantle of justice and wisdom. Its robe is the Revelation vouchsafed unto it by God. Whenever this robe hath fulfilled its purpose, the Almighty will assuredly renew it. For every age requireth a fresh measure of the light of God. Every Divine Revelation hath been sent down in a manner that befitted the Circumstances of the age in which it hath appeared?I

In the light of this controlling Vision of unity in diversity, Baha’u’llah’s linking of social meaning and law becomes clearer. Religious law must operate according to the degree of unity in diversity that humanity has achieved, and it must act only to deepen social meanings that reflect unity in diversity. Divine law does not only react to social meaning, which could evolve in any direction, but also must help in the creation of particular social meanings that reflect unity in diversity.

Baha’u’llah specifically legislated approximately one hundred laws. Their normative and absolute character represents a template for future laws, to be applied if and when configurations of social meaning are appropriate. This explains both why Baha’u’llah’s laws are stated in such binding terms and why they are often not applied because of social conditions. Thus, Baha’u’llah’s laws are socially contingent in reference to the macrocosmic shifts in worldview engendered by the reappearance of a revelation from God, but they are normative for a society growing beyond the “adolescent” phase of humanity’s collective development.

The delay between legislation and implementation may now be reread as resulting from humanity’s inability to understand the implications of that law, animated by a lack of development in social meaning and advancement in society. Implementation of the law could only have destructive consequences, such as the questioning of the authority who promulgated the law, rebellion, and nullification of the law’s potential benefits. Thus, the laws remain out of force

“' Baha’u’llah, Gleanings, 34, p. 81.

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until such understanding and consciousness can be cultivated. The relationship between law and religion is Viewed as relative and open to change as maturation and changes in social meaning occur. Separationism and integrationism, in a Bahá’í perspective, will have to be read in this light.

Bahd ’l'public law:fidelitfy and legislation

Because any discussion of Bahá’í law must occur within the progress and process orientation of the Bahá’í Faith, caution is necessary in drawing conclusions. The wisdom and meaning of this cautious approach is evident when we look at Bahá’í public law or the law of government institutions and their relationship with society.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Bahá’u’lláh’s legal writing is the attention He pays to public law. Baha’u’llah’s writings clearly outline a particular system of government. In the Kitab—i—Aqdas He speaks of “houses of justice” playing a role in inheritance, family, cn'rninal, tax, and education matters. More explicitly, these “houses of justice” are legal authorities to which “[i]t is incumbent upon all to be obedient,” and “All matters of State (umtir—i-siydsiyyih) should be referred to the House of Justice. . 7’63 Baha’u’llah also goes into detail about other public institutions including tax authorities (the institution of Ḥuqúqu’lláh) and centers of worship and community social service centers (the institution of the Mamrz'qu ’lAflkdr).

Bahá’u’lláh’s emphasis on public law is not limited to a description of desired future institutions. He also goes into detail about how these institutions are to come into being and to function. Baha’u’llah envisions the development of these institutions in evolutionary terms. Patterns of community growth and development will dictate when and where these institutions evolve. In His own lifetime very little institution building occurred. It began in eamest—primarily at the local (or municipal) level—under His appointed successor, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. National houses of justice came into being under ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s successor, Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, the Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith. The 1963 election of

63 Baha’u’llah, Tablet of lflraqat, the Eighth Iflraq, in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, p. 91.

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the international ruling body, the Universal House of Justice, marked the completion of a movement from individual authority to government by elected corporate bodies. The current system of elected decision-making bodies operating at local, regional, national, and international levels reflects themes and directions rooted in the writings of Baha’u’llah Himself. It was Baha’u’llah Who advocated for government by consultation, praised elections and democracy, and emphasized the need to move away from autocratic or oligarchic forms of government.

This public—law focus within divine revelation is historically distinct. The amount of public law in the Bible and the Qur’án, for example, is negligible. For Islam, especially, this has been a source of tension. The Qur’án clearly contemplates a public authority to exist after the Prophet and potentially renders some public institutions as legitimate. “0 you who have attained to faith!” the Qur’án states, “Obey God and obey the Apostle and those from among you who have been entrusted with authority.”"3 There is even some discussion of consultation as the method of functioning of such institutions.64 However, ambiguity and an absence of discussion of the placement of power in such institutions renders any discussion of Islamic public and constitutional law highly problematic.65

Beyond the public-law focus, Baha’u’llah’s explicit grant of lawmaking authority to this system of institutions, and in particular

"3 Qu’ran (4:59).

(’4 For example, Qu’ran (42:38) states, “And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel among themselves, and who spend out of what We have given them.”

"5 In the Sunni world it was not until the eleventh-century thinker Abu al-Hasan al—Mawardi that we find systematic attempts by Muslim scholars to theorize about public law. Not surprisingly, al—Mawardi’s important but late contribution The Ordinances ofGovernment (Kitdb al—Akfidm al-Sultdniyyih) cannot be separated from his need both to rationalize historical practice and to manage and explain the inconsistencies of government practice in his lifetime. Among Shiites it was through the notion of the imamate as a politically and religiously constituted authority that the ambiguities ot‘public law were met. However, questions among the predominant Twelver Shiites concerning the line of the Imams resulted in the doctrine Ofthe Occultation of the Twelfth Imam that in some respects has confined the scope of public-law thinking.

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to the Universal House of Justice, is significant. “Inasmuch as for each day there is a new problem and for every problem an expedient solution,” He writes, “such affairs should be referred to the House of Justice that the members thereof may act according to the needs and requirements of the time.”66 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clarifies:

Those matters of major importance which constitute the foundation of the Law of God are explicitly recorded in the Text, but subsidiary laws are left to the House of Justice. The wisdom of this is that the times never remain the same, for change is a necessary quality and an essential attribute of this world, and of time and place. Therefore the House of Justice Will take action accordingly...“7

Analyzing the theory of legislation that supports this grant ofpower t0 the Universal House of Justice takes us one step closer to the core issues related to religious influence in law. Questions of the relationship between revelation and law, religion and legal reasoning, and the dangers of a religiously motivated law are all encompassed by Bahá’í legislative theory.

Let us start with a conclusion that could logically be drawn based on our discussion of the social-meaning approach to law and the above statements about the powers of the Universal House of Justice: that all legislation of the Universal House of Justice is purely utilitarian, dictated by the needs of society at any particular time. If this is so, then while the Universal House of Justice ensures society’s smooth and efficient functioning, it does not seek to impose or implement a particular nonnative or moral Vision. Support for this view may be found in Baha’u’llah’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements that link the powers of the Universal House of Justice to the needs of changing times. This reasoning gives Baha’u’llah’s often misunderstood division of interpretive authority (given to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi) and legislative power (given to the Universal House of Justice) a degree of clarity.“8

““ Baha’u’llah, Tablet oflfIráqét. the Eighth lshréq, in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, p. 91. "7 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, cited in introduction to the Kitab-i-Aqdas, pp. 4—5.

“K For a discussion of the relationship between the Universal House of Justice and Shoghi Effendi, see letter ot‘the Universal House of Justice, 9 March 1965.

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If legislation is utilitarian, legislators should not be tied to the normative vision of revelation when regulating and, in fact, should not have the authority to claim that their legislation has normative legitimacy as religious statements.

One stark counterversion to this utilitarian reading of Bahá’í legislative theory is rooted in experiences of Muslim societies. In general terms the Qur’án and Sunna are the foundation upon which lawmaking occurs, thus importing a degree of textualism into Islamic legal science. In the face of this textualism, the place of human reason within legal interpretation and the generation of legal rules has been a source of contention among legal schools. A general concern has been to maintain the primacy of the texts, as they provide the greatest degree of certainty. In some schools, however, and in particular Twelver Shiism, which is heavily influenced by rationalist mutazilite theology, reason and revelation are said to correlate in the creation of law. Within Islamic law generally, a predominant orientation remains towards textualism and the related idea of intentionalism. “The muslim jurists,” one scholar writes, “always thought of texts as carriers of meanings intended by their authors. The decisive author...is, of course, God.”69 Further, “the widely accepted contemporary notion that a text has a life of its own apart from its author, that the meaning may continually evolve and change,” was a foreign one.70 Thus, one predominant orientation of the law was towards finding absolute, divinely intended meanings.

What we have seen of Bahá’í law so far would not necessarily contradict a textualist and intentionalist methodology. Divine revelation is positioned within the Bahá’í Faith as the standard, the “unerring Balance” against which all things are to be measured. It forms the template, which, by challenging and expanding the consciousness of humanity, allows for humanity’s development to the next stage of collective maturation. A law that fails to

“" Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit Qf'lslamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), p. 53. 7“ Weiss, p. 53.

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seek out divine intention within the text would seem poised to fail as an aid to this development.

There are ample reasons, however, to be cautious with legal intentionalism. It often narrows definitively the body of legitimate lawmakers and establishes a stark opposition between valid and invalid legal claims. The tensions this narrowing creates may be seen within the history of Islam. Intentionalism positions the religiously learned as central legal actors, as learning is a prerequisite to identifying divine meanings properly. This has sometimes resulted in a fractured public sphere and contributed to tensions in political life.“

The potentially destabilizing effects of narrowing the foundations of legal legitimacy are increased by the epistemological dilemmas that accompany intentionalism. How do we discover divine meanings with certainty? Response from within Islamic law has been multifaceted. The sources of Islamic law in their orthodox Sunni form remain tightly bound to the texts and are employed as interpretive tools of the Qur’án and Sunna as opposed to independent sources of law. At the same time, the religiously learned recognized that questions of certainty may threaten an individual’s status as a true follower of the Prophet. To forestall such violations of God’s law, a distinction could be drawn between the degree of certainty needed for action versus belief. As well, the diversity of Islamic schools (magmhab) of law which emerged after the passing of the Prophet and in response to the growth of the Islamic empire, allows for a degree of flexibility and fluidity to counter claims of certainty that could potentially be socially disruptive among Muslim peoples. This diversity was necessary, not only to forestall more serious forms of social fracturing but also given the uncertainties and fluctuations in the process of humanity’s reading of texts for divine intentions.

7' It was the ‘ulamzi ’ who developed a textually bound and intentionalist legal methodology—ugzi/ al-fiqh—partially as a response to a struggle with the Caliphate and other rulers over control of the legal enterprise. The relationship between the legal rules and methods of the ‘ulamd ’ and the legal and political powers of the Caliphate and other rulers has been a source of frequent tension and exploitation throughout the history of Muslim societies.

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Skepticism of an intentionalist approach to Bahá’í law is rooted within its writings. We have already noted the emphasis on utility. The limitation of the interpretive authority of the Universal House of Justice also questions intentionalism. More broadly, given the future-oriented nature of Baha’u’llah’s thinking and His emphasis on the relationship between law and social meaning, one would expect some deviation from an intentionalist and textualist focus. Indeed, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá premises his explanation of the Bahá’í concept of lawmaking power on a critique of the historical evolution of Islamic law. He sets up the legislative authority of the Universal House of Justice in direct opposition to historical practice in Islam:

Briefly, this is the wisdom of referring the laws of society to the House of Justice. In the religion oflslain, similarly, not every ordinance was explicitly revealed; nay not a tenth part of a tenth part was included in the Text; although all matters of major importance were specifically referred to, there were undoubtedly thousands of laws which were unspecified. These were devised by the divines of a later age according to the laws of Islamic jurisprudence, and individual divines made conflicting deductions from the original revealed ordinances. All these were enforced. Today this process of deduction is the right of the body of the House of Justice, and the deductions and conclusions of individual learned men have no authority, unless they are endorsed by the House of Justice. The difference is precisely this, that from the conclusions and endorsements of the body of the House of Justice whose members are elected by and known to the worldwide Bahá’í community, no differences will arise; whereas the conclusions of individual divines and scholars would definitely lead to differences, and result in schism, division, and dispersion. The oneness of the Word would be destroyed, the unity of the Faith would disappear, and the edifice of the Faith of God would be shaken.72

This statement has a familiar theme. The authority of the Universal House of Justice as a legislative body is founded upon the necessity to maintain unity and avoid “schism, division, and

73 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, cited in introduction to the Kitab-i-Aqdas, p. 5.

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dispersion”—an echo of the idea that Bahá’í law must act to reinforce patterns conducive to unity in diversity within society. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also points us in important analytic directions. First, He denies any claim that the text of revelation contains within it all the laws required for human society. This argument is rej ected in both of its possible forms: that all the laws required are those explicitly stated as laws, and that all the laws required are to be found in complete, but often hidden, form within the text. Second, the process of the Universal House of Justice legislating is referred to as one of “deduction” from the “original revealed ordinances.” This raises the possibility of a nonintentional approach to lawmaking that employs human reason as a device to move beyond narrow textual interpretation.

At the same time, however, it is now clear that a completely utilitarian reading of the powers of the House of Justice is inappropriate, as the institution operates with reference to and in the shadow of the text of revelation, with the normative and moral implications that such operation demands.

Of more importance, however, is the fact that the nature of Bahá’í legislation is slowly being clarified with a particular Bahá’í understanding of revelation as a relative text. Revelation is a complete statement of truth, but it is also relative in two important ways. First, it is relative in its art. While its truth is not contingent on time and place, the manner in which Baha’u’llah expressed and organized the truth was dictated to some degree by His circumstances, the questions He was asked, and the society around Him. Second, revelation is relative because it operates within human history. Shoghi Effendi stated that “[t]he fundamental principle enunciated by Bahá’u’lláh. . .is that religious truth is not absolute but relative...”73 As one scholar has argued, this statement means that any knowledge or understanding we have of reality or the structure of being is relative because we are only able to understand it in relative terms.74 The language of revelation, which is

73 Shoghi Effendi, Guidancefbr Today and Tommorrow.‘ A Selectionfrom the Writings ofShoghI' Effendi, the First Guardian th/ze Bahá’í Faith (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1953), p. 2.

74 Moojan Momen, “Relativism: A Basis for Bahá’í Metaphysics” in (cont’d)

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often metaphorical, allegorical, and imprecise, is, in fact, an agent for this relativism. It allows revelation to be both absolutely true and relative, capable of new meanings as the human capacity to understand evolves.

Applied to law, this understanding of relativism provides a clear framework in which the Universal House of Justice operates. The progressive nature of human society, as we have already seen, demands a law capable of change. If revelation is to play a role in the evolution of this changing law, then it must, in a sense, change as well. The relative nature of revelation allows for this. By effecting new understandings of revelation, it allows for the law to react to changes in social meaning.

The legislative act in the Bahá’í Faith thus occurs at the meeting point of the spiritual and the social, of revelation and reason. A legal rule will only be legislated and brought into force when the meanings society attaches to such a law reinforce the objectives of Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation, as deduced by the Universal House of Justice. When this nexus is not present, legislation and the implementation of laws will not occur. Otherwise, the effect would be division and dissension, undermining the central objective of the revelation of Bahá’u’lláh.

The progressive orientation of the Bahá’í Faith allows us to go even further. Social meanings and the understanding of revelation change, as both are relative, but they also change in the context of the collective maturation of humanity. Thus, any form of traditionalism or fundamentalism in the reading of revelation must be avoided if the Universal of House Justice is to remain legitimately within its scope of authority. Logically, the Universal House of Justice cannot assert any particular reading of revelation to be authoritative without undermining and destroying its legislative power by preventing the law from evolving in conjunction with changes in social meaning.

We began our discussion of a framework for understanding Bahá’í law by noting two dichotomous positions on the process

Studies in [/16 B(Zbi and Bahá’í' Religious, vol. 5, Studies in Honor afthe Late H. M. Balyuzi Series, Moojan Momen, ed. (Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 1988).

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of social change: the ethical—diffuse mode and the legalistic mode. Both are found in the Bahá’í definition of legislation: the Universal House of Justice has the legislative power to advocate for the necessary changes in social meaning that it thinks may be essential for the collective maturation of humanity, but it is prevented from legitimately employing the coercive force of law to effect the change prior to such changes in social meaning. Thus, the link between law and social meaning has resulted in a fundamental change in the meaning of legislation itself; it is not just the creation of generally applicable rules, it is also an informal mechanism to lay the foundation for these rules.

This changed notion of legislation also results in a changed notion of legitimacy. The legislation and application of Bahá’í law are only to occur after the prerequisite construction of social meaning, implying that the Bahá’í system contemplates and legitimizes other legal systems and sources of law. Current Bahá’í practice reflects this practice. Baha’u’llah made it incumbent upon His followers to obey the laws promulgated by legal authorities. While often interpreted as political quietism, this injunction also reflects the legal logic that the religiously motivated legislation of the Universal House of Justice legitimately has the coercive force of law only when certain preconditions are met. In the interim, existing legal systems are not only legitimate but also actually fundamental to the movement towards a time when the Universal House of Justice will legislate. In this context, Baha’u’llah’s inclusion within the Kitab-i-Aqdas and elsewhere of messages to the leaders of the United States, Queen Victoria, Napoleon III, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the Shah of Iran, and the Ottoman Sultan, as well as His writings to other world leaders individually and collectively, and the Universal House of Justice’s contributions to international political discourse, all make sense as efforts to encourage the development of social meaning in particular directions.75 Moreover, substantial areas of behavior that could be

75 There are excellent historical and contemporary examples of the central authorities in the Bahá’í Faith presenting arguments for a change in understanding ofcontemporary practices and concepts. Baha’u’llah, in (cont’d)

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subject to legislation are left to individual conscience. The formal explanation frequently given for this is that the time is not right.76

There is one last concern. What prevents the Universal House of Justice from acting out of step with changes in social meaning? Any link between law and social meaning is ultimately a theory of institutional integrity as well. For a lawmaking institution to preserve its institutional integrity—its ability to act effectively in relation to its audience—it must not enunciate laws on issues that are highly contested Within the public sphere. To the degree that it

His letter to Queen Victoria, states the following:

We have also heard that thou has entrusted the reins ot‘counsel into the hands of the representatives of the people. Thou, indeed, hast done well, for thereby the foundations of the edifice of thine affairs will be strengthened, and the hearts of all that are beneath thy shadow, whether high or low, will be tranquillized. lt behoveth them, however, to be trustworthy among His servants, and to regard themselves as the representatives of all that dwell on earth. (The Proclamation ofBahd ’u ’lltih, p. 34)

Baha’u’llah is affirming the positive aspects of parliamentary democracyt Of much more importance, however, is the fact that He is arguing for a reinterpretation of the meaning ofdemocracy. He does this in two ways. First, by emphasizing trustworthiness He links democracy to a political ethic that has been ignored historically and in contemporary discourse about democracy. Second, He calls for political actors within democracy to adopt a global orientation. For an analysis of trustworthiness within the history of political ethics and Baha’u’llah’s discussion, see Ariane Sabet-Sobhani, Die polirischen Botschaften des Religionsgruenders Bahaullah: Ethik una’ Politik im Welt01‘dnungsmodell derBahai (St. Gallen: 2000), pp. 1 16—30.

The best contemporary example of this process is the Universal House of

Justice’s 1985 contribution of The Promise of World Peace to global efforts towards peace. Within that document the Universal House of Justice argues for a redefinition of the meaning of peace and specifically the relationship between gender, race, or economic disparity and peace. 7" There are many examples of this in the letters and statements ot‘the Universal House of Justice covering a wide range of issues, including personal worship practices, the consumption of alcohol, abortion, and sexual relations. For examples of the letters and statements of the Universal House of Justice, see the Universal House of Justice, Messagesfrom the Universal House Q/"Juslice 1963—1986: The Third Epoch qf'the Formative Age, comp. Geoffery A. Marks (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1996).

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does speak on such contested issues, the audience for that institution becomes fractured, and the ability of the institution to speak effectively slowly erodes. It can only speak effectively when social meanings allow for the form and mode of speech of the legislating institution so as not to have a fracturing effect. To maintain their integrity, such institutions must advocate in the interim for the necessary changes in social meaning that would empower them. Baha’u’llah’s concern that the implementation of law must not be a source of discord and dissension is not only to protect the polity from disturbance. He recognizes it as a functional necessity for the successful and enduring operation of legal institutions themselves. Without a Clear understanding and responsiveness to the likely reception of their acts of legislation, lawmaking bodies will undermine and ultimately destroy themselves. If the Universal House of Justice acts out of step with the process through which social meaning is constructed, it ceases to be an effective legal body.

A Relative Relationship: Law and Religion Revisited

Existing literature on the relationship between law and religion in the Bahá’í Faith is limited. Popular Bahá’í belief and literature generally assume that the future will witness patterns of integration of law and religion in which Bahá’í law will predominate, that this integration will be benign and a benefit to all humanity, and that Bahá’u’lláh intended this.77 These assumptions are not without basis. Shoghi Effendi explicitly discusses the likely appearance of the Bahá’í Faith as a “state religion,” the creation of a “Bahá’í state,” and the formation of a “Bahá’í theocracy”—a11 within a Vision of unity in diversity that must be established without force or coercion.7x Recent academic literature, however, has taken the form of a na scent Bahá’í modernism.79 This approach argues that Bahá’u’lláh

77 See Christopher Sprung, “Bahá’í Institutions and Human Governance” in Lawand International Order (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1996), p. 151. 78 For a discussion Ofthese possibilities, see Shoghi Effendi, Messages to the Bahá’í' World 1 9504 95 7, comp. Gertrude Garrida (New Delhi: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1973), pp. 78~79.

7" Juan R.1. Cole, Modernity and Millennium: The Genesis Qf'the Bahá’í Faith in the Nineteenth—Centmy Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

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intended a rather conventional model of separationism. “They surely were among the first major religious figures in the region [the Middle East],” one scholar has argued, in reference to Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, to “embrace...the principle of the separation of religion and state.”80 In this Vision the Bahá’í Faith embodies a political philosophy of “formative republicanism” which, as discussed earlier, is in contrast to the “procedural liberalism” that has dominated much of the twentieth century.Sl

These strands of literature are both problematic—ironically, for similar reasons. As our discussion of Bahá’í legal history illustrated, ingrained within Bahá’í social and legal thought is a philosophical foundation that gives primacy t0 the process of becoming as opposed to being. The pattern of delay, the divorce of lawmaking from interpretation, the rooting of social theory within the category of maturation, the linking of law and social meaning, and the emphasis on the progressive and relative nature of religion all reflect Baha’u’llah’s insight that the social life of humanity can be authentically analyzed and understood only through a framework that emphasizes the dynamism and fluidity of that reality. Thus, what Bahá’u’lláh offers to debates concerning law and religion is not a fixed institutional architecture but a framework that seeks to explain anew the historical realities of law and religion and to indicate directions in which future thought, experimentation, and institutional development should occur. As such, literature that fixates on identifying elements of integrationist or separationist intentions in Baha’u’llah’s writings negates the most essential and exciting aspect of Bahá’u’lláh’s Vision: its process orientation. In a sense, both the integrationist and separationist approaches to law and religion in the Bahá’í Faith could be characterized as weak apologetics. They attempt to present and sometimes to defend the Bahá’í Faith by arguing that its social role will be distinct from that of other religions—either by being capable of creating a benign and healthy form of integrationism or by being wise enough to be separationist in the first place. But both approaches accomplish this

“0 Cole, p. 46. ”1 Cole, p. 191.

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at an extreme cost: the obfiiscation Of the core of Bahá’í social philosophy itself.

Baha’u’llah’s insistence that we attempt to discuss issues surrounding the relationship between law and religion within the framework of changes in social meaning, the category ofmaturation, and the understanding of movement towards unity as the predominant expression ofmaturation, offers some important insights.

A central dilemma within contemporary debates over religious influence in the law is that there are typically incompatible historical narratives on either side of the debate. The rhetoric of the mythology ofAmerican separationism ofien views legal history as a movement towards freedom of religion buttressed by the separation of church and state. As liberty has now been secured, this struggle for liberation has reached an end time. Thus, religious influence in the law is a threat to return to the past, to legal orders that, as we have learned, inevitably oppress.

Opposed to this narrative are ones that seek to return to an integrationist past, usually in a quest to reestablish the internal fidelity of the law. As this Vision of history has difficulty affirming the appearance of separationist and ultimately secular legal systems, there is often no alternative for religious voices but to challenge these developments and, by consequence, the legitimacy of existing norms and structures.

Religion and law are positioned as antinomic in one narrative and inseparable in the other. Baha’u’llah offers a way out of this quagmire by arguing that the internal fidelity of the law must be dynamic, not static, and that fidelity is given to the process in which change occurs and not to an absolute state. Thus, law should change to reflect developments in social meaning that will advance the collective maturation of humanity by solidifying its movement to more sophisticated and inclusive patterns of unity in diversity. The fidelity of the law is therefore always forward looking and progressive. It denies attempts to recover the past or claim that an end time has been reached.

This approach provides a degree of legitimacy and defense for both separationism and integrationism, as conventionally

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understood. Depending upon humanity’s maturation and the configuration of social meanings within a particular culture at a particular time, either of these general models may or may not be legitimate. Baha’u’llah Himself was scathing in His criticisms of religiously dominated political and legal orders, particularly in Muslim societies He observed personally. At the same time, He praised the advances in human freedom made by the founding of the American Republic. This does not, however, make Baha’u’llah a J effersonian, as some have suggested.82 Baha’u’llah legitimates a separationist model within His Vision of the process of social change and evolution, but while it is a necessary stage in the evolution of social meanings towards His global vision, it is not the end time of this evolution.

Baha’u’llah has also created a new approach to the external fidelity of the law by refusing to effect the authority of law through coercion. Legitimacy in the Bahá’í scheme rests upon the relationships among revelation, law, and social meaning as well as upon whether a legal rule Will advance the cause of unity. It also rests upon a conscious voluntarism—the educated choice of people who are aware of the meanings of those laws and who agree to be bound by them. This approach is reflected in the Bahá’í theory of legislation, which empowers the Universal House of Justice to advocate for changes in social meaning but does not grant it the coercive power of law to effect those changes.

Underlying this reasoning, however, is Baha’u’llah’s expectation that religion must gradually assert a greater influence on the law. He is a harsh critic of tendencies towards secularization, which are unable to meet the challenges of humanity as processes of globalization accelerate. The creation of a global society, Baha’u’llah argues, entails the cultivation of individual and group ethics that are other—centered. Dichotomous notions of “us” and “them” must be abandoned. Baha’u’llah argues that an orientation towards discussing the transcendent and metaphysical, which religion often provides, can best accomplish this. But this necessary inclusion of religion in legal discourse is not unconditional. Religion may

“'2 Cole, p. 190.

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be an animating force in humanity’s collective maturation, but only in its progressive and growth-inducing dimension. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states, “if religion is only to be a cause of disunion it had better not exist.”83 In this framework, religious influence does not redeem a fallen humanity or correct our errors where we have gone astray. Rather, religion is a worldview that provides both the tools and, potentially, the substance for people to engage in discourse about the foundations of social unity. If religion fails to make this contribution, it should be ignored.

Baha’u’llah is, in a sense, calling humanity to experiment with new institutional structures and modes of social organization. In His argument, social life will increasingly require religious influence, and so new forms of inclusive legal architectures must be attempted. His own adminstrative order is a template for such developments and should be studied and examined in this light.“4

Within Baha’u’llah’s legal thinking, we thus find the attitude that the relationship between law and religion is relative, necessarily changing as social meanings, individual orientation and mindset, and understandings of revelation change. In Bahá’í thinking, religion is the generative force behind humanity’s progression, but the social expression of this relationship is conditional and intimately linked to the state of society. Any claims of certainty concerning the future institutional relationship between law and religion must be treated with skepticism. Such a static worldview violates the dynamic core of Baha’u’llah’s social philosophy. Inviting us to engage fully in the Visionary process, Bahá’u’lláh advocates a discursive relationship between these two social institutions in which both the fear of the past—coercion, oppression, and unrest—and the idealization of it are subordinated to the process of creating a future in which law, religion, and society, acting relative to one another, may develop patterns that avoid the struggles of past and present.

83 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks: Addresses given by ‘Abdu’l—Ba/zd in Paris in 1911—1912(London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1995), p. 123.

84 There exists to date very little secondary literature analyzing the Bahá’í system of government. A good starting point among the primary literature is the writings of Shoghi Effendi, in particular, The World Order of'Ba/id ’u ’lláh.

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creating a future in which law, religion, and society, acting relative to one another, may develop patterns that avoid the struggles of past and present.

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