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World Order and Global Governance
A BAHA’I’ PERSPECTIVE
Paul Vreeland suggests that a convergence offimtures of a new world order proposed by contemporary 56/901475 wit/v those oflrm’ by tlae literature 0ftke Balmf’z’ Fairly will lead to reformulated definitions 0fw0rld order
and global governance.
he call for a new world order, or at least for global structural transformation, is not a late-breaking news item. “It appears we are now at the threshold of a new era in world politics,” write the authors of a popular university text.1 When the Iron Curtain collapsed upon the world stage, ending the drama of the Cold War, political analyst Francis Fukuyama announced “the end of history,”2 and in 1992 former US President George Bush described the changes in the global political arena as being of “biblical
1 Charles W Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Namformaz‘z’on, 6th ed. (Boston: St. Martins Press, 1997).
2 “What we may be witnessing [is] not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post—war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in The National Interest (Summer 1989), available at <www.wku.edu/~sullib/ history.htm>.
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158 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
proportions.” What writer has not supported a consensus that we are at a critical juncture in world history? Regardless of the theories used to describe historical precedents and Visions offered for the future, our world order is in a turbulent transition.
Whisperings for reform grow louder. Whether we tinker with the mechanisms of the United Nations system to tune their functionality or we deconstruct and re—engineer the overall orga— nization, a sense of urgency is building. The present moment is viewed by some as a “window of oppOrtunity” for serious reform and by others as the last chance to cut short a string of failures leading to an impending collapse. What will happen if the opportunity is missed or the chance lost? An environmental disaster of biospheric proportions? A Marxist—styled class revolution led by the Third World in an attempt to overthrow the “apartheid” 0f the global economy? A proliferation of ethnic Violence and mas— sive Violation of human rights? While predictions of our future differ, agreement regarding our present need is growing. There is little doubt that we need a new world order. Agreement is strengthening, too, with regard to common ground criteria describing that order.
There is growing recognition of the need for “top—down” governments to better accommodate the voices of grassroots organizations and other “bottom-up” structures of civil society. James N. Rosenau, author of “Governance in the Twenty—first Century,” suggests:
In order to acquire the legitimacy and support they need to endure, successful mechanisms of governance are more likely to evolve out of bottom—up than top—down processes. As such, as mechanisms that manage to evoke the consent of the governed, they are self-organizing systems, steering arrangements that develop through the shared needs of groups and the presence of developments that conduce t0 the generation and acceptance of shared instruments of control.3
Protests outside the barricades and locked doors of recent summits
such as those held by the World Trade Organization and the
3 James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty—first Century,” Global
Governance, vol. 1, n0. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 17.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 159
International Monetary Fund may be seen as grassroots calls for the shared instruments of control mentioned by Rosenau.
While voices of civil society are crying to be heard, others are demanding a lessening of control by top-down structures through the curtailment of the powers of national sovereignty. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, a political scholar presently Professor Emeritus of International Politics at the University of Tokyo, writes,
These resonance effects [of global democratization] are creating a world situation where, despite inevitable occasional setbacks, democracy and human rights are assuming the character of international/global norms that may transcend a state’s sovereignty b d h l f h f ' d‘ 'd l 4 and go eyon t e sum tota o t e norm 0 1n lVl ua states.
The effectiveness of a global organization such as the United Nations is dependent upon the degree of unanimity among member states ceding to it shares of their national sovereignty.
While one criterion is the accommodation of the voices of grassroots organizations and other bottom—up structures of civil society, another criterion gaining acceptance is that the new world order will have to assure an equity of powers granted to its member nations and, at the same time, grant powers to local and regional interests. This means that the authority of a global order Will have both horizontal and vertical integration: horizontal among state powers and vertical between bottom—up and top—down organ— izations. If the power of grassroots organizations is to be given legitimate recognition and that of nation states limited, how then will they be balanced? W Andy Knight, editor of Glam! Governance journal and a scholar who has written extensively on the United Nations and conflict resolution, observes:
Given the complexity of this issue, whatever form of governance we envision for the future should support the View that the institutions designed to manage human problems must be developed at every level: global, regional, national, and local.
4 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, “A Perspective on the Changing World Order: A Conceptual Prelude,” in Global Pamformatz'on: Challenges to the State System, ed. Yoshikazu Sakamoto (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), p. 34.
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160 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
It should also include all potential actors that play a role in governing (states, regional bodies, intergovernmental orga— nizations, NGOs, and individuals of civil society). This can be done by embracing the normative notion of panarchy, i.e. “rule of all by all for all.” A subsidiarity model of global governance can be used as an overarching framework within which this “new” governance structure can develop.5
Subsidiarity has played an important role in the development of the European Union, whose Commission defines it “as a guiding principle to imbed multilevel input in a bottom—up fashion, especially in on—the—spot sourcing of policies on water, energy, transport, etc.”6 Looking at its application in the division of labor and in conflict resolution, Knight sees subsidiarity as a principle by which “a central authority” performs “only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more immediate or local level.” With the subsidiarity model, the delegation of state powers to a local or regional institution or agency is made possible When that agency aligns its will with that of the overarching global body.
A third criterion for the future world order is the acceptance of unity in diversity as a governing principle. York University scholar Robert W Cox, a theorist in the fields of international organization and political economy, claims that a posthegemonic or new world order would need to be established upon the search for shared values. In Approaches to 1%er Order, which he coauthored with Timothy Sinclair, Cox writes that With the acceptance of unity in diversity as a governing principle, two conditions must be met: “The first condition would be mutual recognition of distinct
5 W Andy Knight, “Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Oper— ational,” Third 1%er Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (1996), p. 42. See also Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Em: Lessons Learned (London: MacMillan/Palgrave, 2001); A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and tbe Quest for Global Governance (London: Macmillan/Palgrave, 2000); and United Nations and Arms Embargoes Verification (Lewiston: Mellen Press, 1998).
6 European Commission, Secretariat—General, Terms of Reference for Working Group V (Brussels: 16 November 2000), available at <europa.eu.int/comm/ governance/ areas/ group 1 1/mandate_en.pdf>.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 161
traditions of civilization. . .mutual recognition implies a readiness to try to understand others in their own terms.” But mutual recognition and openness to other traditions are not enough. Cox goes on to say that collectively we must press further to arrive at a consensus of understanding of shared principles. Those shared principles, while protecting a diversity of cultures, will maintain unity and facilitate the coexistence of traditions. This governing principle, he says, is driven by “requisites of survival and sustained equilibrium in global ecology,” “restraint in the use of Violence to decide conflicts,” and the need “to develop procedures for coping with conflict that would take account of distinct coexisting normative perspectives.”7 Beyond mutual recognition, then, lies an accord for mutual cultural protection—an accord that must be attained if we are to survive.
What we need, in other words, is a new world order rooted in present—day reality yet radically different in conception. We need something that, by Virtue of its historical precedents, is recognizable, yet carries none of the flaws, weaknesses, and failures of present- day mechanisms. What we want is the promised kingdom of God on earth without the associated apocalypse. And yet the only faith many seem to have is in the latter.
There is a wealth of literature describing the nature and characteristics of the disintegrative crises of our times. That body of observation will not be augmented here. Rather, three paths of change will be examined—paths anticipated by the literature of the Baha’i Faith. The first path leads to a collective political peace agreement termed the Lesser Peace. The second path, developing simultaneously with the first, leads to an emerging global, non— partisan, supranational administrative structure. The third is the convergence of the two other paths leading to the formulation of a new definition of global governance. But what of the old
7 Robert W Cox, “Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun” (1992), in Robert W Cox and Timorhy Sinclair, Approaches to “70er Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 152—53. Here, Cox suggests, “A posthegemonic order would have to derive its normative content in a search for common ground among constituent traditions of Civilization. . . .”
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162 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
definition? What is the current distinction between world order and global governance? James Rosenau writes:
In sum, while politicians and pundits may speak confidently or longingly about establishing a new world order, such a concept is meaningful only as it relates to the prevention or containment of large—scale violence and war. It is not a concept that can be used synonymously With global governance if by the latter is meant the vast numbers of rule systems that have been caught up in the proliferating networks of an ever more interdependent world.8
Thus, until the definitions are reformulated, the function ofworld order is to maintain universal peace while that of global governance is to administer the complex affairs of the planet.
Path 1: The Lesser Peace
Unlike the League of Nations and the United Nations, the goal of the Baha’i world order is not limited to global collective security, which is an intermediate yet critically important stage in the development of a new system of global governance. That stage will be inaugurated when the heads of sovereign states formalize a peace agreement, a solemn and sacred pact, which Baha’u’llah (1817—92), the Prophet-Founder of the Baha’i Faith, described as “the chief instrument for the protection of all mankind.”9 The fundamental principle of the pact is that all governments must enforce the submission of any government that violates any provision of the agreement,10 one of which is that all states cede any and all
8 Rosenau, p. 17.
9 Baha’u’llah, Epistle to the Son of the lVolfOX/ilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1988), p. 30.
‘0 “The fundamental principle underlying this solemn Pact should be so fixed that if any government later violate any one of its provisions, all the governments on earth should arise to reduce it to utter submission, nay the human race as a whole should resolve, with every power at its disposal, to destroy that government. Should this greatest of all remedies be applied to the sick body of the world, it will assuredly recover from its ills and will remain eternally safe and secure.” The settlement of national boundaries is one of the conditions of this pact. ‘Abdu’l—Baha, T176 Secret ofDiz/ine Civilization (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1994), p. 65.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE I63
Claims to make war.11 What Baha’u’llah envisioned during the latter half of the twentieth century was a multilateral structure With teeth. Both the agreement and the period it introduces are termed the Lesser Peace.
Simultaneous and universal disarmament Will be one of the features of that political unity, as Will the limitation of arms to insure internal security. Other features Will include an empowered international police force, the implementation throughout the nations of programs of education for peace, the ceding of certain rights to impose taxation, and the reallocation of defense funds for socioeconomic development. Economic, travel, and trans— portation sanctions Will be imposed against governments engaging in armed conflicts. The political unity will see the evolution of super-state institutions such as an international court of arbitration With representation from all nations and an international border commission. Decisions of the tribunal Will be binding and enforced by compulsory support of all governments. The germ of such an international tribunal foreseen by Baha’u’llah has already been realized.12
While the Lesser Peace recognizes the moral right of the individual and grassroots institutions to a voice, it cannot claim to be a bottom— up world order because its focus is not solely on the empowerment of the individual. It also demands the accountability of political institutions to establish consensus. As ‘Abdu’l—Baha wrote: “The sovereigns of the world. .. must conclude a binding treaty, and establish a covenant, the provisions of Which shall be sound, inviolable, and
1‘ “Some form of a world super—state must needs be evolved, in Whose favor all the nations of the world Will have willingly ceded every claim to make war, certain rights to impose taxation, and all rights to maintain armaments, except for purposes of maintaining internal order within their respective dominions.” Shoghi Effendi, The Wbrld Order ode/m’ ’u’lld/J: Selected Letters, 2d rev. ed. (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1993), p. 40.
12 “A world tribunal Will adjudicate and deliver its compulsory and final verdict in all and any disputes that may arise between the various elements constituting this universal system.” Baha’u’llah, 7776 Proclamation of Balad’u’lla’ly t0 the Kings and Leaders of t/ae W/orld (Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1967), p. xi.
164 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
definite. They must proclaim it to all the world, and obtain for it the sanction of all the human race.”13
Baha’i literature does not offer a blueprint for the attainment of the Lesser Peace, which the Baha’i Faith Views as a secular and political accomplishment. That is, the Baha’i Faith does not see itself as a principal actor. However, its literature does identify a few of the more salient features from which certain reforms can be envisioned. One such reform would be the establishment of a single super-state power. The super—state entity must represent all countries of the planet and be sanctioned by the entire human race.
Another example of reform would be the discontinuation of the right of state sovereignty to the power of veto. Such a right maintains the power of member states at the expense of a collective authority represented by a majority vote. In essence, the exercise of a veto nullifles the power of a transcendent political unity, presently limited to the five permanent members of the Security Council. Chapter VII, Article 43 of the UN Charter calls upon members for voluntary cooperation in actions of peace—enforcement. The Baha’i call for a “solemn pact” implies a more than occasional cooperation among “all countries.” For the security of the collective, no member will be able to opt out of an agreement sanctioned by the entire human race.
The enforcement of peace by an international police force should not depend upon the willingness of member states to volunteer their military resources. The present practice also maintains the status quo powers of states at the expense of the collective. In the future, member states will have been disarmed and the super-state will have autonomous resources, perhaps managed by a mechanism such as an empowered Military Staff Committee.
13 Cited in Shoghi Effendi, T/Je Writ! Order ofBa/yd’u’lla’ly, p. 192. Loni Bramson-Lerche provides another example of that political accountability, writing: “. . .soldiers must require from their governments clear explanations as to first, how and why conditions have degenerated to such a state that war has become necessary, and second, that the war to be waged is just.” Loni Bramson—Lerche, “An Analysis of the Baha’i World Order Model,” Emergence: Dimensions of a New “70er Order, ed. Charles Lerche (London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1991), p. 24.
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WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 165
Similarly, because it sacrifices the power of the collective for the preservation of state sovereignty, Article 51,14 which treats the issue of self-defense, would need to be repealed. No member would have the right to self—help in the event of armed aggression from another member. All members would be required to trust in the principle of collective self—defense.
Implications of the Lesser Peace for constructive UN reform pose some challenging questions. What mechanism(s) would be used to secure the “sanction of all the human race”? How would the super—state deal with member states abstaining from peace enforcement actions? Where would an international police force and its military resources be stationed? What mechanisms would ensure the protection of the civil and human rights of groups within states? As difficult as these questions may be, the gap between the ideals of the Lesser Peace and movement towards their realization is bridgeable.
There is a growing body of criticism of the weaknesses and failures of the United Nations to meet contemporary challenges. Similarly there is a growing number of proposals for UN reform. One “selected bibliography on United Nations reform” lists 189 significant works.15 Among the more notable studies is Our Global Neighbourhood: 7776 Report 0f the Commission on Global Gover— name,16 which was prepared on the occasion of the 50th anniversary
of the United Nations. The UN General Assembly itself had also
14 Article 51, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter reads, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self—defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces— sary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self—defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
15 Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, Yale University Library and Social Science Statistical Laboratory, available at <www.libraryyale.edu/un/un2a6a.htm>.
‘6 New York: Oxford University Press, 1995-
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appointed five working groups to study reform in preparation for the anniversary.
In October 1995 the Baha’i International Community offered its statement Turning Point for all Nations, in Which it supports appeals for the redistribution of UN General Assembly representation to reduce the influence of state sovereignty, calls for compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a minimum standard for membership, and endorses an expanded notion of collective security so as to include responses to such threats to world order as are posed by unsustainable environmental actions and international drug trafficking.17
An earlier statement by the international governing body of the Baha’is, While expressing confidence in the future, describes the concerted actions required for the Lesser Peace as being blocked by a “paralysis of will.” In the document entitled T/ae Promise of erd Peace, the Universal House of Justice writes:
Certainly, there is no lack of recognition by national leaders of the world-wide character of the problem, which is self—evident in the mounting issues that confront them daily. And there are the accumulating studies and solutions proposed by many concerned and enlightened groups as well as by agencies of the United Nations, to remove any possibility of ignorance as to the challenging requirements to be met. There is, however, a paralysis of will; and it is this that must be carefully examined and resolutely dealt with. This paralysis is rooted, as we have stated, in a deep—seated conviction of the inevitable quat— relsomeness of mankind, Which has led to the reluctance to entertain the possibility of subordinating national self—interest to the requirements of world order, and in an unwillingness to face courageously the far—teaching implications of establishing a united world authority. It is also traceable to the incapacity of largely ignorant and subjugated masses to articulate their
17 See Turning Pointfor all Nations: A Statement 0ft/76 Balm’ ’1’ International Community 0n the Occasion 0ft/76 50th Anniversary 0ftbe United Nations (New York: Baha’i International Community, 1995); reprinted in 7796 Babzi’z’ World 1995—96, pp. 241—83.
4-1.1
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WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE I67
desire for a new order in which they can live in peace, harmony, and prosperity with all mankind.18
A stalemate exists between the forces promoting the interests of UN reform and those vested in the maintenance of the political status quo. The confidence of the Baha’i community is that the stalemate will be broken. Reformists are divided in two groups. The first includes those Who see a “window of opportunity” and envision the end of the paralysis prompted by the recognition of the need to avert an imminent global catastrophe. The second group comprises those who see an impending collapse of the UN structure and who fear that political unity may be an accomplishment required to respond to the aftermath of such a catastrophe. Whether proactive or reactive, any movement towards Lesser Peace ideals must be reformist and substantially more constructive than a limited tinkering to optimize a functionality which is, at best, situational. W Andy Knight observes:
...the fifty—year—old UN system is now left with two basic choices: dissolution or succession. Given the persistence of the idea that the fate of humankind depends on state—society collaboration and cooperation around common security issues, dissolving the UN can be considered nothing more than “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” As several commentators have noted in the past, the elimination of the UN today may only result in the reinvention of the wheel tomorrow... The problem [of reform] . . .is that, given the turbulence of the present transitional period, the required task Will not be unlike “trying to Change the wing of an airplane while it is still in flight.” It is an assignment that demands every ounce of our imagination and that Will have to involve both reflexive adaptation and learning strategies if we are to prevent a disastrous crash.19
18 The Universal House ofJustice, The Promise 0f%r[d Peace (Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1985), p. 9.
‘9 W Andy Knight, “Beyond the UN System? Critical Perspectives on Global Governance and Multilateral Evolution,” Global Governance 1, (1995),
pp.251—52.
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168 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
The UN Millennium Summit and Assembly was convened in September 2000 with the United Nations structure a topic high on its agenda. At this gathering the Commission on Global Gov— ernance presented another study, “The Millennium Year and the Reform Process,” in which it notes:
...by and large the UN’s member governments have been less ready to countenance change than we had urged. Prolonged discussions in working groups set up by the General Assembly have produced meagre agreement. The status quo remains undisturbed in the Security Council, where key dispositions stay frozen in their 1945 mould. The call for democratic oversight of the global economy has gone unheeded. In some respects, developments since we issued our report have made the need for changes in governance more compelling.20
Still the paralysis. The essential consideration for the reformists is that they have but one system with which to work. What multilateral system of governance other than that of the United Nations exists today?
Path 2: The Baha’i Administrative Order as an Emerging Global Structure and Model ofWorld Order
[9/
In October 1985 the international governing body of the Bahai community addressed the peoples of the world: “If the Baha’i experience can contribute in whatever measure to reinforcing hope in the unity of the human race, we are happy to offer it as a model for study.”21 The model offered by that experience is one that asserts the dependency of planetary survival upon our recognition of the end of nationalism and upon an emerging global consciousness of the unity of mankind. That model is called the Baha’i administrative order.
In 1936, well before former US President George Bush gave the international media the phrase “new world order” to add to its glossary, Shoghi Effendi, who devoted his ministry to
20 The Commission on Global Governance, available at <www.cgg.ch millenium.htm>.
2‘ The Universal House of Justice, Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 20.
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WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE I69
implementing the Baha’i administrative order, wrote of it as “the very pattern of the New World Order destined to embrace in the fullness of time the whole of mankind.”22 The existence of a tangible base for this prediction is perhaps the most convincing argument for the study of the Baha’i model. It is an organic entity, a world— embracing structure in which at least 235 independent nations and major territories are represented, a structure described as “embryonic and steadily unfolding.”25 The UN, with 191 member states, has also been described as “an embryonic or primitive form of such governance.”24
The Baha’i administrative order has been characterized by Shoghi Effendi as “fundamentally different than anything. . .previously established.” “It would be utterly misleading to attempt a comparison between this unique, divinely conceived Order and any of the diverse systems which the minds of men, at various periods of their history, have contrived for the government of human institutions.”25 In other words, the administrative order is not to be measured by the faulty yardsticks of failed systems of the past. It is, of itself, a standard— a standard that has yet to be fully embodied.
Second, it would be a mistake to claim that a spiritually principled order does not have a historical legacy. Robert W Cox suggests a closer examination of the tradition of Islam, the legacy of which sets the framework for our understanding of the role of the divine in world order and, more specifically, in the Baha’i administrative order. Because the Baha’i administrative order is not a system of secular political governance, it may challenge the understanding ofWesterners in whom the concept of the separation of church and state is deeply entrenched. While the Baha’i administrative order will not be compared with Islamic institutions, the forces leading to the rise of Islam may offer clues to an understanding of how the Baha’i administrative order and the
22 Shoghi Effendi, erd Order ofBa/vd’u’lla’k, p. 144.
23 Shoghi Effendi, Messages to the Ba/m’ ’z’ Wbrld 1950—1957 (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1971), p. 60.
24 W Andy Knight, “Towards a Subsidiarity Model...,” p. 34.
25 Cited in Individual Rights and Freedoms in the \Vorla’ Order ofBa/Jd’u’lldk (Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1988), p. 5.
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170 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001—2002
Lesser Peace will evolve. Some of those forces Will be examined momentarily.
Last, the Baha’i administrative order calls for a redefinition of present—day concepts of freedom, individual rights, democracy, and the nature of man. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, writing in Global Namformation, recognizes the “need for a new way of conceptu- alizing democratization in a time of internationalization.”26 Old world constructs are permeated With beliefs founded in classical realism, Which holds that international systems are anarchic and that competition and conflict are the norm. Driven by needs for domination and exploitation, the natural state of man is one of “war of all against all.”27 This is the “deep-seated conviction of the inevitable quarrelsomeness of mankind,” contributing to the paralysis ofwill. The most significant challenge posed by the Baha’i administrative order is the one it offers to classical realism’s View of human nature.
This examination of the Baha’i model is premised upon two assumptions: divinity is a source of active forces within the system, and the nature of man is essentially noble.
Divinity in World Order
Robert \W. Cox is well known among scholars for his suggestion that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”28 According to Cox, there are two categories of world order theory. One is concerned with problem solving, taking the existing world order as a given and addressing itself to its maintenance. The other— critical theory—is concerned With change and the structural evolution or transformation of world orders. Within Cox’s notion of critical theory is the View of historical structures as elements of
26 Sakamoto, p. 34.
27 From Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Other major contributors to the philosophy of political classical realism include Machiavelli, Rousseau, Carr, and Morgenthau.
28 Robert W Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Inter— national Relations Theory,” Millennium: journal oflnternatz'omzl Studies, vol. 10, no. 2 (1981), p. 128.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 171
world order, entities comprising a constellation of interacting material forces, ideas, and institutions. Of interest here is the role of ideas, ideologies, cultural values, and what Cox calls inter—subjective meanings. Intersubjective meanings, the understandings shared by people within the structure, cannot be separated or isolated from the historical structure. For example, the concept of human nature as driven by self—interest cannot be isolated from the social order that it serves to justify. Cox asserts that ideas and understandings are “the intersubjective meanings that constitute the order itself.”29 Critical theorists such as Cox want to understand how historical structures emerge and transform, an interest pursued here.
If we accept the role of ideas and ideologies in the evolution of world orders and apply Cox’s definition of historical structure, we see that the Baha’i model is one in which divinity as a systemic force is as much an influential element as other nonhuman, regulatory forces such as climatic variation. While divine forces do not lend themselves to formulations of empirical statements, they exist within historical contexts, and the world orders they have spawned can be examined in the light of the critical theory.30
The function of religion is transformational, and the nature of governance systems inspired by religion is to realize changes in normative and ethical values revealed by sources of the divine— sources Viewed as exogenous to traditional models of world order. The need for transformation—personal and collective—is assumed,
2" Robert \W. Cox, “Multilateralisrn and World Order”(1992), in Cox and Sinclair, Approaches to “70er Order, p. 514.
30 Divinities and their kingly representatives were manifest in the political structures of Sumeria, ancient Egypt, classical Greece, the Mayan and Aztec civilizations of the West, and the French monarchy. Socrates acknow— ledged his responsibility to the gods of the state, and Zeno formulated a concept of a universal city under a deity of the universe. As the Roman civilization weakened, St. Augustine (354—430 CE) proposed De civimte Dez' which has been credited as Charlemagne’s inspiration for the Holy Roman Empire. A Christian state was later suggested by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225—74 CE) in his De regimineprinczpum, Evangelid S. Mattbaez' Commentaria, and Scrzptum super Sententz'z's. In practical terms, the influence of the Christian church in the governance of loosely associated European feudal states during the Middle Ages needs also to be considered.
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172 THE BAHA’T WORLD 2001-2002
for if the need did not exist, then what is the mison d’e‘tre of reli— gion or of the divinity? World orders, like religions and the civilizations they inspire, follow a cycle of growth and decay, “from barbarians to bureaucrats.”31 Divinely inspired new world orders are necessary from time to time to revitalize human civilization. Dead Civilizations can no more effect their own resurrection than plants can grow in the absence of light. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, describing state sovereignty as a myth because it refuses to admit to endogenous revolutions and external interventions, writes, “No significant political transformation can take place without this ‘externality’ of the sources of change.”32
The emergence of the Baha’i administrative order coincides with the end of the period of nation building—a period that began with the advent of Islam in 622 CE. The nations of Islam are theocracies, and they include many present—day governments. On the other hand, the Western concept of nationhood, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, is that of a secular institu— tion. Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332—1406), an Islamic historian and theoretician on the rise and fall of political powers, describes the difference between Christianity as a social force and Islam as a political one. He writes:
...in View of the need for authority in every human grouping and society, a chief is needed who will guide men towards objects which are advantageous to them and will force them to keep away from those things that are harmful. Such chiefs are known as Kings... Hence, in Islam, Caliphate and Kingship are conjoined, in order to unite all efforts towards a common end.
[The leaders of religions other than Islam] do not concern themselves with political affairs, but leave the temporal power in the hands of men who have seized it by chance or for some reason with which religion has nothing to do. Sovereignty exists among such peoples owing to social solidarity...their religion as such, however, does not impose any sovereignty on them seeing that
3‘ This expression is derived from the title of a book Barbarians t0 Bureau— cmts: Corporate Life Cycle Strategies: Lessons flom the Rise and Fall of Civilizations, Lawrence M. Miller (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1989).
32 Sakamoto, p. 33.
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WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 173
it does not demand of them dominion over other peoples, as is the case With Islam, but merely the establishing of their faith among themselves.33
Khaldun is suggesting that the c‘common end” of Islam is a unity—a political order and system of governance in which the religion of the state exists for the collective well—being of Muslims “and other peoples.” Because other religious leaders focus their attention on the social solidarity of their own peoples, they exert no influence over others, and create and sustain no political order that would unite them under a more global umbrella.
Robert W Cox explains the role of Muhammad’s prophethood as a function of that political order. Divinity, he says, plays a part in the historical structure. He observes:
The Law, revealed by the Prophet as the guidelines for human life, was the basis for the state. Politics, the construction and maintenance of the state, was a matter for rational scientific enquiry. A prophet, indeed, to be effective, would need to function rationally in being able to communicate and to build the human foundation for the revealed message.34
Regardless of whether religions have developed into social or political forces, the question is how does the appearance of a Christ or Muhammad seed the creation of a new order? From his analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s work, Robert W Cox explains that there are two essential elements in the historical structures of the Christian and Islamic orders. Divinity as a systemic force is one. The other is what Khaldun terms ?zsczbz'ya—a term translated variously as tribal solidarity, community spirit, nationalism, and [esprit d6 corps. Khaldun asserts that without the state, the concept of Elsaéz'yd is superfluous and that the rise and fall of the state is a function of the strength of 2154/79/51. Cox goes further to suggest that prophecy, in the epistemology of Ibn Khaldun, is inoperative without this intersubjective meaning or Elsabiya.
'33 Nosratollah Rassekh, “Islam: The First 138 Years,” “Vorld Order, V01. 15, no. 1/2 (Fall 1980/Winter 1981), p. 7.
34 Robert W Cox, “Towards a Posthegemonic Coneeptualization of World Order,” in Cox and Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, p. 145.
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Do energies such as Elsasz/d, as intersubjective meanings, exist prior to the revelations they welcome? After all, every advent has been awaited by those claiming to follow the prophecies of the preceding one; the function of prophecy being to create the anticipatory and welcoming 2154604 and to prepare the way for the new messenger. The argument would maintain that these forces, as intersubjective meanings, are derived from within the system and are the means by which the exogenous forces of the prophet are accommodated. There is a chicken—and-egg argument here. Do historical structures contain the seed of divinely revealed ideologies, which in the fullness of time become the foundation of their intersubjective meaning—or do the revelations contain the seed of the new historical structures they will foster?
From the Baha’i perspective, the world order of Baha’u’llah is inseparable from His revelation. It cannot consider itself to be an order actualized by an outside influence. Rather it demands an expansion of the definition ofworld order to accept the influence of divinity within it. The source of ‘ambz'yd is as divine as the revelation that it embraces—a revelation that fuels the continuing evolution of shared values. In other words, each world order contains within it the germ of the culture that will accept its successor. To borrow from the language of Cox, “supraintersubjectivity” as a global consciousness exists in God’s Master Plan. The historical succession of orders is leading humanity towards the emergence of the consciousness of the oneness of mankind. Cox asks: “...is the only model of the future one in which differences become absorbed into a new unity, a new global hegemony, perhaps the creation of a new global Mahdi? (The global Mahdi could take the form of a collectivity rather than an individual.)”35 Just what is this Mahdi? In Islamic tradition, the Mahdi is the messiah. For Baha’is the new global Mahdi is Baha’u’llah, and the Mahdi as a collectivity suggested by Cox may be the administrative order— an order that is inseparable from Baha’u’llah’s revelation.
35 Robert W Cox, “Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order,” in Cox and Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, p. 168.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 175
The failure of religious political orders of the past has been the corruption of their powers by representative temporal successors. No prophet or founder of a major faith has detailed provision for religious—state succession. The “effectiveness” of the revealed “Law” depends upon institutions that carry on the functions of the prophet or founder after his passing. As sociologist Max Weber would have it, the charisma of the prophet must become “routinized” or institutionalized.36 For example, the intention of the institutions of the papacy and the caliphate is to perpetuate and reflect the charismatic authority of Jesus Christ and Muhammad. However, because these institutions lack scriptural legitimacy, they have failed to protect Christianity and Islam from schisms. That is, lack of scriptural legitimacy has opened the doors of dissension, fragmenting their world orders.
Baha’is, on the other hand, possess a body of literature revealed by the central figures of their Faith that legitimizes their administrative order. The Baha’i model is initially described in Baha’u’llah’s book of laws, the Kitab—i—Aqdas, and in the Will and Testament of cAbdu’l—Baha, Baha’u’llah’s appointed successor. Recalling the distinction made earlier between world order and global governance—that world order maintains universal peace While global governance administers the complex affairs of the planet—we see that the Baha’i model is one of both world order and governance. It is a system of world order in the sense that the revelation describes the succession of divine authority and the nature of institutions that inherit it. Serving to protect the Faith from schism, the Baha’i administrative order can be Viewed as system preserving its integrity and maintaining an internal and presently limited collective security. It is also a system of governance in the sense that it anticipates the need for future societal administration.
36 For a further exploration, see Peter Smith, “The Routinization of Charisma? Some Comments on ‘Motif Messianique et Processus Social dans le Bahaisme,m Occasional Papers in S/mykbi, 3451’, and 34/147 Studies vol. 3, no. 6 (November 1998), available at <www2.h—net.msu.edu/~bahai/ bhpapers/volZ/motif.htm>.
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The Nature of Man
The other assumption guiding our examination of the Baha’i model is that man, created in the spiritual image of God, is noble. Baha’u’llah tells us: “0 Son of spirit! Noble have I created thee, yet thou hast abased thyself. Rise then unto that for which thou wast created.”37
The Baha’i View of human nature does not reject the role of realism’s will to power as a motivational force in the lives of individuals and sovereign states. Rather, it finds that realism presents only half the picture. While man does possess a material (animalistic), self—serving, and aggressive nature, he also possesses a spiritual nature that must, as he matures, subdue and subordinate the forces of the former. The concept of the nobility of humankind is essential to Baha’i world order. Baha’u’llah writes, “All men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing Civilization.”38
The Baha’i View accepts the notion that the whole of world order cannot be inconsistent with its constituent parts. It would assert that the failure of contemporary realism is the failure of competitive nation—states, hungry for sovereignty, to accommodate a grassroots consensus desiring peace. This inconsistency exists both between and within nations. The nobility of humankind begs us to consider a noble form of global governance in which realism’s ideas of competition for power and dominance would be Viewed as a form of self—destruction. The concept of man’s nobility allows us to assert universal peace as the reflection of both sovereign and popular will. A world order of liberal pluralism is sustainable.
There are at least two problems that the practical demonstration of this nobility must confront. There is the necessity to divorce ourselves from culturally ingrained practices of responsible democracy and comply With the requisite spiritual practices of representative but non—responsible democracy called for by a Baha’i system of governance. That is to say, can we elect our representatives
37 Baha’u’llah, 7776 Hidden W/om’s ofBa/M’u 71d}; (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1994), Arabic no. 22, p. 9.
38 Baha’u’llah, GZeam'ngsfiom the Writings 0f 34% ’u’lla’b (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1994), p. 215.
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and entrust them With the freedom to vote according to their consciences rather than requiring them to sort out a rnélange 0f constituency opinion on every matter? The second problem is that global liberal pluralism has no historical precedents. A world citizenship has not yet been empowered.
The normative model of Baha’i world order and global governance is characteristically both top—down and bottom—up. It is also composite in that it embraces features of democratic, autocratic, and aristocratic systems—features that Will be described subsequently. As noted earlier, it sees two related paths or processes of development, which will eventually converge. One is the administrative order practiced today by the Baha’i community, and the other is evident in secular trends of globalization and integration—trends that Will see the attainment of an enforceable and universal peace agreement.
The Baha’i Administrative Order
Does the community serve the individual or does the individual serve the community? The Baha’i model reflects aspects of communitarianism as described by proponent Michael Sandel, author of Liberalism and the Limits ofjustz'ce.39 Communitarianism claims that individuals are “constituted by their obligations to communities rather than that communities are constituted by the participation of rights—bearing persons.”40 In the debate between
3’9 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
40 The relationships between community, individuals, and institutions are described by the Universal House ofjustice as follows: “The individual’s relationship to society is explained by Shoghi Effendi in the statement that (The Baha’i conception of social life is essentially based on the principle of the subordination of the individual will to that of society. It neither suppresses the individual nor does it exalt him to the point of making him an antisocial creature, a menace to society. As in everything, it fol— lows the ‘golden mean’.. .. Among the responsibilities assigned to Baha’i institutions which have a direct bearing on these aspects of individual freedom and development is one Which is described in the Constitution of the Universal House ofJustice: ‘to safeguard the personal rights, freedom, and initiative of individuals.” The Universal House ofJustice, Individual
Rights and Freedoms, pp. 20—21.
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statist sovereignty and the morality of individual rights and freedoms of the libertarians, communitarianism is the middle ground. Bruce Frohnen is a critic Who has led the libertarian—communitarian debate. In a review of communitarian thought, one commentator describes Frohnen’s approach as follows:
[He] argues that the communitarians’ proposed remedies—such as more democratic deliberation about the common good and rhetorical appeals to self-sacrifice—will be ineffective without a belief in a transcendent source of substantive values. In effect, communitarians seek to create a religion of the state, “to instill in us a faith in civil or political rather than spiritual religion.” Such a project, Frohnen believes, is doomed to failure, for politicians “cannot replace God.” They are at least as flawed as those whom they seek to lead.41
The Baha’i administrative order, by positing a belief in a “transcendent source” of normative values, answers Frohnen’s criticism. The Baha’i model would spiritualize the order. Those elected to serve the Baha’i administration are assumed to be conscious of their responsibility and accountability to God for their actions and decisions. Intent on rational and dispassionate discourse, they pray that they Will be divinely inspired when making decisions affecting the community.
The basic: unit of the Baha’i administrative order is the local Baha’i community, which includes of families, individuals, and local institutions.42 Concepts of power and authority are separated
41Tom Palmer, review of Bruce Frohnen, 7776 New Communitaridm and the Crisis ofModem Liberalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996) in 7796 Globe and Mail (Saturday, 6 October 1996), D10.
42 In a message to the Baha’is throughout the world, the Universal House ofJustice writes: “A community is more than the sum of its membership; it is a comprehensive unit of civilization composed of individuals, families, and institutions that are originators and encouragers of systems, agencies, and organizations working together with a common purpose for the welfare of people both within and beyond its own borders; it is a composition of diverse, interacting participants that are achieving unity in an unremitting quest for spiritual and social progress. Since Baha’is everywhere are at the very beginning of the process of community building, enormous effort must be devoted to the tasks at hand.” The Universal
House ofJustice, Ridvan message 153 BE (April 1996), para. 25.
WORLD ORDER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 179
in the Baha’i model. Authority is invested in the elected institutions of Local and National Assemblies and the international governing body ordained by Baha’u’llah. The power to actualize the authority and the decisions and guidance of those institutions is exercised by individuals. Noting this relationship, Shoghi Effendi “explained that without the support of the individual, ‘at once wholehearted, continuous and generous,’ every measure and plan of his [National Assembly] is ‘foredoomed to failure.”43 The relationship between individuals and institutions is manifest in the ongoing consultative dialogue between communities and their Local Assemblies.
The Baha’i View holds that traditional models of liberal pluralism, expressed in the ideals of representative and responsible democracy, are untenable. How can an elected official represent the divergent views of his constituents? Given a multitude of issues and influences of different interest groups, how can that official be said to be responsible to all who elected him? Elections are costly affairs through which the voice of the electorate is counted on a relatively occasional basis. Representative democracy exists only at the moment that the “batch” process of election is conducted. In the Baha’i administrative order, members of Assemblies are elected by a nonpartisan process of secret ballot. They are not responsible to the electorate; rather they are accountable to them— selves and to their relationship to God, to Whom they turn for guidance.
Practical application of these spiritual principles requires the members to divorce themselves from traditional influences of responsible democracy. The spiritualization of elections is reinforced by procedures of prayer and secret ballot. The campaigns and nom— inations of partisan politics are prohibited. Baha’is are encouraged to vote for character—those who best exemplify five qualifications: 1) unquestioned loyalty, 2) selfless devotion, 3) a well—trained mind, 4) recognized ability, and 5) mature experience. Baha’is regard issue—centered political campaigns as divisive and contrary to the spiritual principle of the power of unity. In an issues-based system, the reasons a person is elected at the outcome of a campaign are not always applicable to the issues that arise later in his or her
43 Cited in the Universal House of Justice, Ridvan message 153 BE, para. 22.
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term. We may find that the person represents our Views on abortion but that he or she subsequently fails to support our concerns about anti—tobacco legislation. And Who knows what questions will be put on the table tomorrow?
While Assemblies are elected annually, community members have the opportunity to address their Assembly at least once each Baha’i month at gatherings that are also legitimized institutions of the Baha’i Faith.44 Dialogue is entertained following guidelines of “consultation,” Which are more spiritual than procedural.‘45 Baha’i consultation cannot be compared with Robert’s Rules of Order or other notions of adversarial or parliamentary procedures. Addressing a session of the United Nations Commission, the Baha’i International Community explains: “The goal of consultation is not to Win, but to find the truth. Therefore, opinions are to be offered humbly, not as definitive and final, but as contributions to the collective effort.”46 Just as Baha’l’s must disentangle themselves from older concepts of democratic elections if they are to practice the ideals promulgated by their literature, so too must their application of the principles of consultation be freed from popular
Western concepts of individual rights and freedoms that undermine
44 The community gathering, termed the Nineteen Day Feast, is held every 19 days—once a month on the Baha’i calendar. “The Nineteen Day Feast is an institution of the Cause, first established by the Bab, later confirmed by Baha’u’llah, and now made a prominent part of the administrative order of the Faith.” Letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to the National Spiritual Assembly of Germany and Austria, 28 May 1954, in Lights of Guidance, ed. Helen Hornby (New Delhi: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1983), no. 509, p. 191.
45 Shoghi Effendi, Ba/m’ ’z’Adminismztion (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1974), p. 88. Consider also: the qualifications or “prime requisites for them that take counsel together are purity of motive, radiance of spirit, detachment from all else save God, attraction to His Divine Fragrances, humility, and lowliness amongst His loved ones, patience and long—suffering in difficulties, and servitude to His exalted Threshold.” ‘Abdu’l—Baha, Cited in Ba/yd’z’Admz'nistmtz'on, p. 21.
46 Baha’i International Community, Equality in Political Participation and Decision-Making: A Statement t0 the 34th Session of tlae United Nations Commission 0n the Status 0f “7me (Vienna: Baha’i International
Community, 1990).
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the authority of their institutions and the greater interests of their communities.
In addition to those community gatherings, members can correspond at any time With the institutions at any level. Similarly, the international governing body communicates with National Assemblies and With individual members. This order promotes a vertical flexibility in both communication and the execution of tasks, a flexibility that is not characteristic horizontally. There is less communication or shared execution between National Assemblies or between Local Assemblies, unless there is an assign— ment of a collaborative task by a higher institution. Cooperative linkages and liaisons Within the Baha’i order are ad hoc and task— oriented. This practice is a limited demonstration of W Andy Knight’s subsidiarity model of global governance, “in which lower levels of governance are not denied of their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned them.” For example, the National Assemblies of Alaska, Canada, Scan— dinavia, and the northern countries of the former Soviet Republic may be assigned a specific arctic project by the international governing body. As Knight notes, this model “would allow the more immediate levels (those most affected by a decision—making fallout) to be responsible for carrying out global governance tasks Which they can effectively and efficiently handle.”47
Other components of the Baha’i community are appointed Counsellors and their assistants. They are not invested With authority but function rather as advisers and facilitators charged With the responsibility of community development and of encouraging members to participate in building and strengthening the order. This appointed institution of the Counsellors is an indispensable component of the administrative order, and the degree of success in significant undertakings is attributed to the quality of the collaboration between the elected and appointed institutions.48
47W Andy Knight, “Towards a Subsidiarity Model...,” p. 32.
48 The relationship between the various components of the Baha’i admin— istrative order is captured in the following passage: “Authority and direction flow from the Assemblies, whereas the power to accomplish the tasks resides primarily in the entire body of the believers. It is the principal (cont’d)
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182 THE BAHA’I’ WORLD 2001-2002
The model of the Baha’i administrative order is recursive. The structure of the national community is a macrocosmie replica of the structure of the local community. The differences between the local and national communities are differences in scope of jurisdiction. On the local level, the community gathering is the institutionalized interface between individuals and the governing body. On the national level, that interface is the national convention Where communities are represented by their elected delegates Who are charged with the responsibility of electing the members of the National Assembly. The same spiritual practices and procedures that are applied on the local level are applied here. The work of advisory members serving on local and regional levels is coordinated by Counsellors working in national and international arenas. Thus the basic structure of the community is descriptive of the local, national, and global components of the administrative order. The cells of the global structure are the national and territorial communities and the interfacing institution is the international convention, where the members of all National Assemblies elect the nine members of the supreme governing body.
The Baha’i administrative order is a model of governance presently limited in the sense that its only practical application is in governing the affairs of the Baha’i community. As an embryonic order, its activities focus on expansion and consolidation. On the local level community efforts may range from the organization of social events to Village literacy campaigns. At higher levels the administrative order may be concerned with the appointment of delegations to represent the Faith in meetings with ministers of state and other high ranking officials and With the participation in world summits such as those on sustainable development
(Johannesburg, 2002) and world peace (New York, 2000).
task of the Auxiliary Boards to assist in amusing and releasing this power. This is a vital activity, and if they are to be able to perform it adequately they must avoid becoming involved in the work of administration...” The Universal House of Justice, letter to the Continental Boards of Counsellors and National Spiritual Assemblies, 1 October 1969, in Messages fiom the Universal House ofjustz'ce, 1968-1973 (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 30.
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Shoghi Effendi, the Visionary responsible for developing the Baha’i administrative order as conceived by the Faith’s Founders, observed that it is “the very pattern of the New World Order destined to embrace in the fullness of time the whole of mankind.” The Baha’i administrative order is organic and elastic, and it will expand as the community it serves expands.
Convergence
Recalling the distinction between world order and global governance made earlier and Rosenau’s observation that world order is a meaningful concept “only as it relates to the prevention or containment of large—scale Violence and war,” then our demands for collective security should be met by the Lesser Peace. Why then is the Lesser Peace not sufficient as a new world order? Why would the Baha’i administrative order as a system of governance need to evolve and expand? Why even consider the convergence of the Lesser Peace and the administrative order?
In the Baha’i View, the applicability of James Rosenau’s conception of world order breaks down after the attainment of the Lesser Peace. The goal of the Lesser Peace is collective security, but the goal of the Baha’i world order is world unity—unity being more broadly defined than simple political accord. The unity of the Baha’i world order will demand an allegiance to the sustain— ability of a planetary state that supersedes any allegiance one would give to a sovereign nation. The cessation ofwar and the containment of armed aggression is not enough. The meaning of “disarma— ment” is conditioned by our definition of “Violence”—but disarmament should be applied to all the weapons in contemporary arsenals—weapons that include poverty and economic oppression, environmental negligence, the inequitable distribution of rights to education, and the suppression of the voice of women. Containment and disarmament now escape the bounds of James Rosenau’s definition of world order and require the application of “a vast number of rule systems” of social institutions for global governance.
The Lesser Peace will be a political achievement. The inter—
national governing body of the Baha’i Faith has noted, “Mankind
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at that time can be likened to a body that is unified but without life... [T] he task of breathing life into this unified body. . .is that of the Baha’1’1’s.”‘49 According to James Rosenau’s definitions, our discussions of the administrative order have described a system of limited global governance. If, however, the expansion of Baha’i communities requires the Assemblies of the administrative order to take on more of the responsibilities of polities, then that sys— tem can be described as both a world order and a system of global governance. When its present function of maintaining the integrity of the Baha’i community and safeguarding it from schism is applied to the entire global community, its goal can be said to be broader than the confinement of Violence. Its goal then becomes the maintenance of a world unity that now defines a new world order— a maintenance that must consider the intentions and impact of the full range of governance decision—making.
Consider then, the following characteristics of the new world order described by Baha’i literature, not from the Viewpoint of the containment of violence, but the maintenance of world unity. The new order will be a super—state commonwealth of nations with a world legislature to which are ceded certain responsibilities such as the authority to enact new laws and to create new institutions. The members of the legislature will “as the trustees of the whole of mankind, ultimately control the entire resources of all the component nations. . .”50 There will be “an international executive adequate to enforce supreme and unchallengeable authority”5‘ “backed by an international Force. . . [that] will safeguard the organic unity of the whole commonwealth.”52 Embracing both top—down and bottom—up interests, the new order will establish a world parliament with members elected by civil society and confirmed by national governments. A supreme tribunal will have the power of binding (compulsory) adjudication of a single code
49 The Universal House of Justice, Wellspring oquidance: Messages 1963— 1968 (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1976), pp. 133—34.
50 Shoghi Effendi, LVorld Order ochzbd’u'lla’la, p. 203.
51 Shoghi Effendi, “70er Order ochz/M’u’lla’k, p. 40.
52 Shoghi Effendi, “70er Order ofBa/Jd’u’lla’ld, p. 203.
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of international law sanctioned by “the instant and coercive intervention of the combined forces of the federated units.”53
The maintenance ofworld unity, within a community composed of members cognizant that they are world citizens, is to be promoted by the adoption of a world currency, script, systems of weights and measures, and a universal auxiliary language. The world order will see the coordinated development of economic resources and markets, the elimination of economic barriers, and the recognition of “the interdependence of Capital and Labor.”54
In the Baha’i perspective, the two evolving models of the Lesser Peace and Baha’i administrative order will merge to form a future cosmopolitan (top—down and bottom—up) world order. The top— down model of the Lesser Peace will accommodate nation-states into the new world order, but national sovereignty will be limited with many powers ceded to the institution of the super—state. The model of Baha’i administration will contribute the bottom—up democratic features of republicanism, with National Assemblies evolving into agencies of sovereign states. The model is composite, too, in that it contains elements of autocratic and aristocratic systems, while being distinct from them.55 Aspects of autocracy
53 Shoghi Effendi, W/orla’ Om’er ofBa/Jzi’u’lld/y, p. 41. 5“ Shoghi Effendi, {World Order ofBa/Jd’u’lld/J, p. 41. 55 “Neither in theory nor in practice can the administrative order of the Faith of Baha’u’llah be said to conform to any type of democratic government, to any system of autocracy, to any purely aristocratic order, or to any of the various theocracies, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic, which mankind has witnessed in the past. It incorporates within its structure certain elements which are to be found in each of the three recognized forms of secular government, is devoid of the defects which each of them inherently possesses, and blends the salutary truths which each undoubtedly contains without Vitiating in any way the integrity of the Divine verities on which it is essentially founded. The hereditary authority Which the Guardian of the administrative order is called upon to exercise, and the right of the interpretation of the Holy Writ solely conferred upon him; the powers and prerogatives 0f the Universal House ofjustice, possessing the exclusive right to legislate on matters not explicitly revealed in the Most Holy Book; the ordinance exempting its members from any responsibility to those whom they represent, and from the obligation to conform to their (cont’d)
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are present in the system as the elected representatives of an international legislature can be said to have exclusive rights to legislate on matters not specified by the authority of Baha’i scripture. Aspects of aristocracy, or “rule by the best,” are manifest in the election of delegates to national conventions, Who in turn, elect those Who will participate in international conventions and the election of the members of the supreme governing body. Baha’u’llah also maintains kingship Within the future world order.56
As noted earlier, Baha’i literature does not offer a blueprint of the Lesser Peace. Nor does it describe in detail the future world order. The revelation of Baha’u’llah, containing laws and ordinances that are to be implemented by the new world order, places its emphasis on the administrative order that is its “structural basis.” The administrative order, as it grows and matures, is seen to be the link to the future world order, the “golden age” of humankind predicated not upon collective security, but upon unity.
The Baha’i model challenges present notions of “democracy” and “individual freedoms.” It calls us to broader definitions of “world order” and “global governance.” It sees, in unity, the foundation of an enduring peace. Political unity and peace and the cessation of war are not the goals of an enlightened collective security. Unity, in the world order of Baha’u’llah, must be observed in all aspects of collective endeavor. Unity, as the goal of world
Views, convictions 0r sentiments; the specific provisions requiring the free and democratic election by the mass of the faithful of the Body that constitutes the sole legislative organ in the world—wide Baha’i community— these are among the features Which combine to set apart the Order identified with the Revelation of Baha’u’llah from any of the existing systems of human government.” Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By (Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1995), pp. 326—27.
56 “According to the fundamental laws Which We have formerly revealed in the Kitab-i—Aqdas and other Tablets, all affairs are committed to the care of just kings and presidents and of the Trustees of the House of Justice. .. The system of government Which the British people have adopted in London appeareth to be good, for it is adorned with the light of both kingship and of the consultation of the people.” Baha’u’llah, YZzMets 0f Balad’u’lla’la revealed afier t/ae Kim’b'i—Aqdm (Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1982), p. 93.
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order, accommodates interconnected economic, environmental, social, and political spheres. Global governance is thus the means of a unified world order, not its end.
“0 ye children of men,” He [Baha’u’llah] thus addresses His generation, “the fundamental purpose animating the Faith of God and His Religion is to safeguard the interests and promote the unity of the human race...” The well—being of mankind He declares, “its peace and security are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established.” “So powerful is the light of unity,” is His further testimony, “that it can illuminate the whole earth... This goal excelleth every other goal, and this aspiration is the monarch of all aspirations.” “He Who is your Lord, the All—Merciful,” He, moreover, has written, “cherisheth in His heart the desire of beholding the entire human race as one soul and one body...”57
What are the obstacles to the fulfillment of the Baha’i promise? Those Who presently influence political dynamics must renounce the constraints of a Hobbesian View of brutish human nature and demonstrate a Willingness to accept the nobility of mankind. Nor Will the promise be fulfilled if we fail to develop a consciousness of the essential unity of mankind and to strip religion of irrational dogma and to critically examine it as a contributing force to the renewal of civilization. A tall order, yes. But perhaps the forces compelling globalization are the Winds that presently fill the sails of the ark of world order. Obstacles? One would do better to ask, where are the fruits of Enlightenment thinking and materialistic theory? What other systems of global governance invite critical examination? What other promises? What other alternatives?
57 Shoghi Effendi, World Order ofBa/Jd’u’lld/y, pp. 202—03.
I I‘ll. vll-lhu_‘i
