World Order/Series2/Volume 36/Issue 1/Text

←Volume 36 Index

World Order, Series 2
Volume 36 - Issue 1

Issue 2→

Return to PDF view

[Page -1]

_“‘ollowing the difficult path

to racial equality in the United States

In this issue...

Brown v. Board of Education: The Beginning of Judicial Desegregotion in the United Sfa’res

Brown v. Board 0! Education United States Supreme Court

School Desegregation and Social Change: Personal Memories June Manning Thomas

The Road to Brown Steven Gonzales

Teaching about Brown v. Board of Education: Lessons in Race Relations

for Today's History Students Richard W. Thomas

Reflections on Brown Michael L. Penn

Inferraclal Unity: The Implications of 0 Judicial Deadline Ted Amsden

AflorWord A Beacon of Unity:

The Louis 6. Gregory Bahá’í Museum, Charleston, South Carolina Nancy Branham Songer

2004

\'<)lum(' 3U. No. I

[Page 0]Religion . Society 0 Polity . Arts

2004 VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1

WORLD ORDER AlMS TO

STIMULATE, INSPIRE, AND SERVE

ITS READERS IN THE”? SEARCH

TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY LIFE AND

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS

AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Betty J. Fisher

Arcsh Abizodeh Monireh Kozemzodeh Dione Loffi

Kevin A. Morrison Robert H. S’rockmon Jim S’rokes

CONSULTANT IN POETRY Herber’r Woodward Martin

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

World Order is published quarterly by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, 536 Sheridan Road, Wilmette, IL 60091—1811. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the publisher or of the Editorial Board.

Peer review: Submissions to the journal will be subject to external blind peer review if they fall outside the expertise of the Editorial Board or upon request by the author.

Submissions and other editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, World Order, 7311 Quail Springs Place NE, Albuquerque, NM 87113—1780 or e—mailed to <worldorder@usbnc.org>. Detailed information for contributors may be requested in writing or by e—mail.

Manuscripts may be typewritten or computer generated; manuscripts accepted for publication are requested on computer disk (Microsoft Word or WordPerfect preferred) or by electronic submission. Article and review manuscripts must be double—spaced throughout and prepared in a 12point Courier font; the footnotes must be at the end of the text and not attached electronically to the texti Each manuscript should list on the first page the article title, the author(s), and addresses, including telephone, fax, and e-mail.

Articles may range in length from some 3,750 to 6,250 words.

Reviews vary in length. Review Nate; run from some 125 to 150 words; Mini—Rtuitw: run from some 1,000 to 2,500 words, and Review Emzyx, from some 3,750 to 6,250 words.

Poems should be single spaced with clearly marked stanza breaks.

Warla' Order is indexed in the Index of American Periodical Very, the ATLA Religion Databaxe, and The Amerimn Humanities Index and is a member of (CELJ) the Council of Editors of Learned Journals.

INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

Subscription Rates: U.S.A. and surface to all other countries, 1 year, US $25; 2 years, US $48. Airmail to all other Countries, 1 year, US $30, 2 years, US $58. Single copies US $7 plus shipping and handling. Make checks or money orders payable to Bahá’í Distribution Service. Send address changes to and order subscriptions from the Bahá’í Distribution Service, 4703 Fulton Industrial Boulevard, Atlanta, GA 30336—2017.Telephone: 1—800—999—9019, United States and Canada; 404—472—9019, all other countries. Or, please e-mail: <subscription@usbnc.org>.

Back issues still in print may be obtained from the Bahá’í Distribution Service at the mailing address above or by email <bds@usbnc.org>. Orders for back issues on microfilm and microfiche can be obtained from ProQuest Information and Learning, 300 North Zeeb Road, RO. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106—1346 USA. Telephone: 1—800-521- i 0600. E-mail: <info@il.proquest.com>,

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Copyright © 2005 by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’í’s of the United States; all rights reserved. World Order is protected through trademark registration in the U.S. Patent Office. Printed in the U.S.A. ISSN 0043—8804.

ART CREDITS

Cover design by Richard Doering; pp. 4, 8, photographs, Steve Garrigues; p. 14, photograph, Stan Phillips; p. 20, photograph, Steve Garrigues; p. 33, photograph, © 2002 Linsay Carlson; p. 34, photograph, Steve Garrigues; p. 40, photograph, Susan Reed; p. 44, photograph, children in Mbabane, Swaziland, © 2005 Paul Slaughter; p. 46, photograph, courtesy, National Bahá’í Archives.

[Page 1]

2 Brown v. Board of Education: The Beginning of Judicial Desegregation in the United States, Editorial

5 Mubarak, a poem by Carol F. Black

6 Interchange: Letters from and to the Editor

9 Brown v. Board of Education, a ruling by the United States Supreme Court (editorial)

13 Bahá'u'lláh Shows the Way, a poem by Janet Tomkins

15 School Desegregation and Social Change: by June Manning Thomas

18 Sonnet to Naw-Rúz, a poem by Irving Kelsey

19 Withdrawal, a poem by Paul Mantle

21 The Road to Brown by Steven Gonzales

28 My Heart Was Troubled, a poem by Paul Mantle

29 Teaching about Brown v. Board of Education: Lessons in Race Relations for Today’s History Students by Richard W. Thomas

33 Inclination, a poem by Kurt Hein

35 Reflections on Brown by Michael L. Penn

41 Interracial Unity: The Implications of a Judicial Deadline by Ted Amsden

45 A Beacon of Unity: The Louis G. Gregory Bahá’í Museum by Nancy Branham Songer

[Page 2]

EdiToriol Brown v. Board of Education: The Beginnings of Judicial DesegregaTion in The United States

In HS 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of EducoTion, The UniTed STOTes Supreme CourT pronounced segregoTion of public schools illegal under The FourTeenTh AmendmenT's guoronTee of equal proTeCTion under The low for all American CiTizens. In a Clear, concise, unanimous de cision, the Court held: “We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.” With this short paragraph the Supreme Court ended some three hundred years of American history during which black Americans had no legal right—and often no access at all—to equal education. Clearly slave owners considered education of slaves useless if not dangerous, knowing that knowledge is power, which widens horizons and opens doors to opportunity. But even after Emancipation, black Americans (now free citizens of the United States) were denied access, de facto or de jure, to public schools attended by their white compatriots.

Brown also signaled an end to the long—held doctrine of separate but equal, which had been established by the Supreme Court at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1896, the Court had ruled, in Plessy 1/. Ferguson, that public services could by law be segregated on the basis of race so long as nonwhites were offered services and facilities that were equal to those offered whites only. In fact, the supposed equality, whether in education, transport, or other public sectors, was seldom achieved, and, by 1954 the very attempt to achieve it was deemed psychologically damaging. In Brown, the Court (quoting from an earlier Kansas court case) observed:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of the negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.

In Brown 1/. Board of Education, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled its holding in P1655}! u. Ferguson, thus putting a stop to decades of legalized apartheid.

Although the main intent of Brown, and its greatest achievement, was to remove

2 World Order. 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 3]

EDITORIAL

racial segregation as a viable option for American civil society, one of the many remarkable things about this short decision is the Court’s statement about the value of education.

It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

The Brown decision thus not only abolished segregation in public schools but also affirmed the principle of the paramount importance to civilization of universal education, a principle enunciated by Baha’u’llah as a cornerstone of His Revelation. In the words of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Baha’u’lla’th declares that all mankind should attain knowledge and acquire an education”; the reason, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá continues, is that “Education makes the ignorant wise, the tyrant just, promotes happiness, strengthens the mind, develops the will and makes fruitless trees of humanity fruitful.”

In spite of its clear affirmation of the legal rights of all American citizens to education, and its laudable sentiments, Brown has not been without its detractors. Some critics of the Brown decision—including many prominent black scholarsdisappointed at the rulings failure to address many of the problems still facing black school children, have suggested that Brown was wrongly decided and have argued that the better course would have been to insist on actual compliance with the “equal” part of PZmy’s separate-but—equal doctrine. They point to the problems that face desegregated schools today: inadequate funding for inner-city schools, white flight from city centers, busing, the loss of qualified black school teachers, and more. But this argument has two shortcomings. First, the social and political role of the American educational system at its best is not simply to teach children math and science and grammar. It is also to teach young citizens how to function in a multiracial society and to prepare them in many ways to be members of civil society. Second, it ignores the central point of the Brown decision: that legal segregation of the races in American society necessarily implies the inferiority of one race, regardless of the “equality” of facilities and other tangibles.

Perhaps such critics expect too much from one decision. The fact that Brown has fallen short in delivering a dream of perfect harmony does not mean that it should never have been decided. Brown broke down barriers and created enormous opportunities for a significant number of Americans. Arguably, the development of a sizable black middle class can be traced to the Brown decision; certainly the swell of numbers of minority students in college and graduate programs results directly from Brown. The NAACP has called Brown “the most significant piece of jurisprudence in the twentieth century.” Although school desegregation cannot singlehandedly undo the racial discrimination, economic inequality, and political disenfranchisement that is the legacy of a slave society, continued segregation would have had disastrous consequences for race relations for nonwhites in this country.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 3

[Page 4]

EDITORIAL

The question of how to achieve racial equality and justice for all citizens in a legally desegregated society is still far from answered. The struggle for true equality among the races is, of course, far from over, and race relations remain, as Shoghi Effendi wrote, the “most vital and challenging issue” facing American society. Yet the impact of Brown cannot be denied, both in its uncompromising stance on the legality of racial segregation in the public sphere and in its elevation of education to one of the highest of civil rights. Much more than a mere legal decision, Brown was, indeed, what one law professor has called a “moral prayer.”

Fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, Bahá’ís again applaud the Court’s decision. It is clear that the Brown decision has been a vital step in the attempt to put into universal practice a concern for human welfare and human rights.

4 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 5]Mubarak

If no image is ever found, no photograph in black and white, pay it no mind,

for he is there, gentle, majestic Mubarak, greeting Mullá Husayn at the door, serving tea from the samovar in the presence of his Beloved,

and later, sweeping the walk leading up to the door with the green—handled broom he fashioned himself, awaiting, awaiting his Loved One’s return, not knowing, He had already left this world.

How they must have danced

in the Abhá Kingdom, when your noble, African spirit Winged its way there,

how they must have greeted you, saying,” Well done! well done, Oh faithful champion!

Future generations are inspired by your service, with your love, the world set aflame!”

—CAROL F. BLACK

CAROL F. BIACK is an instructor of racial and ethnic relations at Purdue University, where she is completing a doctorate in sociology. The host of a West Lafayette, Indiana, radio poetry program, she views poetry as an opportunity for emotional expression and an avenue for furthering intercultural understanding.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

5

[Page 6]

In’rerchonge

Letters from and to the Editor

The elimination of racial prejudice, a central tenet of the Bahá’í Faith and one of the most vital and challenging issues facing the United States, has occupied the Editors since a review of The Autobiography of Malcolm X appeared in W/orla' Order’s first issue in Fall 1966. We found that the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court that started the judicial desegregation of US. schools, afforded an opportunity to look at the matter from a number of perspectives.

June Manning Thomas, a professor of urban planning, provides a perspective on the evils of segregation through the eyes of a student who helped integrate the all—white high school in Otangeburg, South Carolina. Steven Gonzales, an attorney and a law professor, discusses the thorny legal road that led to the Brown decision. Richard Thomas, a history professor, shares his experiences in teaching Brown to predominantly white teenagers from suburban Michigan. Michael Penn, a professor and a psychologist, reflects on what remains to be done, post—Brown, after three generations of black children have enrolled in U.S. schools. Ted Amsden, another attorney, examines an ambiguity in 2003 judicial rulings.

Finally, and rounding out the reflections, is the Brown decision itself. While the text of the ruling has increasingly become part of college—course syl 6 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

labi in the United States, we have, nevertheless, found that many people have not read it. Brown 1/. Board of Education, unlike many legal decisions, is refreshingly succinct and eloquent. Hence, to provide context for the five reflections in this issue, we have reprinted the entire text.

——“‘_——Our apologies! In Vol. 35, No. 4, we neglected, on page 4 in Interchange, to delete the paragraph promising a topical index of articles, editorials, and reviews. We had hoped to complete our thirtyfifth volume with the index, but it proved to be far too long to include in the issue. We are now working toward making the index available on the web, where we can continually update it. We will let you know when and where it will be posted.

T

More apologies—this time to Hedyeh Sadeghi, whom we mistakenly referred to as a male in the biographical information following her poem “To Iran” on pages 30—31 in Vol. 35, No. 4.

And last, news that needs no apology. 1%er Order has won the 2004 interna [Page 7]tional Award for Best Journal Design from the prestigious Council of Editors of Learned Journals (CELJ) in recognition of its new cover and interior designs that convey the journal’s multidisciplinary nature and its relevance to the twenty—first century.

The award was presented to the erd Order staff by the Council of Editors of Learned Journals at a ceremony held in conjunction with the Modern Language Association’s annual conference in Philadelphia on December 27, 2004. The CEL] is the major international organization supporting editors of academic periodicals publishing in the humanities.

The redesigned cover, the brainchild of designer Richard Doering, debuted with the Spring 2002 issue. Doering chose a mix of classic and progressive elements to convey a sense of stability and timelessness and included the words “religion, society, polity, arts” to emphasize the journal’s multidisciplinary focus. The internal design, unveiled in the Fa112002 issue, was created by Patrick Falso of Allegro Design, Inc., a designer who has worked with World Order since 1991.

“\Vorld Order’s new incarnation is the outstanding entrant in this year’s contest for journals that have launched a new design over the last three years,”

wrote CEL] Vice—President Jana Arger INTERCHANGE

singer in a letter confirming the award. The judges, she said, found that “7071:! Order had retained aspects of its original design that gave it a distinctive looksuch as the full-bleed photos that open each article—and at the same time introduced improvements that lend it “a more dynamic feeling in keeping with its multifaceted editorial purview.” The judges also commended the new singlecolumn format, which allows for “the graceful placement of asymmetrical pullquotes,” and the upgraded paper and printing quality, which “add to the crispness of the whole package.”

‘Vorld Order Managing Editor Betty J. Fisher and Doering attended the award ceremony and accepted the award on behalf of the entire design and editorial staff. Falso was not able to attend.

“Until our two—part facelift in 2002, World Order maintained virtually the same design for twenty—five years,” said Fisher. “Through this new design, the Editorial Board hoped to convey a multidisciplinary approach to life, as well as a commitment to social engagement, openmindedness, and intellectual curiosity. We wanted the design to reflect a publication that is thought—provoking but exciting, serious but engaging, innovative but accessible. This recognition from the CEL] is a testament to the efforts of our designers and Editorial Board.”

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 7

[Page 8]

[Page 9]SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 us. 483 (1954) (USSC+)

347 US. 483 Argued December 9, 1952 Recrgued December 8, 1953 Decided May 17, 1954

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS*

One of themost vital and challenging issues fiein “States is the elimination of racial prejudice, and perhaps one (if knit actions of the twentieth century was Brown v Board of Ed _ y ' States Supreme Court ruling that called for desegmgatmg ‘tfy’s sehOOls. Unlike many legal decisions, this one is refreshingly 'b‘ _ éibquent Below we share with you the text of the ruling, which provtdes the context for the five reflections that follow.

—THE EDITORS

Syllabus

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro Children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment—even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.

(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education.

(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the

Together with No. 2, Brigg; er al. 1/. Elliott at 41., on appeal from the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9—10, 1952, reargued December 7—8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board afPrince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Geb/Mrt et al. 1/. Belton et (11., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 9

[Page 10]

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

light of the full development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.

(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal.

(e) The “separate but equal” doctrine adopted in P1655}! v. Ferguson, 16?) U.S. 537, has no place in the field of public education.

(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees.

Opinion WARREN MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so—called “separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then—existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At

10 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 11]

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post—War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment’s history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state—irnposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of “separate but equal” did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of P1255}! 1/. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. County Beard of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gang Lum 1/. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel 1/. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt U. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt 1/. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 H

[Page 12]

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plexsy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.” In McLaurin 22. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: “. . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.” Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of

12 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 13]BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

Plessy 1/. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question—the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.

It is so ordered.

Bahá’u’lláh shows the way

Baha’u’llah shows the way prepares the path

in this, His Special Day away from God’s wrath.

———JANET TOMKINS

and sociology, is interested in the interconnections among environmental sociology, medical sociology, and genetics.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 13

[Page 14]

[Page 15]JUNE MANNING THOMAS

School Desegregation and Social Change: Personal Memories

Ten years offer The May 17, 1954, Brown M Board of Education decision, Iifile seemed To have changed in Orongeburg, South Carolina, my home Town. Blocks and whites lived quite separate lives, in movie Theaters (separate sections), restaurants (most open only To whites),

doctors’ offices (separate waiting rooms), churches (separate congregations), and schools (separate buildings and locations, using only same—race teachers). But the Brown decision gave impetus and support to a growing civil—rights movement in the early 19605. In the summer of 1964 the passage of the Civil Rights Act meant that my parents’ lawsuit against the local board of education—a suit that should have been unnecessary because of Brown—was now almost certainly not going to remain in court, since the legislation accomplished what my parents’ lawyers could not. One warm summer day my mother announced to me that I was changing schools. In the fall fourteen black students, under police escort for the first day of school, integrated the all-white Orangeburg High School. We were “pioneers,” sent into the wilds, in a manner of speaking, in an attempt to force the local white community to recognize the equality of humankind. We were successful in many ways, and in other ways we were not.

My three years in the newly integrated high school revealed, among other things, the deplorable spiritual state of the local white community. In the heart of the Bible belt, where Southern hospitality was a legend, white teenagers—supported by their parents and their community—exhibited the worst behavior they could toward the few black students in their midst. The teachers were not much better. Verbal

JUNE MANMNG THOMAS

is o professor in the Urban and Reglonol Planning Program of Michigan State University in East Lansing and oversees on extension Initiative aimed of several cities in Michigan. Her current research Involves summarizing urban research helpful to the State 'of Michigan In Improan the state's clfles. Thomos’ books 3nclude Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Defroif (Johns Hopkins Universify Press. 1997) and Planning Progress: Lessons from Shoghi Effendi (Assodoflon‘ for Bahá’í Studies. 1999). She Is a co-editor of Urban Plannlng and the African American Community: In the Shadows (Sage Publication, 1997). In 1999 she received the Paul, Davidoff award for redevelopment and race. '

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 15

[Page 16]

JUNE MANNING THOMAS

shunning, taunting in and out of class, physical attacks, and other forms of social ostracism were common. Those of us throughout the South who integrated white schools did break down barriers, but hardly without strife and contention, even though Brown and the 1964 Civil Rights Act declared us all to be equal before the law.

We in Orangeburg who changed high schools in 1964 were mostly privileged: The first round of black students to break the segregation barrier included largely middle—class children who had attended private elementary schools, and many of us were faculty kids whose parents were teachers or college professors. But most black

children in the South at that

IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT SEGREGATED SCHOOLS time did not attend private WERE SUPPOSEDLY EQUAL, schools, and the systematic

THE MAJORITY OF BLACK CHILDREN economic oppression assured

ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOLS that income levels for black

THAT REFLECTED THE POVERTY OF THEIR PARENTS. families were mUCh lower

than for average white families. In spite of the fact that segregated schools were supposedly equal, the majority of black children attended public schools that reflected the poverty of their parents. The lopsided quality of public education was, indeed, the basis for Brown v. Board of Education, which argued that it was impossible to maintain schools that were separate but equal.

Separate but equal, a contradictory and misleading term, became famous because of another case, Plessy v. Ferguson, which the US. Supreme Court decided in 1896. Plessy did not even involve schools but rather public—transportation facilities. When the Supreme Court ruled that separate but equal was the law, it gave legitimacy to the heinous notion that the races should not mix in public facilities and that it was legal to pretend that the separate facilities maintained for people of color were equal. Blacks who lived in the Jim Crow South knew better. How could a white society that regarded people of color as inferior, rightfully disadvantaged, and lower by nature than whites be trusted to provide equal facilities for something so precious as elementary education? How was this possible, when we could clearly see that medical facilities, train station waiting rooms, water fountains, playgrounds, and movie—theater sections reserved for blacks were blatantly unequal? Did not the white society value its children’s education even more than it valued its waiting rooms? And so across the South black children attended school in substandard buildings, read from tattered and outdated hand-me—down textbooks, and listened to underpaid teachers who were, of course, only of their own race, since in the Southern milieu few Whites would consider teaching blacks. It seemed as if the slave masters’ strictures “don’t teach the slaves” had somehow miraculously survived well into the twentieth century.

Brown v. Board of Education was a freedom bell for blacks and whites. For blacks, in a society for which our soldiers had died as surely as white soldiers, it confirmed our right to have equal access to public facilities for which we had, after all, paid taxes. The landmark decision affirmed that the days of segregated lunch counters and bathrooms and doctors’ offices were coming to an end very soon and suggested

16 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 17]SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

that perhaps, in the future, we would have an equal chance to succeed in life because we would be judged by our capabilities and not by our color.

For whites, the Brown decision offered a chance for reclaiming human decency, an opportunity for letting go of false delusions of superiority. The 1954 court case, which seemed so threatening to the majority race, was a sign that the awful burden of carrying out misguided, racist public policy would not last forever, that consciences could be cleared and

wrongful deeds made aright. For FOR WHITES, THE BROWN DECISION

my White fellow students and OFFERED A CHANCE FOR RECLAIMING

my white teachers, who so vig- HUMAN DECENCY, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR LETTING GO Ofously resisted change, racial in- OF FALSE DELUSIONS OF SUPERIORITY.

tegration was an opportunity to grow up to become decent human beings instead of remaining warped souls misguided by wrongheaded notions of racial prejudice.

If Americans had listened to the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith in the early 19005, Brown v. Board of Education would not have been necessary. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá had, in His visit to the United States in 1912, urged blacks and whites to meet together in nonsegregated facilities, to eat together as brothers and sisters, to intermarry if they pleased. If the nation had turned to these teachings early enough, many of the race riots and much of the bloodshed in the 19405 and 19605, for example, could have been avoided. Shoghi Effendi also laid down the basic parameters of racial harmony through his careful instructions in, among other places, his landmark 1938 letter The Advent of Divine fustice.‘ With voluntary efforts to recognize the equality of all human beings, a court case that ruled that all races had the right to attend all public schools would not have been necessary.

But what about my home town? Not having heard about the Bahá’í Faith, Orangeburg, South Carolina, as a whole struggled mightily against the teachings of racial equality, which even now, forty years after my friends and 1 integrated our local high school, have not penetrated all local social, educational, and religious institutions. In 1968, before I left Orangeburg to attend college elsewhere, and just as I was about to give up on the concepts of racial harmony and religious accountability for social injustice, it was my good luck to find a member of the Bahá’í Faith in that same town. Today in Orangeburg, and throughout South Carolina, the South, and the nation, local Bahá’í communities remain steadfast in their determination to live the principles of racial equality by deed as well as by word. They do so because racial harmony, enjoined by the Bahá’í scriptures, is not an option but rather a sacred (and happy) obligation, which leads to diversity of friends and loved ones, unusual in the United States as a whole.

Brown, a precursor to the fall of barriers in other walks of life, helped break down legal support for racially segregated schools in the United States. That decision alone, however, could not change everything. Only our ability to see past racial barriers

1. See Shoghi Effendi, The Advent of Divine justice, lst pocket—size ed. (\Vilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1990).

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36. No. 1 l7

[Page 18]

JUNE MANNING THOMAS

and look toward a common humanity, and to live our beliefs through everyday actions, can bring about true racial harmony. This lack of vision is the reason that injustice continues, not just in the South but also in the North, the West, the East, where schools remain unequal and life chances still depend in great measure on skin color. In that sense, we who saw legally enforced racial integration as the key to progress were only partially right. The protection of legal rights to public access must be vigorously pursued, but this does not eliminate racial disunity. The effort to overcome the effects of discrimination and to allow everyone to live a life free from racial prejudice is a spiritual task, requiring opening hearts and making fundamental, life—altering changes. Such transformation can be accomplished only with spiritual tools and nourished by a community that truly regards racial unity as a divinely ordained principle.

Sonnet to Naw-Rúz

Now another New Year, Naw—Rtiz!

Spring walks the fields, warming frosted limbs, Tearing off winter’s white shroud.

Color returns to nature’s face.

Once more, rivers jump and play. Hills dress in daffodil yellow.

Birds build nests for new born;

Once more, we wander the open road,

And smile on the new day.

Our arms stretch and hug the sky.

Our spirits dance in the morning sun,

Shout and shake the mountain peaks Ya Bahá’í’u’l-Abhá, 0 Glory of the All—Glorious!

We are one in a new creation. —|RVING KELSEY

IRVING KELSEY, who holds a ].D. in law and an M.S. in linguistics, has had two careers: (caching linguistics at Teachers College in Mammy, Venezuela, and practicing mental-health law in Colorado

18 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 19]Withdrawal

The Whole community felt it

when you went to the Center,

scorched off the lawn with a blowtorch, turned the sign inside the

oneness workshop

from “Welcome” to “Closed,”

canceled the wedding rehearsal,

wrote “Not at this address!”

on the insurance renewal,

refused to grieve with tears

set the building on fire,

then climbed to the rooftop

where you teeter on the rusty rain—gutter.

We’re standing here below,

a fallible but focused

group of ordinary people,

in a circle,

with our safety net,

calling for you to jump.

Sure we have faults

but it’s not

an unreasonable leap of faith.

—PAUL MANTLE

PAUL MANTLE, inspired by the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, has written a biography for children and youth entitled “The Man of the Trees: The Story of the World’s Greatest Forester, Richard St. Barbe Baker."

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 l9

[Page 20]

[Page 21]STEVEN GONZALES

The Road to Brown

The Road to Equal Education for All Races On May 17, 1954, The Supreme Cour’r of The United States handed

down The landmark decision of Brown M Board of Educafion, holding That racial segregation in public schools violates The United States Constitution.‘ Bu’r Brown, a consolidation of several cases from Delaware

Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia, also represents a milepost on a long, tragic, yet glorious strand of U.S. history. With growing evidence of the resegregation of schools based on a widening divide between rich and poor, Brown’s fiftieth anniversary challenges us to pause and reconsider the painful chronology that led to the decision.

THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE

Brown is linked to great themes in American history. One such theme concerns the document that Brown interpreted-wthe Constitution. Whatever the brilliance of that 1787 Charter, one of humanity’s greatest achievements in governance, it was, nevertheless, flawed. After the eighteenth—century War of Independence from Britain, the North American colonists fashioned a loose alliance based on the Articles of Confederation, which were drafted in 1777 and ratified in 1781. But the Articles failed to create an effective executive authority, and chaos ensued.2 The Confederation failed miserably.

1. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).

2. For the Articles of Confederation and a description of their problems, see Page Smith, The Comtitution: A Documentary and Narrative History (New York, USA: Quill—Morrow, 1978) 73—90.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 21

[Page 22]

STEVEN GONZALES

FEDERALISM V. STATE'S RIGHTS

In May 1787 the original thirteen states convened a Constitutional Convention to resolve the problems. Disunity was more than an irritant in an age when the fragile former colonies seemed threatened by mighty European empires and vast Indian nations. Two points of view animated the debates of the delegates, now often referred to as the “Framers” of the Constitution. Some, such as George Washington, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton, maintained that a strong central federal government was indispensable to a durable union. The collapse of the Confederation and a legacy of failed confederations throughout history were proof of this argument to the “Federalists.” Others, notably represented in ensuing decades by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, passionately held that the Revolution was waged to free the colonists from oppressive over—centralized government, the source of centuries of irrational subjugation of “commoners” by the aristocrats and kings of Europe.3 They argued that limiting the federal government to powers enumerated in the Constitution and barring it from abridging certain individual rights, as well as creating strong local governments, would prevent Europe’s evils from being replicated in America. Unfortunately, these polarized positions fostered compromises in the U.S. Constitution and a political framework that enabled slavery to persist.

SLAVERY A second theme leading to Brown—and, like the tensions between federalism and state’s rights, another obstacle to forming the union and to achieving equality for all US. citizens—was slavery itself. Much has been written about how the Northern delegates succumbed to and compromised with the Southern delegates and how the North and the South both profited from slavery, but this is not the place to revisit that stain on US. history, except for a brief look at how it connects to Brown. At the Constitutional Convention the Southerners rejected any union endangering slavery, which was rapidly becoming the source of Southern wealth. South Carolina and Georgia overtly threatened to secede. The Framers chose to compromise by not abolishing slavery and by counting “all other Persons,” meaning slaves, as “three-fifths” of a person. Congress was empowered to end the slave trade, but not slavery itself, in twenty years.4 However, the slave trade would not end so easily. The controversy became the premier national issue of the nineteenth century, provoked a series of disastrous political compromises, and culminated in the Civil War. By its deliberate silence, the Constitution of 1787 condemned the children of slaves to remain slaves. Indeed, it was essentially silent on race relations. The only other significant provision gave Congress authority to regulate commerce “with the Indian Tribes.”5 America was destined to address race, but the price of redemp 3. Jefferson was Ambassador to France during the Constitutional Convention, and Madison, though a key member of the Convention, had Federalist leanings at that time. Nevertheless, Jefferson and Madison, because of their activities in later years, have come to be the most prominent figures among the Jeffersonian anti-Federalists.

4. U.S. Const. art. I, see. 2, cl. 3; art. I, see. 9, cl. 1.

5. US Const. art. I, see. 8, cl. 3.

22 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 23]

THE ROAD TO BROWN

tion would be more American deaths from warfare than in any other armed conflict in history, the assassination of a president, and a legacy of a nation divided by race.

FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS

A third theme on the road to Brown is the Civil War and its aftermath. The arguments of the Jeffersonian anti—Federalists evolved in the first half of the nineteenth century into the slave states defending slavery. Conversely, the rhetoric of Adams and the Federalists led to the position of President Abraham Lincoln and the Northerners that the Southern states could not secede from the Union and that slavery must be ended if there is any real meaning to the Revolution and the lofty language of the Declaration of Independence. In hindsight, it is Clear that the South’s point of view was a convenient form of mass denial—a way to avoid facing the horrors inflicted daily upon untold numbers of victims, year after year, generation after generation. This national problem resulted in the Civil War of the 18605 and, a full century later, with the unfinished business of the Civil War, in the Civil Rights Movement of the 19505 and 19605.

After the Civil War and the national trauma of the 1865 assassination of President Lincoln, the Northern—controlled Congress enacted three Constitutional amendments, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth, abolishing slavery and extending legal protection to the newly freed slaves.6 The Fourteenth Amendment, a century

after its 1868 ratification, played a crucial role in the Civil—Rights era THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT!

and in Brown, The Amendment pro- A CENTURY AFTER ITS 1868 RATIFICATION, Vides that no state may deny a person PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE life, liberty, or property Without due IN THE CIVIL-RIGHTS ERA AND IN BROWN.

process of law or deny any person

the equal protection of the law. Before the Amendment there were few Constitutional restrictions on state’s rights. Nearly all of the Constitutional limitations on governmental power restricted federal power—a legacy of the Federalist vs. antiFederalist compromises at the Constitutional Convention.

Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on state power, as well as the other post—Civil War amendments abolishing slavery and racially discriminatory laws, applied to “persons,” not just citizens. In effect, the old Federalist position had prevailed. The constitution, by Virtue of its post—Civil War amendments, now expressly restricted state’s rights concerning slavery and, more broadly, concerning racial discrimination. States could no longer evade federal antidiscrimination laws under the guise of state’s rights.

But it should not be presumed that the Northerners, the Federalists, or even some in the antislavery movement favored integration. Many antislavery proponents

6. US. Const. amend. XIII (ratified in 1865, prohibiting slavery); amend. XIV (ratified in 1868, extending US. citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the U.S., prohibiting states from denying to any person the equal protection of the law, and from denying any person “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”); amend. XV (ratified in 1870, prohibiting states from denying voting rights “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”).

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 23

[Page 24]STEVEN GONZALES

supported relocation of African Americans to Africa, to the interior of the American

continent, or to other sites and believed whites were superior to other races.7 Further, from the birth of the union to the Civil War, the Northern states sacrificed antislavery sentiments in compromise after compromise to maintain a delicate balance between free and slave states, to mute secessionism, and to preserve the union. There were the “three—fifths” compromise of the Constitution of 1787; the Missouri Compromise of 1820 prohibiting slavery in states derived from the Louisiana Purchase situated north of Missouri but permitting slavery in Missouri and in states south of Missouri; the Compromise of 1850 admitting a free California but permitting voters in New Mexico and Utah to decide on slavery in those states; and, finally, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 repealing the Missouri Compromise, substituting yet another

SCARCELY A GENERATION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, compromise calculated to A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO RACE DISCRIMINATION permit admission of new

IN THE SCHOOLS states carved out of the

BASED ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT gIOWing WCStem territories REACHED THE SUPREME COURT. Without dismrbing the

balance between slave and free states. The Kansas—Nebraska Act permitted the two territories to become states and authorized their voters to decide whether slavery would be permitted in their new states. This outraged both antislavery and slavery supporters and erupted in violence. Slavery had finally emerged from behind the thinly disguised veil of the Federalist—state’s—rights debate and compromised principles. A bloody Civil War began six years later.8 Scarcely a generation after the Civil War, a legal challenge to race discrimination in the schools based on the Fourteenth Amendment reached the Supreme Court. In its ruling in Play 12. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court held that the equalprotection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by segregated public schools—as long as “equal” schools were provided for African Americans.9

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The enormous changes America experienced in the early years of the twentieth century constitutes a fourth theme that led to Brown, for the Changes forced the Supreme Court to reconsider the 1896 P1655}! decision. Altered racial demographics, especially the massive migration of African Americans to and their employment in the factories of North; the equalizing effect of the great Depression of the 19305; and the bonding experience of soldiers from various racial and ethnic groups in World War II had begun to change race relations in ways that the passage or repeal of a statute alone could never have accomplished.

7. For examples of sentiments about relocating African Americans, see Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York, USA: Vintage—Random, 2000) 100, 106—07, 158.

8. For a succinct account of the Kansas—Nebraska Act and the compromises preceding it, see Ross Drake, “The Law That Ripped American in Two,” Smithsonian Magazine 35.2 (May 2004): 61—66.

9. See Plan)! I}. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).

24 World Order. 2004. Vol. 36. No. 1

[Page 25]

THE ROAD TO BROWN

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BROWN The fifth and final theme leading to Brown v. Board of Education was the changing legal environment. After Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. ordered a military exclusion from designated West Coast sites and a mass internment of people of Japanese ancestry.10 This included U.S. citizens (many of whom had been Americans for generations stretching back into the nineteenth century), new immigrants, and legal residents. There was no effort to tie internment to individualized findings of guilt or threat. Earl Warren, first the Attorney General and later Governor of California, where most Japanese detainees were arrested, defended the internment program in court. The internments were appealed to the Supreme Court, where, in Korematm 22. United States (1944), they were upheld, despite vigorous dissents by Justices Frank Murphy, Owen J. Roberts, and Robert H. Jackson.11

Brown first reached the Supreme Court in 1952. The justices, we now know, were divided, with Chief Justice Fred Vinson, a Kentuckian, staunchly defending Plessy’s separate—but—equal doctrine. After arguments of counsel were heard by the Court, its inability to reach consensus prompted Justice Felix Frankfurter to persuade his colleagues to order, on June 8, 1953, the case held over to the Court’s next term, following summer break. On September 8, 1953, before the start of the Court’s next term on the traditional first Monday in October, Vinson died. Then, in one of the most memorable ironies in U.S. history, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren, who had fought so firmly for the Japanese internment on the West Coast during World War II, to the Supreme Court and as Chief Justice. Brown was reheard, and the new Chief Justice set about to overrule P1655] and to persuade his fellow justices that the country required nothing less than a unanimous Supreme Court on such a decision, which was certain to be greeted With hostility, derision, and condemnation.12

Lawsuits to redress inequality in or access to education for blacks had been filed before Brown, but they did not directly question Plessy’s separate-but-equal doctrine, which had been a well—settled Supreme Court precedent for more than half a century. Instead, the plaintiffs in the earlier cases contended that, although theoretically separate could be equal, in reality, the facilities, staffing, and resources provided for

10. Within days of the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, Lt. General John L. DeWitt, head of the U.S. Western Defense Command, publicly urged detention of Japanese inhabitants in the western part of the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the Secretary of War and military commanders to set up internment camps. On March 21, 1942, Congress passed Public Law No. 503 criminalizing disobedience of military detainment orders. DeWitt soon detained 120,000 people of Japanese descent. Some people of German and Italian descent were also detained during the war. See Eric K. Yamamoto, ed., et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and thejapanexe American Internmmt (New York: Aspen, 2001) 97—01.

11. See Karematxu v. United States, 323 U.S., 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944).

12. For works on the appointment of Warren and on the Court’s deliberations in Brown, see Charles J. Ogletree, In, All Deliberate Speed: Rcflettiom on the First Half—Cmtury of Brown 11. Board of Education (New York, USA: Norton, 2004), and Richard Kluger, Simplejmtice: The History of Brown v. Board and Black America? Strugglefbr Equality (New York, USA: Vintage Books, Random House, 2004).

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 25

[Page 26]

STEVEN GONZALES

black school children were grossly inferior. In effect, nonwhite schools had subsidized superior education and all that goes with that advantage for generations of privileged whites. A very few cases had required specific instances of desegregation, but only in limited situations in which a particular district did not offer any separate school or facility for nonwhites that could be considered equal under Plessy.

One noteworthy pre—Broum case was Mendez 11. \Vestmimter School District of Orange County, decided in 1946, eight years before Brown.13 In Mendez, a courageous federal district judge held that segregation of school children in three California public school districts violated the California state constitution, a provision of the

California Education Code,

EIGHT YEARS BEFORE BROWN and, by implication, the equalA COURAGEOUS FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE protection clause of the FourHELD THAT SEGREGATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN teenth Amendment. The

IN THREE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS Court found that more than VIOLATED THE EQUAL—PROTECTION CLAUSE five thousand HiSpaniC chil OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. dren were segregated from

white children in the three districts. But the most impressive part of the decision was the court’s bold contravention of Plessy, holding that, Whatever the national standard, the “equal protection of the laws pertaining to the public school system in California is not provided by furnishing in separate schools the same technical facilities, text books, and courses of instruction to children of Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public school system children” and that a “paramount requirement in the American system of public education is social equality . . . [i]t must be open to all children.”14 The Mendez decision is all the more remarkable because nearby Los Angeles experienced a violent conflict between white servicemen and Hispanic youth in the early 19405. A public commission later placed the blame primarily on the racism of white servicemen and public officials. Mendez, indeed, paved the way for Brown. Thus the legacy of slavery, the Constitution with its post—Civil War Amendments, population changes in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and a new legal environment set the stage for Brown in a way that now seems inevitable.

Brown: What it Did—And What it Did Not Do

For all its significance, Brown is important not only for what it held but for what it did not hold. The Court simply ruled that the doctrine of separate but equal violates the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding was limited to public schools and should not be confused with the civil—rights legislation of the 19605 desegregating public facilities, contracts, hotels, housing, and employment. Further, Brown was silent on the crucial question of the remedy for the

13. See Mendez v. Westmz'mter 36/9001 Dixtrz'ct of Orange County, 64 F. Supp. 544 (DC. Cal. 1946).

14. Mendez v. Wextmimter SchoolDz'xm'ct of Orange County, 64 F. Supp. 549 (DC. Cal. 1946). As the Mendez court noted, California law also authorized the establishment of separate schools for children of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or “Mongolian parentage.” See Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 548.

26 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 27]THE ROAD TO BROWN

Constitutional violation inflicted upon millions of people. For all its positive effects, the limitations in Brown and in its follow—up case in 1955, Brown I], are just as significant.15

How to order desegregation was considered in Brown II. The state defendants insisted that moving too fast would cause irreparable harm and that the nation was not ready for desegregation. Indeed, in the months following Brown I, civil disturbances had taken place; public officials had vowed to personally obstruct entrances to public schools; denunciations had streamed from a variety of sources; and US. Senators had called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Warren.

The Court ordered desegregation to proceed “with all deliberate speed.”16 The phrase carries an instructive lineage, as Charles J. Ogletree, Professor of Law and Associate Dean of the Harvard Law

School, has demonstrated. It was used NOT UNTIL THE LATE 19605 by Justices Felix Frankfurter and Oliver DID THE COURT FULLY FACE THE ISSUE Wendell Holmes on previous occasions. OF HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS It is also found in the writings of Sir MIGHT ACCOMPLISH DESEGREGATION Walter Scott and Lord Byron. More IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

relevant is President Lincoln’s usage.

Upon being asked when the slaves might be freed, he responded that it would be when the country was ready and cited the ancient Latin form festina lente, meaning something akin to “make haste slowly.”l7 Not until the late 19605 did the Court fully face the issue of how the federal courts might accomplish desegregation in the public schools, finally making clear that the lower federal courts had authority to use a wide variety of legal tools to desegregate. But by the early 19705 the national mood was shifting. The prospect of forced busing and the reality of integration recruited fresh opponents and emboldened die—hard segregationists.

Lessons Learned? Why did it take so long for the nation to get to Brown? Why did desegregation hinge on a Supreme Court death that just as easily might have occurred a few months later? Why was our nation, so dedicated to equality and individual freedom, paralyzed to the point of being unable to right the three hundred years of injustice visible to it and to the world?

There is no denying that America has come a long way since Brown was decided in 1954. Integration in schools has been accepted in law, if not fully in fact. But how do we learn from this experience and ensure it is not repeated?

The road to Brown is strewn with compromises that enabled slavery to flourish. The slaveholders clung to a racist philosophy that conveniently justified their economic interests. The North placed politics above the abolition of human suffering and the principle of equality and deluded itself in the hope the problem would just

15. Brown 11. Board OfEduaztian, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown 11). 16. Brown 11. Board ofEdumtion (Brown [1), 349 U.S. 294, at 301. 17. Ogletree, All Deliberate Speed 10—11.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 27

[Page 28]

STEVEN GONZALES

go away. Ultimately, the union could not be preserved until the principle of equality was established in law. One lesson that emerges is that some principles cannot be compromised. Some rights are so fundamental to human life that they cannot be negotiated. They will, sooner or later, demand vindication and extract a terrible price for being ignored.

Americans, then, are faced with parallel traditions. One ignores injustice and thrives on deliberate ignorance, material gain, and political compromise. The other is that glorious tradition articulated in the lofty principles of the Framers and the authors of the Declaration of Independence. It animated many in the antislavery movement; it motivated, in part, the sacrifice of thousands of young soldiers in the Civil War who gave their lives to end slavery and preserve the union; and it supplied the courage of the Civil Rights Movement. Perhaps Earl Warren’s role in the Japanese internments and his turnabout in Brown gives hope that it is never too late.

My heart was troubled

My heart was troubled until a laughing leaf ran away with the wind.

RAHIM —PAUL MANTLE

PAUL MANTLE’S research on Richard St. Barbe Baker (1889—1982), a force for conservation for almost half a century, is resulting in a biography for children and youth and a website on the Man of the Trees.

28 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 29]RICHARD W. THOMAS

Teaching about Brown v. Board of Education: Lessons in Race Relations for Today’s History STudenTs

During The posT yeorl have included in my roce-reloTions history classes Richard Kluger’s Simple JusTice: The HisTory of Brown v Board of EducaTion and Block America’s STrugg/e for EqualiTy.‘ Simple JusTice is a hisTory of The legal baTTles That led To The 1954 landmark case Brown

v. Board of Education. It is also a history of the “epic struggle” of Southern African Americans against the formidable Southern white power structure that defended racial segregation before (and often after) 1954. Among its most inspiring features is the story of how a team of African-American lawyers, led by Harvard Law School graduate Charles Houston, successfully challenged the separate-but-equal doctrine (PZmy v. Ferguson, 1896). Equally inspiring are the stories of brave white judges and white and black social scientists who mounted an interracial assault against the law of the land.

The fiftieth anniversary of Brown was part of my motivation for choosing Simple justice for study. But additional impetus came from my wish to connect studentsthe majority of whom are white freshmen from Michigan suburbs but also some from various racial and ethnic backgrounds—to the courageous interracial struggle against white supremacy and to urge their commitment to the ongoing struggle for racial justice.

As my students and I worked out way through Simple justice, Kluger’s engaging book opened the door to understanding how the separate—but—equal doctrine crippled

RICHARD W. THOMAS a professor of history at Michigan State University in East Lansing, has been teaching courses f0! T’ntrty years to provide students wflh knowledge about ‘ o veton of how besT To heat and unify roclotty fragmented communflies His m bu teuti‘ n's tnctude Life for Us Is What We Make It: Building a Black Commumty at '

45 (Indiana University Press 1992): Understanding Interracial Relations (Sage Publications. 1996), Racial Unify: An Imp (011qu Can; Assockaflon for Bohé' f Studies. 1990); and Development (temple Untvetsfl'y Press, 1987) which he 00' Richard Hit. and June Thomas. L

1 J99 Datden,

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 29

[Page 30]

RICHARD W. THOMAS

generations of African—American children by restricting them to run-down schools miles away from their homes—schools equipped with inadequate school supplies and staffed by poorly paid teachers who earned less than their white counterparts. Kluger also illuminated how the racial policy enshrined in Plessy systematically marginalized African—American families and communities and convinced generations of whites that such treatment was natural and right. In one instance, the white school system refused to provide bus transportation for poor rural black studentsa service it provided for white students. When African—American parents bought their own bus, the school system refused to provide them with fuel. Such means for dehumanizing African Americans shocked my students.

One of the most dramatic lessons learned from reading Simple justice was the damage racism did to the psyches of African—American children who grew up hating their blackness and admiring whiteness—a fact demonstrated in the famous doll study of African—American psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark in which AfricanAmerican children preferred white dolls over black dolls.2 We discussed the doll study in class, as well as other examples of racial self—hatred generated by social systems privileging white supremacy. White and black students learned how legally sanctioned institutionalized racism during the separate-but-equal era contributed to black children’s racial identity and affected their life chances. In addition, they learned how to relate pre-1954 examples of behaviors, rules, and situations that clearly damaged psyches to present-day residential racial segregation and social isolation that still affect the minds and hearts of inner-city children. In short, Simple fwtice helped my students to connect the historical dots between the pre—Brown Jim Crow era and the post—Brown era: Legally sanctioned segregation during the preBrown era affected generations of African—American children and youth in much the same way that present-day urban and residential segregation and social isolation affect African—American children and youth.

Kluger, in Simple justice, provides other important lessons to be learned from studying the history of Brown. Notwithstanding the obvious contradictions of the separate—but—equal doctrine reflected in the daily contrasts between well—funded white schools and run—down black schools, white supremacists in the South persisted in their delusion that the system was really equal; that it could be justified with claims that African Americans wanted to be segregated; and that, even worse, whites paid more taxes and thus deserved more. These attitudes prompted serious discussions among my students. Why were Southern whites during the separate—but—equal era (1896—1954) so invested in white supremacy that they felt the need to contain and control the aspirations of African Americans? How are similar investments in supremacy and in the need for control reflected in contemporary racial debates over affirmative action and the erosion of historic white—skin privilege?

In contrast to and working against those attached to entrenched white supremacy stood a small team of African-American lawyers led by Charles Houston. As Dean

2. Kenneth Clark and Mamie Clark, “Segregation as a Factor in the Racial Identification of Negro Pre—School Children: A Preliminary Report,” journal of Experimental Education (Spring 1940): 10103, quoted in Kluger, Simplejustice 824.

30 World Order. 2004, Vol. 36. No. 1

[Page 31]TEACHING ABOUT BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION

of the Howard University law school, he trained a talented and skilled team of African-American lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall (who in 1961 would become the first black justice on the U.S. Supreme Court), to challenge and finally dismantle ley. Kluger’s account of the legal assault on Plessy provides a valuable lesson in how a minority’s quest for justice is more powerful and lasting than the oppression of the majority. The quest at “3?th 11% dedlcated group .Of THE HISTORICAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS white a 1es to the struggle, 1n— OF THE INTERRACIAL ARMY

cludin white 'ud es in the g 1 , g . , STRUGGLlNG TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF lower courts, WhltC socral scr. . AMERICAN RACE REIATIONS CHALLENGED MY entists, and white lawyers, such STUDENTS TO THINK ABOUT HOW THEY COULD

as Jack Greenberg, a young Jewish lawyer who would play EMULATE SUCH COURAGEOUS PEOPLE.

a key role in the protracted

struggle against Plessy. The historical and moral implications of the interracial army struggling to change the course of American race relations challenged my students to think about how profoundly this group of mainly black and some White reformers represented the best of their generation, how they, as students, could choose to emulate such courageous people, how it was insufficient to read about such struggles, and how they were obliged to follow in the footsteps of such great souls.

Another lesson made clear in Simplefustice involved the value of working for unity when seeking to right a wrong. Chief Justice Earl Warren, realizing the immense need for a unanimous opinion, labored to unify all the Brown justices behind the decision to end the separate-but-equal doctrine. He and the country realized that, given the controversial nature of the issue and the great potential for enduring conflict, especially in the South, a unanimous decision was crucial. Unanimity, the lack of any dissenting voice, would send a clear, unquestionable message to the country and the world that Plessy was no longer the law in the United States, the greatest democracy in the world, warts and all. It was while studying Warren’s struggle for unity on the Supreme Court that students learned the true value of genuine consultation as a tool of meaningful historical change.

However, the unity Justice Warren worked to achieve among the Supreme Court Justices was not mirrored and reinforced by the executive branch of the U.S. government. My students were surprised to learn from Kluger’s book that President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had appointed Warren Chief Justice to the Supreme Court in 1953, later regretted appointing him and did little to support Brown v. Board of Education. Kluger observed that

the popular and amiable President of the United States . . . might reasonably

have been expected to place the prestige of his August office behind the Supreme

Court’s monumental ruling. Yet this soldier of formidable rectitude never did so,

except in the most offhand way. Declining to say whether he agreed with the

Brown decision, Ike lamely remarked, “I think it makes no difference whether

or not I endorse it. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it, and

3. Kluger, Simplejustice 755.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 31

[Page 32]

RICHARD W. THOMAS

I must conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this

country.”

According to Kluger, “It might have been carried out far sooner and less bruisingly if the President had urged the country to obey Brown, not just because it was a ruling of the nation’s ultimate court but because it was right. For him to stand above the battle was to lend aid and comfort to the forces of resistance.”3 Justice Tom Clark, one of the nine justices involved in framing the Brown decision, commented, after retiring from the bench, that, “if Mr. Eisenhower had come through, it would have changed things a lot.” His not doing so provided yet another lesson about how moral indecision about racial injustice led to decades of unnecessary resistance. When national or world leaders fail to live up to the highest moral standard, when they fail to support courageously the rights of minorities, they impede the progress of social justice and thus prolong the suffering of minorities.

What were some of the historical and social consequences of the indecision about fully embracing the Brown ruling that became clear in the study of Kluger’s book? What history lessons could be drawn from Simplefustice? Kluger notes the following:

thus unchallenged by the executive and legislative branches of the Federal gov ernment, the South succeeded for ten years in largely evading and defying the

Supreme Court’s directive to end racial separation in public schools. Only a trickle

of black students was allowed to enter the white schools of Old Dixie, and even

this small brave band often had to endure menacing taunts and the spittle of die-hard white supremacists. A decade after Brown, not even one in fifty African

American pupils was attending classes with whites in the eleven states with the

largest proportion of black residents. Meanwhile, the rest of the nation looked

on not overly concerned, preferring to see the South’s stalling tactics as a regional problem and turning a blind eye to the depth and virulence of their own uncodified racism and the dc fizcto segregation in their urban ghettoes.“ The history lesson the students took from the analysis of the post—Brown period helped them to understand both the historical and social consequences of moral indecision and the resilience of racism and how they must constantly be on guard against social injustices.

At the end of my students’ and my study of Richard Kluget’s Simple justice in our race—relations history classes, had anything changed for my students? Only a long—term study of the short— and long—range effects could say for sure, but I felt that many of my students left the section on Brown 1/. Board of Education energized by the vision and dedication of the courageous generation that fought against the oppressive system engendered by Plessy’s separate—but-equal doctrine. Now they had black—and—white role models to emulate in the ongoing struggle for racial justice and the building of a unified society.

4. Kluger, Simple justice 755—56.

32 World Order, 2004,Vo|. 36, No. 1

[Page 33]

Inclination facing west

the gray day surrounds, reflects,

and fills the earth the tide is low

the poles

descend through sand between my eyes

and

the gap

toward which I drift

immersed in His mercy

with every breath,

the gentle breeze releases

—KURT HEIN

KURT HEIN, the author of Radio Build ’lEmador: A Bahá’í Deutlopmtnt Prefect, has worked with educational programs and educational broadcasting in more dun twenty—five countries.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

33

[Page 34]

[Page 35]MICHAEL L. PENN Reflections on Brown

O Children of Men! Know ye not why we created you from the same dust? That no one should exalt himself over the other.

—Baha ” u’llaih

Signaling os iT did The UniTed STOTes Supreme CourT’s resolve To use The power vesTed in H by The ConsTiTuTion To advance The inTeresTs of The notion—even if H hod To do so over The vociferous proTesTs of Those who occupied seoTs of economic, poliTicol, and social power—The

Brown v. Board ofEducation decision of 1954 is one of the most significant judicial decisions in American legal history.

In Brown, the Supreme Court invoked the power of the social sciences to identify the moral and social implications of school segregation and resolved to bring the laws of the land into conformity with undeniable social facts and sound moral principles. In this way one of the most powerful institutions in the most powerful country in the world lent its voice to the irreversible movement toward the implementation of a common set of civil rights. All of the peoples of the world have benefited from this example. In addition, when the president of the United States called on the National Guard to effect implementation of Brown in cases in which local and state governments made public their intention to resist desegregation, for one of those rare moments in history the military power of the state was placed at the service of justice.

Gnomeclate proteasothranklmatMowhoflCoflegemai "' wget Heieeeorch Interests and pubucoflmhcbdeworksks" and: A ' adolescent psychopathology the fey, ‘

,and The epidemiology of gender—bcsed ltshed. with Rowman 3: utflefler, Overcoming Violence Meantime! COW to Eradicate 0 Worldwide Pennsyhrarm W Penn to the Board at Direct WW. He nee sewes ‘ ’

Center amt the: lune? Association of Mental Hearth

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 35

[Page 36]

MICHAEL L. PENN

Three generations of children have enrolled in America’s schools since the Brown decision of 1954.1 In some school districts outstanding magnet schools have encouraged voluntary transfer of students to enhance racial balance and have welcomed significant numbers of minority children into some of the best public schools in the country. In addition, bold metropolitan plans have encouraged voluntary enrollment of suburban students in city schools and city students in suburban schools to improve racial balance in both places.2 Notwithstanding these successes, in many important respects the Brown decision has failed to effect the magnitude of change that was possible because Americans, as a people, have not always applied the social remedies embodied in the Supreme Court’s courageous mandate when it ordered local and state governments to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”3 On the contrary, even today, more than a half—century after Brown, Americans persist in using strategies of delay and have, throughout the country, continued to construct new neighborhoods that ensure that middle— and upper—class white children can avoid associating with mostly urban and poor minority children. Millions of Americans also continue to doubt that children of all races and nations can learn at the highest levels, continue to refuse to give all children a genuine Chance, and continue to believe that education is for the elite and that “the great mass of people must be trained as hewers of wood and drawers of water, if they are to be trained at all.”4

As psychologists Rhona Weinstein, Anne Gregory, and Michael Strambler have observed, such beliefs are reflected in an educational system that sorts children into differentiated pathways of opportunity and success. They are also reflected in the fact that African-American children continue to be overrepresented in the lowest and least stimulating tracks of the educational system, and they are manifested in the reality that an African-American student is 3 times more likely than a white student to be placed in special education, 3.2 times less likely to be placed in a gifted class, and twice as likely to be subject to corporal punishment and suspension.S Thus the pernicious effects of the segregated system that Brown sought to remedy continue to be felt.

1. See Michael Grady, Ellen Foley, and Frank Barnes, “The Third Generation: Contemporary Strategies for Pursuing the Ideals of Brown v. Board,” Voice: in Urban Education (Summer 2004): 6—15.

2. See Grady, Foley, and Barnes, “Third Generation” 8.

3. According to American Treasures of the Library of Congress, “After the Brown opinion was announced, the Court heard additional arguments during the following term on the decree implementing the ruling. While NAACP lawyers had proposed to use the word ‘forthwith’ to achieve an accelerated desegregation timetable, Chief Justice Earl Waxren adopted Justice Felix Frankfurter’s suggestion to use a phrase associated with the revered Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘with all deliberate speed.’ Shortly after Warren retired from the Court he acknowledged that ‘all deliberate speed’ was chosen as a benchmark because ‘there were so many blocks preventing an immediate solution of the thing in reality that the best we could look for would be a progression of action.” See American Treasures of the Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trr007/html.

4. Lawrence A. Cremin, Public Education (New York: Basic Books, 1976), quoted in Rhona Weinstein, Anne Gregory, and Michael Stambler, “Intractable Self—Fulfilling Prophecies: Fifty years after Brown v. Board afEa'umtion,” American Psychologist (2004): 511.

5. See Kenneth Meier, Joseph Stewart, and Robert England, Race, Class, and Education: The Politics of Secand—Genemtian Discrimination (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1989).

36 World Order, 2004. Vol. 36. No. 1

[Page 37]REFLECTIONS ON BROWN

In their statement presented to the US. Supreme Court as it set out to adjudicate the Brown case, social scientists Kenneth B. Clark, Isidor Chein, and Stuart Cook made the following observations:

[A]s minority group children learn the inferior status to which they are assigned as they observe the fact that they are almost always segregated and kept apart

from others who are treated with more respect by the society as a whole—they often react with feelings of inferiority and a sense of personal humiliation. Many of them become confused about their own personal worth. On the one hand, like other human beings they require a sense of personal dignity; on the other hand, almost nowhere in the larger society do they find their own dignity as human beings respected by others. Under these conditions, the minority group child is thrown into a conflict with regard to his feelings about himself and his group. He wonders whether his group and he himself are worthy of no more respect than they receive.6 The Clark report notes further that children who are exposed to prejudice must find ways to cope with the conflicts such prejudice engenders. Not every child, the report affirms, reacts with the same patterns of behavior: “The particular pattern depends upon many inter—related factors, among which are: the stability and quality of his family relations; the social and economic class to which he belongs; the cultural and educational background of his parents; the particular minority group to which he belongs; his personal characteristics, intelligence, special talents, and petsonality pattern.”7 While children of lower socio—economic status may respond to such treatment by becoming overtly aggressive, antisocial, and hostile, children of the middle and upper classes may “react to their racial frustrations and conflicts by withdrawal and submissive behavior. Or, they may react with compensatory and rigid conformity to the prevailing middle class values and standards and an aggressive determination to succeed in these terms in spite of the handicap of their minority status.”8

Although the Clark, Chein, and Cook report was written fifty years ago, it is still clear that the effects of exposure to racism continue to play themselves out in the lives of millions of America’s minority children and youths. As Thomas Pettigrew, an eminent professor of social psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, recently observed, black Americans continue to lag well behind white Americans on nearly every measure of prosperity. For example, in April 2004 black unemployment was 9.7 percent, while white unemployment was 4.9 percent; in

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO RACISM CONTINUE TO PLAY THEMSELVES OUT IN THE LIVES OF MILLIONS OF AMERICA’S MINORITY CHILDREN AND YOUTHS.

6. Kenneth B. Clark, Isidor Chein, and Stuart Cook, “The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement in the Brown 1/. Board of Education of Topeka Supreme Court Case,” 1952, reprinted in American Psychologist (September 2004): 495—96.

7. Clark, Chein, and Cook, “Effects of Segregation” 496.

8. Clark, Chein, and Cook, “Effects of Segregation” 496.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 37

[Page 38]

MICHAEL L. PENN

2001, the average life expectancy for black men was seventy-two years, and for white men it was seventy—eight; and in 1998, 38 percent of black children were living in poverty, while the figure for white children was 11 percent. In 1975 the incarceration rate among blacks was twice that of whites; today it is seven times greater.9 It is equally true that white children, and especially those who are born into privilege, are also adversely affected by the inequities of racism, for the disparities promote attitudes of fear and cynicism, nurture the dysfunctional presumption of racial superiority, and maintain in many a false and untenable basis of pride and arrogance.

But the many documented failings of Brown v. Board of Education do not tell the whole story. The Brown decision set in motion social processes that have contributed in substantial ways to opening up opportunities for students of color that had been sealed shut before 1954. In the wake of Brown, large numbers of poor minority students, for example, have been assisted in attending elite private schools throughout the country, and growing numbers of school districts in places such as Wake County (Raleigh), North Carolina; Cambridge, Massachusetts; La Crosse, Wisconsin; Manchester, Connecticut; Maplewood, New Jersey; Coweta County, Georgia; and Brandywine, Delaware, have begun to experiment with economic integration plans designed to diversify both race and class in public schools. Indeed, as Richard Kahlenberg, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, has noted, in 1999 approximately twenty thousand students lived in school districts with economic integration plans; today the number totals almost five hundred thousand. This figure represents more than ten times the number of students who take part in publicly funded private—school voucher plans.10

In addition, in the fifty years before Brown and the fifty years since Brown, the small yet steadily developing American Bahá’í community has shown that desegregation along lines of race, class, culture, and religion can work and that efforts animated by the sincere desire for all to live in harmony and to prosper can lead to a quality of community life that is far more beautiful, far more interesting, and far more promising than any system of social organization that the world has yet seen. As early as 1912, forty—two years before Brown, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the son and appointed successor, of Baha’u’llah, the founder of the Bahá’í Faith, traveled from the Middle East to North America and inspired among Bahá’ís a vision of racial unity. On 23 April 1912, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, who had only recently been released from forty years of imprisonment because of His religious beliefs, discussed racism at Howard University:

THE BROWN DECISION SET IN MOTION SOCIAL PROCESSES THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN SUBSTANTIAL WAYS TO OPENING UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDENTS OF COLOR THAT HAD BEEN SEALED SHUT BEFORE 1954.

9. See Thomas Pettigrew, quoted in Melissa Dittmann, “Fifty Years Later: Desegregating Urban Schools,” APA Monitor (September 2004): 63.

10. See Richard Kahlenberg, “The Bad News and Good News about Brown,” Voice: in Urban Education (Summer 2004): 22—29.

38 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36. No. 1

[Page 39]REFLECT|ONS ON BROWN

Today I am most happy, for I see here a gathering of the servants of God. I

see white and black sitting together. There are no whites and blacks before God.

All colors are one, and that is the color of servitude to God. . . . God does not

look at colors; He looks at the hearts. He whose heart is pure is better. He whose

character is better is more pleasing. . . .

. . . Therefore, today I am very happy that white and black have gathered

together in this meeting. I hope this coming together and harmony reaches such

a degree that no distinctions shall remain between them, and they shall be

together in the utmost harmony and love.‘1

Many of those who listened to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s message of racial solidarity were inspired by it and committed themselves to rise above the quagmire of bigotry and to welcome into their homes and families people of diverse racial and cultural backgrounds. Indeed, within a decade of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s visit, the Bahá’ís in America had begun to plan a series of race—amity conferences designed to close the racial divide. At the first race-amity convention held in 1921, Louis G. Gregory, an African—American Bahá’í, who was in 1922 elected to the national governing body of the Bahá’ís of the United States and Canada, where he served many terms through 1945, affirmed that “the divine springtime has appeared and the great enlightened principles, which are the light and progress of the whole world of humanity, are set in motion.”12

The promotion of racial solidarity was not left to the Bahá’ís of African descent. On the contrary, one of the earliest leaders in this arena was Agnes Parsons, “‘a white Bahá’í of wealth and social prominence” who became the spiritual protégé of Gregory and assisted him in promoting the consciousness of the oneness of humankind.13 By the time of the Brown decision, Bahá’ís in the United States were electing African Americans to local and national Bahá’í governing bodies, appointing them to local and national Bahá’í committees, holding interracial Bahá’í schools, and promoting racial-amity meetings. The spirit embodied by the American Bahá’ís—-black and white——has contributed to the development of a worldwide community that may well represent the most diverse yet socially integrated body of people on the planet. This spirit of openness and solidarity must spread until it envelops the whole human community. Then and only then will the vision of Brown have achieved its consummation. Perhaps fifty years from now, when we reflect on the one hundredth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, we will be able to look back and marvel at the progress we have made in closing the racial divide that is still so much with us.

11. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgzm'on of UniversalPeaee: 721th Delivered by Hha’u ’l—Baha’ during Hi5 Visit to the United State: and Canada in 1912, comp. Howard MacNutt, 2nd ed. (\Vilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982) 44—45.

12. Louis G. Gregory, “Racial Amity,” in Bahá’íYear Book, Volume One, 1925—1926, comp. National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States and Canada (New York: Bahá’í Publishing Committee, 1926) 165, quoted in Gayle Morrison, 7?) Move the World: Louis G. Gregory and the Advancement OfRarial Unity in America (Wilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982) 134.

13. Louis Gregory to Edith Chapman, 18 September 1935, Edith M. Chapman Papers, National Bahá’í Archives, Wilmette, IL, quoted in Morrison, 7?) Move the era' 135.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36. No. 1 39

[Page 40]

[Page 41]

TED AMSDEN

Interracial Unity: The Implications of 0 Judicial Deadline

Some fifty years ago The United States Supreme Cour’r handed down a pivotal decision about desegregating schools in Brown v Board of Education.] In That case The Court ruled ’rhO’r racially segregated public schools violo’red The equol—pro’rec’rion Clause of The Fourteenth

Amendment to the US. Constitution since separate schools are not, inherently, equal. Although Brown had some serious limitations, it indisputably launched the involvement of the Supreme Court in the struggle to end racial discrimination in the United States. Since that decision, the Court has periodically addressed the issue of race in education.

A pair of cases highlights the urgency of revisiting desegregation issues on the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision. People working to promote greater interracial unity should consider the implications of a deadline that the United States Supreme Court may possibly have imposed two years ago. In 2003, in one sentence in one of its opinions, the Court set out a twenty—five year deadline by Which the ongoing work in eliminating racial discrimination in education should have accomplished its objectives.

Background

The background for the Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling began in 1978, nearly twentyfive years after Brown 11. Board of Education, when the Court handed down its University of Califbrnia Regents v. Bak/ee decision.2 In that case it decided that race

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 41

[Page 42]

TED AMSDEN

could be a factor in considering an individual’s admission to medical school but that racial quotas for admission would not be permitted. The value of having a racially diverse student population was considered sufficiently important to allow race to be a factor in the admissions process. This distinction—race as one factor in individual admissions but not race as a quota—was determined by only one Justice (Justice Lewis Powell), who cast the critical vote in an evenly split Supreme Court. This distinction was followed by courts for twenty—five years.

In 2003, twenty—five years after the Bakke case, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases that further defined the use of race in higher—education admissions. In Gratz 21. Bollinger and Grutter 1/. Bollinger, the Court reviewed the University of Michigan’s consideration of an applicant’s race for undergraduate and law-school admission

policies, respectively.3 In

IN 2003, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE BAKKE CASE, Gratz, the Court rejected THE SUPREME COURT RULED lN TWO CASES the University’s under THAT FURTHER DEFINED THE USE OF graduate use of race in the RACE IN HIGHER-EDUCATION ADMISSIONS. admissions process because

the University automatically allocated, toward the total number of points needed to gain admission, twenty points to applicants from underrepresented minority groups. In its Gmtter decision, however, the Court accepted the University’s use of race as a factor in law—school admissions. At the law school, race was not considered by a predetermined number of points in an admissions point system but was rather one of many factors considered in trying to achieve a diverse student body. The Court agreed, as Justice Powell had in the Bakke case twenty—five years earlier, that the importance of having a diverse student body justified some flexible consideration of race as a factor in individual admission decisions.

A Twenty-Five Year Deadline Little noticed in the Supreme Court’s Grutter decision about the University of Michigan’s law—school admission policies is the following statement by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the majority: “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”4 The only rationale given by the Court for this statement was simply that “[i]t has been 25 years since . . . the use of race [was first approved by the Supreme Court] to further . . . student body diversity in the context of public higher education” and that, since then, “the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased.” The Court was referring to its Ba/e/ee decision some twenty—five years earlier.

The implications of the Court’s statement in the Grutter case are not clear. But it may be a warning that the Court’s “permission” to use race as a factor in any way in admission decisions in higher education has a time limit. Essentially, the Court’s

3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244; 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003); Grutter 1/. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306; 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003). 4. Grumr u. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. at 2346.

42 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 43]INTERRACIAL UNITY

majority opinion has stated its expectation that, in twenty—five years—by 2028racial inequities that foster the need for racial considerations in higher—education admissions should no longer be so prevalent as to require such considerations. The Court does not state specifically whether racial considerations would still be permitted in twenty—five years if racial inequities were still prevalent. But clearly one should not assume that the Court would continue to allow race to be a factor in whether a person were admitted to a public institution of higher education. Twentyfive years from now a very different group of Supreme Court Justices will be asked what the statement in the Grutter decision means. Lawyers concerned about continuing to consider race as a factor in school admissions will argue one way. But lawyers advocating for the end of racial considerations will urge a future Supreme Court to consider Justice O’Connor’s majority—opinion statement to be a basis for ending race as a consideration in higher-education admissions decisions, regardless of the then existing state of racial affairs in the United States.

Some lawyers may easily dismiss the twenty—five—year statement as “dictum”a statement that is not necessary to a court’s opinion and, therefore, should not have a binding effect on future court decisions. Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor’s statement, written for a majority of the Supreme Court, is part of a momentous opinion. It should be expected that those opposed to any form of racial consideration will use the dictum to further their point of view. Such opponents may well argue that the clock is now running on the Court’s favorable consideration of race, even in a limited way, in higher-education admissions decisions.

Unfortunately, the twenty—five-year dictum seems to have received little attention from proponents of racial considerations. No organizations working for a more inclusive society seem to be considering the implications of a twenty—five year clock. And no dialogue seems to be in progress about how society can advance so that no consideration of race in college admissions, or in education generally, will be necessary in twenty—five years.

Moreover, educational data does not provide much comfort about meeting the twenty—five year “deadline.” Brown v. Board OfEduaztz'on was decided more than fifty years ago. Yet Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in the 2003 Gratz decision about racial consideration in undergraduate college admissions, describes the lack of meaningful progress in equality for racial minorities in public education over the last fifty years. She also describes the continued racial segregation of public education, the underperforming and poverty—stricken educational institutions attended by racial minorities, and unequal earnings among racial groups despite “equivalent levels of education.”5 Fifty years of effort have not eliminated the consequence of a student’s race on inequality in public education.

The persistence of racial inequities is also evident outside education. For example, notwithstanding laws against racial discrimination in housing, racial segregation from one neighborhood to the next is still a reality for many. Despite long-standing laws against racial discrimination in employment, the glass ceiling is a reality in many

5. Gratz u. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (Slip Opinion, Justice Ginsburg at 1—3).

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. l 43

[Page 44]

TED AMSDEN

workplaces. Any assumption that twenty—five years is the length of time needed to correct any type of racial inequity—whether in education or in any other fieldcontains an inevitable element of arbitrariness and a disregard for facts. Notwithstanding the continued public—policy failures since its Brown decision, the Supreme Court, in its Grutter decision, may have given notice that in twenty—five years, public institutions of higher education may not be allowed to consider race as a factor to ensure a diverse student body. Failure to consider the possible implications of the Court's “deadline” is risky. Two years have already passed since the Supreme Court’s 2003 decisions in Grutter and Gratz. The clock may be ticking.

44 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

[Page 45]Af’rerWord

NANCY BRANHAM SONGER

A Beacon of Unity: The Louis G. Gregory Bahá’í Museum, Charleston, South Carolina

On the second anniversary of the dedication of the Louis G. Gregory Bahá’í Museum, located at 2 Desportes Court in Charleston, South Carolina, it is more than time to report on this remarkable venture.1 The fruit of more than fourteen years of sacrificial efforts by the Bahá’ís of Charleston and others around the world, the museum honors one of the most beloved figures in the history of the Bahá’í Faith, a man whose life embodied the Faith’s cardinal principle of racial unity and who helped forge the once predominantly white Bahá’í community in the United States into the example of racial diversity that it is today.

The museum, which opened on February 8, 2003, is the first Bahá’í museum in the world and also the first museum to commemorate the life of

1. For more information on the Louis G. Gregory Bahá’í Museum, see louisgregorymuseum.org.

NANCYBRANHAMSONGER

any individual in Charleston, a city devoted to memorializing its past. That the first person so honored was a descendant of a black slave and a white plantation owner can only be appreciated in the context of the history of that city, through whose port an untold number of Africans passed into slavery and whose citizens witnessed the shots that came to symbolize the beginning of the Civil War. It was in this light that Eugene Andrews, one of the speakers at the dedication, envisioned that the museum would become “a beacon of unity” for the world.

Louis G. Gregory

and His Legacy

Louis George Gregory (1874—1951)an intellectual educated at Avery Institute and Normal School, Fisk University, and the Howard University School of La ' can Baha’ is. He was the first American of African descent elected to the national administrative body of the Bahá’ís

of the United States and Canada and

is a miter and bushescwomon ang in Columblo, South {3 ' me trainer

in diversfly' I$UGS and conflict resoluflon, she Is a menibér of the L ,

Museum' 3 Advisory Committee.

World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 45

[Page 46]

NANCY BRANHAM SONGER

LOUIS G. GREGORY Honored in the Louis G. Gregory Bahá’í museum in Charleston, South Carolina, Louis C. Gregory worked tirelessly for more than four decades to promote racial unity and diversity and understanding of the Babe?! principle of the oneness of humanity.

posthumously was named a Hand of the Cause of God, an honor bestowed on only fifty Bahá’ís worldwide for their singular work in spreading and safeguarding the Faith. His incisive mind and exemplary character helped guide the American Bahá’í community toward understanding the oneness of humanity called for in the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith. He was also a major force for racial unity in the country, spearheading tace—amity conferences in major cities that drew audiences of thousands from

2. After the racial warfare that erupted in US. cities in the “Red Summer” of 1919, the Bahá’ís planned a series of tace—amity conferences that, unlike efforts of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Urban League, addressed human diversity; the interrelationship of the equality of religion, nationality, race, and gender; and the pivotal Bahá’í teaching of the oneness and wholeness of the human race.

46 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, NO. 1

all backgrounds.2 Giving up a successful Washington, D.C., legal career in 1917, he spent some three decades of his life, through 1946, traveling throughout the United States, often in dangerous circumstances, speaking on race amity in colleges and churches and to Civic groups. Gregory died in 1951 in Eliot, Maine, near the Green Acre Bahá’í School, where he had spent his last years teaching, corresponding with friends, and finishing a manuscript on “Racial Unity.”

Louis was born in Charleston only nine years after the war that freed his parents. His father, Ebenezer George, died not long after, and his mother struggled to support him and his brother until she married George Gregory, :1 freeborn man to whom the boy became devoted. It was George Gregory who made Louis’ education at Avery Normal Institute and Fisk University possible, and it is in George’s house, Where Louis spent part of his childhood, that the museum is housed.

The Charleston Bahá’ís acquired the deteriorated building in 1989 When Henry Wigfall, a Charleston Bahá’í, recognized the address and bid on the property at a tax auction. Bahá’ís in South Carolina and around the world quickly responded to an appeal from the Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Charleston (the local Bahá’í governing body) for help in financing the bid and, later, in renovating the house. The creation of a museum far exceeded the initial goal, which was simply to acquire and restore the property in Gregory’s honor. By the time the museum was dedicated, the tiny two—story edifice, constructed in the “Charleston single—house” style, had been proudly restored on the outside and its interior modernized to accommodate visitors and small gatherings.

[Page 47]Displayed in the museum are photographs of Gregory, his British—born wife, Louisa, and many prominent Bahá’ís; his diplomas and law license; personal correspondence and effects; programs from race-amity conferences at which he spoke in the 19205 and 19305; and other historic documents.

The museum dedication took place over three days between February 7 and 9, 2003, and included a celebration of the arts; workshops on race unity; a visit to Avery Institute; and a talk by Gayle Morrison, the author of To Move the World: Louis G. Gregory and the Advancement of Unity in America. Her 1982 biography of Gregory introduced the life of this extraordinary man to a new generation of Bahá’ís and thus was a major impetus for the museum.3 Morrison said she found that Gregory had been such a prominent figure in his lifetime as to be virtually a household name in black homes east of the Mississippi. Also part of the program was a PowerPoint montage of photographs of twenty—nine young people from ten countries and fourteen states who had been named in his honor—only a small number of his namesakes around the world.

On the last day, when the museum was officially opened, a proclamation from Charleston mayor Joe Riley was read before the ribbon was cut. Then the crowd that had gathered in the tiny court waited in respect while representatives of the institution of the Hands of the Cause, of the national Bahá’í governing council on which Gregory had served so

3. 7b Move the \Vorla' (Wilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982), may be obtained from www.bahaibookstore.com.

AFTERWORD

nobly for sixteen years, and of the Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Charleston one by one stepped reverently into

the building.

The Ripple Effect A few days before the dedication, on February 2, 2003, the Charleston Post and Courier heralded the museum’s opening with a story headlined “The Ripple Effect” featuring both Gregory and Philip Simmons, the noted AfricanAmerican blacksmith who crafted the museum’s sign. There was no hint as to how prescient that title would be. Three months after the dedication, on May 16, a 750—word article about the museum was published in the Columbia, South Carolina, daily newspaper, The State. Entitled “A Haven of Serenity,” it included a full-color reproduction of the montage of Gregory’s namesakes. The article was picked up by papers across the country and printed under other titles, usually with a photograph of Gregory or the museum. Over a sixweek period it appeared in the Salt Lake City Deseret Morning News (May 24), the Daily Oklahoman (May 24), the South Bend Pihum’ (May 29), the Washington Post (May 31), the 72’": Haute Tribune Star (May 31), the Indianapolis Star (June 14), the Atlanta journal—Comtitutian (June 28), and the St. Thomas (Virgin Islamic) Daibl News (May 24). The opening paragraph was published in the Ft. Wézyne Sentinel under “Top National Features Headlines” (May 21). In addition, press releases prepared by the museum dedication team were printed as large features in the South Carolina Black News (Jan. 30), the Wnston-Salem Chronicle (Feb. 6), and the Southern Mississippi Picayune Item (Feb. 14). Thus

news of the museum, which also ap World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1 47

[Page 48]

NANCY BRANHAM SONGER

peared on many of the papers’ web sites, reached countless thousands.

In the two years since the dedication, public knowledge of and regard for Louis Gregory has grown exponentially. In October 2003, Charleston’s MOJA (a Swahili word meaning “One”) Arts Festival, a celebration of African-American and Caribbean art, named the museum an African-American historic site.

In February 2004, a year after the dedication, Gayle Morrison was invited to speak at the South Carolina Book Festival, a major regional literary event, about her experiences in writing Gregory’s biography. She also had substantive interviews with the South Carolina Educational Television network and \WISTV, which serves the largest commercial market in the state.

In March 2004, Duette Rochelle, a Bahá’í from Kauai, Hawaii, arrived to serve as the museum’s first activities

4. To download or to view the 2005 South Carolina Aflz’mn American History Calendar, see

www.scafricanamericanhistory.com.

48 World Order, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 1

coordinator. Soon the museum was open to the public on a regular part—time schedule, receiving visitors who had learned about Gregory through the media or by word of mouth.

And in October 2004, Gregory was honored with other prominent South Catolinians when BellSouth published its 2005 Sout/y Carolina African American History Calendar; the “Bahá’í leader” is featured in January.4 BellSouth unveiled the calendar, produced for distribution to every school child in the state, at a formal ceremony celebrating those featured in it. Seventy—six year old Elizabeth Martin, whose mother had been taught the Bahá’í Faith by Louis Gregory, accepted the honor on behalf of the Bahá’ís of South Carolina. She stood alone in a spotlight on the stage in the darkened theater filled with more than one thousand guests while a huge projected photograph of Gregory’s face gazed over her at the audience. At that moment, few hearts could have remained untouched as the emcee recounted the story of the young boy from 2 Desportes Court who had come to be revered by people of all colors around the world.

[Page 49]Rellglon - Society 0 Pollty . Arts

Help World Order

continue to break new ground during its second Thir’ry-five years.

The magazine is accepting submissions (articles, poems, and reviews of hao/es, films, and exhibits) for m/eml theme issues:

The UN at Sixty Conflict Prevention

Law

Africa

Sustainable Development Unity

The magazine is also soliciting individual zzrticles on the theme topics and other issues of broad social concern, including:

Religion History Development Science Ecology Education

The Elimination of Racism and Sexism Architecture Urban Planning And More

Manuscript Submission Information

For a copy of the World Order style sheet for preparing a manuscript (and other tips), send an e—mail to <worldorder@usbnc.org>, or write to the address below.

Submissions to the journal will be subject to external blind peer review if they fall outside the expertise of the Editorial Board or upon request by the author.

Manuscripts (in Word or WordPerfect) should be sent to World Order, Dr. Betty J. Fisher, Managing Editor, 7311 Quail Springs Place NE, Albuquerque, NM 87113—1780, USA 01'

t0 <worldorder@usbnc.org>.

W/orla' Order has been published quarterly since 1966 by the National Spiritual Assembly

of the Bahá’ís of the United States.

[Page 50]

Forthcoming...

A Look at the Arts in Three Cultures

Adrienne Jervis reviews orfis’r Robin White's renderings of island life in New Zealand and Kiribofi

Anne Gordon Perry reviews a touring exhibit of The mulflfoceted work of US. arfls’r Romore Beorden

3. Barry Darugar explores, in 0 short story, escaping religious persecution in Iron

Articles on Unity and the UN 01‘ Slx’ry

ISSN 0043—8804