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World Order, Series 2 Volume 36 - Issue 4

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[Page i]Religion • Society • Polity • Arts

WORLD ORDER

In this issue...

The Search for Values in an Age of Transition A Statement of the Bahá’í International Community on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the United Nations Guest Editorial

Preventing Future Genocides An International Responsibility to Protect William R. Pace Nicole Deller

Global Education and Mobilizing Political Will for a Larger Freedom John Woodall, M.D.

AfterWord The International Criminal Court at a Crossroad An Update, 1998–2005 Jeffery Huffines

Sixtieth Anniversary of the United Nations Uneven History, Unprecedented Challenges

2005 Volume 36, No. 4 [Page ii]Religion Society Polity Arts. WORLD ORDER 2005 VOLUME 36, NUMBER 4

WORLD ORDER AIMS TO STIMULATE, INSPIRE, AND SERVE ITS READERS IN THEIR SEARCH TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY LIFE AND CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Betty J. Fisher Arash Abizadeh Monireh Kazemzadeh Diane Lotfi Kevin A. Morrison Robert H. Stockman Jim Stokes

CONSULTANT IN POETRY

Herbert Woodward Martin

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

World Order is published quarterly by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, 536 Sheridan Road, Wilmette, IL 60091-1811. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the publisher or of the Editorial Board.

Peer review: Submissions to the journal will be subject to external blind peer review if they fall outside the expertise of the Editorial Board or upon request by the author.

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Articles may range in length from some 3,750 to 6,250 words.

Reviews vary in length. Review Notes run from some 125 to 150 words; Mini-Reviews run from some 1,000 to 2,500 words, and Review Essays, from some 3,750 to 6,250 words.

Poems should be single spaced with clearly marked stanza breaks.

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CELJ

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COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Copyright 2006 by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States; all rights reserved. World Order is protected through trademark registration in the U.S. Patent Office. Printed in the U.S.A. ISSN 0043-8804.

ART CREDITS

Cover design by Ric Doering; cover photograph, Emilio Chan; pp. 14, 34, photographs, Steve Garrigues; p. 56, photograph. Paul Slaughter; pp. 58, 64, photographs, Steve Garrigues. [Page 1]2005 VOLUME 36, NUMBER 4

CONTENTS

2 The Search for Values in an Age of Transition: A Statement of the Bahá’í International Community on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the United Nations Guest Editorial

15 Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect by William R. Pace and Nicole Deller

33 Unforeseen Encounter a poem by Anne Gordon Perry

35 Global Education and Mobilizing Political Will for a Larger Freedom by John Woodall, M.D.

57 It’s the People a poem by Robert Atkinson

59 AfterWord The International Criminal Court at a Crossroad: An Update, 1998–2005 by Jeffery Huffines [Page 2]

I

In 1945, the founding of the United Nations gave a war-weary world a vision of what was possible in the arena of international cooperation and set a new standard by which to guide diverse peoples and nations toward a peaceful coexistence. Against the backdrop of the most calamitous war in human history, the creation of a world organization for the protection of the dignity, equal rights, and security of all peoples and nations was an extraordinary feat of statecraft. Sixty years later, the questions that fueled the San Francisco Conference assert themselves anew: Why have the current systems of governance failed to provide for the security, prosperity, and well-being of the world's people? What responsibilities do nations have toward their neighbors and their citizens? What fundamental values should guide relationships between and within nations to secure a peaceful future?

In the collective effort to find answers to these questions, a new paradigm is taking hold that of the interconnected nature of our challenges and our prosperity. Whether the issue is poverty, the proliferation of weapons, the role of women, AIDS, global trade, religion, environmental sustainability, the well-being of children, corruption, or the rights of minority populations-it is clear that none of the problems facing humanity can be adequately addressed in isolation from one another. The blurring of national boundaries in the face of global crises has shown, beyond a doubt, that the body of humankind represents one organic whole.¹

Copyright 2006 by the Bahá’í International Community.

1. While the United Nations has begun to formally recognize the interdependence of human rights, development, and collective security, such a holistic perspective has been echoed throughout the contributions of civil society organizations to the work of the United Nations, as, for example at the global United Nations conferences including the Conference on Environment and Development (1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (1993), the World Conference on Population and Development (1994), the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), the World Summit for Social Development (1995), and the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (1996). [Page 3]practical implications of this emergent paradigm for the reform of the United Nations are the focus of the Bahá’í International Community's contribution on the 60th anniversary of this august body.²

The processes of United Nations reform must be understood as part of a broader evolutionary course, starting with early forms of international cooperation such as the League of Nations and leading to increasing levels of coherence in the administration of human affairs, facilitated by creation of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the growing body of international law, the emergence and integration of newly independent states, and mechanisms for regional and global cooperation. The last fifteen years alone have seen the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court, the African Union, the significant expansion of the European Union, the global coordination of civil society campaigns, and the articulation of the Millennium Development Goals—an unprecedented global development framework aimed at the eradication of poverty worldwide. In the course of these developments, the definition of state sovereignty—a cornerstone of the modern system of international relations and a foundational principle of the United Nations Charter—has itself emerged as the object of vigorous debate: what are the limits of traditional notions of sovereignty? What responsibilities do States have toward their citizens and toward each other? How should such responsibilities be enforced?³ Although uneven and fraught with set-

2. The Bahá’í International Community, in its capacity as an international nongovernmental organization, has been actively involved with the United Nations since its founding conference in 1945. On the occasion of the United Nations' 10th anniversary, the Bahá’í International Community submitted its proposals for Charter Revision to the Secretary General based on the recognition that "real sovereignty is no longer vested in the institutions of the national state because the nations have become interdependent; that the existing crisis is moral and spiritual as well as political; and that the existing crisis can only be surmounted by the achievement of a world order representative of the peoples as well as the nations of mankind (Bahá’í International Community, "Proposals for Charter Revision Submitted to the United Nations by the Bahá’í International Community [1955]." The Bahá’í World 1954-1963, Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton, New York, 1970). In 1995, the Bahá’í International Community released a statement on the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, which highlighted the trend toward the ever-increasing interdependence of humanity and presented proposals for the resuscitation of the General Assembly, development of the executive function, strengthening the world court, promoting economic and moral development, human rights and the advancement of women (Bahá’í International Community, Turning Point for All Nations, Bahá’í International Community's United Nations Office, New York, 1995.) Throughout its history of association with the United Nations, the Bahá’í International Community has contributed its vision and experience through submissions dealing with the advancement of women, human rights, the environment, global prosperity, and economic development, among others.

3. In 2000, in response to the alarming failure of the international community to intervene, or to intervene effectively, in massive crises such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, the Canadian Government established a commission to address questions about the legal, moral, operational, and political dimensions of humanitarian intervention. The resulting International Commission on Inter- [Page 4]

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backs, the emergent institutions, movements, and discourse evidence an increasing drive toward unity in world affairs and constitute one of the pervasive features of social organization at the end of the 20th century and in the first years of the new millennium.

Why, then, given the dramatic increase of mechanisms and fora for cooperation is the world so deeply divided against itself? Why the universal affliction, which assails relations between those of different cultures, creeds, religions, political affiliations, economic status, and gender? To answer these questions, we must examine dispassionately the legal standards, political and economic theories, values and religious formulae, which have ceased to promote the welfare of humankind. The advancement of men and boys at the expense of women and girls has sorely limited the creative and material capacities of communities to develop and address their problems; the neglect of cultural and religious minorities has intensified ancient prejudices setting peoples and nations against one another; an unbridled nationalism has trampled the rights and opportunities of citizens in other nations; weak states have erupted in conflict, lawlessness, and massive refugee flows; narrow economic agendas exalting material prosperity have often suffocated the social and moral development required for the equitable and beneficent use of wealth. Such crises have laid bare the limits of traditional approaches to governance and put before the United Nations the inescapable question of values: which values are capable of guiding the nations and peoples of the world out of the chaos of competing interests and ideologies toward a world community capable of inculcating the principles of justice and equity at all levels of human society?

The question of values and their inextricable link to systems of religion and belief has emerged on the world stage as a subject of consuming global importance, which the United Nations cannot afford to ignore. While the General Assembly has passed a number of resolutions addressing the role of religion in the promotion of peace and calling for the elimination of religious intolerance, it struggles to grasp fully both the constructive role that religion can play in creating a peaceful global order and the destructive impact that religious fanaticism can have on the stability and

vention and State Sovereignty released its findings and central principles in a 2001 report titled, Responsibility to Protect. Repeated failure to intervene effectively in the crisis in Darfur, Sudan has lent even greater urgency to the definition of legal standards and operational norms for intervention.

4. For example, "Promotion of interreligious dialogue" (A/RES/59/23), the "Promotion of religious and cultural understanding, harmony and cooperation" (A/RES/59/142), the "Global Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations" (A/RES/56/6), the "Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance" (A/RES/59/ 199), and the UNESCO Director-General's report (A/59/201) to the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly "Promotion of religious and cultural understanding, harmony and cooperation" (A/RES/58/128). [Page 5]progress of the world. A growing number of leaders and deliberative bodies acknowledge that such considerations must move from the periphery to the center of debate—recognizing that the full impact of religion-related variables' on governance, diplomacy, human rights, development, notions of justice and collective security must be better understood." Neither political leaders nor academics foresaw such a widespread re-emergence of religion in the public sphere nor did the practice of international relations develop the conceptual tools to address religion in a meaningful way. Our inherited notions of religion as an irrelevant and obstructionist voice in the international public sphere offer no help in resolving the complex problems before the leaders of the world's nations. In fact, the appropriate role of religion in the public sphere is one of the most pressing issues of our time.

That religions have been manipulated and used for the accomplishment of narrow ends cannot be denied. Yet, a careful historical analysis reveals that the periods of greatest advancement in human civilization have been those where both faith and reason were permitted to work together, drawing on the resources of the totality of human insight and experience. For example, during the height of Muslim civilization, sciences, philosophy, and the arts flourished; a vibrant culture of learning propelled the human imagination to new heights, providing, among others, the mathematical basis for many of today's technological innovations. Among humanity's diverse civilizations, religion has provided the framework for new moral codes and legal standards, which have transformed vast regions of the globe from

5. These include, among others, religious teachings and interpretation, followers of religions, religious leaders and institutions. 6. While a detailed description is beyond the scope of this statement, examples of the resurgence of religion as a matter of urgent political importance includes: widespread violence in the name of religion; spread of religious fundamentalism and its impact on political regimes; increasing tension between religion and States' policies; challenges in the design of national and regional governing structures capable of satisfying demands for fair representation from different religious groups; social, political and economic integration of religious minorities; clashes between religious and civil law; impact of religion in international policy forums (i.e. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 1994; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995); violation of human rights in the name of religion including the right to change one's religion. Such developments are set against the increased efforts at inter-faith dialogue and cooperation between religious leaders and their communities; the impressive global networks of religiously inspired charitable and humanitarian organizations and movements calling attention to the ethical dimensions of global economic integration; the intellectual and moral legacy of religions in the articulation of moral principles (e.g. just war ethic); the capacity of religions to move individuals and groups toward selflessness, non-violence, and reconciliation. 7. Several factors have contributed to the near complete rejection of religion in concepts of international relations. First, the social sciences were based upon the work of those who believed that religion was giving way to rational and scientific modes of thought which would crush what they saw as the ignorance and superstition caused by religion, thereby ushering in a period of modernity. Second, [Page 6]

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brutish and often anarchical systems to more sophisticated forms of governance. The existing debate about religion in the public sphere, however, has been driven by the voices and actions of extreme proponents on both sides—those who impose their religious ideology by force, whose most visible expression is terrorism—and those who deny any place for expressions of faith or belief in the public sphere. Yet neither extreme is representative of the majority of humankind and neither promotes a sustainable peace.

At this juncture of our evolution as a global community, the search for shared values—beyond the clash of extremes—is paramount for effective action. A concern with exclusively material considerations will fail to appreciate the degree to which religious, ideological, and cultural variables shape diplomacy and decision-making.

In an effort to move beyond a community of nations bound by primarily economic relationships to one with shared responsibilities for one another’s well-being and security, the question of values must take a central place in deliberations, be articulated and made explicit. While the United Nations has repeatedly emphasized the need for multilateralism, such efforts alone, while a step in the right direction, will not provide a sufficient basis for community building between nations; collaboration alone does not confer legitimacy or ensure benevolent outcomes for the greater good. In order to fulfill the promises of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent treaties and resolutions, we can no longer be content with a passive tolerance of each other’s worldviews; what is required is an active search for those common values and moral principles which will lift up the condition of every woman, man, and child, regardless of race, class, religion or political opinion.

We assert that the emerging global order, and the processes of globalization that define it, must be founded on the principle of the oneness of humankind. This principle, accepted and affirmed as a common understanding, provides the practical basis for the organization of relationships between all states and nations. The increasingly apparent interconnectedness of development, security and human rights on a global scale confirms that peace and prosperity are indivisible—that no sustainable benefit can be conferred on a nation or community if the welfare of the

“not only was international relations theory (like other social sciences) founded upon the belief that religion was receding from the world as an important factor, it can be argued that the modern context for the relations between states was founded on intentionally secular principles. The modern concept for the territorial state, the basis for modern international relations, was articulated by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,” which, “was designed to end the Thirty Years’ War between Protestant and Catholic States. In doing so, it developed a format for relations between states which did not include religion.” (Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2005), “The Question of Religion and World Politics,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 17: 296-98). [Page 7]nations as a whole is ignored or neglected. The principle of the oneness of human- kind does not seek to undermine national autonomy or suppress the cultural and intellectual diversity of the peoples and nations of the world. Rather, it seeks to broaden the basis of the existing foundations of society by calling for a wider loyalty, a greater aspiration than any that has animated the human race. Indeed, it provides the moral impetus needed to remold the institutions of governance in a manner consistent with the needs of an ever-changing world.

From the teachings of the Bahá’í Faith, we offer the following vision, in the realization of which the members of the worldwide Bahá’í community across 191 nations are engaged:

A world community in which all economic barriers will have been permanently demolished and the interdependence of capital and labor definitely recognized; in which the clamor of religious fanaticism and strife will have been forever stilled; in which the flame of racial animosity will have been finally extinguished; in which a single code of international law-the product of the considered judg- ment of the world's federated representatives-shall have as its sanction the instant and coercive intervention of the combined forces of the federated units; and finally a world community in which the fury of a capricious and militant nationalism will have been transmuted into an abiding consciousness of world citizenship.

II

In light of the foregoing analysis and the areas currently under consideration by the United Nations, we offer the following recommendations as concrete steps toward the realization of a more just and effective United Nations system. Our recommen- dations address human rights and the rule of law, development, democracy, and collective security.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW

No effective and peaceful international order can be founded and sustained unless it is firmly grounded in the principles of justice and the rule of law. An adherence to such principles provides the requisite stability and legitimacy required to gain the support of peoples and nations that the system aims to serve. We offer the following recommendations:

a. The grave threats posed by religious extremism, intolerance and discrimination require the United Nations to address this issue openly and earnestly. We call on the United Nations to affirm unequivocally an individual's right to change his or her religion under international law. The General Assembly may request the International Court of Justice, under Article 96 of the United Nations Charter, to issue an advisory opinion on the issue of freedom of religion or

8. Shoghi Effendi, "The Goal of a New World Order" [1931], The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh (Wilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1991). [Page 8]

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belief. Specifically, the Court could be asked whether the principle of freedom of religion or belief has attained the status of jus cogens, customary international law, or is merely left to the interpretation of each state. Such a clarification would help to remove fallacious interpretations of this right and lend moral force to the condemnation of policies and practices that violate the principle of non-discrimination in matters of religion or belief."

b. Beyond the ongoing structural and functional reforms of the United Nations human rights machinery, the legitimacy of this machinery must be restored through its consistent adherence to the highest principles of justice, including those elaborated in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Only in this way, will it secure the legitimacy and trust of Member States and their citizens required for it to exercise its mandate.

c. The General Assembly should consider setting a timeline for the universal ratification of international human rights treaties.

d. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, bolstered by the requisite moral, intellectual, and material resources, must now become the standard-bearer in the field of human rights and an effective tool in alleviating the suffering of individuals and groups whose rights are denied.

• As one of the most effective instruments for the protection of human rights, Special Procedures should receive adequate budgetary and administrative support. Government cooperation with Special Procedures should not only be limited to access into the country in question but, equally important, should include full consideration of subsequent recommendations. These should be reflected in the interactive dialogues between the Rapporteur and Member States.

The Public Information section of the Office of the High Commissioner should be developed in order to allow resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights/Human Rights Council, recommendations of the Special Procedures and concluding observations of the treaty monitoring bodies to be accorded more prominence in the media. This could include, for example, the translation of documents into relevant national languages in order to generate more publicity.

The Office of the High Commissioner, along with the Council, should continue its productive engagement with non-governmental organizations, which, since its inception, has contributed positively both to the work of the Office and to the development of non-governmental organizations' capacity to interact meaningfully in this context.

9. Bahá’í International Community, Freedom to Believe (Bahá’í International Community’s United Nations Office, New York, 2005). [Page 9]

DEVELOPMENT

At the heart of human development must be the understanding that people are irreplaceable resources in a self-sustaining process of change. The challenge is to find methods that allow them to fully express this potential in all its dimensions. Development defined in terms of certain patterns of “modernization,” however, seems to refer exactly to those processes, which promote the domination of people’s material ambitions over their spiritual goals. While the search of a scientific and technologically modern society is a central goal of human development, it must base its educational, economic, political, and cultural structures on the concept of the spiritual nature of the human being and not only on his or her material needs. We offer the following recommendations:

a. The capacity of people to participate in the generation and application of knowledge is an essential component of human development. As such, priority must be given to the education of girls and boys, women and men in order to enable them to set the path of their own development and to apply their knowledge in the service of the greater community. The United Nations should consider that in terms of economic investment, the education of girls may well yield the highest return of all investments available in developing countries considering both private benefits, as well as returns to family members and the greater community.¹⁰

b. We submit for the consideration of the United Nations five spiritual principles, which may serve as a basis for the creation of indicators of human development, to be used alongside existing measures of development. These principles include: unity in diversity, equity and justice, equality of the sexes, trustworthiness and moral leadership, and the freedom of conscience, thought, and religion.¹¹

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10. According to the World Bank, in addition to being more productive in market work, educated women have smaller families, fewer of their children die in infancy and the children who survive are healthier and better educated. Educated women are also better equipped to enter the paid labor force, which is critical to the survival of the many female-headed households in developing countries. Nations with higher levels of female school enrollment show higher levels of economic productivity, lower fertility, lower infant and maternal mortality, and longer life expectancy than countries that have not achieved as high enrollment levels for girls. (World Bank, “The Benefits of Education for Women” (1993), URL: www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/hnp/hddflash/hcnote/hrn002.html).

11. For a detailed discussion see: Bahá’í International Community, Valuing Spirituality in Development: Initial Considerations Regarding the Creation of Spiritually Based Indicators for Development, a concept paper written for the World Faiths Development Dialogue, Lambeth Palace, London (The Bahá’í Publishing Trust: London, 1998). [Page 10]c. The rich countries of the world have a moral obligation to remove export and trade distorting measures that bar the entry of countries struggling to participate in the global market. The Monterrey Consensus, which recognizes the importance of creating a "more open, rule-based, non-discriminatory and equitable" system of trade, is a step in the right direction. 12

d. Alongside reform in systems of trade, countries must facilitate the flow of labor and address the dehumanizing impact of trafficking in persons, which leads to widespread economic and sexual exploitation of people seeking a better life.

DEMOCRACY

We commend the international community for its commitment to democracy and to a freely elected government as a universal value. However, the standard of deliberation and truth-seeking required for the realization of goals set by the United Nations needs to go far beyond the patterns of partisanship, protest, and compromise that tend to characterize present day discussions of human affairs. What is needed is a consultative process-at all levels of governance-in which individual participants strive to transcend their respective points of view, in order to function as members of one body with its own interests and goals. Through participation and unity of purpose, consultation becomes the operating expression of justice in human affairs. Without this principled anchor, democracy falls prey to the excesses of individualism and nationalism, which tear at the fabric of the community-both nationally and globally.

Beyond the administration of material affairs, governance is a moral exercise. It is the expression of a trusteeship-a responsibility to protect and to serve the members of the social polity. Indeed, the exercise of democracy will succeed to the extent that it is governed by the moral principles that are in harmony with the evolving interests of a rapidly maturing human race. These include: trustworthiness and integrity needed to win the respect and support of the governed; transparency; consultation with those affected by decisions being arrived at; objective assessment of needs and aspirations of communities being served; and the appropriate use of scientific and moral resources. 13 We offer the following recommendations:

a. To secure the legitimacy, confidence, and support needed for the realization of its goals, the United Nations needs to address the democratic deficits in its own agencies and deliberations.

b. Thorough deliberation of the pressing issues of the day requires the United Nations to develop modes for constructive and systematic engagement with organizations of civil society (including businesses and religious organizations)

12. The Monterrey Consensus, (A/CONF.198/11).

13. In the 1980s and 1990s the world made dramatic progress in opening up political systems and expanding political freedoms. Over eighty countries took significant steps toward democracy, and today 140 of the world's nearly 200 countries hold multiparty elections-more than ever before. Despite these positive developments, Gallup International's Millennium Survey (1999) found that of the 50,000 people surveyed in 60 countries, less than a third felt that their country was governed by the will of the people. Only 1 in 10 respondents said that their government responded to the people's will. [Page 11]as well as members of national parliaments. The relationship between civil society organizations, parliamentarians and the traditional diplomatic processes of the United Nations need not be one of competition but rather complementarity, rooted in the recognition that the relative strengths of all three constituencies are necessary for effective decision-making and subsequent implementation. We urge the United Nations to give serious consideration to the proposals put forth in the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relationships. 15

c. A healthy democracy must be founded on the principle of the equality of men and women and equal recognition of their contribution to the establishment of a just society. In its efforts to promote democracy, the Member States of the United Nations must vigilantly work for the inclusion of women in all facets of governance in their respective countries. This is not a privilege but a practical necessity for the achievement of the high-minded and complex goals before the Organization today.

d. The meaningful integration of minority groups in democratic processes is of critical importance-both to shield minorities from the abuses of the past and to encourage their participation and responsibility for the well-being of society. We urge Member States, in their work to promote democracy, to strive for

14. Over the last five years, the United Nations has generated numerous examples of innovative governance: In 2000, the United Nations Economic and Social Council established a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to serve as an advisory body to the Council on indigenous issues relating to economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, and health and human rights, culminating a decades-long struggle of indigenous peoples to regain standing within the global community; in June 2005, the General Assembly-for the first time-held interactive hearings with civil society and the private sector, in which some 200 non-governmental organizations presented their views on United Nations reform for consideration by Member States in preparation for the 2005 United Nations World Summit; also in June 2005, a tripartite convening group composed of a core group of Member States (Argentina, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, and Tunisia), civil society, the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs organized a conference titled Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, which aimed to provide input to the 2005 World Summit regarding strategies to promote interfaith cooperation for peace. It was the first time that a Member State-initiated conference had been co-organized and led by Member States, civil society and United Nations agencies working alongside. Given the challenging nature of the subject matter, the organizational approach provided a useful template for similar endeavors in the future. Also worthy of note is that in 2002, the International Parliamentary Union was granted permanent observer status in the General Assembly of the United Nations, setting in motion new forms of cooperation.

15. Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relationships, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the UN and Global Governance (United Nations: New York, 2004). [Page 12]

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the full inclusion of minorities-belonging to any faith, race, or class-in the processes of goal-setting and deliberation. As the cultural make-up of states becomes increasingly fluid and diverse, no one cultural or religious group can lay claim to an adequate definition of the national interest.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

We welcome the United Nations' efforts to articulate a more comprehensive vision of collective security, based on the understanding that in our interconnected world, a threat to one is a threat to all. The Bahá’í Faith envisions a system of collective security within a framework of a global federation, a federation in which national borders have been conclusively defined, and in whose favor all the nations of the world will have willingly ceded all rights to maintain armaments except for purposes of maintaining internal order. While cognizant of the grave shortfalls of the current system of collective security, we commend the Security Council for its landmark Resolution on "Women, Peace, and Security" recognizing for the first time in its history the needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations 18 and their enduring role in the promotion of peace. We offer the following recommen- dations: 19 a. To address the democracy deficit and relentless politicization of the Security Council, the United Nations must in due course move toward adopting a procedure for eventually eliminating permanent membership and veto power." Alongside procedural reforms, a critical change in the attitude and conduct are needed. Member States must recognize that in holding seats on the Security Council and as signatories to the Charter of the United Nations, they have a solemn moral and legal obligation to act as trustees for the entire community of nations, not as advocates of their national interests. 20

16. For the system to be successful, unity, strength, elasticity and public opinion are essential: unity of thought and purpose among the permanent members, strength involving the use of adequate force to ensure the efficacy of the system, elasticity to enable the system to meet the legitimate needs of its afflicted upholders, and universal public opinion-that of women and men-to secure collective action.

17. Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325 (2000).

18. Typically wars and conflicts have drawn little distinction between militants and civilians, and between adults and children. Yet armed conflicts affect women and girls differently from men and boys. For example, rape and sexual violence perpetrated by the armed forces, whether governmental or other actors, including peacekeeping personnel, increase the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually trans- mitted diseases. Most of the HIV/AIDS victims in developing countries are women and girls. That disease leaves millions of orphans who, in most cases, are cared for by older women.

19. While the veto has often served as an important safeguard against the oppressive majoritarianism, it has also obstructed effective action against countries that pose a threat to their neighbors. An interim measure may include not using veto power when voting on questions of genocide or other gross threats to international peace and security.

20. The United Nations Charter states that, "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." (Article 24). [Page 13]b. A definition of terrorism must be adopted. We agree with the Secretary General’s characterization of terrorism as any action, “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” Moreover, it is imperative that problems such as terrorism be consistently addressed within the context of other issues that disrupt and destabilize society.²¹

c. We urge the United Nations to take the necessary steps to increase the participation of women at all levels of decision-making in conflict resolution and peace processes, locally, nationally and internationally, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.²²

We believe the task of establishing a peaceful world is now in the hands of the leaders of the nations of the world, by virtue of the tremendous responsibilities with which they have been entrusted. Their challenge now is to restore the trust and confidence of their citizens in themselves, their government, and the institutions of the international order through a record of personal integrity, sincerity of purpose, and unwavering commitment to the highest principles of justice and the imperatives of a world hungering for unity. The great peace long envisioned by the peoples and nations of the world is well within our grasp.

---

21. Such disruptive and destabilizing factors include, among others: governments’ failure to meaningfully integrate religious and ethnic minorities; increased access to weapons; the destabilization and collapse of governments; and a general sense of social, political, economic, cultural crisis—all of which combine to create an environment that could invite violent radical ideologies to take hold and flourish.

22. This requires the implementation of the Secretary General’s strategic plan of action (A/49/587), which calls for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes. Member States need to follow through with their commitments under international law including the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).

[Page 15]

Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect

By William R. Pace and Nicole Deller

Introduction

The Charter of the United Nations begins with a goal of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” The inability of the United Nations to live up to this goal and to prevent deadly conflict has contributed to the loss of millions of lives, the displacement of millions more, and untold economic devastation.

During the first four decades of the UN’s history, the world understood that the Cold War was responsible for the UN’s inability to prevent wars and protect the most at-risk civilians. During that time only those conflicts and crises that did not concern the direct strategic interests of either the United States or the Soviet Union could be addressed within the UN.

The end of the Cold War restored hope that the UN would become the institution through which collective international action could be taken to respond to global security threats and to protect those in greatest need. Since that time, however, millions of civilians have been the targets of deadly conflict in Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda, among others.

The UN and collective security should be synonymous. Instead, the principles of sovereignty and noninterference continue to prevent collective responses that [Page 16]would avert massive human-rights abuses, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In Kosovo, the Security Council was not able to take action against the atrocities being committed by Serbian forces because China and Russia sought to uphold the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and objected to Security Council involvement in the internal affairs of that state. The concern over respecting the sovereign rights of Sudan—notwithstanding the evidence of the government's role in committing atrocities—severely limited actions to protect the populations in the Darfur region.

Despite the many human-rights and humanitarian commitments that states have accepted, a substantial number of governments continue to believe that sovereignty entitles them to block international scrutiny, even in the face of massive human-rights violations and acts of genocide. Governments have hidden behind the principles of sovereignty and noninterference while allowing or themselves conducting atrocities against their own populations.

Because governments have long resisted intrusion into their internal affairs, the international community has not invested in collective mechanisms that would prevent conflict and has not made protecting civilians (particularly in the poorest countries) a political priority. The major powers have consistently failed to take early action in cases where large numbers of civilian lives are in jeopardy. The most horrifying example of this failure during the past decade was the genocide in Rwanda. Despite clear warning of the oncoming attacks against civilian populations, the Security Council did not act to protect the people of Rwanda. Instead, as the genocide erupted, the Security Council reduced the UN presence, leaving only 270 peacekeepers to protect the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu victims.²

The tension between national sovereignty and a lack of international will to protect vulnerable populations is one of the major dilemmas that UN member states are facing at this time, the United Nations' sixtieth anniversary. UN member states are currently attempting to confront many of the shortcomings of the UN's capacity to respond to the most urgent threats to global security. Under the auspices of the General Assembly, governments agreed in April 2005 to negotiate a reform agenda spanning a wide range of proposals intended to provide security for all people. "Security" in this context was broadly defined to include protection from genocide, freedom from poverty, safety from environmental degradation and disease, and freedom from the threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. It was expected that commitments to strengthen the UN's capacity to respond to such threats would be finalized in September 2005 at a High-level Plenary Meeting, a summit of world leaders at the UN.

2. See United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 912, 1994. [Page 17]

PREVENTING FUTURE GENOCIDES

Despite lengthy negotiations at the UN and in capitals around the world, the 2005 Summit did not realize many of the goals included in the ambitious agenda. Member states did not agree on a definition of terrorism or on measures to strengthen the international commitments regarding nonproliferation and disarmament. Supporters of reforms for environment and development struggled to preserve the status quo rather than to make advancements. Member states did reach a general agreement about establishing a new UN human-rights council and a UN Peacebuilding Commission. But they failed to agree on the specifics for the two institutions, and negotiations on the details are continuing.3 The bar was set high for the reform process, and many critics lamented the missed opportunities." Governments did, however, make an unprecedented commitment to act earlier and more effectively to prevent genocide and other massive violations of human rights. Specifically, governments agreed that there is a national and international "responsibility to protect" populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

The significance of the commitment to the responsibility to protect (also referred to as R2P) is that (1) it reconciles the needs and rights of the individual with the duties of the international community and the rights of the sovereign state, reinforcing the belief that human security lies at the heart of national security; (2) it establishes a basis for accountability not only for the state's failures but also for those of the international community; and (3) it codifies the responsibility of the international community to prevent as well as to react to massive violations of human rights.

Introduction of the Norm of the Responsibility to Protect

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the term "responsibility to protect" in its report The Responsibility to Protect, published in December 2001.6 The ICISS was established by the Canadian

3. Negotiations for the Peacebuilding Commission were completed in December 2005, whereas negotiations on the Human Rights Council are expected to continue through January 2006. 4. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Wimp on Genocide," New York Times Sept. 18, 2005; Mary Robinson, "A New Way of Doing the World's Business," International Herald Tribune Sept. 25, 2005; Nancy Soderberg, "The United Nations' Missed Opportunity," Financial Times Sept. 13, 2005; Emma-Kate Symons, "UN Reform a Disaster: Evans," Australian Oct. 19, 2005; Ramesh Thakur, "U.N.'s 'Einstein' Moment," Japan Times Oct. 3, 2005; Nick Wadhams, "U.N. General Assembly Agrees on Watered-Down Document for World Leaders to Approve," Associated Press Sept. 14, 2005. 5. United Nations, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Sept. 15, 2005, par. 138, http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/docs/2005summit_final_outcome.pdf. 6. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Dec. 2001, http://www.iciss.ca/pdf.Commission-Report.pdf. [Page 18]Government in September 2000 during the UN Millennium Summit in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's challenge to member states to address dilemmas posed by humanitarian crises where intervention to protect human lives and the sanctity of state sovereignty are in conflict.

The concepts put forward in The Responsibility to Protect bring clarity to the issues of when the UN must refrain from acting out of respect for state sovereignty and when it must take action to protect human rights. While the UN Charter affirms a principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, it also sets forth, as one of its main purposes, the achievement of international cooperation in promoting human rights. But the Charter offers no guidance about when sovereignty (a fundamental principle of international law) must yield to protection against the most egregious violations against humanity and international law—genocide, ethnic cleansing, and massive human-rights abuses.

Earlier governmental and academic discussions frequently addressed the dilemma between national sovereignty and human rights within the framework of humanitarian intervention, which considers whether there is a right for one state or group of states to intervene in another state's affairs. But the authors of the ICISS report rejected the humanitarian-intervention construct that emphasized the perspectives of states. They also rejected a debate arguing for or against a "right to intervene," a concept that they called "outdated and unhelpful"; instead, the ICISS report emphasized the needs of the people and the responsibilities of states for the "functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare." The responsibility to protect, according to the ICISS report, lies "first and foremost with the state" whose populations are at risk, an assertion intended to reflect existing international law as well as the "practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference."10

The concept of state responsibility that is articulated in the ICISS report builds on earlier works of influential academics and international policy makers. For example, Francis Deng, the Secretary-General's special representative on internally displaced persons, articulated the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility in a book

7. See Charter of the United Nations, art. 2.7, Preamble. 8. See, for example, Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), and the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999). 9. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 2.4, 2.15. 10. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 2.30. [Page 19]on the protection of internally displaced persons." In a 1999 article the Secretary-General commented on the emerging understanding of the state's responsibilities to its populations:

States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty-by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties-has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.12

The ICISS report supports the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility and adds that the state's duty to the individual is so important that it must also be borne by the international community. That is, when a state fails its responsibility by permitting or conducting widespread killing or massive human-rights violations on its own populations, the international community has the responsibility to protect those individuals.

That the international community has duties, rather than mere interests, in the protection of individuals has underpinnings in many legal and political undertakings. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva conventions and additional protocols, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 13 Collectively, these international obligations are fostering a "transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability." 14

The international responsibility to protect is also an extension of the human-security paradigm that is gaining acceptance within governments. The idea of this

11. See Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution P, 1993) 14-20; see also Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution P, 1996).

12. Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," Economist, Sept. 18, 1999.

13. See United Nations, General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948; United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966; United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966; United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 260 A (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948; Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV, Switzerland: 1849-1949, and additional protocols (Protocol I, II), Switzerland, 1977; and United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002.

14. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 2.18. [Page 20]paradigm is "for people to be secure, not just for territories within borders to be secure against external aggression."15 The ICISS report describes human security as "the security of people-their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms."16 The concept that security requires solidarity with humans that transcends state borders is at the foundation of the principle of the responsibility to protect.

One of the most important contributions of the ICISS report to the debate on sovereignty and human protection is its assertion that the international community's responsibility is not simply a question of whether military intervention should take place. Instead, the international community should take responsibility for a continuum of actions to avert or to halt a crisis. The ICISS report describes this responsibility as one of preventing, reacting, and rebuilding. The international community must employ a range of tools to prevent latent threats from becoming imminent and to prevent imminent threats from becoming reality.

At the same time, the responsibility-to-protect concept places limitations on when the international community can and should act to prevent states from taking measures in pursuance of their own national interests while characterizing the measures as human protection. Specifically, the ICISS report proposes precautionary principles that must be considered if preventive efforts fail and if military force is needed to avert or halt the large-scale loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing. The recommended precautionary principles are:

• seriousness of threat
• right intention (averting or halting human suffering)
• last resort
• proportional means
• reasonable prospects of success

The five criteria are designed to serve as indicators guiding when the Security Council should intervene and helping to determine when justifications for the responsibility to protect are disguising other motives. Meeting the criteria would encourage action where political will is otherwise lacking or is obstructed by one country's strategic interests. Not meeting the criteria would attest to possibly improper motives on the part of the would-be intervener or would indicate that not all nonmilitary measures have been exhausted. Moreover, the criteria would set a

15. Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003, 6, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/chapter1.pdf. 16. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 2.21. [Page 21]standard by which Security Council actions and inactions could be judged, thus improving accountability and deterring unilateral and illegitimate preemptive wars. Finally, the ICISS report discusses what should be done if the majority of the international community seeks action, but the Security Council fails to act. The goal of the responsibility to protect is to get the Security Council to work better, but the ICISS believes that, if the Security Council fails, alternative sources of authority must be explored. They propose that the General Assembly or regional or subregional organizations are possible alternative sources of authority. The ICISS report establishes a threshold indicating when such action would warrant that step and insists on the application of the precautionary principles.

Early Reactions to the Responsibility to Protect

The timing of the December 2001 release of The Responsibility to Protect was devastating to its initial reception. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the international debate shifted away from consideration of measures to prevent another Rwanda or Srebrenica and toward measures for preventing and preempting terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, based in part on an argument of human protection, was even more devastating to the responsibility-to-protect agenda. The invasion increased concern that the responsibility to protect would be used to further erode the sovereignty of smaller developing countries. One of the authors of the ICISS report, Gareth Evans, wrote that the argument that the invasion of Iraq was based on protecting Iraqis against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein "almost choked at birth" the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect.¹⁷

In the political climate of the first years of the twenty-first century, civil-society organizations, particularly those dedicated to human rights and the protection of civilians, also began considering the responsibility-to-protect principles. The World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) engaged in initial consultations about the ICISS report to determine whether its principles could be useful to civil society and whether they should be the subject of advocacy campaigns. The WFM-IGP convened roundtables with humanitarian organizations, such as CARE International, Oxfam International, and World Vision; human-rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; and faith-based organizations, including Quakers, Mennonites, and Unitarians. The consultations reflected widespread support among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the expansion of the notion of sovereignty to include protection and for the interna-

17. Gareth Evans, "When Is It Right to Fight?" Survival 46.3 (2004): 59-82. [Page 22]tional community to commit to a continuum of protective measures that emphasize prevention and treat force as a last resort. However, the NGOs consulted showed little interest in advocating a doctrine aimed at justifying military interventions, particularly those that occur without Security Council or multilateral approval. 18 Although support for the responsibility to protect was limited in the initial period after the release of the ICISS report, the crisis that began in early 2003 in the Darfur region of Sudan again highlighted the need to improve the international community's response to emerging humanitarian crises. By the spring of 2004 the fact that crimes against humanity, if not genocide, had been taking place for well over a year without the international community's comprehensive effort to bring them to an end prompted calls for strengthened norms of the responsibility to protect and the capacity to do so. Many advocates, such as Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and the Aegis Trust, turned to the responsibility-to-protect framework as a basis to call for further international action on Darfur. 19 The UN Secretary-General is one of many public figures who has embraced the responsibility to protect as a way for the international community to respond to a future Darfur.

The growing support for the responsibility to protect led to its consideration within the context of the Secretary-General's agenda for reforming the UN so that it could better advance development, security, and the protection of human rights.

Responsibility to Protect in the UN Reform Agenda

The UN General Assembly convened a high-level Summit in September 2005 to (1) review progress on the Millennium Declaration (an agenda of global cooperation on security, development, the environment, and other pressing global issues to which the majority of UN members had agreed in 2000) and (2) follow up on the outcomes of the major UN economic and social conferences and summits. The agenda for the September Summit was expanded significantly beyond a review of progress on political commitments made in recent years. The Summit became an opportunity

18. See World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, "Civil Society Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect," Apr. 2003, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/, which contains the list of NGOs consulted at the roundtable discussions.

19. See Michael Clough, "Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?" Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2005, http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/index.htm; "The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing N°28, International Crisis Group, Jul. 6, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/Sudan/2005/0706bridgegap.pdf; and James M. Smith and Ben Walker, "Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide," Aegis Trust, Nov. 2004, http://www.aegistrust.org/images/stories/Aegis%20Darfur%20Report%202004.pdf. For these and other analyses of the crisis in Darfur as it relates to the responsibility to protect, see http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/. [Page 23]

PREVENTING FUTURE GENOCIDES

to reaffirm the fundamental goals of the UN and to commit to strengthening the UN to meet these goals.

The Secretary-General was integrally involved in setting the reform agenda. In September 2003, six months after the United States began the invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorization and only one month after the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Iraq, Kofi Annan issued a challenge to the members of the UN. The United Nations had come to a "fork in the road"; 20 it must adapt itself to global political realities, or it would be marginalized. He convened the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a panel of sixteen eminent persons, to identify the most urgent global security threats and issue recommendations on needed changes. One of the issues that the Secretary-General asked the group to address was the failure of the international community to prevent genocide and other massive violations of human rights.

In December 2004 the High-level Panel released its report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. 21 The premise of the report is that collective security will require addressing the security concerns of all states, including fighting poverty and AIDS, preventing and resolving wars between and within states, countering terrorism, and addressing environmental degradation and organized crime.

Included among the report's 101 recommendations on strengthening the international security framework is an endorsement of the international responsibility to protect populations from grave threats. The High-level Panel recognized that the concept of state sovereignty "clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community" and that, in circumstances where the state is not able or willing to fulfill this responsibility, the "principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community." 22 The report also

• Affirms that with state sovereignty comes the "obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples";
• Declares that the international community has a responsibility to protect peoples when states are "unable or unwilling to do so";
• Defines responsibility as "spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies";

20. Secretary-General, Address to the General Assembly, New York, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.un.org./webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923. 21. See United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld/. 22. United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 29. [Page 24]

• Affirms that the responsibility is "exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."23

The High-level Panel report informed the work of the Secretary-General, who was asked to submit to the General Assembly his recommendations for the agenda of the 2005 Summit. The Secretary-General endorsed the broad security perspective of the High-level Panel and supported many of its recommendations. After consultations with governments and UN officials and with input from many civil-society organizations, the Secretary-General published, on March 21, 2005, his report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.24

In Larger Freedom poses a far-reaching challenge to governments: "We must aim 'to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace.'"25 Similar to the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General emphasizes the need for governments to take action against threats of massive human-rights violations and other large-scale acts of violence against civilians. The report includes

• A call to governments to "embrace the 'responsibility to protect' as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity";
• An assertion that the responsibility to protect "lies first and foremost with each individual State";
• A recognition that, if individual states are "unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility" to protect "shifts to the international community";
• A description of the international community's responsibility to protect that includes the use of "diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations";
• A recognition that, if these measures are "insufficient," the Security Council has the right to "take action under the Charter [of the United Nations], including enforcement action, if so required."26

As a result of the Secretary-General's recommendation, for the first time the "emerging norm"" of the responsibility to protect was openly debated by the General Assembly. 27

23. United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 29, 201, 203. 24. See United Nations, Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/. 25. United Nations, Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, par. 12. 26. United Nations, Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, Annex, III.7.(b). 27. See United Nations, Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, par. 135. Government statements from the debates leading to and through the 2005 Summit are available at www.reformtheun.org. The fact that the responsibility to protect was adopted at the highest level of governments is due in large part to the political commitment of the Government of Canada (which established the ICISS in 2000) and the financial support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Most funders are willing [Page 25]

Intergovernmental Negotiations: The Evolution in the Understanding of the Responsibility to Protect

With regard to the responsibility to protect, the Secretary-General's report departed in one substantial way from the recommendations of the High-level Panel, a departure that has had a significant impact on governmental acceptance of this agenda. The High-level Panel considered the responsibility to protect a subset of its discussion of "Collective Security and the Use of Force," describing the subject as "Using Force: Rules and Guidelines."28 As a result of being placed in the context of "Using Force," many governments viewed the High-level Panel's recommendations about the responsibility to protect as recharacterizing the humanitarian-intervention concept, a concept that many governments had rejected as unlawful interference in the internal affairs of another state. 29 In contrast, the Secretary-General's report separated the normative aspects of the responsibility (the assertion of the responsibility to protect as a basis for collective action) from the discussion of the use of force.30

The Secretary-General made clear that the issue was not merely about the use of force; it was also about a normative and moral undertaking requiring a state to protect its own civilians. If a state fails to do so, the international community must apply a range of peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian measures, with force to be employed only as a last resort.

Following the recharacterization of the responsibility to protect, the General Assembly debates demonstrated growing support for its normative aspects by governments and civil society in all regions. Argentina, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Rwanda, South Africa, and the United Kingdom were some of the influential governments insisting on a meaningful commitment to the responsibility to protect. However, a few vocal opponents resisted the endorsement of the responsibility to protect because they feared that it would codify humanitarian intervention. Belarus, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Russia, and Venezuela were some of the governments who resisted inclusion of various elements of the responsibility to protect.

Some gov-to support the costs of a blue-ribbon commission for producing a related report, but they rarely fund the follow-up. The Government of Canada and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, principal supporters of the production of the ICISS report, have also contributed significant resources for implementing and following up on the ICISS report's key recommendations. Their work has led directly to the increasing acceptance of the norm of the responsibility to protect.

28. See United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 183-209.

29. For a summary of how the concept of humanitarian intervention has generally been perceived by governments, see Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: IDRC Publications, 2001) 23, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9439-201-1 -DO TOPIC.html..

30. See United Nations Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, par. 122-26, 135. [Page 26]ernments went so far as to seek removal of all references to the concept of the responsibility to protect. Others quietly expressed skepticism about the utility of the responsibility to protect, saying that the proponents of the doctrine are fond of putting words on paper but have not done enough in practice.

For its part, the United States appeared to oppose a norm that the international community has a responsibility to protect because having such a norm would limit its ability to undertake unilateral action and would impose further obligations on it to act to protect other states' populations even when it might not be in its political interest. At one point during the negotiations, the United States attempted to water down the text by proposing that governments accept that they have a "moral" responsibility to protect, which was taken to mean that this was not intended to be a political commitment.31

Through intensive negotiations in the days and hours before the September 2005 Summit began, the supporters of the responsibility to protect succeeded in obtaining an endorsement of the concept in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Heads of state and governments agreed to the following:

• "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity."
• The responsibility to protect entails prevention, including incitement to these crimes.
• The international community should encourage states to exercise the responsibility to protect, including their supporting the creation at the UN of an early-warning capability.
• "The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."

If national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations, and if peaceful means are inadequate, the international community is "prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the [United Nations] Charter, including Chapter VII."32

31. See John Bolton, United States Representative to the United Nations, letter to colleagues attaching proposed changes to the text regarding the responsibility to protect, Aug. 30, 2005, www.reformtheun.org/index.php/countries/44?theme-alt1.

32. See United Nations, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, par. 138-39. Chapter VII in the UN Charter confers on the Security Council the authority to take measures to respond to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. [Page 27]

PREVENTING FUTURE GENOCIDES

The provisions on the responsibility to protect in the Outcome document have been hailed as one of the few true successes of the 2005 Summit. The Secretary-General remarked about the agreement that "Perhaps most precious to me is the clear acceptance by all UN members that there is a collective responsibility to protect civilian populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, with a commitment to do so through the Security Council wherever local authorities are manifestly failing."33 Referring to the responsibility to protect, Mark Turner, a reporter for the Financial Times, observed that, "In coming years, as historians reflect upon what was achieved at this week's United Nations summit in New York, one decision may stand out." He described the responsibility to protect as a "profound shift in international law, whereby a growing sense of global responsibility for atrocities is increasingly encroaching upon the formerly sanctified concept of state sovereignty."34

Yet the language in the Outcome document endorsed by world leaders falls short of what had been requested by the Secretary-General, the High-level Panel, and many NGOs.35 For example, it does not affirm that the responsibility to protect is an "emerging norm" that spans a "continuum" of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding, as the report of the High-level Panel had.36 Also, the language does not commit to a responsibility to use Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which deals with actions necessitated by threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). As a result, some took the language to mean that the commitment to an international responsibility did not exist, only a commitment to a national responsibility. Although the final text of the Outcome document was weaker than the text in the reports of the Secretary-General and the High-level Panel as a result of a compromise to obtain the consent of some of the concerned states, the language is sufficiently strong to be considered an endorsement of a new set of principles on national and international responsibility. According to the Outcome document, the international community first has the responsibility to work through the Security Council to

33. Kofi Annan, "The UN Summit: A Glass At Least Half Full," Jakarta Post Sept. 23, 2005. 34. Mark Turner, "UN 'Must Never again be Found Wanting on Genocide' The 'Right to Protect'-Intervention to Stop Mass Murder-May Well Be the Summit's Lasting Legacy," Financial Times Sept. 16, 2005. 35. See, for example, William Pace, open letter to UN ambassadors, endorsed by almost ninety international networks and NGOs, July 11, 2005, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil society statements/?theme=alt3 (under "all R2PCS-Dear Ambassador Letter on R2P); and Oxfam International, "The UN World Summit Must Show New Determination to Live Up to the Millennium Declaration," Response to August 5, 2005, draft outcome document [undated], http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/conflict_disasters/un summit.htm. 36. United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 203, 201. [Page 28]protect through peaceful means, and then, "in this context," should peaceful means fail, the international community is prepared to take collective action.37

Hence the Outcome document includes commitments to employ a range of responses at the national, regional, and international levels, both peaceful and, as a last resort, using enforcement measures. The provisions on the responsibility to protect contained in the Outcome document provide a vital new tool to hold governments and the international community accountable when they are manifestly failing to respond to grave threats to humanity. One newspaper op/ed article described the promise of the responsibility to protect as follows: "Where formerly there was no recourse for you but to try to flee, now you have a claim on the international community at large."38

THE ROLE OF THE "USE-OF-FORCE" CRITERIA

One element of the concept of the responsibility to protect proposed in the ICISS report that did not survive the negotiations was the recommendation that governments adopt precautionary principles about the use of force. The Secretary-General and the High-level Panel had asked the Security Council to "adopt a resolution setting out these principles [seriousness of threat, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and likelihood of success] and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force."39

Negotiations on the five criteria, however, did not progress during General Assembly debates. Some permanent members of the Security Council would not accept universally applicable criteria that would limit their actions. Other governments, skeptical about the ways in which the Security Council determines to use force, expressed concern that the criteria would be applied arbitrarily or subjectively. While early drafts of the Outcome document called for consideration of principles on the use of force, the final draft made no mention of these principles.40

Given the current political climate, formal acceptance of the criteria for using force may require several more years of deliberation. However, the endorsement of the principle of the responsibility to protect is likely to advance the discussion of how force should be used to protect at-risk populations. With the adoption of

37. United Nations, General Assembly, 2005 World Summmit Outcome, par. 139. 38. Tod Lindberg, "Protect the People; United Nations Takes Bold Stance," Washington Times Sept. 27, 2005. 39. United Nations, General Assembly, In Larger Freedom, par. 126; see also United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 207. 40. See, for example, Draft Outcome Document, released June 3, 2005, par. 47, http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/united nations/991. [Page 29]

PREVENTING FUTURE GENOCIDES

responsibility-to-protect norms comes the question of how they will be implemented in country-specific situations. Important questions are surfacing such as how governments will avoid misusing the norms in politically motivated interventions and how governments will ensure that measures employed to fulfill them do not cause more harm than they prevent. In the near future the criteria for the use of force may become, in an ad hoc manner, an informal tool used by civil society, by the media, and by governments when the Security Council considers the use of force. One important issue regarding the use of force that was addressed in the ICISS's Responsibility to Protect but that was not carried forward during the UN reform debate is the highly controversial subject of alternative ways to legitimize the use of force if the Security Council fails to act in the face of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ICISS report recommended that, if the Security Council fails to deal with a proposal to protect a population at serious risk of genocide or similar large-scale atrocity, one possible alternative source of authority would the be General Assembly, acting under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure. Another alternative proposed by the ICISS "would be for collective intervention to be pursued by a regional or sub-regional organization acting within its defining boundaries." The topic was far too controversial to be taken up in any of the reports of the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General, and it was not considered in the intergovernmental debates leading to the Summit because the Summit agenda was focused on improving the UN's system's responses rather than on considering ways of operating outside the UN. The goal was to strengthen the UN system so that member states would be able to react to outbreaking crises more effectively and at earlier stages. Future reforms must now be focused on bolstering the Security Council's ability to respond better to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and on monitoring its activities more closely.

PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

One of the central tasks of the responsibility to protect as originally conceived by the ICISS report is to rebuild post-conflict societies. Although not addressed as an element of the responsibility to protect in the Summit Outcome document, the UN member states did recognize a "gaping hole" in the UN system that leaves the UN without the "institutional machinery" to assist properly countries transitioning from

41. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 6.29-6.30. 42. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 6.31. [Page 30]"war to lasting peace."43 UN member states, therefore, endorsed the creation of an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission.44

The Peacebuilding Commission will have a coordinating role for the various stakeholders during post-conflict recovery. Focusing attention on reconstruction and institution-building efforts, the Commission will help countries in need to navigate the many stages of recovery and marshal the necessary resources for sustained peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission will include members of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), national or transitional authorities from the subject country, donor governments, and troop contributors. The High-level Panel originally proposed that the Peacebuilding Commission include a preventive and early-warning role. Many governments quickly rejected the proposal because they feared that such a role could open a door to further interventions. Yet it is understood that, because some 50 percent of resolved conflicts slide back into conflict, even without an early-warning role, the Peacebuilding Commission will be engaging in conflict prevention. On December 20, 2005, the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted concurrent resolutions establishing the Commission, including a description of its composition and reporting procedures.45

IMPROVING SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICES TO ADVANCE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

As the UN body with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has a particular role in fulfilling the responsibility to protect. Yet the past indifference or indecision of the Security Council has led to the loss of millions of civilian lives. The Security Council's inability to fulfill its responsibility is in many ways related to its structure. The permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council are able to block action based on their own unrelated national interests. Even placing an issue on the Security Council's agenda is a source of political maneuvering because such a decision is generally taken without a vote that is, by consensus. This practice means that any country, not only one with the veto, can prevent a situation from being taken up by the Council. As a result, crises of human protection or human rights generally recognized as threats to regional or international security (presently situations in countries such as Nepal, Northern Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe) are not addressed by the Security Council.

That Security Council members' narrow national interests have resulted in a failure to protect at-risk populations goes against the intent of the UN Charter, in

43. United Nations, General Assembly, In Larger Freedom, par. 114. 44. See United Nations, General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, par. 97-105. 45. See United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution A/60/L.40 (December 20, 2005), and United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1645 (December 20, 2005). [Page 31]which, according to article 24, the Security Council agrees to act on behalf of all members of the UN. Several reforms have been suggested to make the Council more accountable to the other nations of the UN.

The ICISS report and the High-level Panel recommended that the Security Council adopt a code of conduct whereby permanent members of the Security Council pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human-rights abuses. The ICISS report considers it "unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern."46 Governments did not agree to this recommendation, as it had little support among the permanent members of the Security Council.

The High-level Panel and several governments also proposed that a system of indicative voting be adopted to clarify member states' positions on a proposed action and to prevent members from obstructing the Security Council's deliberations on the responsibility to protect. Indicative voting is a preliminary public round of voting, described by the High-level Panel as follows: "members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. . . 'no' votes would not have a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force."47 Measures set out in Security Council resolutions can range from toothless statements of condemnation to strict punitive measures. A mechanism for indicative voting would increase transparency by clarifying which members support the various measures proposed in a draft resolution.

In the short term, member states are unlikely to agree to measures that will restrain the use of the veto and change the voting methods of the Security Council. Yet a serious commitment to the responsibility to protect will require actions beyond adopting the principles and related initiatives for implementing it as set forth in the Summit Outcome document. It will require measures that will ensure transparency and accountability of those governments with the authority to take action for the protection of at-risk populations.

Conclusion

The affirmation of the concept of the responsibility to protect by world leaders brings the potential for a change in the way the international community responds to the threats faced by vulnerable populations.

46. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, par. 6.20. The World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy believes that progressive governments and civil society need to challenge the existence of the veto in all circumstances, not only in situations that involve genocide and large-scale human-rights abuses.

47. United Nations, Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, More Secure World, par. 257. See also Switzerland, Non-Paper to the General Assembly, Apr. 27, 2005. [Page 32]Now that a commitment has been made in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, governments should be judged by whether and how they implement their commitments. This will be an even greater challenge than securing agreement on the new principles. Will the responsibility-to-protect principles, in combination with numerous other commitments made in recent resolutions and treaties, become a collective force to pressure the UN Security Council to finally improve dramatically its working methods and practices? As the Security Council enters its seventh decade, is it too much to hope that it will one day take decisions to prevent conflicts, to react to early warnings, to intervene and stop genocide? Will the UN and regional organizations identify indicators that will trigger sanctions and humanitarian responses, including, as a last resort, using force to ensure peace? Will the governments agree in coming years to principles on the use of force as suggested by the ICISS, the High-level Panel, and the Secretary-General? The answer to these questions will be the answer to a larger one. Will the twenty-first century repeat the twentieth century and be a continuation of the most violent period in all of recorded history?

Affirming the principle of the responsibility to protect and establishing a Peacebuilding Commission are not panaceas. But the new commitments, together with the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002, the adoption in 2000 of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and an array of other decisions to improve peacekeeping and peace enforcement can, together, greatly enhance the ability of the UN and the international community to prevent and react to deadly conflict, to secure peace, and to transform and rebuild nations when conflict cannot be prevented.

The extraordinary globalization of trade, economic interdependence, and finance are only one side of the story. The globalization of democracy, human rights, justice, and the rule of law since the end of World War II is an extraordinary development in human history. Democracy must be established federatively, at the local, provincial, national, regional, and global levels. And one person at a time. The normative values of the responsibility to protect reflect not only important political principles but universal human and moral values shared by all great religious traditions. We all have moral and political responsibilities, including the responsibility to protect each other. [Page 33]

Unforeseen Encounter

The havoc of war hits him full in the face as he rounds the bend at Basra. The ambush is perfectly timed. Even without the shield of his chemical suit he knows they can't lose. Flashes of fire mix with dust and green haze. He stumbles, falling into a small boy at the side of the road who wears a ragged turban. They clutch at each other, the boy and the man. He thinks of his own son playing the violin beside an open grave: his own. The boy with him now has dark eyes that ask why even as his lips render the word "Allah" with unquestioned certitude. Doubt dissolves. Just before his eyes close the man sees God in the dust.

Copyright 2006 by Anne Gordon Perry

-ANNE GORDON PERRY

ANNE GORDON PERRY is a lecturer at the University of Texas at Arlington, where she teaches literature, creative writing, and film studies. Her Ph.D. in aesthetic studies and humanities included work on the intersection of art and religion. A member of the Dallas-Ft. Worth Writers' Workshop, she is the editor of ORISON, an arts journal affiliated with the Association for Bahá’í Studies, and has published essays, fiction, poetry, and historical biography in numerous publications.

[Page 35]Global Education and Mobilizing Political Will for a Larger Freedom

Introduction

In 2005 the United Nations commemorated its sixtieth year. The year 2005 is also the fifth since the leaders of the world adopted the UN Millennium Declaration at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. Central to a serious reflection on the state of the world prompted by these two anniversaries is a report by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, released on March 21, 2005. Entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All and prepared for the convening of the world's leaders in a September 2005 Summit, the document serves as Annan's comprehensive effort to "review progress made since the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted by all Member States in 2000." The report is a masterful statement of both the operating principles that must underlie united global action and a practical blueprint for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.²

During the six decades since the founding of the United Nations, innumerable statements describing the nature of the world's problems and making moral appeals for united efforts to correct them have been painstakingly drafted and distributed to the peoples of the world. Much has been accomplished. But, at a cost in tens

Copyright 2006 by John Woodall.

1. Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, March 21, 2005, par. 3, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/. The Millennium Development Goals, drafted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, are the objective indicators by which progress (or lack of progress) in accomplishing the goals of the Millennium Declaration can be measured.

2. See Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 4.

JOHN WOODALL, M.D. is a research fellow at the Judge Baker Children's Center at the Harvard Medical School. He has consulted extensively with U.S. government agencies, the United Nations, universities, and international organizations on issues of human rights, conflict resolu- tion, community building, and inter-ethnic reconciliation. He is the founder and direc- tor of the Unity Project (www.unityproject.org), a not-for-profit educational organiza- tion dedicated to educating a generation of competene global citizens. [Page 36]of millions of lives, much remains to be done. If plans of action coupled with moral appeals for collective effort were enough, we would have already mobilized the collective will of the peoples of the world and, through collective action, would have seen the eradication of many of the world's ills. We often assume that simply explaining the nature of problems and making moral appeals to work together are enough to activate collective will. History shows this method is rarely successful, at least not to the degree required to meet, through sustained effort, the long-term challenges represented by an agenda as complex as the Millennium Development Goals. No collective action, no global plan, including the Millennium Development Goals, can be achieved unless we mobilize a significant portion of the collective will of the peoples of the world.

But we cannot mobilize this collective will unless individuals identify more completely with humanity as a whole. Yet this identification and the specific cognitive skills that support it are not, for the most part, taught in current educational curricula. Therefore, nurturing this identification with the world at large and training in the skills to support the identification must become matters of highest policy priority and must take universal concrete form as a program for global education. Otherwise, we cannot expect that the motivation to achieve large-scale global goals will be available when needed.

Collective Will and In Larger Freedom

In Larger Freedom is sweeping in its scope, comprehensive and specific in its outlook and recommendations, practical and inspired in tone. How can we move toward accomplishing its goals? A brief overview of the statement's content will lay the groundwork for understanding the need for a more functional approach to mobilizing the peoples of the world to understand its vision and commit themselves to accomplishing its goals.

In the statement the Secretary-General paints a picture of a world with great possibilities for development, for peace, and for protecting human rights. He explains that these three principles are the bedrock upon which real freedom must be built. He then describes how more than one-sixth of the world's population languishes in a poverty so bleak that it amounts to a death sentence. Fully one thousand million individuals subsist on less than a dollar a day, "lacking the means to stay alive in the face of chronic hunger, disease and environmental hazards."³ For lack of the means to acquire mosquito netting or a $1 treatment, the life of a child can be snuffed out by a single mosquito bite. Twenty thousand lives are lost every day to the ravages of poverty, eleven million children die from preventable causes before their fifth birthday, and three million die of AIDS each year. Human distress

3. Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 26. [Page 37]is further compounded by the degradation of the environment, the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of armaments, political instability and corruption, economic imbalances, and antagonisms that lead to the barbarity of war. Under such conditions, it becomes hard to imagine any freedom that is worthy of the name for a majority of the peoples of the world. But the same dire conditions also emphasize the importance of continuing to strive to expand human freedom.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL POINTS TO ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE POLITICAL WILL" "CRITICAL INGREDIENT MAY YET BE EMERGING TO DEVELOP BROAD-BASED ACTIONS.

The Secretary-General tells us that the Millennium Development Goals are the bold global agenda that will enable us to build the freedoms necessary for addressing the world's horrible conditions. He makes repeated references to the need to mobilize united collective will if we are to have any chance of facing the challenges by completing the MDGs. He says that we must "garner the necessary political will" to achieve these vital goals, to "revitalize consensus on key challenges," and to convert will into action. He points to encouraging signs that the "critical ingredient-political will" may yet be emerging to develop broad-based actions. But, he continues, a "clear commitment" is needed to root out corruption. His appeals for a collective will to achieve the Millennium Development Goals ring throughout the report, the relative lack of that will being highlighted by the need to call for it.

As we peruse the goals for reforming aid, reducing debt, expanding and making possible equitable trade, reversing desertification, protecting biodiversity and controlling climate change, we also, inevitably, read between the lines that efforts to achieve the goals have not, for over six decades, been pursued with the commitment that the numerous agreements calling for action have promised. That failure to act has resulted so far in the far worse conditions that we now must face. Annan, for example, reports that, despite a number of initiatives to encourage trade diversification and to reduce vulnerability to price fluctuations, support for the measures has “fallen far short of what is necessary."

In Larger Freedom lists the reforms suggested to recipient Member States for strengthening governance, combating corruption, investing in growth in the private sector, and maximizing domestic resources available to fund national development strategies. It also lists the commitments of developed Member States to help—through increased assistance, a development-oriented trade system, and debt relief—countries that adopt transparent, credible, and properly budgeted strategies. "All of this has been promised," the report states frankly, "but not delivered. That failure is measured in the rolls of the dead—and on it are written millions of new names each year."

4. For a broader description of the challenges facing the world, see Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 8, 9, 26. 5. Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 5, 7, 29, 36. 6. Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 56. 7. Annan, In Larger Freedom, par. 32. [Page 38]JOHN WOODALL, M.D.

"Promised but not delivered." The world has enormous means, expertise, and capacity to act to meet the challenges of the MDGs. Why, then, are the promises not kept? The answer lies in the lack of the "critical ingredient"-political will. The time has come when we must see mobilizing collective political will to achieve the MDGs as a goal in its own right, a primary and essential goal that requires considered reflection and systematic planning. We are past the time when we can rely solely on intelligent and moral appeals to a distracted world. A plan of action to build political will, arising from broad consultation and based on an understanding of basic human motivation, needs to be devised, consensually agreed upon, and systematically executed.

How, then, do we motivate the victims of demoralizing poverty and oppressive injustice? How do we motivate those with the means to help who are distracted by the very affluence and privilege they enjoy? We need a better understanding of the roots of motivation to answer these questions.

Identity and Will

To understand the nature of motivation, we turn to the most common of human experiences-suffering. All people suffer to some degree, and the world is awash in suffering. Suffering has a profound effect on our sense of who we are. It influences whom we allow into our life and whom we exclude. It has an effect on our sense of identity. And it is our identity that determines how we mobilize our will.

Day to day, people are motivated by what serves their basic needs for providing resources for themselves and for their loved ones and for acquiring the capacity to fulfill these needs. These needs are directed toward the service of a particular identity: one's self, one's family, one's community, one's nation, one's ethnic group, and so on. Our motivation, our hopes, and our mobilizing our inner talents to meet these needs are all directed toward serving some identity we hold.

We see, for example, that once adolescents identify with, say, a sports team, they have an identity to which they can direct their hopes. This identity and the hope for the team to do well mobilizes their will to mine the latent potentials they possess to accomplish tasks in service of the team's identity. Through the agency of this larger identity into which they project themselves, they can mobilize the will to explore, realize, and perfect their latent physical and social potentials. Having given something of themselves to something larger-the team-the youth value the experience because it brings out what they see as their best qualities. In addition, the shared identity connects them to others with similar or harmonizing abilities and gives meaning to their talents by putting them to use in the service of a transcendent goal.

Of course, when separate identities compete for the same resources, we have the primary cause of rivalry, which, in extreme cases, can turn into conflict. Hence a spectrum of outcomes flows from our natural tendency to form into identity groups. [Page 39]Some of these outcomes are beneficial. Some are harmful. Either way, people are prone to think of their identifications and the actions they perform in the name of that identity as virtuous because they see that they are giving themselves to something larger and using virtues they feel are ennobling. This assumption often carries with it a further unexamined assumption that the other side is not similarly motivated. The logic goes that, "If we are virtuous, and you are against us, you must be evil." It is precisely the tendency of identities to compete and to assume moral superiority that prevents the mustering of collective will. We reserve our will to promote our own identity groups. This central point holds some unexamined implications that need further exploration to show how we can blaze a path that will lead toward positive collective action.

The idea around which a collective identity forms is referred to as the group's "collective center." Allegiances to identities shift when times are good or when they are not. How the identity of a group is altered in the face of suffering becomes an essential point to consider when planning how to muster collective will to accomplish a task that involves many group identities being organized around a variety of collective centers. Stated plainly, how do we mobilize people of various backgrounds to act together when they do not perceive that their interests are at stake? To answer this, we need further explanation about how crises affect human identity and motivation.

An individual may have an infinite variety of identities, which can change, develop, and grow many times over a lifetime. Certain generalities are helpful when considering the effects on identity from different forces. With suffering, for example, our identity undergoes one of at least three predictable changes that affect our motivation. The first and second responses to crisis-constriction and hardening-are related in that they both tend to occur without much thought. These two tend to set the conditions for immobilizing collective will or for conflict. The third-identifying with the universal human condition-requires a conscious choice and provides a way to move forward together. Differing from the previous three changes by the lack of the presence of suffering, a fourth reaction is also possible. A complacent identity is characterized by its being formed with a relative lack of suffering. Each of these four types of identity formation directly affects how we mobilize our will to act. Hence it is important to understand how these types of identity form and how they affect motivation-especially how motivation is mediated through what we perceive to be fair."

8. For a discussion of "collective centers," see ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Tablets of the Divine Plan, Ist pocket-size ed. (Wilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1993) 14.3.

9. For the purposes of this article, fairness and justice are used as near synonyms to describe the way in which an individual assesses, by means of an assumed set of standards, what is due to herself and others. [Page 40]

CONSTRICTION OF IDENTITY AND WILL

The first type of identity change that can occur under suffering is a constriction of the identity. One of my own experiences provides an example. When I began to work at a hospital some years ago, I arrived feeling that I was a part of the entire hospital team. I was excited about the possibilities and about contributing to the joint effort, and I was anxious to stretch myself to helping advance the overall mission of assisting others. Within a short period of time, however, I found that the Chief of Staff, a cardiac surgeon, was siphoning funds from the department to which I belonged to build a marble foyer in his department. I no longer felt as strong an identification with the entire hospital. Instead, I felt much more allied to my own department. My identity had become constricted. Then I found that the head of another division within my own department was trying to change my schedule so that I would be required to do work in his division. Because I now felt beleaguered in my own department, I focused my efforts more on my own clinic. But the social worker and psychologist also held strong ideas about time, finances, and how the clinic should be run. As a result, I found that at times my identity had constricted to the point that I felt isolated and less motivated to act in concert with the whole.

When my identity was constricted, my motivation was constricted as well. It required a more conscious force of will to act on behalf of the whole.

Under severe forms of suffering, individuals may find their identity constricted and their will paralyzed. We see this in areas experiencing extreme poverty and violence. Some war veterans, refugees, survivors of deprivation, human brutality, and oppression find that their sense of personal identity has been shattered. The vivid reality of horror and the extreme emotions it evokes overshadows experience and beliefs in the order and goodness of the world that were grounded on less graphic experiences. The grief, terror, and anguish brought on by the horror of war, for example, can be enough to make one a stranger to oneself and can overwhelm every other experience. In such cases, it becomes difficult to hold onto a sense of good in the world and to see oneself as a possible agent of good. More than a constriction of identity, a collapse of the sense of self occurs in which it is difficult to imagine any future at all. With this fractured sense of self, one is unable to marshal the personal will to move toward a goal. No doubt countless millions of victims of war and survivors of extreme poverty, political repression, social injustice, terror, natural disaster, domestic violence, and disease throughout the world are afflicted with this malady of the mind, heart, and soul that drains them of the will to hope and the vitality to act. The constriction of their identities and the consequent paralysis of will immobilize them.

10. For an excellent overview of the loss of the foundations of identity after severe trauma, see Loss of the Assumptive World: A Theory of Traumatic Loss, ed. J. Kaufman (New York: Brunner-Rutledge, 2002). [Page 41]The immobilization of the will is not inevitable. Many find healthy, resilient ways to cope with the extreme effects of suffering caused by human beings and by natural causes. Nor is the immobilization of will irreversible, for many inspiring reports and stories from the press and the arts tell of resilient individuals who have undergone terrible suffering only to find some noble element of human nature that allows them to thrive in the face of crisis. But the paralyzing response is common. Between those with healthy and heroic responses and the identifiable 15 percent or so who respond with the most debilitating forms of a fractured sense of self-forms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), for example-is a majority whose identities as human beings with dignity will be severely affected.¹¹ While not affected to the point of a psychiatric pathology such as PTSD, the majority will suffer a constriction of identity caused by suffering that will lead to some degree of paralysis of the will to act. Yet suffering tends to rob those who experience the most difficulties of the motivation needed to correct the cause of their suffering. Tragically, this is often the case in those who previously had held the highest convictions of what is good. In the words of W. B. Yeats written shortly after the calamity of World War I, "The best lack all conviction."¹² This pool of good-natured but dispirited individuals is the primary body of stakeholders on which the success of the Millennium Development Goals depends.

SUFFERING TENDS TO ROB THOSE WHO GO THROUGH THE MOST OF THE MOTIVATION NEEDED TO CORRECT THE CAUSE OF THEIR SUFFERING.

RIGID IDENTITY AND WILL

We can feel a sense of compassion for those who suffer and find themselves weakened in their ability to choose for themselves. But the second response to suffering may well bring a chilling wake up call because of the threat it poses to the individual and to society. This response lies at the opposite end of the pole from the first example. Rather than having one’s sense of self shattered and constricted, a social identity is amplified over all others. Hence a person may identify with an ethnic group, a political party, a country, a religion, or some other identity group in an exclusive and extremist way. Whereas before the trauma, the person may have had a number of flexible identities, the crisis reinforces one of the identities to the exclusion of the others. It is as if, before the crisis, the person’s full spectrum of emotions and commitments, represented by chips at a roulette table, were spread across various roles and identities. But after the crisis suddenly all the chips are placed on one number, which bears the entire load of the person’s emotional commitment. Consider, for example, after September 11, 2001, how a short-lived sense of national

11. For a lucid discussion of the psychological, physical, and social effects of trauma, see Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body and Society, ed. B. A. Van der Kolk, A. C. McFarlane, and L. Weisaeth (New York: Guilford P, 1996). 12. William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," in The Best Poems of the English Language, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Harper Collins, 2004) 770. [Page 42]solidarity in the United States quickly degenerated into the politics of extremes. One rigid identity group saw itself as patriotic while viewing all others as wrong or even traitorous.

Many psychological reasons, which are beyond the scope of this article, explain why rigid identification occurs. 13 Basically, the sense of fear, anxiety, anger, and grief after an extreme crisis can be overwhelming. Fixing on a particular group identity can serve the psychological purpose of calming these emotions and focusing the will. Rigid identification gives meaning to suffering by providing a sense of transcendence for which one is willing to sacrifice self. Hence the person experiencing rigid identification almost always sees the rigid focus as virtuous.

Of course, not all expressions of rigid group identification are virtuous. Some are. But many are patently immoral and dangerous. The most widely known extreme example of rigid identification was the rise of National Socialism (or Nazism) in Germany after the devastating trauma of World War I. Adolf Hitler, a young would-be painter, became convinced that the answer to the crisis in Germany was to come together in a rigid and exclusive nationalism that glorified Germany. His diatribe Mein Kampf (literally, "My Struggle") explained how an extreme nationalism would give meaning to the suffering of the German people. His rigid form of nationalism clearly laid out not only the good of those giving allegiance to the collective center of Nazism; it also stated very clearly that those organized around any other collective center of identity were evil and enemies of the state. Once Hitler was in power, his regime produced the propaganda masterpiece Triumph of the Will, a film designed to show how a clearly defined national identity would have the effect of mobilizing the collective will of a distracted and disheartened populace. For those who fit the definition of a good Nazi, the country did begin to move. For those who did not, life became unbearable. Tragically, the country was mobilized around hunting down "enemies" of the state whose only crime was to be different. The rest was a bloody descent into hell. In this example we see the potent effect of a systematic effort to create a strong collective identity by mobilizing collective will. We also see the danger in emphasizing an exclusive identity.

Once we draw a tight circle around a particular group identity, we have not only defined who is in our circle, but we have also declared who is not. And that is the problem. One group's assuming such an extreme virtue and attributing evil or ignorance to the motives of other groups creates a climate of conflict between those within the group and those outside of it. Emotions that reinforce the perception of others as evil or ignorant come to the fore, and we confuse anger, contempt, and

13. For a discussion of the psychology of forming allies and enemies, see, V. D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (Northvale: Aronson, 1988). [Page 43]vindictiveness with righteous indignation. The result is a constriction of what we are willing to perceive as relevant information for solving a problem appropriately. The climate is now ripe for the exercise of oppression, misguided overextension, heated passions, and recklessness. This is true in the lives of individuals, communities, and nations. Again, in the words of Yeats, "the worst are full of passionate intensity."14

The example of the rigid nationalism of Nazism is not to disparage a sane and mature patriotism or the natural pride that comes from honoring one's ethnic or religious roots. Rather, the example highlights how extremism cuts off the exercise of certain basic human powers of the mind necessary for personal and communal freedom to flourish: the will to respect the basic humanity of another, to decide to take the perspective of another, to want to contain impulsive and reckless emotions, to choose to reflect on one's own assumptions, to see a larger picture, to opt to examine facts at face value. These exercises of volition are the foundation of civilized life, but they are devalued when there is no sense of identification with our shared humanity. In times of suffering, seeing our common humanity is harder to entertain as an option if a sense of self is shattered or if a rigid social identity has been adopted. This is especially true if the media, civil society, and institutions of education do not explicitly reinforce our identification with our common humanity and the civilizing virtues that derive from and support that understanding.

IN TIMES OF SUFFERING, SEEING OUR COMMON HUMANITY IS HARDER TO ENTERTAIN AS AN OPTION IF A SENSE OF SELF IS SHATTERED OR IF A RIGID SOCIAL IDENTITY HAS BEEN ADOPTED.

COMPLACENT IDENTITY AND WILL

Not all forces that shape identity and motivation come from suffering. The lack of suffering can also affect identity. Complacence as a defining feature of identity is a case in point. By complacent identity is meant the inability to mobilize or sustain an intention to act on behalf of the dignity of others. To explain complacence, we must examine the nature of human dignity, which is defined as the sum of latent potentiality that each individual possesses that enables them to pursue life goals. It is a peculiarity of life that suffering is a major cause of bringing out these potentialities in the form of talents and competencies, which can then be used in the service of various identities.

Due to the lack of an urgent motivation—that is, suffering—the complacent make less of an effort to examine deeply the nature of human dignity. Without an intimate sense of their own dignity, they find it difficult to grasp its shared nature with others. Their capacity to exercise will in service to our common humanity is, therefore, unused. As a result, it is difficult to gain and sustain the focused will of complacent people for the service of common goals. Because the complacent have

14. Yeats, "The Second Coming," in Best Poems of the English Language 770. [Page 44]

JOHN WOODALL, M.D.

no deep understanding of the common humanity shared by those who suffer and those who do not, their natural aversion to suffering is reinforced by their avoidance and denial of the plight of others. While those with a shattered or rigid identity cannot avoid the consequences of their pain, complacent individuals avoid any exposure to real suffering.

Jerome Kagan, a renowned developmental psychologist from Harvard University, was asked what, in the final analysis, motivates people. He replied, "People want their virtues recognized."

Perhaps it is easier for the complacent in all of us to avoid focusing on the suffering of others in order to avoid the moral obligations that suffering demands. The suffering of others reminds us of our own moral culpability. To maintain a sense of our own virtue, we simply avoid knowing about the suffering of others so that we are not put in a position of having to choose to act on behalf of another. Ironically, our news and entertainments are full of pain and suffering. But the complacent perceive such suffering as a fantasy; none of it requires choice or action on their part. In the avoidance of the real suffering of others comes a shallow appreciation of the dignity we all share and of the rich mine of virtues and talents in human nature. Consequently, in the complacent there is little to sustain the will to act for the common good.

The success of the Millennium Development Goals may depend on mobilizing not only those whose wills have been dampened and those whose identities have become rigid by suffering but also those with means who are complacent and whose attention is distracted easily, if it is held at all.

In reality, there is no place to hide from the consequences of many of the issues the MDGs address. Complacency, even in the well-intentioned, is a sign of an habitually narrow outlook. It springs from a limited understanding of the nature of our shared human dignity, a lack of understanding about the interconnected nature of the planet's natural and human-made systems, a limited ability to stay focused on the demands of an interdependent world.

If those with a complacent identity find themselves placed under what, for them, is unusual suffering, they are also prone to the other three identity shifts. For those with financial position or social privilege, the relative effects of their choice to become nihilistic, join rigid groups, or identify and work for the collective good is greater because of their greater financial or social means.

For all the forms of unexamined identity, including complacency, there are patterns of thinking that limit motivation and problem solving. These include, to name a few, an unreflective repetition of closed-identity thinking and routines; a lack of curiosity about the fate of others not belonging to one's own group; an assumption of the good intentions of one's own group; a presumption of ill intentions in others; an undeveloped sense of the consequences of one's acts on others outside the group; difficulty in thinking in inclusive, systemic ways; and a lack of skill in solving problems with an unbiased examination of facts. [Page 45]

IDENTITY AND JUSTICE

Positive approaches to relating to others (self-reflection, thinking in an inclusive way with an open examination of facts) are essential components needed to assess a situation fairly. They are the ingredients of our sense of justice. They are influenced by the eyes through which we perceive the world—our identity. Hence our capacity to assess the world fairly is intimately connected to the identity we hold.

Before discussing the third type of identity change that can result from suffering, we must explore the relationship between identity and justice. Our identity defines for us the spectrum of information we are open to considering. Information that comes to us but falls outside our identity is likely not even to be perceived, let alone considered and factored into mutual problem solving. The effect of such filters on the exercise of fairness and justice is pivotal because our identity defines for us the standards we use to weigh fair outcomes in our interactions with others.

Another of my own experiences provides insight. Several years ago I visited a country divided into two opposing ethnic groups that had experienced years of suffering at each other's hands. Both sides had a "museum of atrocities" to showcase the evils done to their people by the other side. The country was divided in two by concertina wire and tall barricades. The gates between them were protected by UN Peacekeepers. I asked a woman from one side what her people wanted most. She replied, "All we want is peace," adding emphatically, "but, peace with justice!" She then outlined what that justice would look like to promote the sense of the dignity of her people and the right to freedom from want and fear. The next day I crossed the checkpoints to the other side where I asked a woman from that side what her people wanted. Her exact words were, "All we want is peace. But, peace with justice!" She then described what peace with justice meant in terms of the need to protect her people's rights to freedom from want and fear and to preserve their dignity.

Exactly the same words. Exactly the same hopes. Exactly the same need for dignity and freedom from fear and want. But also exactly the same rigid identification, shaped by years of pain and suffering, horror and loss, that prevented both women from seeing the humanizing similarities for which both sides wished. Identities had become rigid. Perceptions about a just solution were restricted only to those elements that would serve the needs of one's own identity group and would reinforce one's own preconceived worldview.

Another example of rigid identification took place during a conference in Israel. While boarding a bus, a colleague and I were discussing the issue of identity. As we sat down in our seats, I said that our sense of justice is defined by our identity. My friend said she did not see the connection and asked me to explain. At exactly the same moment, another colleague in the seat across the aisle from us stood up to hang his coat on the hook in front of his window. But, he noted, the coat would prevent his seeing out of his window. Without hesitation, he removed his coat from the hook in front of his window, stepped across the aisle to our side of the bus, [Page 46]reached in front of us, and said, "Excuse me," while he hung up his coat on our hook. Then he sat down to a clear view out his window. But, of course, we could not see out of our window. "Well, there you have it," I said. "He does not include us in his identity. For him, we do not factor into his equation for what is fair." Our colleague did not perceive that we had needs. Because we were not part of his identity, his perceptual field did not include us. Thus, with no overt ill will, he made decisions that excluded us from consideration. If we had protested our colleague's action, he might have become indignant, feeling that we were unruly. After all, he had said, "Excuse me." The point is that our identity defines what we will perceive and, most important, how we set the standards for fairness in our lives.

BY DEFINITION, FAIRNESS REQUIRES DISPASSIONATE REASONING THAT INCLUDES THE INTERESTS OF ALL.

We only include in our decisions about fairness those with whom we identify. If our most important allegiance for us is ourselves, our decisions about fairness will only include one person in the equation of fairness. If we see ourselves primarily as being allied to one ethnic group, one religion, or one nation, the interests of that group will be the primary standard used to decide issues of fairness. But by definition, fairness requires dispassionate reasoning that includes the interests of all. Standard forms of rigid group identification prevent us from considering or even perceiving the needs of others, making fairness impossible. If we want fairness, we must first deal with the issue of creating an inclusive identity.

We all seek to be treated fairly by others so that they will consider our needs and treat us fairly. But after a crisis, achieving fair treatment is far more difficult because the stakes for survival are much higher. Identities are far more likely to be exclusive, rigid, and idealized, and it is far less likely that the needs of others will be perceived as valid. The result is that there is a far greater likelihood of extremist thinking that excludes those who are different and labels as ignorant or mean-spirited their legitimate needs and requests for a hearing. The further result is the birth of political extremism; religious fanaticism; self-righteous oppression; unbridled nationalism, racism, and sexism; and the fight for power to dominate or prevail over others not in the group.

In February 2003, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, New York City's Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD) asked me to advise it on how to proceed with helping children of the city to cope. There were many wonderful and inspiring stories in the city of people responding to the tragedy with generosity and compassion and of their working 15

15. I wish to thank Jeanne B. Mullgrav, the Commissioner of the New York Department of Youth and Community Development, and Yvette Furman, Director of Communications at DYCD, for their foresight and initiative in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, in bringing relief to countless children in New York. [Page 47]together. There were also problems. While the officials had known that they needed to be prepared to deal with the mental-health issues of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the more pervasive issue we discussed was the effect the attacks were continuing to have on the identities of children, especially adolescents. One could expect a momentary increase in a general sense of solidarity. But as familiar identities were reinforced and became more exclusive and rigid, perceptual fields would be narrowed, and standards of justice, constricted. This would be followed by a considerable rise in the potential for conflict between extreme and rigid identifications as the children and youth broke into much more highly charged ethnic groups, gangs, religions, and races. The city officials noted, almost a year and a half after 9/11, that they had seen a rise in gang violence and in ethnic and racial conflict. The aftermath of 9/11 mirrored the aftermath of any social crisis: Identifications in some individuals become exclusive, extreme, and rigid. Standards of assessing fairness and justice then become constrained. Conflict and violence are not far behind.

The greater the suffering among nations, ethnic groups, religions, and other social divisions, the greater the pressure becomes for these same suffering people to ally themselves with exclusive and rigid social identities—which is exactly the opposite of what is needed. While the complexity and extent of the problems of the world require a perspective that sees the interconnected and often global nature of causes to problems, the crises of our times are narrowing the perspectives of vast numbers of the people most in need of collective problem solving. We see a world distracted by the pressures of human suffering moving into smaller and smaller social groupings. Each, because of these small allegiances, is less able to perceive the suffering of others. Each is less able to perceive the just rights of others who also suffer. Each is less able to construct solutions on a global scale that problems demand. Each is becoming either more hopeless and paralyzed or more strident and aggressive. The greater the number and intensity of global crises, the more intense will become the allegiances to separate identities. The more intense, rigid, and exclusive these identities, the more distorted will be the sense of fairness in its exclusion of the condition of others outside the group. The more restricted the sense of identity and justice, the more shallow will become the pool of collective will for global solutions to address the crises we face.

WILL AND IDENTIFYING WITH THE HUMAN CONDITION

Collective will for global action is impossible to muster from individuals who see themselves as primarily allied to nations, ethnic groups, religions, and so on. Hence the first task in mobilizing global collective will is to build a sense of our shared humanity. Without the exercise of real freedom and justice undergirded by a commitment to our common humanity, the will for global action is impossible to imagine. [Page 48]What is to be done? The answer lies in the third process of identification that results from extreme crisis. 16 Not all people, as we have seen, respond to crises by having their identity shattered or by becoming rigid in identification. Some, while they suffer, find a way to see the nobility that all humans share. Suffering becomes a doorway to compassion and to identifying with the condition of all peoples. Some the Martin Luther Kings, the Nelson Mandelas, the Vaclav Havels-reach this perception independently though their own convictions. But most people, while innately capable of such a response, need to have this meaning taught to them so that they can choose it. It needs to be modeled by exemplars, stated publicly as policy by authorities, demonstrated in families and communities, taught in schools and religious communities, and explored in the media. Once the general meaning of our shared humanity is modeled, we need to learn the personal skills that enable us to navigate in such a world and to build institutions that can safeguard and nurture its promise.

The key feature of a response to suffering shaped by a sense of common humanity is that the individual reports a profound sense of the basic dignity of life-their own and all others. Consequently, there is a sense of being caught up in the fate of others, a sense of responsibility that links one's fate and the consequences of one's actions to others. Antagonistic passions are stilled, and a peace-inducing emotion begins to open the mind to new possibilities within oneself and the world. In New York, the administrators at the Department of Youth and Community Development understood the need to adopt the common condition of humanity in the suffering after 9/11 as the one they would publicly support. To their great credit, they chose to design programs to build the resilient skills of children that would enable them to operate in a world that accepts our common humanity as a given. 17

After a crisis, unless the sense of common humanity is consciously chosen, the constriction of identity or rigid identification will instinctually come to the fore, or those not directly affected by the crisis will remain complacent. Once individuals adopt a sense of our shared humanity, however, the effects are positive. A meaningful notion of global stewardship of the earth's resources and a sense of responsibility to all the peoples of the earth can emerge. The natural flow of motivation is more

16. See John Woodall, "Humanity's Coming of Age: The Bahá’í Faith and World Order," in Toward a Global Civilization? Contributions of Religion, ed. Patricia M. Mische and Melissa Merkling (New York, NY: Lang, 2001) 331-58.

17. The initiative that grew out of my work with the New York Department of Youth and Community Development was the Healing Arts Project, a coalition of the DYCD, the Boston Institute for Arts Therapy, and the Unity Project. The purpose of the Healing Arts Project is to use the arts in citywide after-school programs to promote the idea of our common humanity and the resilient skills needed to work constructively in such a world. [Page 49]

GLOBAL EDUCATION

likely to move to include all people. This identification motivates the person to seek standards of fairness and justice that include everyone in problem solving.

The consciousness of the interconnectedness of humanity allows for the healthy development of fundamental skills required for civilized life. It opens the doors of perception and reflection to allow a wide examination of facts from every quarter of the globe and from people from different backgrounds and points of view and to permit the consideration of potential causes of problems that habits of constricted or rigid thinking would prevent. It allows for systemic thinking that looks at the interconnections of causes and effects. It allows for the possibility of devising solutions at the scale at which problems exist. The consciousness alone will not guarantee a successful solution to all of the world's problems. But it is the necessary precondition for exploring, identifying, and applying potential solutions at the correct scale. It allows for a match between the global nature of the problems and the global perspective with which to address the problems. It allows for the possibility of collective will.

The institutions needed to address the world's problems still are largely designed to protect the separate identities of nation states. Sacrificed in the current arrangement are the needs of humanity as a whole. Building a real sense of our common humanity is a precondition upon which genuine institutional reform must be based. Otherwise, the forces exerted by lesser political identities will prevent the emergence of truly international institutional efforts capable of meeting the global challenges we face.

The United Nations, a product of the representatives of the peoples of the world, is as effective as the limited identities of its member states allow it to be. Ironically, the diluted political will to support it undermines its effectiveness. Its relative ineffectiveness then saps further the political will needed to make it effective. The vicious cycle must be stopped. While political and administrative reforms are under way, a similar effort must be made to address the issue of commitment to its purposes. Yet commitment is impossible without an effort to educate the peoples of the world about their essential oneness in human dignity. Without such education, there will be no gain in collective political will to sustain the goals or initiatives of the United Nations.

Identifying with our common humanity, based on our shared dignity, provides a goal toward which our motivation can be mobilized and directed. We can give allegiance without needing to create enemies and allies. Human suffering no longer has to be the engine for reinforcing repeated cycles of human conflict based on rigid and narrow identities. Rather, suffering can be mined for its potential to release newfound capabilities for the common good. 18 The principle of the oneness of humanity

18. Because of the inclusive power of the concept of the oneness of humanity, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá makes the profound statement that, by it, "the law of the struggle for existence" in human affairs is "abrogated" (Tablets of the Divine Plan 14.3). This implies that this type of united approach to human affairs could set a new course for human evolution. [Page 50]inoculates against the tendency of suffering to lead to the paralysis of the will of the masses or of their polarization into agitated and exclusive extremes.

The idea of the oneness of humanity cannot be approached as a pious hope, however much it rightly bears the aura of a sacred truth. It requires an approach that is universal and practical. During the next sixty years, world leaders need to emerge from a pool of competent, globally minded, and well-trained individuals.

Developing that pool of human resources needs to be a major goal of the United Nations. From these individuals will come the leadership to mobilize the political will for plans of global action. Left to chance, the mounting crises of our times will push talented young minds more and more into eddies of paralysis or into turbulent extremism. We must plan thoughtfully and systematically to cultivate competent global leaders of the future—leaders who can expand the freedom of dignity and the freedom from want and from fear. Education is a primary means for accomplishing this goal.

Education for the Oneness of Humanity

The idea of teaching the oneness of humanity is not new. What is proposed here is teaching this principle globally through a systematic and long-term plan of action. This is essential for preparing much-needed, competent global leaders and the ground swell of general political will to accomplish the daunting development tasks the world faces. We do not have to re-create the educational wheel. Three core goals of the educational initiative proposed include ideas at least as old as the ancient Greeks.

That we are capable of critical self-examination; that we are all united as a species; and that we are, therefore, able to consider sympathetically the perspectives of others have been seen as the goals of education since antiquity.¹⁹ This is because these three powers of the mind allow for innovation in problem solving that maintains social cohesion in the midst of social diversity. But, as I have been arguing, the crises of our time have put constraints on identity and ethical reasoning that are undermining these basic capacities and hence the foundations of civilization. To avert dire consequences, the three powers of the mind require thoughtful restatement and systematic application on a global scale.

Valuing critical self-examination has roots in every flourishing culture. While tradition inevitably informs our perspective, the mind must not be constrained by unexamined habits of thought. The capacity to reflect on one's own assumptions dispassionately and to follow ethical reason wherever it leads is a hallmark of a refined

^{19. See Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997) 52.} [Page 51]mind. Unfettered inquiry is at the heart of personal freedom and social progress. There is a poised certitude that underlies such a daring intellectual position. The presumption is that the world will faithfully unfold its truths, even when the road is unclear or counter to the inertia of common thinking. There is an assurance that free, disciplined, and moral inquiry will lead to truth and that this pursuit is sufficient and good. It also assumes that this unfettered self-reflection will lead to a richer understanding of our common humanity. This conclusion is the goal of free inquiry and self-reflection. It is the opposite of ideological thinking characterized by a tendency to see knowledge as acquiring predigested facts, a state in which the mind's fundamental power of self-reflection atrophies. Objective and critical self-reflection is the beginning of all ethical reasoning and social responsibility. It is the foundation upon which social good rests.

TO BE COMPETENTLY EDUCATED MEANS TO SEE ONE'S OWN DIGNITY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY SEE IT AS INTRINSICALLY CONNECTED TO THE DIGNITY OF ALL HUMANITY.

Closely allied to the capacity for self-examination is the capacity for seeing that all human beings are one in natural dignity. The ancient Greek Cynic philosopher, Diogenes, when asked where he was from replied, "I am a citizen of the world."20 The difference in physical scope between what that comment could have meant twenty-three hundred years ago and what it means now is immense. But the basic moral and intellectual attitude is the same. To be competently educated means to see one's own dignity and simultaneously see it as intrinsically connected to the dignity of all humanity-to reflect on one's own condition and to see it tied to the condition of the world."

The fate of the world is one's personal concern, just as one's own fate is influenced by all that touches the lives of others. While each of us is blessed to inherit a rich background of culture and tradition from a particular people and place, our larger allegiance ought to reside with the moral community bound together "by the humanity of all human beings." Such a perspective is at the heart of what it means to be a citizen of the world.23 A curricular effort to promote the principle of the oneness of humanity must, therefore, not shy away from open discussion and elaboration about the nature of human dignity because dignity is the stuff of human oneness. The more vigorously we delve into this mine, the richer will be the results in terms of commitment to common human goals. The realization of our shared human dignity is a potent source of collective motivation.

20. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity 50.

21. For an examination of the relationship between spiritual principles and the cognitive, social, and emotional skills that form the basis of civilized living, see Elena Mustakova-Possardt, Critical Consciousness: A Study of Morality in Global Historical Context (Westport, CT, USA: Praeger, 2003).

22. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity 59.

23. The word "citizen" usually implies a member of a political state entity. Some argue that the phrase "world citizen" is a misnomer as there is no state entity with global sovereignty. The word "citizen" is not used here in that context. Rather, it is meant to convey a sense of being morally, intellectually, physically, and socially bound to the welfare of the world. [Page 52]With the foundation skills of self-examination and a knowledge of our common heritage of moral dignity, we will be able to examine the lives of others in a way that is culture inducing. 24 Instead of the distortions that morally unexamined suffering causes, we will be able to comprehend the motives and choices of others who are different from ourselves, "seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and other, but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us."25 Through the three core powers of the mind, we will no longer experience suffering as something leading to nihilistic and paralyzing views of the world. Nor will we be pulled to rigid extremist identities that distort the motives and needs of others and induce conflict and aggression. The skills of critical self-examination, of recognizing our common humanity, and of considering the perspective of others may be seen as corollaries of each other, all building our capacity to see the world as a member of a global community.

An important refinement of the classical view of education adds another core element to a curriculum centered around the oneness of humanity. That is the creation of capacity for fair-mindedness or justice. "Justice," Bahá’u’lláh states poetically, is to free oneself "from idle fancy and imitation, discern with the eye of oneness His glorious handiwork, and look into all things with a searching eye."26 More than giving what is due, the idea of justice encompasses the essence of the classical ideal for education and offers additional insight into the critical thinking skills that underlie the sum of civilizing virtues. Reflecting critically on one’s own bias; thinking wholistically and systemically about a problem free of bias; and then investigating a matter deeply, discriminating between nuances are essential elements of a refined and civil mind: This expanded and nuanced idea of justice places a keener focus on the cognitive skills needed for its exercise. It is also consistent with the classical ideas about the goals of education. In doing so, it allows for the reintroduction of a key moral principle into the discussion on education that is free from dogmatic assertion or vague relativism. This definition of justice both flows from our understanding of the oneness of humanity and deepens and reinforces our understanding of it. Teaching such skills ought to be goals to which a curriculum devoted to the oneness of humanity aspires.

24. For a discussion of the history of the values necessary for a peaceful culture, see Sissela Bok, Common Values (Columbia, MO, USA: U of Missouri P, 1995). 25. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity 85. 26. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, comp. Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, trans. Habib Taherzadeh et al., İst pocket-size ed. (Wilmette, IL, USA: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1998) 157. [Page 53]

GLOBAL EDUCATION

Perhaps no greater challenge exists in curricular design than in including the proposition that the purpose of education is to actualize the noble potentiality of a human being. An educational model to meet the needs of our turbulent world must reveal the nobility in individuals and groups so that they can contribute competently to a community that plays an integral part in advancing a sustainable global civilization.

Any plan for global education that has at its core the inculcation of the principle of the oneness of humanity cannot exclude the arts and the media, which have always reflected the context within which cultural discourse evolves. 27 Nor can global education ignore the role of religion. The universal aspects of religion that elucidate the dignity of the human person and our shared humanity in that dignity must be overtly and repeatedly expressed and reinforced. The elements of faith that promote the poised inner conditions that resist the tendency to form rigid or shattered identities in the face of suffering must be more directly reinforced. Religious communities must play an important role in promoting the idea of the oneness of humanity. Sectarian differences and doctrine at least in the public domain ought to be relegated to a subordinate place and the universal and ennobling elements of religion brought to the fore.

One of the Millennium Development Goals is to provide a primary school education to all of the world's children by 2015. Integral to this process ought to be appropriate curricular processes and content to create a pool of children, competent not only in basic educational content but in the knowledge of the common dignity of all people, the basic freedoms and rights all people possess, and the responsibilities of global stewardship and citizenship. The goals must be seen not as incidentals but as core elements of the curriculum woven into the presentation and understanding of the core content if we expect such children to be motivated to act as responsible members of a global community. Nothing less will work. The crises many of these children face will pull them toward the poles of nihilism and extremism unless we deliberately adopt a universal policy of education to instill higher social standards that undergird our quest for a larger freedom.

The current UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-14) provides a timely vehicle for teaching the oneness of humanity. Rather than promoting the concept of the oneness of humanity as an ideological belief, the UN Decade offers a chance for experimenting with educational approaches that demonstrate the organic relationship between humanity and the natural world. What influences one affects the other. In teaching this interdependence, the oneness of humanity is implicit. What might be added to such educational efforts would be

27. The Unity Project is an example of a community effort designed to promote the cognitive and social skills implied in the principle of the oneness of humanity. See www.unityproject.org. [Page 54]to make explicit the implicit assumptions and conclusions about the oneness of humanity, not by an ideological fiat but by rational argument from fact. Instead of promoting ideological thinking that simply rehearses predetermined slogans that result in rote, stolid, uncritical thinking, emphasizing the oneness of humanity should have as its key promoting the capacity to reason ethically in a complex global community.

It is not likely at this time in history that a single global curriculum could be advanced internationally. Nor would it be wise to adopt such a monolithic approach in a pluralistic world. Rather, a set of universally accepted educational principles, similar to the ones outlined, needs to be explicitly defined, laying out the essential features of a curriculum that explores the nature of the oneness of humanity. Then, like a thousand seeds sown, local initiatives in curriculum development should apply the principles in ways that take into account local needs and resources. Some form of global assessment process should gather the results of the initiatives to glean the innovations that might be universally applied, the ones that work best in specific situations, and the approaches that are not fruitful. As much as possible, the principles ought to be applied to core content that gives context to the Millennium Development Goals. For the new type of education must become immediately relevant to the needs of peoples and not simply an exercise in repeating facts and figures.

A technological infrastructure for education about the oneness of humanity and for assessing the results ought to be incorporated into development plans. This should be done in such a way that the use of technology does not broaden the gap between the haves and have nots. In some regions, where resources are scant, expectations that education needs to take place in centralized universities may need to be reexamined. Instead, teaching ought to be approached in ways that enable the students to use their new skills to serve local development needs. Education for the goals might best be approached by using constructivist methodologies that demonstrate the interrelation of all human activity and the nature of human dignity.28

Graduates of an education focused on the oneness of humanity would see as a challenge to the education system and the society it serves any fall into volitional paralysis in which individuals are unable to recognize or mobilize their nobility for their own benefit and that of others. Likewise, such graduates would also be able to see the rise of extremism and intolerance as a crisis of civilization requiring explicit and vigorous examination and action within the educational system and its social supports. Graduates would also see complacency about the suffering of others as

28. Constructivist approaches to education rely on methods that assist students to "construct" meaning based on their own experiences. [Page 55]indicating the lack of the penetration of the implications of our shared dignity as human beings.

Any effort to establish a program of global education should not be confined to the agencies of the United Nations or to institutions of higher education. But the UN can take the lead in stating clearly the value of such an effort and by emphasizing that global education about the oneness of humanity is a priority of global public policy. It can facilitate the discussion leading to the elucidation of the guiding principles by which curricular experimentation develops, and it can help establish a variety of pilot efforts to support this work in areas of particular need.

The time is now. The political will to achieve the Millennium Development Goals must be cultivated. Competent leaders of the world community need to be prepared to accomplish them. Practically speaking, we must be thinking in a time span that extends beyond 2015. Initiating a global movement for education based on the principle of the oneness of humanity will require some five to ten years for securing funding and preparing teacher-training institutions, pilot sites, and methods for assessing the new educational program. In the meantime, already existing efforts ought to be identified and supported.

Where possible, efforts might be focused initially on developing young leaders who can plant the seeds for such an education in the communities in which they live. Such leaders can be found in existing educational institutions and among youth already serving in their local communities. As local needs, resources, and opportunities allow, innovations in education outside of or in partnership with academic institutions need to be explored as pilots.

To begin, one can envision a series of well-funded pilot efforts launched to train leaders in public administration, community development, agriculture, education, and health care. These disciplines ought to be the framework within which the principle of the oneness of humanity and its core competencies are taught as intrinsic to the field itself. These pilot efforts ought to be based on a variety of educational models, yet be consistent with the core principles. This effort might be endorsed by UNESCO, administered through local partnering agreements with educational programs, and generously funded by the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to integrate the educational initiative into the fabric of development plans. Technical and administrative capacity to assess results factored into the planning and funding process will help refine the process and highlight successful initiatives.

Conclusion

The concept of the oneness of humanity is the context from which mobilizing the collective will must come. It links the welfare of others to one's own. It is based on the knowledge of the inherent dignity of all. It sets the scales of justice to include the freedoms and needs of others. It mobilizes human potential and physical [Page 56]resources toward goals that include all. As such, it is the foundation for prosperous global development. The concept of the oneness of humanity is the precondition upon which meaningful motivation for global stewardship and global citizenship can take shape.

The particulars are open to discussion. But if we hope to see a serious engagement with the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, we must make a serious effort to expand the pool of trained individuals who are willing to tackle them. This means a deliberate, explicit, and systematic effort to educate ourselves about the oneness of humanity and the skills needed to sustain such an awareness.

We all hope that in the years ahead further calamitous suffering of the peoples of the world can be averted. But however events unfold, we are not helpless in shaping our future. Whatever may be in store for the world community, the forces that support our common humanity must win out over the regressive pull of nihilism, extremism, and complacency. We can no longer allow our destiny to be decided by hopes, well-meaning appeals, and good intentions. Explicitly adopting a global policy to teach the inherent oneness of humanity is both the inoculation against the regressive forces in humankind and the liberator of the better angels of our nature. [Page 57]

It's the People

It's the people, In all our rich diversity, Who make this planet, What it is.

The natural wonders of the earth- Water, clouds, mountains, trees, valleys, islands, meadows- Are each in all their splendor A reflection of divine beauty.

So it is with us, In all our rich diversity, Each person, an element of sacredness, A reflection of divine beauty.

For every majestic mountain vista We can find an equally inspiring and affirming Recognition of sacredness and wonder In every human face we gaze consciously and respectfully upon.

It's the people, In all our rich diversity, Who make wherever we are on this shimmering globe, the center of the world.

It's the people, In all our rich diversity, Who make this planet the garden we thought we had left But have been sharing all along.

It's all the people, Each and every one of us included, Who make up-in our fullness, beauty, and unity- The human family.

-ROBERT ATKINSON

Copyright 2006 by Robert Atkinson

ROBERT ATKINSON is director of the Center for the Study of Lives and a professor of human development at the University of Southern Maine. His several books include The Gift of Stories: Practical and Spiritual Applications of Autobiography. Life Stories and Personal Mythmaking (1995), The Life Story Interview (1998), and The Beat of My Drum: An Autobiography (2005), as well as some two dozen articles and chapters. He wrote "It's the People" while a faculty member in the fall 2002 Semester at Sea voyage around the world.

[Page 59]

AfterWord

JEFFERY HUFFINES The International Criminal Court at a Crossroad: An Update, 1998-2005

Establishing the International Criminal Court

The world at the dawn of the twenty-first century appears to be an ever more dangerous place. The slaughter in Darfur continues unabated, violent insurgencies continue in countries as diverse as Colombia and Sri Lanka, and Iraq is sliding into civil war. Yet the reality is that, since the end of the Cold War in 1991, armed conflict and nearly all forms of political violence have decreased globally by 40 percent. The number of genocides and other mass slaughters has dropped by 80 percent during the same time period. Why? One reason for the decline in large-scale violence may be that the United Nations, freed from the paralysis of Cold War geopolitics and in partnership with governments, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), has initiated and supported an unprecedented range of conflict-prevention and peace-building initiatives. In the area of legal mechanisms designed to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocity crimes against individuals, one of the more important developments has been the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court adopted in Rome in July 1998.

The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), which includes more than two thousand nongovernmental organizations from all regions of the

Copyright 2006 by Jeffery Huffines 1. See Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21 Century (New York: Oxford UP, 2005).

JEFFERY HUFFINES is the United Nations representative for the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States and an adjunct professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University. Based in New York since 1996, he has been a leading advocate for a number of national and international coalitions related to the United Nations. He serves as co-chair of the Faith and Ethics Network for the International Criminal Court, which is composed of a diverse group of some thirty organizations representing the world's religious and ethical traditions that examine the moral and ethical values surrounding the Court. Huffines also represents the Bahá’í International Community at the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. [Page 60]world, was a major partner of the United Nations and of progressive and like-minded governments in advocating the establishment of the new world Court. The extraordinary cooperation, consultation, and community among the various entities during the process leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represent a new kind of multistakeholder partnership in global diplomacy.

More than three years have passed since the required minimum of sixty countries ratified the Rome Statute in April 2002. By Statute, the Court came into force three months later on July 1, 2002. In 2003 the States Parties’ to the Rome Statute elected eighteen Judges, a Prosecutor, two Deputies, and the Registrar. In 2004 the Prosecutor launched the ICC’s first prosecutorial investigations. Never before has a treaty-based court system been so quickly established.

The ICC’s Jurisdiction

Although the ICC has been rightly hailed as the greatest advance in international criminal justice during the twentieth century, its ability to administer justice is circumscribed by statute limitations and by the political will of both its supporters and opponents. It was designed as a court of last resort to prosecute individuals, not States, who have committed acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes only when national courts are destroyed, are unable to do so, or are deliberately shielding the accused from justice.

Matters can be referred to the Court by a State Party to the Rome Statute, by the Prosecutor, or by the UN Security Council. In matters referred to it by a State Party or by the Prosecutor, the Court can only prosecute crimes committed by individuals in the territories of the one hundred countries that have thus far ratified the Rome Statute or crimes committed by individuals who are citizens of those ratifying countries. Thus, for the time being, the ICC’s jurisdiction does not extend to the considerable portion of humanity represented by governments that are not parties to the Statute, including China, India, Russia, the United States, and most of the States ruled by Muslim regimes.

However, when the Security Council refers a matter to the Court, it has jurisdiction regardless of whether the individual’s State is a party to the ICC treaty. Non-States Parties may accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The Court can only prosecute crimes that took place after July 1, 2002, the date on which it came into force.

A critical political issue for the framers of the International Criminal Court was to determine what body would be responsible for authorizing cases taken up by the Prosecutor. Because of concerns expressed by some members of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Department of Defense about the potential for politically motivated prosecutions against U.S. military personnel, the United States strongly advocated that the UN Security Council be permitted to veto cases referred to or initiated by the ICC Prosecutor. However, a majority of the delegates to the 1998 Rome Conference resolutely affirmed the independence of the Prosecutor by refusing to subject court cases to the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Hence the Rome Statute stipulates that the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation upon a referral by the Security Council, by ICC States Parties, by civil-society groups, or by proprio motu, [Page 61]

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AT A CROSSROAD

meaning of his own initiative. If the Prosecutor wishes to launch an investigation proprio motu, it must be approved by a Pre-Trial Chamber of judges, subject to appeals by five other judges, to determine whether the case would fall within the jurisdictional scope of the ICC.

Because the Rome Statue denied the Security Council veto power over cases referred to the Court, U.S. President Bill Clinton refused to sign the Rome Statute until the last hours of his administration in December 2000. U.S. opposition to the Court solidified when President George W. Bush subsequently "unsigned" the treaty in April 2002 following the official establishment of the ICC upon ratification by its sixtieth State Party. For the past four years the United States has refused to take part as an observer in the Court's Assembly of States Parties, has instituted sanctions against countries that do not exempt U.S. citizens and some foreign personnel from the Court's jurisdiction, and has made it clear that the U.S. does not intend to cooperate with the Court.

Referrals to the Court

The high hopes represented by the emergence of the International Criminal Court onto the world stage have quickly given way to the complex realities of funding and administering a new world body designed to prosecute the most egregious atrocities committed by tyrants and war lords under whose yoke millions of innocent oppressed people have suffered.

From the beginning of its operation in 2003, the Court has faced challenges and opportunities not anticipated by its framers only a few years earlier. The framers had expected that the Court would try cases through third-party referrals in countries where cease-fires had already been negotiated. Unexpectedly, the first situations to be investigated by the Court came from governments that referred atrocities committed in their own territories by combatants who were still engaged in raging conflicts. Uganda made a referral to the Court in December 2003, a case that the Prosecutor subsequently decided to investigate. It involved the civil war of nearly twenty years duration in Northern Uganda, specifically atrocities committed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), including the abduction of some twenty-five thousand children who had been forced into fighting and sexual slavery. In July 2005 the Court issued its first arrest warrants for the top five senior leaders of the LRA for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes.

With no police force of its own, the ICC must rely on the cooperation of regional bodies and governments to arrest criminals, including those governments whose officials may be guilty of the very atrocities the Court is designed to prosecute. Should government forces succeed in arresting the LRA leaders, the first trials could begin in 2006.

The second referral to the Court, which the Prosecutor decided to investigate, came in March 2004 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It arrived after the Prosecutor had announced, in July 2003, his intention to follow the situation in the DRC, especially in the Ituri region, where some sixty thousand lives have been lost in fighting between local tribes allied with national rebel groups and foreign backers. The Prosecutor has indicated that he expects to issue indictments in 2006.

In January 2005 the Prosecutor announced that he had received a third [Page 62]referral, this one from the Central African Republic where he will analyze the situation to determine whether to initiate an investigation.

In February 2005 the ICC Registrar announced that Côte d'Ivoire, a non-State Party, had declared its acceptance of jurisdiction over crimes on its territory. In March 2005 the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and with the implicit cooperation of the United States, referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC. With three prosecutorial investigations now in progress, and the first arrest warrants in Uganda made public in October 2005, the Court is prepared to begin its first trial soon.

The referrals by Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have established an important precedent for future cases. Throughout the prosecution of each case, the ICC's coordination with key partners, from NGOs to governments and from the United Nations to humanitarian agencies, is crucial. The Court's related field activities, including investigations conducted by the Prosecutor, protecting the rights of defense, conducting outreach to explain the Court to affected populations, and carrying out the Court's specific mandate as it relates to victims and witnesses, rely on the cooperation of both governments and civil society.

Building a Track Record

Now that the Court is beginning to build a track record, it can be judged by its actions and decisions. The ICC is far from perfect, and at this early stage in its development, it has made and will continue to make mistakes. For example, to protect witnesses, victims, and its own staff, the Court decided in 2004 to maintain a low public profile in Uganda during its investigations. Because of the political sensitivities of its investigation, the Court took pains to protect the confidentiality of victims and witnesses. As a result, it did not open a public-information office in the country. But the excess of caution allowed rumors and innuendo about its operation to flourish.

Moreover, from the time of its announcement about its investigation into the atrocities committed by the Lord's Resistance Army, the Court found itself caught up in the vicious partisan politics of Uganda. Many of the Acholi people in Northern Uganda opposed the timing of the Court's investigation, fearing that its threat of prosecution would derail the amnesty program put into place as an inducement for the LRA to demobilize and lay down its arms. This fear was exacerbated by the suspicion that the President of Uganda had deliberately invited the ICC to investigate atrocities committed by the LRA while ignoring atrocities committed by the Ugandan armed forces. As the ICC investigation continued into 2005, the peace negotiations floundered, further inciting the anxieties of the people. Despite the Prosecutor's repeated statements that he was investigating atrocities committed by all parties, suspicions remain that the ruling party was manipulating the ICC to punish only one side of the combatants engaged in the civil war.

Recognizing the need to counter misperceptions about the Court's mission, Court officials engaged the leaders of the Lango, Acholi, Teso, and Madi communities of Northern Uganda in consultations in both The Hague and in Uganda. As a result, the Prosecutor reassured the Ugandans that the Court [Page 63]respects the national peace negotiations as well as the associated traditional approaches of justice and reconciliation championed by local cultural and religious leaders. Yet many at the grassroots level still seriously question the Court's impartiality. Following the Court's public announcement about its arrest warrants against the five top leaders of the LRA, the worst fears of many were realized when the LRA quickly responded with violent reprisals against innocent civilians and aid workers during the fall of 2005.

During the fourth session of the ICC Assembly of States Parties that took place in November and early December 2005 in The Hague, governments, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, mindful of the potential for misinformation about the intentions and actions of the Court, urged the ICC to implement a more vigorous outreach and communication strategy to inform affected populations about its purpose, mission, and actions.

Challenges

A challenge regarding countries in civil conflict is figuring out the appropriate sequence and mix of judicial and social remedies that are most conducive to peace, that will most effectively achieve the demands of justice and reconciliation for both the survivors and perpetrators of atrocities, and that will best serve the victims. The range of alternatives that have been and are being deployed in troubled regions throughout the world include military operations; peace negotiations; amnesties; truth commissions; international, national, and hybrid courts; and other traditional and local methods of reconciliation. With each conflict, advocates are confronted with the same dilemmas of law and politics, peace and justice, retribution and restoration, vengeance and forgiveness. Civic and religious leaders often find themselves switching sides of the equation from conflict to conflict and from region to region. Thus it is all the more important that the judicial procedures of the Court not be seen as the final word in the administration of justice but be placed within the broader context of transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives already taking place on the ground.

The Future

Despite its growing pains, it is clear that the International Criminal Court has already made significant contributions to the emergence of a universal standard of jurisprudence for the prosecution of crimes of mass violence by both domestic courts and international tribunals. With several countries and the UN Security Council referring cases, the ICC is now poised to exercise the full powers of its mandate with the commencement of its first case in 2006.

The ICC does not operate inside a vacuum. The Court's mission to "put an end to impunity" and to "contribute to the prevention" of the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community" can only be achieved within the broader framework of the global order of which it is a part.2 Fueled by such moral tragedies as the Holocaust, the killing fields of Cambodia, and the recent genocide in Rwanda, the Court represents humanity's latest attempt to ensure the possibility of justice when all other efforts have failed at the national

2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble. [Page 64]level. Beyond its efficacy as a juridical instrument, the ICC will succeed only to the extent that the countries it purports to serve will also exemplify the values of justice, peace, and accountability.

It remains to be seen whether leaders during the course of this century will live up to the promise of "Never again!" that high officials have so piously proclaimed following one genocide after another since the end of World War II. The bloodstained record of the twentieth century suggests that significant advances in international law and order tend to take place only after the violent vicissitudes of world war. Yet the end of the Cold War indicates that the world's leaders are capable of making significant changes in the international order through largely peaceful means, however imperfectly rendered. The ICC, established with such high hopes at the beginning of the twenty-first century, may yet extend the light of justice to future generations even as it now treads a path shrouded by the anxieties of a troubled age. We can only hope that, by force of example, the International Criminal Court is answering, in part, the urgent need for the enforcement of the rule of law so indispensable for the "peace, security, and well-being of the world."³

3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble. [Page 65]

ABSTRACT DEADLINE: JUNE 15, 2006

Religious people throughout the ages have often been critical of "materialism." But what exactly is materialism? The term connotes several distinct concepts, at least some of which have no direct relation to each other. The term not only means different things in different fields of inquiry but has also meant different things in different historical periods. If one is to think critically and intelligently about "materialism," one must be clear about the various meanings of the term. World Order is seeking submissions that survey critically the distinct concepts to which the term materialism refers, in such diverse fields as philosophy; theology; the social sciences, including history and economics; psychology; and Bahá’í studies. We invite, in particular, treatments of "materialism" in the following contexts:

Brief Critical Reviews:

Materialism as ontology, traditionally the view that only entities that exist are physical entities. What is the case for and against this view of the nature of reality? What is the history of this idea? What is its current status in philosophy?

Materialism as philosophy of mind, the view that the mind is a purely physical phenomenon. What is the case for and against this view of the mind? What is the history of this idea? What, if any, are its ethical implications? What is its current status in philosophy of mind and psychology?

Materialism as historical methodology, the view that economic factors, rather than ideas, are the most important causes of historical outcomes. What is the case for and against historical materialism? What is its current status in the social sciences?

Extended Essays:

Materialism as consumerist ethic, the view that the consumption of material goods is the most important component of a flourishing human life. What is the philosophical case for and against a consumerist ethic? What are the social, economic, political, spiritual, and ecological consequences of consumerism? How widespread are consumerist values and culture? What are the causes of consumerist values and culture? What are the causes and consequences of what social scientists call "post-material" values? What is the relationship between globalization and consumerism? Between capitalism and consumerism? What is the future of consumerism? Can it be contained? What role should material goods play in a human life?

Materialism as scientific explanation, the epistemological view that the only appropriate methods of scientific explanation and justification appeal to material phenomena only. What is the case for this view of science? What is the history of this idea? What is its current status among philosophers? Among scientists? Is this view of scientific explanation compatible with religion? With theism? With the Bahá’í writings? How is it different from other senses of materialism?

Materialism in the Bahá’í writings. What did ‘Abdu’l-Bahá mean by the term materialism? What does analysis of the original Persian- and Arabic-language texts of the Bahá’í writings tell us about what is meant by materialism? What did materialism mean in the nineteenth century, and how does this help us understand what ‘Abdu’l-Bahá meant by it when addressing nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers and audiences? What did Shoghi Effendi mean by materialism? What do the Bahá’í writings say about materialism in its various senses? In what sense(s) and for what reasons are the Bahá’í writings critical of materialism?

Manuscript Submission Information:

For a copy of the World Order style sheet for preparing a manuscript (and other tips), send an e-mail to <worldorder@usbnc.org>, or write the address below.

Submissions to the journal will be subject to external blind peer review if they fall outside the expertise of the Editorial Board or upon request by the author.

Manuscripts (in Word or WordPerfect) should be sent to World Order, Dr. Betty J. Fisher, Managing Editor, 7311 Quail Springs Place NE, Albuquerque, NM 87113-1780, USA or to <worldorder@usbnc.org>.

World Order has been published quarterly since 1966 by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States. [Page 66]

Forthcoming...

Arash Abizadeh explores the ethical and spiritual foundations of Bahá’í elections

Derik Smith examines the maturation of the artistic genius of Robert Hayden, the first African American Poetry Consultant to the U.S. Library of Congress

Alexandra Humphrey reviews Building Sustainable Peace, edited by Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight

Firuz Kazemzadeh reviews Kenneth E. Bowers' God Speaks Again

Anne Gordon Perry reviews The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05, edited by David Wells and Sandra Wilson

Robert H. Stockman reviews In Service to the Common Good: The American Bahá’í Community's Commitment to Social Change