World Unity/Volume 3/Issue 6/Text

←Previous

World Unity Volume 3, Issue 6

Next→

Return to PDF view Proofread once

[Page 365]

WORLD UNITY

C. F. ANSLEY W. W. ATWOOD A Monthly Magazine for those who seek the world outlook upon present developments of philosophy, science, religion, ethics and the arts

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, Editor HORACE HOLLEY, Managing Editor HELEN B. MACMILLAN, Business Manager

Contributing Editors A. MENDELSOHN BARTHOLDY BARON BAUDRAN L. F. DE BEAUFORT GERRIT A. BENEKER PIERRE BOVET EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT HARRY CHARLESWORTH No POON CHEW RUDOLPH I. COFFEE BAYARD DODOB GEORGES DUHAMEL ANNA B. ECKSTEIN HAVELOCK ELLIS AUGUSTE FOREL C. F. GATES V. SCHULZE GAVERNITZ HELLMUTE VON GERLACH HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS KARLIL GIBRAN CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN JOHN W. GRAHAM A. EUSTACE HAYDON WILL HAYES YAMATO ICHICKASHI MORDECAI W. JOHNSON RUFUS M. JONES DAVID STARR JORDAN SAMUEL LUCAS JOSHI ERNEST JUDET VLADIMIR KARAPETOFF P. W. Kuo RICHARD LEE HARRY LEVI ALAIN LOCKE GEORGE DE LUKÁCS LOUIS L. MANN SIR JAMES MARCHANT VICTOR MARGUERITTE R. H. MARKHAM ALFRED W. MARTIN F. S. MARVIN KIRTLEY F. MATHER LUCIA AMES MEAD FRED MERRIFIELD MARJA GRUNDMANN-KOSCIENSKA KARIN MICHAELIS FRANK H. HANKINS HERBERT A. MILLER DHAN GOPAL MUKERJI IDA MÜLLER YONE NOOUCHI HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET DEXTER PERKINS JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. PAUL RICHARD CHARLES RICHET FORREST REID TH. RUYSSEN NATHANIEL SCHMIDT WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD MARY SIBORIST ABBA HILLEL SILVER ISIDOR SINGER DAVID G. STEAD AUGUSTUS O. THOMAS GILBERT THOMAS ISABELLA VAN METER RUSTUM VAMBARY WALTER WALSH HANS WERBERO M. P. WILLCOCKS FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT

Editorial Office:—4 East 12th Street, New York City

WORLD UNITY MAGAZINE is published by WORLD UNITY PUBLISHING CORPORATION, 4 East 12th Street, New York City: MARY RUMSEY MOVIUS, president; HORACE HOLLEY, vice-president; FLORENCE MORTON, treasurer; JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, secretary. Published monthly, 35 cents a copy, $3.50 a year in the United States, $4.00 in Canada and $4.50 in all other countries (postage included). THE WORLD UNITY PUBLISHING CORPORATION and its editors do not invite unsolicited manuscripts and art material, but welcome correspondence on articles related to the aims and purposes of the magazine. Printed in U. S. A. Contents copyrighted 1929 by WORLD UNITY PUBLISHING CORPORATION. [Page 366]

Race and Civilization

RACE is the garment we are born in and is set in our biologic or blood inheritance; civilization—or culture, to use a more comprehensive term—is the garment we learn to wear and depends on physical and social environment: time, place, parents, teachers, society. The author of this chapter holds, in common with his fellow-anthropologists, that no necessary or innate connection between race and civilization has yet been proved, and that while such connection is conceivable it is highly improbable. He holds further that there is no warrant for the assumption that certain races are "higher" than others, or that there are any "pure" races, or that race mixtures or "hybrid races" are biologically (or culturally) inferior; or even that any existing classification of mankind according to biologic or heritable features and psychologic or cultural traits has any scientific merit or furnishes any real clue as to how peoples and cultures are genetically related. . . .

Such racial mixtures as we have in America today are in no essential different from race mixtures which have been going on for thousands of years in Europe and Asia, and which we have no reason to believe have ever resulted in inferior races or in breaking up civilization. Our problems, then, are not those of race and civilization, but of too little understanding and too much prejudice. . . . Like human behavior, civilization is made and not born. Like life itself, it must be nourished day by day, ceaselessly, with new energy and new materials, or it sickens and dies.

—Race and Civilization in Whither Mankind, GEORGE A. DORSEY [Page 367]

THE NATURE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

For the average person, internationalism has arisen as a dominant fact in a quantitative far more than qualitative sense. By the construction of railroads, villagers first actually became conscious of the distant city—through the increasingly intricate system of credits and exchange which modern industrialism has made its highway, village-minded workers and business men in cities have been forced to recognize the larger social horizon. The proof that warfare no longer permits neutrality, but penetrates the entire world structure with irresistible forces, completes the experience by which living men and women have been given the first, introductory lessons in world citizenship.

Thus, for the first time in history, people in private life and modest circumstances pass their days amid world affairs and are quickened to some degree of internationalism by fear and apprehension, or by ambition and hope, even when conscious of no spiritual influences at work and oblivious to any moral value in the trend of the age. Their field of observation has been vastly enlarged; their minds are given a greater range of facts to deal with; their lives are conditioned by the destinies of men in distant lands; but the transformation so far is physical, in terms of augmented space, rather than spiritual, in terms of deepened significance.

It is as though a man blind to the mystery of the tree in his own dooryard had been given a telescope capable of revealing a universe beyond the local moon and stars. His indifferent and unseeing gaze encounters objectivities whose reality reaches him through uncountable periods of elapsed time; but he apprehends [Page 368]them less than he apprehends the goods displayed in windows along Main Street, and remains as foreign to their proffered meaning as to the personal lives of the workers in his own factory. Whether one point of light is a star receding or a sun new-born; whether another whorl of brilliance is a world in agony or a comet rushing to destroy this little earth—he does not ask and cannot know with the inwardness of real knowledge, for his own being is lost in the darkened mirror of a self become derivative and second hand.

The whole implication of world affairs focusses upon the screen of local events in every community, were there but men and women vital enough to witness the movements of truth and love in human life. Internationalism is but a mask of glamor covering the faces of people we see daily, but have never learned to know.

It is more essential to understand the nature of world affairs at this time than to fulfil faithfully the task of keeping up with the mere details of "foreign" events and international issues. So far, we have but attempted to extend our local moral irresponsibility into the new and larger realm. We strive for no true justice at home—that justice which relates human beings to universal purpose—consequently our prejudices are expanded when we deal with things abroad. We examine the world scene to find justification for economic, religious, racial or political concepts offering some temporary advantage in our own environment. We must condone war if we sanction any form of injustice in the city or hamlet where we live.

But the time will come—perhaps has already come—when the nature of world affairs will be disclosed as that full area of human action in which cause and effect are finally conjoined; that rounded environment in which irresponsibility can no more be evaded; where, in brief, the modes of human conduct must be made to correspond with the laws of mind and soul. [Page 369]

THE NATURALIZATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

by S. G. PANDIT Attorney, Los Angeles, California

Has Racial Prejudice Become a National Policy?

THE first naturalization statute passed by Congress (March 26, 1790) provided that any alien being a free white person who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof. The policy was to encourage immigration and naturalization of aliens in order to hasten the growth of a new nation and develop its vast resources. Indeed the most gigantic importation of human beings to toil as slaves-unparalleled in the history of mankind-was being carried on then, and for more than half a century thereafter, in order that their forced labor might reclaim the wilderness and make it blossom so as to feed and clothe their masters of an alien race. It was thought advisable to withhold from slaves-both the white indentured slaves and the vast number of black chattel slaves from Africa-all political power by denying to them the privilege of voting. Hence the requirement that the aliens to be naturalized should be "free." The word "white" was used in the law for a similar purpose. Its effect was to exclude from naturalization the Negroes-most, if not all, of whom-were then slaves. The popular race differentiation in the United States has always been between "white" and "colored"-meaning by the latter term a person with Negro blood-little or much-in his veins. The word "white" has generally been used in the federal and in the state statutes, in the publications of the United States, [Page 370]and in its classification of its inhabitants, to include all persons not otherwise classified. (See "A Century of Population Growth in the United States," published by the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1909. See also United States Census classifications from 1790 to 1850). A statute of Arkansas requires separate accommodation in travel for the "white and African races," and provides that all persons not visibly African "shall be deemed to belong to the white race." Acts 1891 p. 17 c. 17, sec. See also Laws Florida 1909, p. 39, c. 5893; Acts Virginia 1902 to 1904 (Extra Sess.) p. 987, c. 609, subc. 4 (Code 1904, Sec. 1294 d); Civil Code South Carolina 1902, Sec. 2158. Concerning the use of the word "white" in treating of schools, see Civil Code South Carolina 1902, sec. 1231; Kentucky Statutes 1909 (Russell's) Sections 5607, 5608, 5642, 5765 (Ky. Stat. 1909, Sec. 4523, 4524, 4428, 4487). The Constitution of Oklahoma (article 23, Sec. 11) reads as follows:

"Wherever in this Constitution and laws of this state the word 'colored' or 'colored person,' 'Negro' or 'Negro race' are used, the same shall be construed to mean to apply to all persons of African descent. The term 'white race' shall include all other persons."

Says Circuit Judge Lowell (In re Halladjian, 174 Federal Reporter 834, 843):

"While an exhaustive search of the voluminous records of this court, sitting as a court of naturalization, has been impossible, yet some early instances have been found where not only western Asiatics, but even Chinese, were admitted to naturalization."

The federal census classified Chinese as white until 1860. According to the census of 1910 (vol. I p. 1070) there were at that date 1368 naturalized Chinese and 483 who had received first papers.

With the development of agitation against Chinese labor immigration to this country there gradually grew a desire to exclude Chinese from the privilege of citizenship. When Congress, at the end of the Civil War, was discussing and formulating [Page 371]

NATURALIZATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

legislation which would admit Negroes, then emancipated, to citizenship, the suggestion was made in the Senate that the term "white person" might be dropped from the existing statute, thus making Negroes eligible. But it was opposed by some senators on the ground that that would leave the way open for Chinese to be naturalized. It is true that the term "Asiatics" was sometimes employed in that debate, but the context makes it perfectly clear that it was used to mean "Chinese." Congress thereupon amended the naturalization law by the Act of July 14, 1870, which provided that "The naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."

In 1873 the United States Statutes were edited and compiled as "The Revised Statutes," in which the foregoing amendment appeared as:

"Section 2169: The provisions of this title [naturalization] shall apply to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."

There was no mention of "white persons" or of any others than Africans in the first compilation of the Revised Statutes relating to naturalization. So that between 1873 and 1875, that is until the amendment and re-enactment of the foregoing section by Congress in 1875, only Africans or Negroes, could be legally admitted to citizenship. By action of Congress in 1875, however, section 2169 of the Revised Statutes assumed its present form:

"The provisions of this title [Naturalization] shall apply [to aliens being free white persons, and] to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."

The growth of labor agitation against the Chinese continued. Says Professor D. O. McGovney in the Iowa Law Bulletin for May, 1923:

"It was not until 1878 that any reported opinion held any other race [than Negro] ineligible, in that case a Chinese [In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155, Fed. Cas. No. 104 (Circ. Ct. D. California, 1878)], and there is conclusive evidence that Chinese were naturalized both before and after that decision." [Page 372]On May 6, 1882, Congress in an Act suspending Chinese labor immigration for ten years, provided:

"Section 14. That hereafter no State Court or Court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship, and all laws in conflict with this act are repealed."

Thus Congress seems to have felt that only by specific legislation for that purpose could Chinese be definitely excluded from naturalization under the meaning of the term "free white person" of the Naturalization law. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, however, gave the start to a restrictive interpretation of the term "white persons" in section 2169 of the Revised Statutes providing for naturalization of aliens. Thereafter, in some judicial pronouncements one meets with the phenomenon of a change in sentiment and usage producing a change in the construction of a statute! As witness:

"Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws," said the Supreme Court of the United States in 1893, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 716, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905.

As was said by Circuit Judge Lowell regarding the foregoing:

"So far as this statement construed in 1893 the existing statutes of the United States, even apart from the statute of 1882, it was authoritative. But it was not correct, if historically applied to the practice of federal courts one or two generations earlier."

To the same effect as Fong Yue Ting (supra) are In re Ah Yup, Fed. Cas. No. 104; In re Gee Hop, (D. C.) 71 Fed. 274; In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163, 24 Pac. 156. In these cases the distinction made was between Caucasian and Mongolian.

Somewhat later it was decided that Japanese were also excluded from naturalization, as they belonged to the Mongolian race. In re Saito, 62 Fed. 126; In re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 Fed. 922; In re Knight, 171 Fed. 299; In re Yamashita, 33 Wash. 234, 70 Pac. 482, 94 Am. St. Rep. 860.

Western Asiatics generally, including Hindus, Arabs, Ar- [Page 373]

Naturalization Law of the United States

menians, Syrians and Persians, if they succeeded in proving to the satisfaction of the naturalization court that they belonged to the Aryan or Semitic branch of the Caucasian or white race, were admitted to citizenship, though not without opposition from the representatives of the government at the naturalization hearing.

In 1918 and 1919 Congress passed statutes admitting to citizenship under specially favorable conditions "any person of foreign birth who served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the present war &c. . . . for the period of one year after all of the American troops are returned to the United States."

Under these laws Japanese and Chinese applicants who had served in the army or navy of the United States during the world war were admitted to citizenship in a few instances. A federal district court in a Japanese case, In re Saito (unreported, 1919) said:

"Was it not as much our duty to extend the protection which citizenship only would afford to the Orientals in our service as it was to extend it to others? We had drafted them into our service and they had thought enough of us to be willing to serve, to risk their lives in our service. Was Congress unwilling to grant citizenship to those among them found to possess the qualifications required of others? I hope it is not improper to say that I do not believe that Congress was so illiberal."

The Supreme Court of the United States, however, decided in 1925 in the case of Hidemitsu Toyota v. United States, that "any alien" in the laws of 1918 and 1919 meant "any alien" eligible for naturalization under previous laws including section 2169 Revised Statutes. And Chinese and Japanese being not "white persons" were declared excluded from the benefits of the above-mentioned war legislation relating to naturalization.

In the case of Ozawa v. United States, (260 U. S. 178) the Supreme Court had before it for the first time a question involving interpretation of the term "free white person" of the naturalization statute as applied to a Japanese. The court decided that [Page 374]a Japanese, not being a Caucasian is, under a long line of decisions of federal and state courts, ineligible for citizenship. The following year (1923), the Supreme Court had before it for interpretation the meaning of the same phrase in its application to a Hindu (United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U. S. 204). The court opined that the Hindus belonged by race to a more or less debatable zone of borderline cases; nay, it even conceded that they may be Caucasians. But the decision went against the Hindu’s admission to citizenship on the extra-legal ground of his "unassimilability." Thus if one is not a Caucasian he is out, but if he is a Caucasian he is not necessarily in, so far as his statutory racial qualification for naturalization is concerned. That must be determined, says the court, by "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."

It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the opinion and decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Bhagat Singh Thind case is clearly erroneous. How can the errors therein be explained? One heard around the ministerial offices of the court, for some time after the decision was rendered, that it was a political decision. Later one heard distinguished jurists suggesting that since England rules India she is necessarily interested in trying to make it out that Indians belong to a race inferior to the English, and in getting the world at large also to adopt that view. And more than once one heard suggestions that the unconscious operation of such feeling in the mind of Justice Sutherland—the writer of the opinion in the Thind case, and by birth an Englishman—would suffice to explain its anomalies. And one frequently heard the suggestion that if the case had been assigned to a judge belonging to an oppressed race the opinion written would have supplied clear grounds for the eligibility for naturalization of Hindus and the decision would have been rendered accordingly. Anyone accustomed to self-analysis and to watching the queer unconscious workings of the Psyche in men and women would find it difficult to brush away the foregoing suggestions unceremoniously.

Thus in the history of the United States naturalization law [Page 375]

NATURALIZATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

we find that the term "white person" has, through judicial interpretation, acquired successively different meanings: (1) a catch-all phrase to include all persons not otherwise classified, and particularly to exclude the Negro, who was by many in the southern states of the Union regarded as an animal and denied the possession of a soul. (2) Caucasians, whether of western Asia or Europe; but excluding Mongolians because of the prejudice developing against the Chinese. (3) An undefined meaning, depriving the law of all certainty and uniformity and favoring judicial legislation under the guise of interpretation, to make the meaning of statutory words conform to popular prejudice for the time being, and dignified as "judicial inclusion and exclusion."

The black or Negro race, as said before, was made eligible by statute in 1870. Later such American Indians were made eligible as gave up tribal life and adopted the ways of civilization. In 1924, however, Congress declared all American Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States citizens of the United States. So that the only people excluded from naturalization today are Mongolians (Chinese, Japanese, Malays)—if we were to take the racial division of Caucasian, Mongolian, Negro, and American Indian—and such others as are made to belong to a debatable racial zone by the process of judicial legislation, and at present made to include Hindus.

In the end of the last century and in the first years of this century a great number of frauds in naturalization were brought to the attention of the government, out of which grew a demand for laying down strict procedural rules for the naturalization of aliens. Theodore Roosevelt, then President, appointed a commission of three to look into the matter and to recommend appropriate legislation to Congress. The recommendations of the commission, with slight modification, were embodied by Congress in the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906. Section 15 of this act provides for the cancellation, at the suit of the United States, of certificates of naturalization which should be proved to have been "procured by fraud" or "illegally procured." [Page 376]During the World War in the attempt to cancel certificates of certain citizens of German birth, some courts started the practice of interpreting "illegally procured" of the statute to mean "granted contrary to law" (See Grahl v. United States, 261 Fed. 487, 489). Under this interpretation of "illegality" in section 15 of the statute of 1906, certificates of Japanese soldiers and sailors serving under the American flag in the World War and admitted to citizenship at the end of the war, were cancelled at the instance of the government. In the case, In re Yamashita, 30 Washington 234, the Supreme Court of Washington in 1902, had held that a certificate issued to a Japanese is void on its face, as the courts are without jurisdiction to naturalize a Mongolian. The Supreme Court of the United States in Yamashita v. Hinkle (260 U. S. 199) held in 1922, that a Japanese was not eligible for naturalization, and as this ineligibility appeared upon the face of the judgment of the Superior Court (of the State of Washington), admitting Yamashita to citizenship, that court was without jurisdiction and its judgment void.

The case of United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind was decided by the United States Supreme Court in February, 1923, in which it held that a Hindu was ineligible for citizenship because of his race. The government immediately instituted proceedings, under section 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, for the cancellation of the certificates of about 60 or 70 Hindus who had been naturalized during the preceding 15 years or more. In some cases on the analogy of the Yamashita case the suggestion was thrown out that the naturalization court had admitted the applicants without jurisdiction. In other cases the certificates were held to have been "illegally procured," that is, granted contrary to law (United States v. Mozumdar, 296 Fed. 173; judgment affirmed, Mozumdar v. United States, 299 Fed. 240; United States v. Ali, 7 Fed. [2d] 728). From the middle of 1923 to the end of 1925 about fifty cases for cancellation of Hindu (Indian) citizenship were brought by the government in different parts of the United States, and in every instance the decision went in favor of the government and the Indians were deprived of their citizenship. [Page 377]

Naturalization Law of the United States

One case from Los Angeles, California—that of Akhay Kumar Mozumdar—was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at San Francisco. But the finding of the United States District Court of Los Angeles that Mozumdar's certificate was illegally procured and decreeing its cancellation was approved by the appellate court.

The case of United States v. Sakharam Ganesh Pandit was tried in the United States District Court at Los Angeles before Federal Judge Paul J. McCormick on December 15 and 16, 1925. The defences stricken out of the defendant's answer on motion of the government, were based on (1) Res adjudicata, (2) the Statute of Limitations, and (3) Laches. The defence of equitable estoppel was the one on which evidence was heard at the trial of the case. The decision was in favor of the defendant and against the government's petition to cancel his certificate; and for the first time the government had failed to win one of these cancellation cases against Indians. Most lawyers and government officials were surprised at the court's decision and felt the judgment was erroneous and would be reversed on appeal. The court found that the defendant was duly and regularly naturalized in 1914 by a court having jurisdiction; that the United States had appeared at the hearing of his application for naturalization and contested his application on the identical grounds on which cancellation is sought, cross-examined his witnesses and argued the case and presented a brief in opposition; that the United States took no steps for a review of the case or for cancellation of his certificate until 1923; that defendant relied upon the finality and binding force of the judgment admitting him to citizenship and the non-action of the United States to have it set aside; and so relying, began the study of law, passed the examination, was regularly admitted as attorney and counsellor in the State Courts of California, and was regularly admitted as proctor, advocate, attorney, counsellor and solicitor in the United States District Courts and later in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Ninth Circuit; that he secured commission as notary public from the Governor of California; that he bought a home [Page 378]in California; &c., &c.; and that the cancellation of defendant's naturalization certificate would involve the loss of his commission as notary public, of his right to practice law in California and in the United States, the loss of his home in California, &c.; and:

"That the defendant at the time of his naturalization complied with all of the provisions of the statutes on naturalization in every particular, and there was no irregularity or fraud in the procuring and granting of said naturalization to defendant, and at the time said naturalization certificate was granted and issued to the defendant the great weight of authority was to the effect that the defendant was entitled to be naturalized and there was no authoritative decision to the contrary. That the defendant was, at the time of his naturalization, ever since has been and now is a person morally, mentally and physically qualified and fit to be naturalized as a citizen of the United States."

The government appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and met with defeat in that court also (United States v. Pandit, 15 Fed. [2d] 285), the court suggesting in its opinion that while erroneous rulings of courts may be contrary to law they must be distinguished from illegal rulings which occur where the power is lacking to make any ruling on the subject matter or affecting parties to the controversy. It further held that the appellee's right to citizenship, in 1914, "having been distinctly put in issue, the United States appearing and contesting, and the issue directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment, not having been modified or reversed, cannot now be disputed."

Towards the end of 1926 Senator Reed of Pennsylvania introduced, in the second session of the 69th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 128 "providing for the ratification and confirmation of the naturalization of certain persons of the Hindu race." It was referred to the Senate Committee on Immigration which held hearings on December 9th and 15th. But it never got out of the committee to the floor of the Senate, and died with the 69th Congress.

A little earlier there was introduced in Congress by Dr. [Page 379]Copeland, junior senator from New York, a bill amending section 2169 Revised Statutes and defining "white persons" for naturalization purposes, the definition including Hindus in the meaning of the term. This bill did not even reach the stage of hearings in any committee of the senate, and died automatically with the 69th Congress.

The fate of the foregoing bills in the last Congress is a pretty clear indication that there is no chance, under existing conditions, of any legislation by Congress favoring the naturalization of Hindus, as Indians are called in this country.

The government, however, was not to be baffled with two defeats in the United States Courts in its case against Sakharam Ganesh Pandit. So it filed, in January, 1927, in the Supreme Court of the United States, its petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit. The Supreme Court, in a memorandum filed on March 14, 1927 (273 U. S. 759, 47 Sup. Ct., 473, 71 L. Ed. 878) denied the government's petition. Thereupon the government dismissed the fifteen pending cases in different parts of the United States against Hindus for the cancellation of their citizenship, and it also declared that it would not start cases against the few Hindu citizens who had not been sued for the cancellation of their citizenship certificates.

Perhaps the quotation of a few general reflections on the character of the racial discrimination involved in the United States naturalization laws, by distinguished American jurists will be permissible at this point. Said that eminent judge of the Michigan Supreme Court, Justice Campbell, in 1866:

"No one has, so far as I know, advanced the absurd notion, that a preponderance of mixed blood, on one side or the other of any given standard, has the remotest bearing upon personal fitness or unfitness to possess political privileges. The subject cannot be discussed upon philosophical grounds, because there is no philosophical distinction involved" . . . but only "an extensive and remarkable prejudice, which has been recognized in all countries as one of the peculiar features of American society." [Page 380]Professor D. O. McGovney, of the College of Jurisprudence of the University of California, writing in the Iowa Law Bulletin for May, 1923, pointed out, at p. 216, that it may be deduced from the tables in the Census of 1920 that the total number in the United States of those who are, under present court decisions, certainly ineligible for citizenship as well as those doubtfully ineligible (as Asiatics other than Chinese, Japanese, Malays and Hindus) is 244,585, and went on to say:

"How insignificant is this total of 244,585 of certain or doubtful racial ineligibles compared with the six or seven million racially eligible aliens. Is this small number denied the opportunity to attain citizenship merely as a vent for that genial trait that manifests itself in cutting off one's nose to spite one's face? Or is some national welfare accomplished?

"While the country is urging its campaign of Americanization, including naturalization, upon its millions of aliens, and relying upon the personal fitness tests to protect itself against the objectionable among its 1,000,000 Polish aliens, its 1,400,000 Russian aliens, its 1,600,000 Italian aliens, and merely sets up the same tests for its 73,803 foreign born Negroes, its 5,603 resident Filipino-Malays, why does it not rely upon the same tests for its pitiful number of representatives of ancient civilizations?

As Justice Campbell said, there is no philosophical relationship between racial descent and capacity to vote. By the Fifteenth Amendment (to the United States Constitution) the American nation has endorsed that opinion. By it neither the United States nor any state may deny any citizen the right to vote because of race or color. If race or color serves no basis for distinction between citizens, it affords none for keeping personally fit permanent residents in a status in which that illogical distinction may be made against them.

"Who will say that for ownership of land, and productive use of it for the feeding of the nation, racial descent is a logical or sensible qualification. Should any court of last resort invoke a technical logic to support such a distinction, what would be [Page 381]

Naturalization Law of the United States

gained? Shall greed and covetousness forever be allowed to set up some hollow excuse for coveting the neighbor's ox?

"The fact is that permanent residents are a part of the community. That all should be given the opportunity to make the most of themselves is obviously sound policy. There is no doubt, of course, that a homogeneous society is the most congenial. But just as some individuals must give up some of their desires in organized society, so must communities such as states take the burdens of the Union along with its benefits. Measures designed to perpetuate disabilities merely aggravate the evil.

"The continuance of the status of alienage beyond the moment at which the resident alien becomes personally fit is, . . . a disadvantage to the nation, with potentially grave national responsibilities. Realizing this, we are seeking to induce our millions of resident aliens to fit themselves to share the burdens of citizenship and relieve the nation of its responsibility. Realizing also that even as aliens they reside in and form a part of our communities as human economic elements, we have given them civil rights beyond the power of the states to deny. Just as individuals have their ethics bolstered and their temporary unethical impulses restrained by society, so groups or communities such as states profit by the restraining judgments and influence of the nation, in one generation it may be this state or those states, in another generation it may be another state or states.

"The determination of when alienage must or may cease is a national problem. The nation has been brought to a realization that it has all the foreign born that it can absorb into its political society at present and has almost closed the outer doors. Let us shut them more closely if necessary, but let us repeal this foolish racial discrimination against a few thousand of our millions of alien residents. It may be that only a few hundreds of the now racially ineligible to naturalization can qualify under the personal fitness requirements, but a repeal of the racial discrimination will square us with our sense of propriety, our sense of justice, and will square us internationally." [Page 382]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

by EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago

I. THE HUMAN MEANING OF SCIENCE

UST what ought we to have in mind when we use the word science?

In an age calling itself scientific and deluged with literature discussing the achievements of science this would seem to be a pertinent question to raise.

If we begin by noting what people actually do have in mind when they use the term we shall find them dividing into two general groups, the dividing line being determined by whether they have had systematic discipline in scientific research or not.

The man in the street, who has had no such discipline, will be apt to think of science in terms of the more or less startling re- sults which are offered to him on the authority of men of science.

The novel ways in which he is bidden to think of his world, and which he is told embody the authenticated outcome of scientific investigation, exhaust the meaning of science to his mind a situation entirely natural in an age in which science has won prestige and power but in which scientists themselves are yet few and strange. If his interest be predominantly prac- tical, as is the case with most of us, this authority gained by science over his thinking will be due to the obviously essential part which scientific knowledge has played in the invention of the tools that have so remarkably increased during the last hundred and fifty years human control over nature. The evidence of this increase is around him in such astonishing actualities as the railroad, the telegraph, the radio, the aeroplane; a still more [Page 383]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

startling extension is promised by preliminary experiments on television, on the dissection of the atom, and on glandular injections. No one with alertness of mind could survive the European War and note the extent to which scientific research was commandeered by both sides in a supreme effort to master hitherto unmastered forces that might spell victory in the struggle, nor the manner in which, especially since the war, scientific foundations have proved themselves essential to any industrial corporation that hopes to weather the stress of competition, without realizing that science is a practically important enterprise. It appears to be its business to attain a kind of knowledge whose possession is vitally important in the race for power and prosperity. None of us would really be willing to surrender these achievements and attempt to get along without them; accordingly, the man who recognizes this fact, even though he have no more intimate vision of what science stands for, will find himself in a sense irrevocably committed to it. Even though the pressure of traditional religious interests may foster in his feeling a lingering distrust of scientific investigation, he cannot abandon himself to such motives without reservation. As a clearly proven means to an end so firmly rooted in normal human desires that he cannot help sharing it, science commands his respect and secures his submission to its authority.

If one schooled in the procedure of scientific inquiry—a scientist, in short—be asked the question, he will almost certainly point not to the results of science but to its method. For him, science is mainly a way of reaching results that can justify confidence when established by it, a way gradually built up through centuries of arduous intellectual effort. It is in what he feels to be the essential characteristics of this method that he will find the meaning of science. In his answer to the question he will point therefore to such matters as his principles of observation, by which data likely to be significant are uncovered, to his use of already attested knowledge in the formation of hypotheses and their development, to his technic of experimental verification and the laboratories and delicate instruments which [Page 384]constitute indispensable aids in this verification, to the fundamental concepts such as atom, space, mass, cell, nucleus, evolution, reflex, which have proven themselves uniquely fruitful in attacking the problems which from time to time arise in scientific work. Science means to him an appealing enterprise which carries on by this method, and as a teacher he will care far more to have the minds of students who come to him permeated by the habits of thinking which express themselves in this method of intellectual advance than to have them accept the outcome of his investigations on the ground of any external authority, however obviously well founded.

Now to have advanced this step in our understanding of the meaning of science is to have made a great gain in our appraisal of it.

But is even the conception of science as a method of inquiry into nature adequate to its live meaning for the modern world? My conviction is that it is not. I believe that if, after we have gained some discipline in scientific procedure and have allowed ourselves to share unreservedly the purpose informing it, we retire a bit after the manner of the philosopher, and reflect on the nature of this purpose and its value in relation to the other ends of human life, we may find ourselves suspecting that one penetrates to the heart of the meaning of science for modern life only when the attitude, the ideal, if you will, that underlies its method and finds peculiar satisfaction in its results, is thoroughly understood and synthesized in the manner which it contacts with the other ideals which control modern life. It may be that the human importance of science lies in the end neither in its specific discoveries nor in its method, but rather in the kind of transformation that tends to follow in human character whenever the fundamental attitudes that are embodied in scientific research are adopted by an individual or community. Scientists themselves, while revealing these attitudes in their work, are apt to be blind to them for the same reason that all of us are unconscious of what we most constantly and intimately are; they live them, but do not find it necessary for the purpose of their work to know them. [Page 385]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Here is precisely the opportunity welcomed by students of philosophy, for if philosophy can make any contribution of value to the history of thought it is by virtue of the fact that philosophers are interested in understanding to the full other intellectual enterprises such as science, while at the same time remaining sufficiently aloof from them to avoid blindness to their controlling motivations. The philosopher wants if possible to know what it is to be a scientist without being one himself, and thus to acquire a vantage point from which to survey the changes that are going on in an age of science and see clearly how the ideals at work in the scientist's thinking are related in social evolution to the ideals revealed in other great but different enterprises, such as art, religion, and practical statesmanship. Whether the results attained by this somewhat parasitic procedure meet real human needs or not is of course for others than philosophers to say. What I am suggesting as our leading theme, more specifically put, is something like this: Is there a definitely describable attitude toward life and the world that tends to follow when one has woven his controlling interests into a unity under the dominance of the scientific spirit; if so, what sort of attitude is it and of what scope and authority; and what are likely to be the consequences of its continued impact upon other attitudes that persist in modern life? And if we are to speak of the corollaries of modern science for world unity, for philosophy, or for religion, let us mean the consequences of this attitude in whatever transformation it tends to bring about in our convictions with respect to such subjects. The attempt to explore such a theme ought not to be without interest; I hope that it will not be without some definite reward.

Presumably no one will question the right so frequently exercised of speaking of our day as the age of science. To be sure, science is not the only claimant of such a uniquely descriptive position in the modern world. With equal historical justification we might speak of the age of democracy, of the age of capitalism, or of the age of nationalism. Without attempting to argue for a thesis that might be strongly defended, namely that [Page 386]it is the scientific leaven more than any other that has made it possible for these phrases to seem relevant, it remains that if the phrase age of science is pertinent at all we are bidden to look at other ages, now become past history, in order to see whether we are likely to be right in our assumption that the vital meaning of any institution which can be intelligibly used in such a phrase is to be sought in the fact that it expresses a characteristic ideal that has been gradually if subterraneously maturing, a distinctive feeling and conviction as to what is of fundamental value in life. Let us consider one or two parallels.

The extreme popularity in the late ancient and early medieval period in the western world of mysticism and of all practices that contribute to mystic attainment, even carried to the extreme of hermitry in an astonishing number of cases, has furnished many writers a descriptive phrase for the age in question. Now is this interesting phenomenon adequately explored unless we come to understand and appreciate the ideal of life and destiny that is being pursued, whether consciously or no, by those who commit themselves to this mystic endeavor? Hardly. In all ordinary uses of the term natural it is surely a highly unnatural procedure to turn one’s back on the practical activities of everyday life and the companionship of society for the sake of some good that is to be secured by renouncing them. Only when we appreciate the historical changes which conditioned the appearance of such an ideal does the phenomenon seem intelligible, but when we do see the purpose which would express itself in this way the trend of the entire age opens readily before us. A time had come in the vast expansion and gradual degeneration of the Roman Empire when the normal activities of social life which earlier had led to their appropriate satisfactions no longer did so. Every institution that the ancient world had built up for the sake of developing the normal motivations of conduct seemed to have lost hope and potency. The world that man was naturally familiar with, the world of ordinary practical and social life, was running amuck, the earnest men no longer honestly hoped that anything worth while could really be done with it. [Page 387]But human nature, particularly in its strange reaches of imagination and emotion, is almost inexhaustibly fertile. Conceptions had already been worked out, by oriental peoples who had never been able to accomplish much on the stage of this world's drama, of another kind of good whose satisfaction was independent of the fortuitous play of success or frustration in the exercise of man's primary impulses. There was another world, an inner realm of the spirit, possessing an eternal stability, promising an enduring intensity of exaltation that far transcended the transitory pleasures of natural impulse, and this world could be discovered and entered by any man who would surrender the things of the flesh for the sake of that blessed attainment. In fact, the discovery was to be made simply by retiring to the recesses of one's own individuality, and isolated from nature and society contemplating the entire realm of being as caught up and held fast by the power of an eternal good. For the fullest realization, of course, severe sacrifices had to be made and the way of mystic discipline was hard, none the less the independence of the ideal and of the method of its attainment from the ordinary processes of life was clear. Now in a day when other goals had become sickeningly futile and the disappointed aspiration of the world was casting about for a more dependable point of attachment, is there any wonder that a vision of character and an ideal of destiny such as the age of mysticism reveals became widespread and controlled the conduct of large numbers of men?

Again, if we come down to that brilliant period of medieval life which begins with a strong revival of intellectual interest in the late eleventh century and comes to full flower in the thirteenth, do we not find on examination that the transformation reflects a widespread change in the controlling ideals of the time and that its significance is most fully uncovered when we appreciate the nature of these novel visions of what is worth living for?

The mind of northern Europe, slowly working its way toward maturity under the tutelage of the church, came to the point where it was no longer content simply to repeat its lessons [Page 388]from the ancient text. It had to think about them on its own account and in its own way, not at first to question their truth, of course-it was as yet far from possessing the necessary critical power for that-but to make their meaning real in terms of its own experience and its own inherent ways of thinking. It was the age of faith seeking to understand and justify itself by reason. St. Anselm, in his Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo, gives clear expression to the temper of this type of speculation. "Credo," he says, "ut intellegam." Faith is ultimate, in the reality of God and the truth of Christ's vicarious atonement, but the goal of faith, the larger attainment for the sake of which faith has its value, is faith's self-justification through rational understanding of her object. The whole temper of the resulting movement in philosophy is well described by Professor Woodbridge when he speaks of "philosophizing on your knees." We believe in order that we may know what it is we believe and why our faith in it is justified.

To a mind without rational curiosity this might appear a strange pervision but once we see how, in terms of the necessary growth to self-consciousness of the mind of a race, such a transformed ideal would normally arise, so that blind faith-the credo quia absurdum of Tertullian, flinging full defiance in the face of reason-lost its supreme value and became supplanted by the ideal of a reflective faith, we have before us the clue to the age that is to follow. Given as men's vision of a praiseworthy character that of acquaintance with the rational grounds of one's conviction rather than conviction without insight, and all the major characters of the period easily follow.

What has been illustrated by these two examples is in short but a familiar doctrine of historiography, namely that the most fundamental clues to the history of any complex course of human affairs are to be found in the ends most deeply prized and hotly pursued by the leading spirits who stamped their mark upon the time.

Now the point which I wish to gain support from these considerations is of course that if our own is in any vital sense [Page 389]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

the age of science we should look for its real significance in nothing short of a novel ideal of character, of what is most to be prized in human life and most intelligently pursued as a justifiably controlling value. But if there seem to be some preliminary sense in such a statement, two further questions become pertinent before we embark upon the main task of analyzing the nature of this ideal and considering it in its more important relations such as those to philosophy and to religion.

In the first place, in what definite way might we expect that this approach would throw illumination on the problems which most excite intelligent interest today, such as those arising from the conflict of science and religion? Well, I think that an encouraging hint appears at this point when we note that practically all discussions of science and religion, taken from whatever angle, have proceeded on the assumption that there are in some sense two disparate spheres of experience in which each of these two institutions has its appropriate validity. The only exceptions to this assertion that I am familiar with are those scientists and philosophers strongly influenced by scientific results who have denied any legitimate place to religion at all. You are all acquainted with enough illustrations of this fact so that it is hardly necessary to produce a variety of examples. Especially of course by those whose chief interest has been to champion the cause of religion one notes a universal tendency to restrict the legitimacy of science to a quite limited field, as a preparation for the contention that in the unlimited realm of reality at large faith in God and in the traditional holies of religion is still warranted.

One of the most astonishing forms of this dichotomy—astonishing, that is, in its ability to win approval among religious circles—seems to me to be found in the usual manner in which religion has been justified in recent years by men of science who happen also to be strong in piety. These men are concerned to point out that the island of assured knowledge possessed by science is ever surrounded by an ocean of mystery and often appear to find a legitimate field for the exercise of religious faith [Page 390]simply in this consideration. Now we need not take issue with the fact thus affirmed—surely at no given time does science know all that we should like to know—nor would I dispute the contention that in the appropriate object of religious feeling an element of transcendence of finite knowledge, even of overwhelming mystery, is present. The thing that astonishes me is that these matters, taken in themselves, should seem to offer an adequate basis for religion, and that the questions that ought to be asked about such a foundation are not usually asked. For surely, on the one hand, the natural response of the scientist, as scientist, to this realm of the unknown, is simply agnostic and experimental; he admits his ignorance of it without any necessary bow of reverence, and is ready to entertain, again without any necessary complications with feelings of adoration, hypotheses that might lead to verifying experiments on the nature of this or that specific part of it. The unknown is for him something that might become known. And on the other hand, if we may take the history of theology as at all significant, the God of religious experience is surely far more than a mere Great Unknown. Is the Great Unknown personal? Of course we do not know. Is it morally good, bad, or indifferent? Again of course we do not know. Is it eternal, or is the advancing march of science destined to conquer it entirely at some distant but finite time? A third time we cannot say. Is it really the God of religion about which we cannot make an affirmative answer to even such questions as these? Surely this we can answer with a flat negative. And it might well seem to a Rip van Winkle who should suddenly pop into our midst from an age of more vivid religious certainties a testimony to the complete intellectual bankruptcy of faith that anyone should seriously cling to such straws as these in his endeavor to avoid engulfment in the abyss of scepticism. At any rate it indicates strongly that an adequate reflective grounding for religion in the light of the influences that are actually moulding the modern world lies yet in the future.

But in what direction lies a more adequate analysis of the nature of religion and of its relations with science, and how can [Page 391]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

we tell that it is more adequate? Surely our approach offers encouragement here. If science is at bottom the expression of a somewhat novel ideal that is slowly permeating the thinking and feeling of the modern world, the way to proceed is surely to make an exhaustive study of the nature of this ideal and particularly of the manner in which and the extent to which it is grounded in human nature and in the necessary relations of man to his environment. Only thus can we compare intelligently its relation to the ideals that have dominated other ages, such as the age of religious faith, and see with any clarity in just what manner they must be woven together in the unified character which all of us in some fashion are seeking to realize.

It may be that the traditional assumption of disparate realms within which religion and science each has a legitimate place is a sound one. But previous influential attempts to offer a rational grounding for such an assignment, like that of the philosopher Kant, have lost cogency; how can we discover the precise line of separation and the function in human experience at large that can be assigned to these two great enterprises? Certainly it seems at first sight that even a scientist, when he participates in a religious ritual which strengthens emotional attachment to high ideals is doing something not easily describable by any scientific term and yet something of legitimate value for life. But if we wish to establish such a conclusion on solid ground and see just what form these different activities would take if brought together in a single harmonious character, can we do it in any other way than by attempting to see clearly just what the ideal of science is and just what function it will play in such a character when it has been fully understood and realized in its appropriate relation with other valid ideals? And if such a separation is not a sound one, and science should in some sense displace religion entirely, can we justify this conclusion ultimately in any other way than by showing that the fundamental valuations revealed in science are all-inclusive and rightfully dominant in their relations with all competing values? At least this is the approach whose promise we are now setting out to explore. [Page 392]But what reason have we to hope much from the ideal of science? Well, ours is certainly an experimental and dissatisfied age, and that indicates that the great valuations controlling the life of former ages have all proven themselves inadequate at some important point. We may exemplify again from the ideals already considered, and note wherein their inadequacy lies.

It is fairly evident that the mystic ideal is one which cannot be adhered to with full consistency, at least not in practice. To escape from the world of commonsense action is really possible only by committing suicide, which the mystic does not really want to do. For the suspicion lurks that being alive may be a necessary condition of his ecstatic enjoyments. But being alive involves some attention to the practical affairs which form the fundamental concerns of the rest of us; even Stylites on his pillar had to eat, drink, and take care of the minimum requisites of bodily cleanliness. Now this involves a certain inconsistency with his controlling ideal, for not only does it mean that his transcendental absorptions have to be broken from time to time while these quite mundane matters are in the foreground of attention, but it means that other impulses than his dominant one have to be continually fostered with the consequent inevitability of temptations that he would like to banish completely, such as the temptation to gluttony and to sexual satisfaction. Moreover, this inconsistency is not the only or the most serious one. There is a social inconsistency as well, which by reason of the fact that the tendency of the mystic experience itself is to elevate thought and feeling beyond selfish objects of desire and attach it to more universal concerns, inherently prevents the attainment of genuine unity of character around the mystic purpose. For if the mystic continues to live, in however meagre a fashion, he will avail himself of the products of the economic activity of others, who if they were to be converted to his goal would make its pursuit quite impossible for all except in the very mild fashion of the farmer-friars. But if he really believes his way of life to have essential validity he must regard it as relevant to others as well as to himself, and he cannot rest quite content as a spir- [Page 393]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

itual imperialist who pursues his individual salvation at the cost of helping deny it to others. Yet further, because of the impartial point of view which the anio mystica enforces, he will find his own thrills losing their zest when he reflects on the fact that other people do not care or know how to pursue them; he will be moved to spend a large part of his time preaching the gospel of salvation instead of practising it himself, thus mutely testifying to an ineradicable competition in his soul between his avowed ideal and another, that of responsibility to a social good transcending any individual achievement, whatever its solitary appeal. The point need not be elaborated further; our concern is simply to bring out the fact that because of the fundamental conditions under which human existence must be carried on, the ideal of escape into another world of values than those of ordinary sense-experience cannot really maintain itself unpoisoned, and so no matter how eagerly one age or another may commit itself to this notion of what is most worth while, a return will eventually have to be made to other controlling purposes if it still seem desirable to live at all.

In like fashion, the ideal of an age seeking rational justification for its accepted faith proved an impossible foundation of a stable character, because the questioning tendency which drives faith on to this search for reasons cannot stop short at any designated point. To solve the difficulties it raises it must perforce go on and raise more serious ones, until in the end the very basic assumptions on which the whole structure of faith rests are involved in uncertainty.

Innocent enough seems the beginning of the process. It is but an obedient response to the injunction of St. Paul to "give a reason for the faith that is in you"; that God exists, for example, is accepted as certain, but it is important to see why belief in his existence is justified. Suppose now that in some who are encouraged to engage in this inquiry a thoroughly satisfactory reason does not appear; the problem of evil, let us say, seems not to be met by any considerations that reason is able to establish. What is to be done then? Shall we still believe, and say that such [Page 394]divine subjects transcend the powers of human reason but are still to be intelligently believed on the ground of revealed authority? Such was the attempted position of many in the age that followed that of Anselm and Aquinas.

But contradictions lurked in this attempt. For the assumption with which the age began was that it is important to seek a reason, but if the reason cannot be really found the seeking becomes irrational and the foundations of all faith are jeopardized anew. And continued belief where one cannot see a reason becomes difficult on other grounds. It is conditioned on an implicit conviction that the proffered revelation from the past really is authentic. But suppose reasons for this conviction begin to be sought. Are the proofs of the unique divinity of the Scriptures adequate? This leads to critical questioning as to the very nature of proof and the ultimate criterion of truth, and once such a basic question as this is really raised no answer in terms of faith in external authority can possibly command assent. The serious raising of such a question means that a live process of thinking is going on, and truth can never mean anything other than what satisfies that live thinking, revelations from the past so far as they are verified in contemporary individual experience, but not possibly so far as they fail to gain such present verification. The ball of live thinking, once set rolling, increases like a snowball on a hillside of its own momentum, and the ideal of faith seeking intelligent justification inevitably leads on to other ideals which avoid at least some elements of the contradiction that holds the secret of its dissolution.

Is the ideal of science more securely grounded in human nature and the essential conditions of human existence than such ideals of past ages as we have been exemplifying? Are there definite and important ways, discoverable by impartial examination, which show that certain basic inadequacies of dominating ideals of the past are remedied by the scientific spirit, and thus justify the conclusion that what we are calling the ideal of science is more inherently stable and offers a more dependable foundation for unified character than any preceding ideal? [Page 395]

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The succeeding chapters must offer what justification I can give for an affirmative answer to this question. But before this introductory discussion is closed it may be helpful to bear in mind the fact that in a specific sense the need which the enterprise of science satisfies is more fundamental than any other human need. If we agree to this, it offers preliminary support to the thesis with which we shall be occupied, namely that the controlling valuation of scientific research must occupy a central and hence determinative place in any unification of life and character which can be carried through consistently, not only in our age but in any age in which human nature and its environing conditions remain essentially the same.

Why is the need which science seeks to meet more fundamental than any other? Because the aim of science is to establish dependable knowledge of the relations of things, and such dependable knowledge is needed in the effort to satisfy any other need. By a need we mean a persistent desire for some type of object that cannot always be grasped at once when the desire happens to occur. Now if it cannot be grasped at once then some intermediate conditions must be satisfied which will bring the object within reach; to take very simple examples, if blueberries are wanted we must walk to the hillside where they grow and pick them, or to the store and purchase them; if we want to overcome a recurrent temptation to some act which we believe wrong, we must discover those conditions governing submission to the temptation so as to avoid them. In either case—and this is true of every need—for dependable satisfaction we need knowledge of some relation or relations between two events, such that we can say with assurance: If I do a (which is within my reach), I can trust 6 (which is not now within my reach) to appear, or to be prevented from appearing.

But if we do not unduly limit our conception of need or of what we mean by such simple words as "do" and "reach," the whole purpose of science is exhausted in the effort to establish such regular and exact relations. As an institution it begins with the loose and scattered "sayings", built up by hardly more [Page 396]than casual observation, still embodied for us in primitive languages, and which clearly reveal the intensely practical motives which underlie scientific inquiry by the imperative form in which they are usually cast: Make hay while the sun shines-Nothing venture, nothing have. As it transforms these into the imposing form that the great laws of modern science reveal it is doing nothing more than expand these primitive statements of relation greatly in number, make them consistent with each other by discovering dependable conditions of the exceptions to them, and render them more unified and exact by putting them in systematic quantitative form wherever possible. And its method in doing all this, as will be illustrated later, is nothing other than the method which the very nature of our thinking forces all of us to use when we seek to explain a puzzling event that catches our attention, only the method becoming self-conscious rather than blind and thus able to develop systematically its necessary technic and its instrumental aids.

If there is then such a thing as a definite attitude or valuation expressed in the development of this unique institution, it would seem to be, in the sense thus outlined, a valuation which is fundamental to all other values, and thus rightly demanding that they conform to what it requires wherever conflict arises between them in the course of living. Whether this is so, and how it is so, and what the consequences of it may be for some of the problems which excite intelligent interest today must now be the object of more detailed examination.

X

[Page 397]

THE WORLD WE LIVE IN

Men live less and less in geographical and more and more in spiritual communities. The involuntary elements of existence tend to be limited to the regional area, the voluntary elements find increasing opportunity of self-expression through association of likeminded people selected out of the entire population by identity of interests and ideals. In this department, World Unity Magazine will publish each month a brief description of some important modern movement, voluntary in character and humanitarian in aim, believing that knowledge of these activities is not only essential to the world outlook, but also offers the true remedy for the sense of isolation and loneliness which has followed the breakdown of the traditional local neighborhood.

THE COMMITTEE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS

As the name implies, the objects of this organization are the promotion of international friendship and goodwill through personal service by and for students from other lands. The Committee seeks to provide information concerning American student life and conditions to be confronted by the foreign student. New students are met at the steamship piers, advised regarding plans for reaching their destination. Local representatives in the various college communities extend a cordial welcome to these students, assist them in obtaining lodgings and in becoming acquainted with fellow students and professors.

An effort is made to relate foreign students to American home life, and to facilitate on their part free expression of opinion and, in particular, the dissemination of facts about their home lands. Without "Americanizing" them, the Committee is desirous that foreign students shall discover the distinctive features of American civilization and apply this knowledge in their life work at home.

The practice of Christian principles in inter-racial and international contacts is a central aim of the Committee; therefore the Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean and Russian Student [Page 398]Christian Associations are affiliated with the organization. Each of these national Associations maintains a secretary, publishes a monthly bulletin and conducts annual conferences. Cooperation is extended through all Churches, Mission Boards, YMCAs and YWCAs, and any social or religious agencies interested in the welfare of students from abroad. The Committee maintains a speakers' and writers' bureau, listing some of the ablest graduate foreign students; letters of introduction are given which enable scores of students to inspect American industries, welfare institutions and when necessary to obtain part time employment.

A survey indicates that there are nearly ten thousand students from 100 different countries enrolled in about 300 American colleges and universities. The larger groups are Chinese, 2000; Japanese, 1200; Filipino, 1500; Russian, 800. The Committee on Friendly Relations was organized in 1911. Offices are maintained at 347 Madison Ave., New York, where a staff of ten Secretaries and stenographers have headquarters. The officers of the Committee are: Frank L. Polk, Chairman, Thos. S. Lamont, Treasurer, Chas. D. Hurrey, General Secretary, Dean L. Kelsey, Executive Secretary. [Page 399]

XVI—EDMOND DENE MOREL

by H. M. SWANWICK Author of "Builders of Peace"

WHEN E. D. Morel, after defeating Winston Churchill at Dundee in the general election of November, 1922, had made his first big speech in the House of Commons, a distinguished Conservative left the Chamber in company with an old colleague of Morel's, saying as they walked,

"I'd no idea Morel was that sort of man!"

"No," replied the other with some heat, "I suppose you took your notions from the gramaphone press."

"I suppose I did," said the Tory reflectively. Then, "What a wealth of knowledge! And what an attractive personality!"

For the brief two years that the House was to know him, this impression spread in all ranks and in his own party he had acquired an influence which would unquestionably have altered its course, had he lived. He died in his fifty-second year.

Morel's life fell into three definite epochs, each shorter than the previous one. There was the great achievement of his early manhood, when his untiring energy, his genius for organization, his capacity for mastering, presenting and interpreting facts, his glowing eloquence and all the charm of a rich personality were put at the disposal of an overwhelming moral purpose: the liberation of the Belgian Congo.

It took this unknown young clerk some thirteen years to accomplish his aim and only those who knew something of his emotional temperament can measure the degree of obstinate [Page 400]determination which kept him to the weary task. It was a terrible induction into the searing side of capitalist diplomacy and to his end he carried the marks of the experience. I remember well the pang which I received at hearing this man with the cordial brown eyes and the frank handclasp say, in that warm voice of his which always suggested good-fellowship, "Don't think me simple. Life has made me a very suspicious man."

It was characteristic of the wide sweep of his mind that the hideous Leopoldian regime in the Congo led him to the contemplation of all white rule and white exploitation in Africa and ultimately in all the world and made him one of the first to declare the doom of the white men should they fail to admit their duty to the colored and end their own civilization in a greedy struggle with each other for the spoils of cruelty and oppression.

The applause and congratulations of innumerable distinguished persons-politicians, ecclesiastics, writers-which greeted the last meeting of the Congo Reform Association on July 16, 1913, had scarcely died away when E. D. Morel entered upon his second and more painful struggle, which lasted from the outbreak of the world war until, with his entry into Parliament, his great qualities once more began to obtain popular recognition. Even during his Congo campaign he had become a prolific writer for the press on international affairs. In October, 1911, the Daily News published five articles by him entitled "How Wars are Made" and in 1912 appeared his book, "Morocco in Diplomacy," republished in 1915 under the title, "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy: an Unheeded Warning." It was clear, then, that he could not regard the war as it was first presented to us-a Balkan squabble nor as it was popularized in England, a chivalrous rally for the defence of Belgium or an idealistic "war to end war." He had prophesied too truly; he knew too much about the ways of diplomacy and of propaganda, and from the start he led the most formidable, the most constructive and the most steadfast British opposition to the continuance of the war until the bitter end. He knew how bitter the end would be. [Page 401]He became, to the unthinking mass, during those four years of war, a sort of bogey-man. It was necessary that he should be so represented. The propagandists of authority in war time must depict opposition to the war as due to some peculiar villainy. It is necessary to expose those who oppose the herd in war time to the hatred of the herd; otherwise it might perchance listen. Those expert in mob psychology know well the importance of throwing the mob a name to hate. Mobs, being composed of persons who have, for the time being, given up the most sacred human right and duty, thought, cannot hate an idea; they must I have persons to hate. It is not in the least necessary that these should be real persons. In fact no real person could satisfy a war mob's cravings for an object of hatred. It must have the personification of an "idea of vileness." The most fantastic inventions do not sicken its appetite for the impossible. The names of real persons are taken, but preposterous lies and legends are invented to obscure the real personality. E. D. Morel became one of these names.

His friends, who knew him for the most lovable of men, were puzzled by this legendary blackness. People who knew little or nothing about him were inclined to comment that "there must be something in it"; a man "didn't acquire such a reputation for nothing"; there was "no smoke without fire"; all the lazy and cowardly excuses for refusing to think and for running with the herd. No one was more puzzled than Morel himself and because he was a genial man, liking to be liked, he suffered inordinately. Because he was a proud and passionate man, not in the least resembling the negative pacifist of the vulgar press, he was enraged by filthy insults he could not answer and he withdrew from social contacts in a haughty anticipation of possible repulse.

If he was more fantastically traduced during the war than any of his comrades (not excepting Ramsay MacDonald) it was partly because he was one of the ablest. But there were certain circumstances which facilitated the dirty business. He had already made enemies in certain Belgian and French circles by his [Page 402]fearless exposure of the Congo horrors; what more simple than to suggest that he had been all those years ago already an agent of Germany? His grateful and enthusiastic fellow-workers had raised a handsome testimonial; this was interpreted during the war as having been a solatium, although the names of the subscribers would have refuted that slander if anyone had looked at them. He was partly French and partly English; his opposition to the war was therefore doubly treacherous. It was known that his father's name was Morel-de-Ville, which he shortened to Morel when he was finally settled in England; but it was insinuated that he found an alias convenient and his name was frequently printed in inverted commas. It was even pretended that he was a Frenchman liable to conscription in France and there can be no doubt that the French authorities urged that he should be spied upon and even, on one occasion, tried to get him over to France. He was himself apprehensive of being kidnapped and "Once in France," he said, "you'll hear no more of me." So late as 1924 I had curious confirmation of the importance attached to him in French military circles when a high French staff officer said sneeringly to me: "Il est votre ami, M. Morel? Eh bien, Madame, c'est l'homme le plus dangereux de l'Europe."

After months of espionage they caught him out, in August, 1917, in a purely technical offence and he was imprisoned for six months. His colleagues carried on his work with enthusiasm during his imprisonment and, had it not been for its disastrous effect on his health, it would have been pure gain, for undoubtedly the persecution of Morel had a high advertisement value for the Union of Democratic Control which he helped to found in September, 1914, and of which he remained secretary until his death.

Within two months of its inception it numbered five thousand members and the following spring, meetings were being held in London alone at the rate of forty-seven a month.

For the next six years the most advanced international thought in Great Britain and abroad rallied to the Union. Interest was kept alive because the Union was alive and was thinking boldly and originally on the burning questions of the day. Mani- [Page 403]

EDMOND DENE MOREL

festoes were carefully drafted and discussed with knowledge, many remarkable pamphlets were issued, the monthly journal, Foreign Affairs, was founded with Morel as first editor, and the Labor movement was permeated with the principles of the Union. Its conception of the origins of the War, of the right kind of peace terms, of a League of Nations, of the problems of Empire and of international cooperation became part of Labor’s faith and drew into the Labor Party all that was best of the old Liberal Party; so that when Labor took office in 1924 there were nine members of the U. D. C. in the Cabinet and at least ten more in the Government.

Then began Morel’s third epoch, of two short years only. He was returned for Dundee but he was not included in the Labor Government. He possessed knowledge and powers far superior to many of those who obtained office, but many considerations besides ability have to be weighed in the forming of a team. He felt bitterly that his great powers were not being used to the full and in those last years I think he guessed that he was running a race with death. He worked superhumanly hard. He became the leader of a group desiring closer association with Russia than even that for which the Labor Government was prepared. He would have preferred that that Government should go out of office on some big measure like the Anglo-Russian Treaty, rather than on a side issue like the prosecution of an obscure English Communist. Like other Labor candidates, he was mystified and angered by the “Red Letter” incident which he thought had been badly mishandled. It did not affect his personal triumph at Dundee, where they idolized him, but he came back to London vowing he would not rest until he had got to the bottom of the ugly business. But rest was suddenly imposed upon him on November 12th, 1924.

Besides the book already named and innumerable pamphlets, he wrote The Black Man’s Burden, Truth and the War, Africa and the Peace of Europe. As orator, comrade, friend, he inspired millions. [Page 404]

RACIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONY

by FRANK H. HANKINS Department of Sociology, Smith College

II. RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE: THEIR BASIS, SOCIAL ROLE AND MODIFICATION

RACE pride and prejudice are such obvious mental attitudes that their existence and vigor require no demonstration. It has long been the habit of certain types of "liberal" and democratic writers on political and racial problems to denounce race pride as a silly and even immoral attitude, while adherents of the doctrine of racial superiority have preached the sacredness of race pride and the preservation of racial purity. There is, on the one hand, the assumption that the ideals of egalitarian democracy represent the summum bonum of social achievement and that any attitude which interferes with the leveling out of all racial and class differences is inherently bad. There is, on the other hand, the assumption of a race purity which probably does not exist and of an inherent race superiority whose only basis is often a lucky historical accident.

It seldom occurs to any one to inquire whether the feelings of race pride and solidarity have any basis in those natural processes whereby the human world has come to be what it is, and if so, what. It is so much easier to denounce the things we don't like, or to praise the things which fit our own emotions, than to understand them in their genetic aspects. This resort to heat rather than to light is easily explained. It gives us enormous subjective satisfaction to express our emotions, especially when in so doing we can also display a sense of moral superiority. [Page 405]

RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

Let us first take a look at the naturalistic basis of the feelings of race pride and prejudice.

In the first place, they are so universal among men as to lead to the presumption that they play, or have played, some part in man's struggle for existence. The race pride of all peoples who have achieved a high culture is proverbial. The Greeks believed themselves descended from the gods and set themselves off sharply from the barbarians. The Roman was always the "noble Roman," while the Jews believed themselves to have been created by God in his own image and to be the chosen people of Omnipotence. The Chinese are the "celestial" people, while the Japanese burn with a consciousness of racial excellence. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that similar attitudes characterize people at every level of culture. Even the African pigmies show great pride of race. The Jews, persecuted through the centuries, have developed an extraordinary racial sensitivity. Though Jewish writers have been conspicuous among the chief advocates of doctrines of racial equality, they inevitably display at the same time an irrepressible pride in the achievements of persons of Jewish blood. The Negro in America, not long since emerged from centuries of slavery, is now actively cultivating a sense of racial worthiness and of equality with the world's premier races.

If we inquire into the psychological bases of such attitudes, I think we will find at least two. There is, first, the demand of the human ego for a consciousness of worth. The individual, regardless of his station in life, must respect himself if he is to maintain health, vigor, and courage to face the problems of existence. Loss of personal morale leads to a speedy disintegration of one's powers, and that leads to death. Men who achieve greatly are usually possessed of a notable self-confidence. At the other extreme, there are few so lowly that they do not find something in their physical or mental powers, in their activities or their trade upon which to erect a monument of pride. The teamster takes pride in his ability to handle horses, the stevedore in his skill and feats of strength and endurance. Wherever there is some evidence of special skill or knowledge, there is a basis for [Page 406]egoistic satisfactions. Human variability is so great that there is scarcely a human creature anywhere that cannot lay claim in his own mind, to some degree of uniqueness and monopoly. There is thus a universal basis for at least that modicum of personal pride which is a basic necessity of life itself. Even the slave and the servant find an egoistic satisfaction in the wealth display, prowess or achievements of their masters, who in veritable reality are a part of themselves.

In the second place, we must observe that man has always carried on his life in groups. There is no such thing as an isolated human being. As Aristotle long ago said, an isolated creature is either a beast or a god. "Man is a political animal," that is, he realizes his potentialities only as a member of an organized social group. This fact is of the most profound significance for all questions of racial harmony and international peace. It means that man combines with his egoistic individualism a deep-seated gregarious need. There is much dispute now among the social psychologists as to whether or not man is possessed of a gregarious instinct. The answer is usually dependent on definitions and carries very little significance for the actual course of human affairs. Man acts as though he is gregarious by nature; his gregarious behavior is patent enough; and the assumption of his gregarious tendencies helps to clarify understanding of what he does.

The herd animal must have a tendency to identify itself with the herd. This is not necessarily a herd of its own kind, but whatever group satisfies his yearning for association, and thus helps to complete his personality and gives him that sense of security and of "belonging" without which life is unbearable. Among the traits manifested by herd animals are the following: 1) huddling together; 2) running in the same direction; 3) heightened suggestibility in times of group danger; 4) manifestation of discomfort in isolation; and 5) manifestation of pleasure on being restored to the bosom of the herd. Man manifests all these traits. He is not, however, a herd animal of bovine type. He more nearly resembles the hunting pack found among wolves, dogs and ba- [Page 407]

RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

boons. It is said that when a herd of baboons is invading a new feeding ground the older males compose an advance guard while the females and young bring up the rear. If they are attacked, the alarm is given, the females and young retreat while the males serve as a defensive rear guard. Man also possesses not merely the capacity to subordinate himself to his natural leaders and to follow them implicitly; he possesses in addition, 1) a ready willingness to sacrifice himself for the preservation of his group in times of danger; 2) a lust for blood, or an unrestrained capacity for cruelty and the shedding of blood when his fighting propensities have been aroused.

The necessity for these traits while human life was on its most primitive plane becomes clear when we recall that man is, so far as his physical structure goes, one of the most defenseless of all animals. He has no protection against enemies, such as thick hide or shaggy coat; he has no organs of offense such as fangs, hoofs or claws. Nevertheless, it was necessary for him to be able not only to protect himself against attack but even to conquer the wild beasts of forest and plain for food and for his own security. For these ends he required an indomitable courage and capacity for cooperative effort.

This view accounts for certain traits which man has manifested abundantly throughout his racial history. They are traits which he still manifests and which make the problem of world peace immensely more difficult than the making of resolutions and the signing of treaties. They also go a long way toward explaining the true inwardness of race pride. It is a matter of common experience and observation that courage is greatly enhanced by confidence, and confidence is greatest when one is surrounded by his fellows. It is a universal practice among men to elevate their courage on the eve of battle by manifestations of group solidarity. There is an appeal to tribal divinities, song and story to recall the valor of ancestors and superiority of the tribesmen in times of danger. Pride of race, of tribe, or of nation gives the fighting edge to courage, confidence of success in battle, and an uninhibited marshalling of individual and collective resources. [Page 408]Man is not a timid, shrinking creature that runs to a tree top or to his burrow upon the approach of danger. Rather, he faces danger, when cooperating with his fellows, with remarkable steadfastness. While we find in this the basis for his lustful shedding of blood, we also find here the basis for some of his noblest qualities, his courage, his loyalty to his group and to social values, his spirit of independence, and his capacity for self-sacrifice. Had he been otherwise he would never have mastered the wild beasts and the forces of nature. He would never have crossed mountains and subdued oceans. These traits have, however, made him his own most redoubtable enemy; and because of the very intensity of his group solidarity and loyalty, the whole course of history has been strewn with the heroic sacrifices to noble, and also to ignoble, causes.

If any proof of these contentions were needed, it could be found in those cases where the destruction of group unity and confidence has destroyed even the individual will to live. A recent study of the decimation of population among the Pacific Islanders (W. H. R. Rivers and others, Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1922) reached the conclusion that the inability of the natives to maintain their religious and racial traditions in consequence of the rude shocks due to contacts with the whites had destroyed group courage and ambition. Man lives largely under the inspiration of the myths which he creates for the purpose of maintaining his courage and confidence. The tribal gods of these Islanders proved powerless in the face of the white man's aggressions. Magico-religious practices were of no avail in the presence of the white man's science and technology. Tribal faith in themselves and their most cherished group values disappeared and with it went the pride and hope by which alone the struggle for existence can be faced with equanimity. The result was not merely the loss of all power for united resistance, but even the physical capacity to withstand the simplest ailments. Upon the onset of even a common cold the native would prepare to die, and did so, largely because of the lack of the desire to live. [Page 409]

RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

If the foregoing discussion is sound in essentials, then we are warranted in concluding that race pride is an important factor in group cohesion and has played an important role in group survival. It is an essential condition for group aggression and domination. Nothing is more frequent in the history of man than the conquest of peaceful and timorous peoples by aggressive and spirited tribes filled with pride of race and the "will to power" which comes from confidence and intense loyalty to leaders and to the ancestral divinities. Had man not been endowed with a desire to dominate, with a zest for competition and an overweening pride in his tribal tradition, it is doubtful whether he could have survived at all. Certain it seems that, if he had been a timid creature shrinking in fear and timidity into caves or tree-tops on the approach of danger, there would have been no human history. Race pride has been essential not merely to human survival as a species but to man's conquest of the globe. True, it has drenched in blood the whole course of history, but we must understand man as he is if we are to grapple seriously with problems of human betterment. As he emerges from the superstitions of his pristine ignorance and supplants the postulates of his age-long savagery with the doctrines essential to an era of world trade, we may assume that he will learn how to temper force and passion with justice and reason.

As we have conceived it, race pride is a manifestation of loyalty to and confidence in the group with which one identifies himself. We thus use the term "race" in a very broad sense. But we are compelled by the facts to do so because the loyalties and antipathies center about social groups and only incidentally or secondarily about specific anthropological types. Such loyalty. or antipathy takes on a multitude of particular forms depending on the circumstances of time and place. In every form, however, are the two ingredients: the demand of the ego for a sense of worth, and the necessity of pride and confidence in the group as a whole. Some one has defined patriorism as "pooled self-esteem." So also is race pride. So also is pride of class. Indeed, one meets the same psychic norm wherever two groups of human [Page 410]beings are set face to face in competition. There is a pride of Methodism, of Judaism, of trade unionism, of Rotarianism, of Republicanism, and even of Pacificism, Feminism, and Communism.

The pride of race whereby one flatters and expands his ego seems to carry with it as an inevitable accompaniment a derogation of the qualities and achievements of others. There are two basic elements in race prejudice. There is, first, the above noted tendency to identify ourselves with a given group. It follows from the sentiments of race pride that anything which flatters my race or social group flatters me also. My loyalty to whatever is thus identified with my race, class or nation is thus loyalty to myself, a manifestation of my egoistic desire to be well thought of. It is in consequence of this that I have a jealous regard for any and all the ways of acting, speaking or living which are marks of my own race, class or nation. I rate them as superior to the possessions and ways of other people and am sensitive regarding the judgments other people pass upon them.

There is, secondly, the universal tendency to overrate that with which we are familiar and to be skeptical regarding whatever is alien to our customary ways. In all parts of the world the stranger is an object of suspicion, while the stranger's ways of talking, dressing or eating are subjects for derision and merriment. Only persons of wide travel or extensive culture arrive at any capacity to see the universal humanness behind the peculiarities of face, manners or dress, or to rate at their true value racial qualities or cultural traits different from those of their native community. It is for this reason, in part, that a religion of humanity and ideals of universal brotherhood can arise only in an advanced state of culture. They can acquire power throughout the world only as national isolation and separatism are annihilated by the progress of science, the expansion of trade and the development of a world-wide community of interest in peace and prosperity.

It follows from what has been said that race prejudice or antipathy manifests itself only when two self-conscious racial [Page 411]

RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

groups come into competition. In New England there is little or no active antipathy toward the Negro because Negroes are few and widely scattered. In certain northern cities, such as Chicago and Detroit, where colored populations have grown rapidly during recent years, the animosity between white and colored has grown with amazing rapidity. In such places this animosity manifests itself first among workers because contacts and competition are direct. If, however, the more successful Negroes attempt to move into good residential sections, other classes at once feel and manifest an intensity of race antipathy they had themselves previously thought impossible. We see something very similar in the growth of anti-Semitism in this country. Twenty years ago the rank and file of native Americans in New York City had already developed a good deal of anti-Jewish sentiment, but most of the rest of the country was wholly indifferent. Today there is a vast amount of such sentiment in all large cities of the north and east, while it scarcely exists in rural sections and in the south and west. It grows with the increase in the Jewish population and spreads as they spread. Likewise the anti-Japanese feeling has been intense on the Pacific Coast. The American attitude toward the Chinese is in sharp contrast, for the Chinese have not entered trade and agriculture. Moreover, since the Exclusion Act all fear of their securing a strong foothold has disappeared. It is exactly the same as between nations, France and England were immemorial enemies because they were rivals for the headship of Europe. Recently England felt more and more sharply the rivalry of Germany. Fear, envy and hate between these two countries surpassed all other enmities to such an extent that England became the firm ally of her former enemy, France.

Another indication that race antipathy is dependent on competitive contact is seen in the changes wrought by freedom in the attitude of southern whites toward Negroes. Where a society is divided horizontally into castes or classes and such stratification has been accepted as more or less "natural," two diverse races may live not merely in peace and harmony but even in [Page 412]affection and mutual admiration. The old-fashioned Negro expected, and from force of habit and tradition even wished, to be dominated. He wanted his white folks to be superior and took a certain reflected pride in whatever enhanced the status of his white masters. Even now there is no race friction so long as the Negro "knows his place" according to the status defined for him by white tradition. Any manifestation of ambition or race pride by the colored man is, however, resented. Much the same is true of the attitudes of the native New Englander toward successful and aspiring Jews, Irishmen or French Canadians. This means that the races which have traditionally held positions of social and economic advantage resent any encroachment on their prerogatives. Both their sense of superiority and their feeling of security are disturbed by the active competition and aggressive encroachment of previously inferior stocks. There is thus a sense in which a hard and fast caste system promotes racial harmony and cooperation. But such a society cannot function in a dynamic culture. It is too rigid. Moreover, in the highest sense, it is inefficient and uneconomical, because it unduly represses the talent of the socially inferior classes and gives power and prestige to individuals who are unworthy of them.

In recent years, therefore, there has been a certain intensification of race feeling in this country. The Negro has begun to throw off his apologetic attitude and to assert his rights as a free man under the ideals of democracy. He has rapidly developed a sense of racial solidarity which in turn has elevated in vast numbers of colored people the sense of individual worth and courage to resist oppression, and has produced more and more frequent assertion of the full rights and prerogatives of citizenship.

The problem of race relations in this country is, therefore, by no means simple. Our tradition holds that the individual should be treated on his merits regardless of race. Moreover, there is no basis in fact for the condemnation of an entire race to a status of social inferiority. Many Negroes, millions of them, are superior to the average white in native intelligence, character, [Page 413]industry and potential social worth. At the same time every branch of the white race in this country is determined in the last analysis to preserve the social, economic and political dominance of whites over colored. The result is an enormous amount of injustice, the tragic fate of many gifted Negroes condemned to menial tasks, and the social losses due to friction and failure to fully utilize the abilities born among us. Almost exactly the same kind of problem exists in South Africa, only there the proportion of Negroes is much greater.

It would seem then that race pride is an essential condition of racial vigor and achievement. But it seems also necessarily to create feelings of prejudice or antipathy whenever two distinguishable racial groups are brought into competitive contacts. There is an element of instinct in such attitudes so that they are not easily modified by argument or appeals to reason.

At the same time their form and direction depend on youthful training and the patterns of social life. They are thus, in their objects of attachment and their intensity, products of the social milieu in which they function. The question then arises whether it is not possible to reduce or eradicate feelings of race antipathy so as to realize the ideals of democratic individualism. One cannot be too hopeful. Race pride and prejudice are as old as man and seem to be nearly as deep as life. Certain modern psychologists of the ultra-behaviorist brand claim to be able to shape all the emotions and sentiments of an individual provided they are allowed to begin early enough. But Watson's recent book (Psychological Care of Infant and Child. W. W. Norton and Company, 1928) indicates that he would rear a race of individualistic egotists; and an egotist would be proud of his race even though he was quite certain that it contained no exemplar equal to himself.

I see, historically, only three ways in which the force of race feelings have been mollified. One is by a rigid caste system; but it must be so rigid that every layer not only feels modification impossible, but has been so perfectly adjusted to its status by custom, religion and morals that it believes profoundly in the rightness of the existing arrangement. Such a system is [Page 414]possible only in a static and isolated society and is now no longer possible anywhere in the world. Even in India the caste system is breaking down, and as it does so the problems of internal organization and cooperation are rendered immensely more difficult. Even the despised "Outcasts" are becoming self-conscious and give signs of a sub-racial solidarity which may have momentous consequences for the future.

A second possibility appears when a racial group which at one time is strong and powerful at length loses its capacity for effective competition. The North American Indian is in such a class. We seldom now hear any but soft words for the poor Indian, and seem to be well started on our way toward his idealization as a noble though savage race. This is strangely different from the character given him by our ancestors, who found him wily, treacherous, cruel and blood-thirsty, deceitful and an ally of the devil himself. If perchance the Negro should become an actually diminishing element in the American population through a series of decades, I think we should see a very considerable change in popular sentiments regarding him. Not that he would be admitted to full social equality with approval of his marriage with whites. Opposition to such legal crossing of white and black is too firmly implanted in our social tradition. But he would become an object of pity and compassion to some extent; fear of his competitive power would diminish; treatment of him would become more just and merciful. If he actually disappeared he would become a legend and folklore would magnify his importance in the creation of American culture.

A third possibility lies in the direction of changes in the patterns of social life so as to change rivalry into direct cooperation. This means that rival racial groups must develop a community of interests important enough to throw a decisive material advantage on the side of unity and solidarity as against rivalry and separatism. This happens constantly in business and politics, so far as individuals are concerned. It has happened between tribes and nations, in military alliances, though these are not often enduring. In the processes of nation forming, con- [Page 415]

RACE PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

quered and conquerors long live in a state of tolerant hate, but they usually have found an appreciation of each other's merits after they have united to repel a foreign foe.

None of these methods promises much for the alleviation of the world's present burden of racial antipathies. The context of world relations is constantly shifting. New racial and nationalistic groups rise to power and with them new racial suspicions and fears. The average American is today highly suggestible as regards the Japanese. He may profess a high regard for their efficiency and taste, but he suspects them, readily believes all sorts of tales about them, and could easily be lashed into a fighting hostility toward them. The colored races of the world are now seething with a fresh awakening of racial pride and a new sense of solidarity. There is every prospect that their self-consciousness will continue to grow and that therewith will arise new conflicts of nations, races and classes.

It might seem that the final solution of all such difficulties would be to grant to all races and nationalities full and equal rights regardless of color or traditional status. But we need not expect that this will be done. Nor is there any great gain in constructing false utopias. It seems to be one of the most profound lessons of history that races and nations must achieve a position of equality or of prestige by force or genius. They have what they are able by strength of arms or force of character to acquire and to hold. The strong and privileged, taken as races, classes or nations, seldom, if ever, voluntarily surrender their privileges and advantages. There must be a quid pro quo, if those who are in power are to admit others to an equal status. The Russo-Japanese war resulted in a veritable revolution in racial attitudes, because it was a victory of colored over white. It resulted in a new international status for Japan and a revival of race consciousness throughout Asia and Africa. The Japanese thus achieved position as one of the great powers. She won, or even commanded respect, but she did not thereby annihilate feelings of race antipathy between whites and yellows. Rather she changed attitudes of indifference into attitudes of fear and suspicion. [Page 416]I incline, therefore, to the view that feelings of race pride and prejudice are permanent elements of the human drama. They change their form and vigor with every shift of the scene. A few of us, who take pride in our intellectual breadth, may rid ourselves of their most virulent forms and most silly absurdities. But for the mass of any population they seem likely to remain, playing their ancient roles of elevating the individual sense of worth, strengthening ambition and courage, but nevertheless producing their due quota of injustice, social disharmony and social inefficiency. [Page 417]

THE WISDOM OF THE AGES

Edited by ALFRED W. MARTIN Society for Ethical Culture, New York

The Chief End of Man

UR study of the sacred scriptures of the three great Aryan religions has shown us how differently they answer that Imost vital of ethical questions, the one with which the O® old Presbyterian catechism began,-"What is the chief end of man?" The Upanishads,-the highwater mark of ancient Hindu religio-philosophical thought-make answer: to realize the essential oneness of the finite soul (atman) with the Soul of the universe (Atman), "twam twat asi" (That art Thou), culminating in reunion with Brahma. According to the Pitakas of Buddhism the chief end of man is to attain the enlightenment that points the way to escape from Maya, illusion, and prepare for entrance into Nirvana, that state in which there is no more rebirth. The Avesta of Zoroastrianism answers the question in terms of the age-long struggle between the powers of Light and the powers of Darkness, led by Ahura-Mazda and Angro-Mainyus, respectively. The chief end of man is to be a soldier, fighting on the side of Ahura-Mazda, his Archangels and Angels against Angro-Mainyus, his Archdemons and Demons,--and the weapons to be used are not swords, but ploughshares, not guns, but "good thoughts, good words, good deeds.

Turning, now, to the answer given in the Four Books of Confucianism we have to note that it has nothing whatever in common with the preceding answers. The Presbyterian injunction, [Page 418]"to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," would have been an end altogether too metaphysical and mystical to satisfy Confucius. To stop the process of reincarnation, whether by the Hindu, or by the Buddhistic method, was an end wholly foreign to the order of ideas on which Confucius had been brought up. Zoroaster's answer,—to cooperate with Ahura-Mazda, the primeval good-principle in the struggle for victory over Angro-Mainyur, the source and sustainer of all evil—this, too, was an end altogether alien to the mind of Confucius. Having for his prime and ever-present purpose, the perfecting of the relations that exist between man and man, his answer would have been expressed in terms of that all-absorbing problem. To him the chief end of man was to become a desirable member of society, and the main function of Confucius as a great moral leader lay in pointing the way to the attainment of this end. He directed attention to the word "reciprocity" as that "on which the whole of life may proceed," adding, "What you do not wish done to yourself do not unto others." He enjoined upon each individual, whatever his calling or his position in society, the practice of "the five cardinal virtues": justice, temperance, generosity, humility, propriety (a sense of the fitness of things). He divided the possible relations of man into five groups, attaching to each specific duties and defined "the superior man" as one who recognized these relations and fulfilled the duties of such of the five as came into the realm of his experience. Sovereign and subject, husband and wife, parent and child, older and younger brothers and sisters, friend and friend. As typifying the duties identified with each of these five relations he bade sovereigns be benevolent and subjects loyal, husbands devoted and wives affectionate, parents wise and children obedient, older brothers and sisters considerate of younger and the younger deferential toward the older, friend faithful to friend.

Given the fulfillment of these various duties, scrupulous observance of all the rules which Confucius had prepared for the different departments of life, and there would ensue of necessity, he believed, that regulation of the individual, the family and the [Page 419]

THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF CONFUCIANISM

state which guarantees to the whole nation "the three greatest blessings, material prosperity, learning and virtue." Yea, there would be seen again in society, what glorified the kingdoms of Yao and Shun-a reproduction in human life of the serene, harmonious order visible in the solar system and in the regular operations of Nature. Only through these, Confucius held, does "Heaven" speak. That order in Nature provides man with a pattern of moral conduct. Man, he believed, has no higher lesson to learn than that taught him by Nature, viz., to reproduce in his own personal life and in society an order as calm and unbroken and harmonious as is hers.

As it is written in the Analects: "Strive to accord your dispositions to Nature; so shall you be seeking great happiness. The four seasons pursue their courses and all things are continually being produced in order. Equilibrium is the root from which harmony springs. Harmony is the universal path which all should pursue. Let the states of harmony and equilibrium exist in perfection and a happy order will prevail and all things flourish."

Belief in God

Confucianism is frequently described as "atheistic" but the sacred scriptures of the religion give no warrant for the allegation. It is true that, in expressing himself concerning belief in God, Confucius was exceedingly reserved. He "preferred not to speak" on the subject and seems to have had an innate agnostic attitude toward things supersensible. We read in the Great Learning: "Among the subjects on which the Master did not speak were spiritual beings and miraculous things." Unlike Gotama—who was an atheist in the sense that he "left vacant the place above the finite gods," denying the existence of a supreme permanent Reality (Brahma) and believing that all things and beings exist only in "a state of flux,"—Confucius recognized a Power higher than man and related to man. But knowing nothing of that Power he preferred to be silent on the subject. Plenty of passages there are in his own "Ch'un-ts'iu-King" and in the [Page 420]"Four Books" to prove him a deeply religious man, conscious of dependence on an inscrutable Power. But being inscrutable, Confucius invariably used the cosmic term "Tien" (Heaven) in preference to the anthropomorphic term "Shang-ti" (Highest Lord). It is related that when imprisoned in the city of Ku'ang with a group of disciples and it seemed to them that release would be indefinitely postponed, Confucius reminded them that "Heaven protects the culture" which he and they represent. "What harm can come to those protected by Heaven?" On another occasion, when threatened with assassination and his disciples urged him to flee, the Master said, "Heaven has endowed me with virtues, what have I to fear from oppressors?" On another occasion he said, "Alas! there is no one that knows me." Tsze-Kung said, "What do you mean by thus saying that no one knows you?" He replied, "I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven,—That knows me!"

Such scriptural passages as these make clear the non-atheistical character of the Confucian religion and testify to the essentially deep religious nature of the Founder. And this is substantiated further by what we read in the Shu-King and in the Li-Ki-King with reference to the worship of "spirits" subordinate to "Tien" of "Shang-Ti."

For centuries prior to the birth of Confucius, there obtained in China belief in a hierarchy of Nature Spirits corresponding to the political organization of the country and this belief was carried over from the ancient Chinese religion into Confucianism. Just as the various officials of the empire stand under the emperor, so under the heaven-spirit, highest lord, "Shang-ti," there exist the spirits of the sun, the moon, the stars, the rivers, the forests, etc., together with the ancestral spirits of families, ranked according to the social status of the people. There being such a hierarchy of spirits, it follows that all persons cannot be permitted to worship these spirits indiscriminately. Only the Emperor can worship Heaven. Only governors of provinces can worship the spirits of mountains and rivers. Only magistrates and [Page 421]officials below the governor can worship the minor orders of spirits. The common people can worship only the spirits of their ancestors and are required to do so. Hence in every Confucian home there is a "hall of the ancestors" where tablets are placed bearing the names of the ancestors, father and mother conducting the ceremony. This consists of praises to the spirits of the ancestors and the offering of flowers, followed by a family meal to which the spirits are invited and at which they are represented by one of the bo, s of the family, dressed in his dead grandfather's clothes, to symbolize the presence of the ancestral spirits. The Emperor, no less than the common people, is required to worship the spirits of his ancestors and the supreme semi-annual festival is that in honor of the royal ancestors, conducted by the Emperor himself, assisted by the chief dignitaries of the realm. At the common meal one of the imperial grandsons, duly robed in an ancestral royal gown, represents the spirits of ancestral royalty.

To this "spring and autumn festival" must be added the annual ceremony in commemoration of Confucius, celebrated in the red-walled temple of Confucius at Pekin and conducted (until the end of the old regime) by the Emperor. Before the tablet of the Master he utters the following invocation: "Great art thou, O perfect Sage. Thy virtue is full, thy doctrine complete. Among mortal men there has not been thy equal. All Kings honor thee. Thou art our pattern. Reverently have the sacrificial vessels been set out. Full of awe we sound our drums and bells."

A State-Religion

Thus Confucianism is a state-religion of the most pronounced and thorough-going type, employing civic officials where other religions hire priests and acknowledging in these officials no supernatural power or meditorial functions, but solely that of conducting the commemorative exercises; a religion without theology, church or priesthood; a religion so identified with the national government as on the one hand to have given it its unrivalled, unsurpassed persistence through five thousand years, [Page 422]and on the other hand to have denied it that sense of infinite relations and infinite possibilities without which no religion can ever permanently satisfy.

Immortality

With regard to belief in a future life, Confucianism takes the same agnostic position observed in its attitude to theism. This is strikingly exemplified in the following passage from the Analects.

"Chi-Lu asked about serving the spirits of the dead, and the Master said, 'While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?' The disciple added, 'I venture to ask about death' and he was answered, 'While you do not know life, how can you know about death?'" Still more striking is a conversation with another disciple, recorded in the "Narratives of the School."

"Tsze-Kung asked him, saying, 'Do the dead have knowledge (of our services, that is), or are they without knowledge?' The Master replied, 'If I were to say that the dead have such knowledge, I am afraid that filial sons and dutiful grandsons would injure their substance in paying the last offices to the departed; and if I were to say that the dead have not such knowledge, I am afraid lest unfilial sons should leave their parents unburied. You need not wish, Tsze, to know whether the dead have knowledge or not. There is no present urgency about the point. Hereafter you will know it for yourself." (Legge, Chinese Classics, PP. 95, 99).

But being a practical people, it is not unusual to find Confucianists, when confronted with business or domestic misfortune, or with death, employing Taoist or Buddhist priests to bring their magical auguries to bear on the crisis, or to chant their requiems for the departed, as the case may be. In other words, not being certain of what comes after death, and their own religion providing no ceremonial related to the soul's future welfare, they find it practicable and desirable to resort to religions that make a specialty of securing eternal bliss in the world to come. [Page 423]Commendable as such eclecticism may be, it none the less betrays a fatal defect in the Master’s religion and the probability of a neo-Confucianism rising in China, equal to meeting a spiritual need which no one of the three ruling religions of China supplies to the satisfaction of the best elements of the nation.

As the Hindu Upanishads reveal a religion of the spirit stressing the essential oneness of man’s spirit with the Universal Spirit; as the Buddhist Pitakas unfold a religion of the heart, emphasizing the supreme importance of a self-renouncing love and sympathy for all who remain under the spell of Maya (illusion); as the Zoroastrian Avesta sets forth a religion of the hand, laying stress on work as the chief purifying and saving agency in the conflict between the good and evil principles of the world; so the Confucian Books expound a religion of the head, intellectual mastery of the moral teachings of the Founder being the surest guarantee of an ideal social order. For Confucius firmly believed that if people would but reverently memorize and master these precepts, the intellectual task would so react on the will as to produce the moral life. People, he used to say, are just like water which takes exactly the shape of the dish into which it is poured. Such a dish he saw in his system of rules and if only the people could be, as it were, poured into the dish, the desired moral result would ensue. But alas, between knowing what is right and doing it, there lies love of right and the will to do it. And until the affections and the will are more fully reckoned with and duly trained, the Confucian plan must remain but partially complete. So far did he go in his reliance on rules as to advocate the assuming of certain physical postures expressive of moral qualities—such as humility, reverence, obedience—believing that the very soul of the individual would become informed with these graces of character of which the postures were the external signs.

Whatever degree of value is to be attached to such intellectual and physical self-discipline as Confucius enjoined, it will be conceded that this faith of his in the efficacy of rules and attitudes to achieve the desired moral end, this method of working from the circumference to the center, coupled with the influence [Page 424]of ancestor worship, explains in large measure that age-long arrested development of China to which she has recently awakened and from which she is steadily freeing herself. And yet, after all, the supreme reliance of Confucius, as we have seen, was not on rules alone, nor on rules plus biographies of great souls, but on the power of personal example. This he held superior to every other known reformatory agent. Such having been his conviction, it should be noted further that the lifting power of his example was due, not so much to his exalted character and great learning, as to his striving for an ideal of virtue and of scholarship which he felt he had not yet attained. Others, seeing that striving, were moved to a like endeavor. So is it ever with the truly great teacher. Not his intellectual or moral attainments, but his spiritual passion to possess more of infinite truth and right, this it is that determines his lifting power over other lives. So was it with Confucius. His greatest work of art was not his edition of the "Kings" nor the composition of the "Spring and Autumn Annals"; it was the life in which he practiced the precepts taught in the books. [Page 425]

YOUTH AND THE MODERN WORLD

Edited by ISABELLA VAN METER

"Above and beyond all war and death is our deep yearning for the time when we shall be able to work side by side with the youth of the whole world."

During the crucial years since the European war, the youth of the world has been gathering its force as if for a supreme struggle with the militant, destructive past. Repudiating alike its inheritance of institutions, customs and ideals, the generation now assuming manhood and womanhood in East and West is gradually creating the substance of a different way of life, a new outlook, destined to form a new civilization. Viewed from the ranks of those molded by the past, this manifestation of youth has appeared one of the most tragic, misguided, even sinister of social phenomena, since its triumph must involve the overthrow of so much that mankind has done and been. The statement of youth itself, so far as youth has yet defined its own energies, experiences and directions, will tell a different story. In this department World Unity Magazine will publish from time to time brief articles expressing the outlook of youth, by youth itself, on those vital issues which are recurrent from age to age.

YOUTH AND WORLD PEACE

by JOSEPH B. MATTHEWS Howard University

INTO the promise of newly-dawned manhood, war strikes its most poisonous fangs. The graves of ten million youths, marked for death by reason of their physical fitness, are mute and terrible testimony to this fact. It is youth that gives all when war comes. It is youth that goes through life maimed because reason retreats before passion. It is youth that struggles through life with sub-normal vitality because of under-nourishment when the gluttony of war wastes the fat of the land. It is unborn youth whose economic resources are mortgaged in the madness of war’s destruction.

Such is the answer to the inquiry: Under what auspices was the first World Youth Peace Congress which convened in Holland in August, 1928, held? Some “officialness,” so the implied [Page 426]argument runs, must validate the findings of such a gathering. Youth's sole and sufficient authority for convening the World Youth Peace Congress lay in its peculiar relationship to the institution of war. Governments are absolutely dependent upon youth to man the war-machine. Youth, therefore, has every right to raise its voice in protest against the destructive conflicts of the old order, and to assert its leadership in the movement for universal cooperation.

From its incipiency to the present moment in the continuation work, youth initiative has sponsored the Congress. This expression of youth's deep interest in international harmony should present one of the most enheartening spectacles of a generation that is waiting for the creation of a genuine international mind to give final and effective ratification to its epoch-making treaties for the renunciation of war.

But it was no smooth and easy undertaking which confronted youth on the evening of August 17, 1928, when it arrived at the little camp ground outside the town of Ommen in Holland. Those who came expecting a happy get-together with interesting young people from all over the world were soon disillusioned in part. The Congress was not an hour old before it was apparent to all that difficulties of the most serious nature confronted it. Barriers of language, psychology, political philosophy and economic theory loomed high and forbidding.

The five hundred delegates who participated in the Congress were drawn from thirty-one countries of the World and spoke almost that many languages. It was necessary to have a few "official" languages for the Congress. These were French, German, English, and Esperanto. Not a few of the delegates understood and spoke all four. Needless to say not many such were in the delegation from the United States. Translations consumed much time and but for the amazing efficiency of the young German interpreter the language barrier would have been appalling. The only redeeming feature about the language barrier was that the translations gave time for "heated" delegates to cool off before they got a chance to reply to some provocative utterance [Page 427]

YOUTH AND WORLD PEACE

of the preceding speaker. Forgetting, in their enthusiasm, the necessity for translations a score of delegates who had understood a speech would spring to their feet asking for the floor in order to reply. Thirty minutes later when translations were completed their ardor would be cooled perceptibly.

The psychological barriers were also evident from the beginning. Through differing environments, different national temperaments undoubtedly develop, as do also different class temperaments.

There were delegates drawn from the student class of the United States on the one hand, and delegates drawn from the industrial workers of Europe on the other hand. There were those from comparatively privileged groups who approached all world problems in something of an academic fashion, and then there were others who had served prison sentences for their political theories who were inclined to hurl stinging invectives at all existing institutions. This chasm of experience was bound to reveal itself in marked psychological attitudes. Some drifted lightly into humor, others seemed to look with disdain upon it. Some wanted strict adherence to accepted parliamentary practice, while others demanded the right to speak when they felt like speaking and as long as they were inclined to do so. Some wanted formal resolutions set forth in carefully prepared minutes, while others wished merely the opportunity for expression.

No attempt was made to limit the viewpoints represented in the Congress. The Netherlands and German Governments refused to allow the Communist delegates from the Soviet Union to attend the Congress, but there were individual Communists among the other delegations. The leaders might have excluded all delegates holding extreme views, but in so doing they would have robbed the Congress of reality. If the World Youth Peace Congress was torn by conflicting economic and political philosophies, at times approaching a complete break-down, it was merely reflecting the stern reality of the world situation. Thus it was a gain in reality for the delegates to find themselves face to face with the world as it is. [Page 428]The extreme left wing, made up of sixteen Communist delegates, was at one end of the line of thought. The extreme right wing of conservatism, fewer in number than the Communists, was at the other end. In between these were to be found all the other social, economic, and political "isms" of five continents. The large majority of the center was as far removed from conservatism as it was from the Communist position. It believed that international relations are sorely in need of improvement, and that only thorough-going remedies are likely to prove effective. Of course its proposals rarely satisfied the Communists. Conscious of its numerical strength, this large majority of moderates was sometimes tempted to win hollow victories by majority votes. On the whole it overcame this temptation admirably and gave full opportunity for small minority opinions to get before the Congress. The extreme minorities were also tempted to demand more than their fair share of consideration. This barrier of conflicting views put the delegates' peace technic to a severe test.

When one points to a general absence of the scientific mind among the delegates, he does so with the consciousness that youth shares this deficiency with maturity. This always interferes with the most constructive results. It did at Camp Eerde. The assumption of too many seemed to be that the first step in thinking is to select a label, not to gather all the available data. Labels were everywhere in evidence. Partisanship was frequently dominant. What are you? was the question thrust at one repeatedly with a tone that betrayed the questioner's intention of giving one a quick and easy classification. When this was brought to the attention of the delegates, the criticism was cordially received and the following statement was included in the report of the Commission on Economics:

"It is necessary to approach all proposals of whatever nature with an unbiased mind and with eyes and ears open. The cause of mutual understanding and peace will be furthered when we cease to judge persons and programs by labels alone."

The question of what the Congress accomplished is invariably raised, and rightly so. In answering the question the definite [Page 429]limits under which such a body works must be kept in mind. Obviously it possesses no powers of legislation, and none of its decisions could be considered binding anywhere. Its achievements, if any, must be broadly educational-first for those in actual attendance, and second for those who are later reached by the influences which follow the gathering. In regard to the latter it may be stated briefly that a Continuation-Secretariat with headquarters in Holland is now operating, and also continuation committees in various countries.

The educational value for those who were present is a thing difficult to measure. It varies with individuals, and in any instance eludes adequate description. I suppose the one outstanding impression made upon all was the stupendous nature of the task of winning peace. If any easy-going visionary pacifists came to the Congress, surely none went away from it. There was little talking in the clouds.

Perhaps many of the delegates were shocked into the realization that peace within the economic and social status quo is an idle dream. Delegates from colonial, and especially Oriental, lands impressed this upon the Congress. Justice was articulate! The gravest peril of the peace movement in the West was believed by many to lie in the "freezing of the status quo" through pacts and machinery ostensibly set up for peace purposes. The demand for justice must, at all points, parallel the desire for peace, said youth from China, India, Africa, and Mexico. The machinery for justice must be set going along with any sincere renunciation of war, was a proposition that all came to see with clearness.

Many learned, by the effective method of doing the thing, that world unity may be achieved without first, or ever, having uniformity. The Economics Commission report was drawn up by a committee consisting of an Anarchist, a Socialist, a Communist, a Physiocrat, and one who did not choose to wear a label. Hindus, Muslims, Christians of all varieties, and those who disavowed all religion, worked together for days, considering that ultimate aim of all religion-man's attempt to make the most fruitful adjustment to his total environment. Many of them were [Page 430]conscious of participation in the greatest of all adventures—the productive fellowship of all nations and races.

Many of the most profound experiences of a gathering like the World Youth Peace Congress are not subject to statement on the agenda or to inclusion in the minutes. Outside the formal sessions of the Congress activities were many. In some of these came the high experience of awareness of unity. The camp fires will not soon be forgotten. They are an important institution in the European Youth Movement. They are designedly a spiritual exercise. Several were held during the ten days that the Congress sat. Music, silence, or poetry, according to the prevailing mood of the moment, drew the hundreds of youth together in a truly international comradeship. In those skyward-leaping flames on the heath of northern Holland there was a therapy that healed the bitterness of conflict.

Perhaps the spiritual value for many cannot be better expressed than to quote one of the American delegates who said: "After this, all sight-seeing is anti-climax"—notwithstanding a long-dreamed-of visit to Paris that was to follow the Congress. [Page 431]

THE NEW HUMANITY

"Without edifices or rules or trustees or any argument, The institution of the dear love of comrades."

Edited by MARY SIEGRIST Author of "You that Come After," etc.

FOCH CITES HER

There was glory enough for a saga in just her job. Since honor and trust supreme put her to driving an ambulance at the front. To be privileged to take wounded men back to white rest and quiet; To steer against jolts, to skirt shell holes, and make me make way for her wounded- Glory enough for a saga there! What woman fathered of man could ask life for a deeper, fuller splendor? To cherish and save wounded men, her brothers, Fighting at the wheel for them, carrying them, as if in her arms, Back, far back, to white rest and quiet? What trust in woman could go beyond that? Listen! They set her among the chosen who go down into hell; The immeasurable battle flamed and roared and slew; Such a vastness of destruction for killing such little humans, valiant midget humans! And the blessed woman, the proud woman, the woman a saga should sing, Got her men now from the dreadful first stations, Where the red-wet surgeons moiled and dripped. [Page 432]Listen: She had turned off for her goal in the hidden lane, And now it was only two hundred yards away; She was getting her men safe out from between death’s crunching teeth, When the shell fell: Her machine was but splintered wreckage in the road, and her brothers, Her wounded it was given her to succor, Lay tumbled and twisted with it in their bleeding helplessness. Hit twice she was, too, “serious wounds,” And her men’s need, the cry of life and death, and the hospital two hundred yards away.

She made it. The little khaki-breeched figure crawled it And inched it and wet it with her blood, And before she fainted gasped out the word she lived for— “Get my men!”

Now Foch himself has said, “Give her the Cross of the Legion of Honor.” Not important for such as she, such honors; As must be, the cross goes for many doings, big and less, But Foch himself asked for hers, Foch named her name and deed and said, “Give her the cross of the Legion of Honor.”

“Miss Fraser,” the cable called her, “an English girl.” Oh, yes, we call them all English, but claim her, claim her, Men of the Black Watch, and gay Gordon Highlanders, All ye proud Ladies from Hell, lift up your heads prouder yet, And claim kin with this Fraser; For your Scotland of great memories must grow greater mothering her.

VIOLA ROSEBORO [Page 433]

UNITY AND DISUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Edited by DEXTER PERKINS Department of History and Government, University of Rochester

The Passage of the Cruiser Bill

WITHIN a few weeks of the ratification of the Kellogg treaty the Congress of the United States, by decisive majorities, has sent to the President of the United States a bill calling for the construction of fifteen ten-thousand ton cruisers within the next three years. It has taken this action despite the expressed opposition of Mr. Coolidge to that clause in the bill which sets this brief three-year period as the limit of time during which the new vessels are to be built.

Before attempting to analyze and criticize this action, it may be well to examine the historical background of the whole matter. By the Washington treaties of 1922, treaty limitations were set upon battleships of over 10,000 tons on the basis of an approved ratio for the great powers. This ratio is commonly expressed as the 5-5-3 ratio, indicating parity for the United States and Great Britain, and 60% of American or British strength for Japan. At the same time, France and Italy accepted a figure of 1.75. But in vessels of 10,000 tons and under no limitation was achieved at the Washington conference. The nations were, so far as treaty obligations are concerned, left free to build or not to build as they might choose.

The British government preceded the United States in availing itself of this right. In light cruisers, under 7500 tons, it was already decidedly superior to this country. It began to lay down [Page 434]10,000 ton cruisers in 1924, five such vessels being provided for in that year. Two more ships of this type were laid down in 1925, two more in 1926 and four in 1927.

It was not until the last named year that that portion of American public opinion which is most insistent on a strong navy began to make itself felt in Congress. The increase in British naval force stimulated a demand for a new building program in the United States. The administration tried to deal with the situation through the calling of a second naval conference, which met at Geneva in June of 1927. Unfortunately, from the very outset, the naval technicians dominated the Geneva conference. And the views of the American and the British naval experts were so widely divergent that no agreement could be reached. American proposals for limitation were brought forward and discussed. But while the British were willing to limit the number of large cruisers, they desired a large number of smaller ships, and were reluctant to accept any genuine limitation on this side. The discussions from the beginning had a bad press, and they ended in complete failure.

Out of the failure of this effort at limitation grew the fifteen cruiser program. It was given an added impetus, in all probability, by the so-called Anglo-French agreement of last August which, from the standpoint of American exponents of increased naval power, appeared like an attempt on the part of the British government to secure support for its views on naval armament, in exchange for similar assurances given to France with regard to land forces.

It is important to understand these facts. For however deplorable the cruiser bill may seem to some of us, it gained a good deal of its strength in Congress from the feeling that this country was being outbuilt, and that from the standpoint of prestige and protection of its commercial interests, America ought not to be left in a position of permanent inferiority in relation to Great Britain.

It is needless to say that a strong case could be made out against any such view. That case it is perhaps not worth while [Page 435]

THE PASSAGE OF THE CRUISER BILL

to set forth in detail. But it may be worth while to remark that nothing in the existing diplomatic situation justifies the unseemly haste displayed; nor does the past history of our relations with Great Britain, at least in the last thirty years, indicate that we have needed a navy equal to hers in order to secure recognition for our interests or our desires. Time and again, with inferior material force on the seas, we have gained our ends in diplomatic negotiations with the government at London. It is certainly easy enough to doubt the expediency of the action just taken.

But the bill has been passed. The American people apparently believe that they need a navy as large as any navy in the world. Even in their relations with Great Britain they are, apparently, not willing to trust to reason and moral force. They are still influenced by vague fears and distrusts. They intend no aggression, of course. But they have not the faith to believe that they can defend their national interests effectively without material power in the background.

In this, of course, they are no different from the other peoples of the world. Never, perhaps, in human history, has there been so great a yearning for peace. But the institutions on which peace depends, upon which reliance can be placed to preserve peace, are, at the most, in the making. And if the analogy of the development of national states has any meaning, it is only when those institutions have been developed that peace will really be secure, and men will throw away their arms.

In a sense, then, the passage of the cruiser bill sharply underlines the limitations of the Kellogg treaty. That treaty may indeed mark a great advance. But apparently even the American people, who have sponsored it and supported it, do not really believe in it who '-heartedly. They are not willing to trust to a promise to keep he peace, even to the promise of that nation with which they e most closely allied in blood.

We must go further than this, it now appears, if we hope to deal at all effectively with the whole problem of armaments. The peace pact of 1929 has obviously not contributed very effectively to the solution of this great question. [Page 436]At the same time, it would be very unwise to view the cruiser bill from too pessimistic an angle. While it was under debate in the Congress, the prediction was freely made by its opponents that it would inaugurate an unfortunate era of naval competition between Great Britain and the United States. It was pointed out that the rivalry of England and Germany began with much the same professions 'efensive purpose and with much the same disclaimers of na competition that have been so common today. The decision of the British government to build two more cruisers, a decision arrived at after the passage of the American naval bill, and after much division in the British cabinet, seems to some persons additional evidence of the danger of a race in armaments.

Now it is possible that the American cruiser program will lead to an enlargement of the British building program in large cruisers. The bill just passed will put this country ahead of Britain in vessels of 7500-10,000 tons. But it is not at all likely that the British will seek to go beyond us. Sir Austen Chamberlain recently declared that his government cheerfully recognized the pretensions of the United States to parity. The British, in other words, are not going to try to seek to outdistance the United States in large cruisers. And there is very little reason to believe that the United States will seek further to outdistance Great Britain. The measure just enacted owed much of its strength to the feeling that this country should have a fighting navy equal to that of England. There would not be a handful of votes found in either house of Congress for a program that was a frank attempt to outbuild England. If it has not been possible to prevent the enactment of the cruiser bill there is no reason for doubting that it would be entirely possible to prevent any further increase which might carry with it the danger of a genuine competition.

It may be taken as very probable that the British government will not provoke a quarrel with the United States on the naval issue. There is always a considerable body of British opinion that is pronouncedly friendly to this country; but aside [Page 437]

THE PASSAGE OF THE CRUISER BILL

from this body of opinion the clearest motives of expediency warn British statesmen from a policy of hostility to this country. Such a policy would strain the bonds of the British Empire to the breaking-point; it would be the most dangerous and reckless upon which a British government could possibly embark. Not the most unimaginative and Tory of governments would be likely to chart out so perilous a course.

Nor could anything be more disastrous to British finance than to enter into a naval race with the United States. The economic resources of this country are so superior to those of Great Britain that the final result could hardly be in doubt. The American people have shown what may be regarded as an unreasonable desire for parity with the British; but reasonable or unreasonable it is a desire which is not likely to be challenged.

It is not, perhaps, wholly a bad thing that after the roseate visions of the Kellogg treaty, the cruiser bill should arise to challenge the zeal, the intelligence and the tenacity of the friends of international peace. When the peace pact went through the Senate by so overwhelming a vote, it carried with it the temptation to overestimate its practical consequences. But it now appears starkly clear that one victory is by no means enough; that the great cause of international concord is not to be won in any single engagement; and that much remains to be done to substitute a new order for the old. If this fact can be clearly apprehended, if it is seen more definitely than ever before that the creation of a truly international society is still before us, challenging to new efforts, the passage of the fifteen cruiser bill may not be the unqualified misfortune that it seems to some of those who sought to prevent it from becoming law. [Page 438]

WORLD UNITY CONFERENCES

Under the Auspices of World Unity Foundation

The World Unity Conferences are a medium by which responsible leaders of opinion can convey their message to the public without restriction of race, class, nationality or creed. Upholding the ideals of brotherhood found in all religious and ethical teachings, the Conferences strive to quicken the spiritual resources of the community by bringing upon one platform gifted speakers representing the universal outlook and capable of interpreting the meanings of the new age. World Unity Conferences are held at frequent intervals in cities of the United States and Canada, and this educational activity will be extended as soon as possible to Europe. A distinctive feature of the Conferences consists in the local World Unity Councils, composed of leading liberals, established in the various cities to further the world unity ideal. This department will publish the programs and report the activities of the World Unity Conferences and Councils.

Meetings Held at Detroit, Michigan February 5, 6 and 7, 1929

Under the Auspices of the Detroit World Unity Council

Two public World Unity Conferences were held at Detroit, preceded by an informal conference for discussion at First Universalist Church. Dr. Frank D. Adams, minister of the Church, presided, and the discussion was led by Dr. John Herman Randall, Director of World Unity Foundation. Both public Conferences were held in the Auditorium of The College of the City of Detroit. On February 6, Rabbi Leo Fram of Temple Beth El served as chairman. Following a Statement of Purpose by Dr. Randall, Mr. James Schermerhorn, founder and publisher of Detroit Times, spoke on "The Broken Windows of the Press"; and an address, "The Opportunity of World Unity in an Age of Revolt," was delivered by Rev. Allen Knight Chalmers, First Presbyterian Church, Buffalo.

The chairman on February 7 was Judge Iva W. Jayne. An address, "The Unity of the Americas," was given by Dr. Jesse S. Reeves, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. "The Birth of a World and Its Implications for the Twentieth Century," by Dr. Randall, concluded the Conferences.

Addresses on world unity were also delivered at Detroit by Dr. Randall before the following groups and organizations: International Club, Y. M. C. A., St. Stephens A. M. E. Church, First Universalist Church, Men's Club of First Congregational Church, Y. M. C. A., (Central Branch), Adult Class of Woodward Avenue Baptist Church, Second Baptist Church, Tabernacle Baptists Church, City Club, (Detroit Teacher College, Y. M. C. A., Fellowcraft Club), School Assembly of Jewish [Page 439]

WORLD UNITY CONFERENCES

Temple, Kiwanis Club, Sorourness Club, Detroit University School, Book League of Public Library, Northwest Kiwanis Club, Liggett Girls School, The College of the City of Detroit, Highland Park Kiwanis Club, Highland Park Junior High School, Highland Park High School, Special Teachers of Detroit, Ecorse High School, Lincoln Park Junior College, Lincoln Park High School, Detroit Laymen's Club, Detroit Business University, Bahá’í Assembly.

Detroit World Unity Council

Chairman, Dr. Frank D. Adams, Pres. Nat. Universalist Council; Rt. Rev. Herman Page, Bishop of Mich.; Rabbi Leo M. Franklin, Temple Beth El; Dr. Frank Cody, Supt. of Schools of Detroit; Mrs. Carl B. Chamberlin, Pres. Det. Fed. Women's Clubs; Dr. W. L. Coffee, Dean Col. City of Detroit; Mr. Ralph C. McAfee, Ex-Sec. Fed. Churches; Adam Strohm, Public Library; Mr. James Schermerhorn, Founder and Publisher, Detroit Times; Mrs. G. T. Hendrie, Ch. Mich. W. I. L. P. and Ex-Pres. Wom. Century Club; Dr. Augustus P. Reccord, First Unitarian Church; Mrs. Wm. Alvord, Gen'l. Sec. International Inst.; Dr. Morton Pearson, Supt. Presby. Extension Bd.; Mr. John Dancy, Detroit Urban League; Mrs. Eric Leyton Gates, Gen'l. Sec. Y. W. C. A.; Dr. Chester B. Emerson, No. Woodward Cong.; Mr. Lee M. Terrill, Ex-Sec. Y. M. C. A.; Mrs. H. W. Dunklee, Bahá’í Assembly; Mr. T. W. Wing, Quaker Group; Mrs. Charles M. Novac, Ch. Bd. of Managers of International Institute; Mrs. Philamine Altman, Ch. Ways and Means W. I. L., Business and Professional Women's Club; Mr. Robert L. Davis, Ex-Sec. and V. P. of Cornell Univ. Assn. of Mich.

Meetings Held at Washington, D. C. February 26, 27 and 28, 1929

The meetings in Washington followed the same form as the Detroit Conferences-an Informal Conference with discussion, and two public sessions with addresses. All were held at First Congregational Church, Dr. Jason Noble Pierce, minister. Dr. Cloyd H. Marvin, President of George Washington University, presided at the Informal Conference held on February 26, with Dr. John Herman Randall, Director of Vorld Unity Foundation, leading the discussion. The chairman at the first of the two public Conferences was Dr. William S. Abernathy, of Calvary Baptist Church. A statement of the purpose of the Conferences was made by Dr. Randall. Mr. Alfred W. Martin, of the Society for Ethical Culture, New York, delivered an address on "The New Internationalism," followed by an address, "Highway or Barrier," by Rabbi Abram Simon, of Washington Hebrew Congregation. The program on February 28 included Dr. Jason Noble Pierce, chairman, an address, "World Unity-the Strategic Opportunity of the United States," by Dr. Mordecai W. Johnson, president of Howard University, and "The Birth of a World and Its Implications for the Twentieth Century," by Dr. Randall. [Page 440]

NOTES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

The shock of the European War inevitably made internationalism the crucial issue for mankind. Until a world commonwealth has been established, every local issue must continue to be unduly influenced by the ever-present danger of the larger, overwhelming disaster. The last word, however, has by no means been said on nationalism in its true sense.

The assertion can be justified that world peace even today depends less upon the League of Nations, or even upon the Paris Pact, than upon the domestic condition in the United States. No peace plan failing to obtain the whole-hearted and understanding support of the American people has more than paper value. The destiny of that people, then, as the largest and most influential politically and morally homogenous portion of humanity, deserves first concern. As the problems of industry, religion and race are solved, or unsolved, in America, so goes the immediate future of the world.

Of these problems, it may be that the problem of inter-racial amity offers America the greatest challenge. Nowhere else is there such contrast of racial experience and status, casting such a dark shadow upon otherwise brilliant social conditions. Nowhere else, consequently, are there such potent agencies for either the spirit of fellowship and concord to effect true progress, or for the spirit of prejudice and hate to produce far-reaching catastrophe.

For this reason, the question raised by Mr. Pandit in this issue: whether the United States has made racial prejudice a matter of public policy, goes to the root of the larger question—can humanity find the way to world peace? For the same reason, the scientific study on Racial Relationships by Prof. Hankins has fundamental importance in the evolution of World Unity Magazine.

Once more it is our privilege to call the attention of readers to the program of summer lectures announced by the Institute of World Unity. It would be difficult to bring together four lecturers, or four subjects, possessing greater interest and value than those offered on the third annual program of the Institute.

World Unity extends hearty greeting and sincere congratulations to a new publication arisen to serve the cause of human brotherhood—Calamus, a Quarterly published as the organ of the Threefold Movement, League of Neighbors, Union of East and West, and Fellowship of Faiths. Calamus is edited by Will Hayes, at 12 Palmer Street, Westminster, London, S. W. 1, England. Annual subscription for the U. S., $1.50. [Page 441]

INDEX

WORLD UNITY MAGAZINE Volume 3, October, 1928-March, 1929

ANGELL, NORMAN, by John Mez, 96 BOOKS RECEIVED, 74, 179 BOOK REVIEWS, by John Herman Randall, Jr., 67, 132, 201, 274, 347 BUDDHISM, SACRED SCRIPTURES OF, by Alfred W. Martin, 53 CHINA, WHAT CHINA HAS TO OFFER US, by Richard Wilhelm, 78 CIVILIZATION, by Alfred Zimmern, 286 CIVILIZATION, MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL, by Hu Shih, 146 CONFUCIANISM, THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF, by Alfred W. Martin, 257, 320, 417 CREATIVE THINKING, editorial, 287 DEMOCRACY IN HISTORY, by John Herman Randall, 221 DE CONSTANT, D'ESTOURNELLES, by Paul D'Estournelles de Constant, 126 EDUCATION, THE NEED OF A SPIRITUAL ELEMENT IN, by Rufus M. Jones, Pierre Bovet, Hugh Moran, and Charles Parker Connolly, 16 EDUCATION AND RELIGION, by John Herman Randall, 5 EDDY PILGRIMAGES, Tax, by Chester C. Platt, 187 HUMANITY, THE NEw, ed. by Mary Siegrist, 63, 191, 265, 343. 43* INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, THE INSTITUTE OF, by Archie M. Palmer, 167 INTERNATIONAL MIND, WANTED-AN INTERNATIONAL MIND IN AMERICA, editorial, 147 MOREL, EDMOND DENE, by H. M. Swanwick, 399 NATURALIZATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, by S. G. Pandit, 369 NOTES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS, 75, 142, 213, 283, 359, 440 ONE AND THE MANY, THE, by Abba Hillel Silver, 81 PAN AMERICANISM, by Herbert Adams Gibbons, 218 PEACE-VOLUNTARY OR IMPOSED? editorial, 219

Titles

PEACE CONFERENCE, THE GENEVA PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE UNIVERSAL PEACE CONFERENCE, 252 PENWITH, LORD COURTNEY OF, by H. M. Swanwick, 181 POEMS: BEATITUDES FROM A BUDDHIST HERMIT, by William Norman Guthrie, 64; "SCUM o' THE EARTH," by Robert Haven Schauffler, 192; SIMON THE CYRENIAN SPEAKS, by Countee Cullen, 195; PRAYER AFTER THE WORLD WAR, by Carl Sandburg, 266; SOULS, by Fannie Stearns Davis, 266; THE DREAMER, by Vachel Lindsay, 267; A MIOHTIER THAN MAMMON, by Edward Carpenter, 268; BLACK MEN, by Lucia Trent, 344; I THINK OF HIM AS ONE WHO FIGHTS, by Anna Hempstead Branch, 344; O TENDER HEART, by Edward Carpenter, 345; Fock Cras Ha, by Viola Roseboro, 431 PROGRESS BY TELIC GUIDANCE, by Mary Hull, 37, 102, 152, 233 PROGRESS, LEAGUE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF, by R. Broda, 301 RACE AND CIVILIZATION, by George A. Dorsey, 366 RACIAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD UNITY, by Frank H. Hankins, 89 RACIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONY, by Frank H. Hankins, 311, 404 SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, by Edwin Arthur Burtt, 382 SOCIETY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF, by F. S. Marvin, 332 STUDENTS, COMMITTEE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS, 397 TIDE, THE RISING, ed. by John Herman Randall, Jr., 67, 132, 208, 274, 347 UNITY AND DISUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ed. by Dexter Perkins, 128, 196, 269, 327. 433 UNIVERSITY CITY OF PARIS, THE, by Lucia Ames Mead, 123 [Page 442]VERESTSHAOIN, BASIL B., by Henry Lanx, 305 WAR AND REVOLUTION, War, by Herbert Adol- phus Miller, 149 WAR DEBTS, THE TREASURY REPORTS ON THE by A Revisionist, 289 WASTE PLACES, by C. F. Ansley, 169 WISDOM OF THE AOss, Tas, ed. by Alfred W. Martin, 53, 115, 174, 257, 320, 417 WORLD AFFAIRS, THE NATURE OF, editorial, 367 WORLD COMMONWEALTH, ELEMENTS Ov, edi- torial, 3, 79 WORLD UNITY, APOSTLES OF, 96, 182, 216, 305, 399 WORLD UNITY, THE WILL TO, by Herber Adams Gibbons, 2 WORLD UNITY CONFERENCE, 140, 110, 1, 357.438 WORLD WE LIVE I, TB, 113, 167, 152, 301, 397 YOUTH AND WORLD PRACE, by Joseph 1 Matthews, 425 YOUTH AND THE MODERN WORLD, ed. by le bella Van Meter, 337. 435 YOUTH MOVEMENT, THE MEANING OF THE, b Isabella Van Meter, 337 ZOROASTRIANISM, SACRED SCRIPTURES OF, by Alfred W. Martin, 115, 174

Authors

ANSLEY, C. F., Waste Places, 169 BOVET, PIERRE, The Need of a Spiritual Ele- ment in Education, 16 BRODA, R., League for the Organization of Progress, 301 BURTT, EDWIN ARTHUR, Science, Philosophy and Religion, 382 CONNOLLY, CHARLES PARKER, The Need of a Spiritual Element in Education, 16 DE CONSTANT, PAUL D'ESTOURNELLES, D'ES- cournelles de Constant, 116 DORSET, GEORGE A., Race and Civilization, 366 GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS, The Will to World Unity, 1; Pan Americanism, 118 HANKINS, FRANK H., Racial Differences and World Unity, 89; Racial Relationships and International Harmony, 311, 404 HULL, MARY, Progress by Telic Guidance, 37, 102, 152, 233 JONES, RUFUS M., The Need of a Spiritual Ele- ment in Education, 16 LANZ, HENRY, Basil B. Verestshagin, 305 MARTIN, ALFRED W., Wisdom of the Ages, 53, 115, 174, 257, 320, 417 MARVIN, F. S., The Transformation of Society, 332 MATTHEWS, JOSEPH B., Youth and World Peace, 425 MEAD, LUCIA AMES, The University City of Paris, 123 Maz, Jonx, Norman Angell, 96 MILLER, HERBERT ADOLPHUS, Why War and Revolution? 149 MORAN, HUow, The Need of a Spiritual Ele ment in Education, 16 PALMER, ARCHIE M., The Institute of Interne tional Education, 167 PANDIT, S. G., The Naturalization Law of the United States, 369 PERKINS, DEXTER, Unity and Disunity in la ternational Politics, 128, 196, 269, 327, 433 PLATE, CHESTER M., The Eddy Pilgrimages, 187 RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, Education and Re ligion, 5; Democracy in History, 221 RANDALL, JR., JOHN HERMAN, The Rising Tide, 67, 132, 201, 17.347 REVISIONIST, The Treasury Reports on the War Debts, 189 SHIN, Hu, Material and Spiritual Civilization, 146 SIBORIST, MART, The New Humanity, 63, 191, 265, 343.43% SILVER, ABBA HILLE, The One and the Many, 81 SWANWICK, H. M., Lord Courtney of Penwith, 182; Edmond Dene Morel, 399 VAN METER, ISABELLA, The Meaning of the Youth Movement, 337; Youth and the Mod- ern World, 337, 425 WILHELM, RICHARD, What China Has to Offer Us, 78 ZIMMERN, ALFRED, Civilization, 186 [Page 443]

Keeping Step With The Student Movement

REFLECTING STUDENT LIFE-its problems, its ideals, its scientific attitude, its perplexities.

AND LEADING IT-not content to be a mirror only but standing before the majority for the conviction of the minority.

Keep in touch THE INTERCOLLEGIAN $1.35 per year for each subscription, or $1.00 each in lots of Sve or more.

"Student Opinion at its Best"

THE INTERCOLLEGIAN, 347 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. I want to know what students are thinking about. Enclosed is $for which send......subscriptions to Name .Address

ASK ME ANOTHER

QUESTIONS: Is Youth Communistic? Radical? Conservative? Informed? Pacifistic? Religious? Conventional? Hopeful? Idealistic? Practical?

ANSWER: You will find the answer in "YOUTH LOOKS AT WORLD PEACE" A Story of The First World Youth Peace Congress (Holland, 1928) by Joseph B. Matthews

CONTENTS

I. THE BIRTH OF THE IDEA. II. THE CONGRESS CONVENES AT EERDE III. YOUTH DISCOVERS SOME OBSTACLES TO PEACE. IV. YOUTH EXAMINES THE ECONOMIC ORDER. V. YOUTH LOOKS AT EXISTING PEACE MACHINERY. VI. YOUTH FACES THE BARRIERS OF RACE. VII. YOUTH CHALLENGES MAJORITY DOMINATION. VIII. YOUTH TURNS TO EDUCATION. IX. YOUTH WEIGHS RELIGION IN THE BALANCE. X. EVALUATION: AN INTERNATIONAL YOUTH SYMPOSIUM. APPENDIX: List of American Delegates, etc.

100 pages; photographs; limited edition Price, One Dollar, Postpaid

Order at once from: American Committee W. Y. P. C., 2813 13th St., N. W., Washington, D. C. [Page 444]

PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION

The Magazine of Liberal Thought for Teachers, Principals, Parents

Stimulating articles on newer methods. Reports on new experiments in education. Answers to problems of the school and home hooking articles on tenden of the day. News of important school activities. reviews of the t books. Illustrations of school activities and creative work by children.

The April Issue— EDUCATION, AN ACTIVE PROCESS Seventy-five cents per copy

ARE YOU A SUBSCRIBING-MEMBER? Three Dellers will bring you the magazine for year, any two reprints of former es, estive membership in the association, and a fund of mutual service you cannot do without. May we count you with us?

INSTITUTE OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION State College, Pennsylvania July 1-19, 1939 Send for Circular

WRITE DEPARTMENT P PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 10 Jackson Place Washington, D. C.

God builds no churches; by his plan that labor has bem left to man

Church Leadership

A Journal for Laymen Who Lead

Church Leadership is a magazine with a single purpose. It proposes to act as an idea exchange for the lay workers—men and women—who bear the burdens of the voluntary groups in our churches. Articles which have appeared include

Status of Women as Laymen Petit Larceny in the Church Kitchen A Guide for Ushers The Committee Way of Action How to Pick a Pastor Musical Setting for an Art Night Service

A free sample copy will be sent upon request.

Address Church Leadership 626 Huron Road Cleveland, Ohio